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4. CONFERENCE FORMAT.

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INFO LOG-00 CEQ-01 CIAE-00 CFE-00 C-01 DODE-00 DOEE-00
EB-00 EUR-00 H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 IO-19 L-00
ADS-00 NRC-03 NRRC-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OES-09 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SB-00 SDEL-00
SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-01 USIE-00 TSKY-01
EPAE-00 /871R

MAYORSKI OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE DEPOSITARIES HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT THE 1995 CONFERENCE SHOULD REVIEW THE NPT, AS WELL AS EXTEND IT. THIS RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT THE TITLE OF THE CONFERENCE -- SHOULD IT SIMPLY REFER TO THE NPT OR REFLECT THE FACT THAT THIS WAS A REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE. MAYORSKI NOTED THAT THE DECISION ADOPTED BY THE 1991 UNGA ON THE 1995 CONFERENCE WAS TITLED SIMPLY "TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: 1995 CONFERENCE AND ITS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE." GORDON UNDERSCORED THE US VIEW THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE WAS THE EXTENSION OF THE NPT. THIS IS THE ONLY CONFERENCE THAT IS REQUIRED BY THE TREATY IN 1995. WHILE A REVIEW WILL PROBABLY OCCUR, THE TREATY DOES NOT REQUIRE IT. DONNELLY REPORTED THAT IN HIS CONSULTATIONS WITH A FEW OTHER NPT PARTIES, SOME HAD ARGUED FOR A SEPARATE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN 1995. ALL DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE TO HAVE ONLY ONE CONFERENCE AND THAT THE 1995 CONFERENCE SHORT TITLE WAS PREFERABLE.

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/NP/INA: SBURK: E23 (NPT/DOC#1565)
APPROVED BY: ACDA/NP: BGDORDON
OES/NTS: CSTOIBER DOE/ORG: DDONNELLY S/NP: RKENNEDY
EUR/ISCA: JGARRISON (INFO)

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P R 041833Z AUG 92
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USVIENNA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USMISSION GENEVA

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USVIENNA FOR UNVIE, GENEVA FOR CD DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: PARM, KNNP, NPT
SUBJECT: NPT DEPOSITARIES MEETING

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY HOSTED A DAY AND A HALF LONG MEETING OF THE NPT DEPOSITARIES (US, UK AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION) IN MOSCOW OVER JULY 13-14 TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES RELATED TO THE 1995 NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCE AND ITS PREPARATORY MEETINGS. PREVIOUS DEPOSITARIES MEETINGS OVER THE PAST YEAR HAD ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES INCLUDING THE NATURE OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE (EXTENSION WITH A REVIEW ELEMENT), ITS VENUE (NEW YORK) AND DURATION (THREE TO FOUR WEEKS), AND THE NUMBER OF PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) MEETINGS THAT SHOULD PRECEDE THE CONFERENCE. DEPOSITARIES USEFULLY EXPLORED QUESTIONS OF CONFERENCE FINANCING, IN VIEW OF TIGHT FINANCIAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA AND ADHERENCE OF A NUMBER OF NEW PARTIES; ORGANIZATION AND PROGRAM OF WORK FOR THE PREPCOMS; AND OTHER INITIATIVES THAT MIGHT BE PURSUED AT THE 1995 CONFERENCE. ALL AGREED THAT THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT WAS THE PREFERABLE OUTCOME. DEPOSITARIES AGREED TO MEET NEXT ON THE MARGINS OF THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

3. ON JULY 13-14 IN MOSCOW, THE RUSSIAN MFA HOSTED A MEETING OF THE NPT DEPOSITARIES (US, UK, AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION) TO DISCUSS OBJECTIVES OF AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1995 CONFERENCE TO EXTEND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT). DELEGATIONS WERE HEADED BY BORIS MAYORSKI, RF MFA; BRAD GORDON, ASSISTANT

DIRECTOR, ACDA; AND BRIAN DONNELLY, UK FCO. COMPLETE DELEGATION LISTS ARE CONTAINED IN PARA. 2B. A SERIES OF MEETINGS AMONG THE DEPOSITARIES OVER THE PAST YEAR HAD LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR DISCUSSIONS THAT WERE FRIENDLY, FRANK AND CONSTRUCTIVE. THIS REPORT DISCUSSES THE VARIOUS ITEMS AS THEY WERE COVERED UNDER THE RUSSIAN-DRAFTED AGENDA.

5. UNGA RESOLUTION ON THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE

UK REP DONNELLY OFFERED A MINIMALIST DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE DEPOSITARIES WHICH NOTES THE DECISION OF THE PARTIES TO ESTABLISH A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (PREPCOM) AND REQUESTS THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CONFERENCE AND THE PREPCOM. ALL AGREED THAT IT WAS

LIKELY THAT EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE BY THE MEXICANS AND PERHAPS OTHERS TO ADD TO THE TEXT. THE SPARENESS OF THE UK DRAFT LEFT ROOM FOR ACCEPTABLE ADDITIONS SUCH AS LANGUAGE INDICATING THAT THE 1995 CONFERENCE ALSO WOULD REVIEW THE TREATY. ALL AGREED THAT PERU COULD BE EXPECTED TO CHAIR THE CAUCUS OF NPT PARTIES ON THE MARGINS OF THE UNGA TO ESTABLISH THE PREPCOM. MAYORSKI ARGUED FOR CIRCULATING THE UK DRAFT RESOLUTION SOON TO GET THE FIRST DRAFT ON THE TABLE. DONNELLY AGREED THAT THE UK WOULD CIRCULATE IT IN GENEVA IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS. WITHIN THE NEXT MONTH, THE UK WILL TAKE STEPS TO HAVE THE DRAFT HANDED OUT IN ALL NPT CAPITALS.

6. PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

THE DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HAVE ONLY THREE PREPCOM MEETINGS. IF A STRONG DESIRE FOR ADDITIONAL PREPCOMS EMERGED, FOUR PREPCOMS, BUT OF A SHORTER DURATION, MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. MAYORSKI ASKED THE OTHER REPS THEIR VIEWS ON ENGAGING THE FIRST PREPCOM MEETING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS OF THE TREATY'S EXTENSION. SUCH A SUBSTANTIVE PREPCOM, IN HIS

VIEW, WOULD HELP TO FOSTER THE VIEW THAT THIS IS A VERY SERIOUS CONFERENCE. IT ALSO COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DELEGATIONS TO SET OUT THEIR VIEWS IN GENERAL STATEMENTS. GORDON RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE INADVISABLE TO ENGAGE THE PREPCOM EARLY ON ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE. RATHER, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES THAT WOULD BE UNIQUE TO THE 1995 CONFERENCE THAT WOULD NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE PREPCOM. DONNELLY NOTED THAT PAST RULES FOR NPT REVIEW CONFERENCES HAD BEEN PRETTY GOOD IN TERMS OF PROVIDING MEANS FOR HANDLING MOTIONS AND AMENDMENTS. THE UNGA RULES MIGHT ALSO PROVIDE SOME GUIDANCE. GORDON SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD BEGUN TO LOOK INTO THE CHANGES NEEDED IN EXISTING REVIEW CONFERENCE RULES OF PROCEDURE TO ACCOMPLISH THE

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EXTENSION DECISION. HE AGREED TO TRY TO HAVE DRAFT
RULES FOR THE 1995 CONFERENCE READY FOR DISCUSSION BY
THE DEPOSITARIES AT THEIR NEXT MEETING IN SEPTEMBER.
BEFORE THE DEPOSITARIES ASK THE UN SECRETARIAT TO DRAFT
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE 1995 CONFERENCE, THEY SHOULD
HAVE THEIR OWN VIEWS ON SUCH RULES. GORDON ALSO
SUGGESTED THAT THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES EXAMINE THE
MEXICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION FROM 1991 AS A GUIDE TO WHAT
THEY MIGHT EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER AT THE UPCOMING NPT
CAUCUS.

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DONNELLY AND GORDON WELCOMED MAYORSKI'S SUGGESTION.

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7. TIMING AND VENUE OF PREPCOMS

THE 1991 NPT CAUCUS DECIDED THAT THE FIRST PREPCOM WOULD
BE HELD IN NEW YORK DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1993. THE
DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT THE EXACT SCHEDULING OF THIS
PREPCOM WOULD DEPEND ON THE AVAILABILITY OF CONFERENCE

SPACE. DONNELLY COMMITTED THE UK TO QUERY DEREK
BOOTHBY, UK NATIONAL ON THE STAFF OF THE UN DEPARTMENT
OF DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, ON THIS POINT. UNDER A THREE
PREPCOM ARRANGEMENT IT WAS AGREED THAT THE SECOND ONE
COULD BE HELD IN FEB/MAR 1994 AND THE THIRD IN LATE FALL
1994. GORDON INDICATED THAT THE U.S. COULD AGREE TO
HOLD THE OTHER PREPCOMS IN GENEVA BUT THIS WAS SOMETHING
THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NEED TO DECIDE. MAYORSKI MADE A
STRONG PUSH FOR VIENNA AS A PREPCOM SITE ON THE GROUNDS
OF THE IAEA'S ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE NPT UNDER
ARTICLES III AND IV. THE US SIDE RESPONDED THAT
CONFERENCE COSTS AND INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION WERE
STRONG ARGUMENTS AGAINST VIENNA. MAYORSKI SAID THAT IT
WOULD BE NECESSARY TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE IAEA OR THE
AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE SOME
SUPPORT IF THE PREPCOM WERE HELD IN VIENNA. HE URGED
THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES TO KEEP OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF
VIENNA. GORDON AGAIN DISCOURAGED THE IDEA. DONNELLY
SAID THAT THE UK COULD ACCEPT HOLDING ALL THE PREPCOMS
IN NEW YORK. HE NOTED, MOREOVER, THAT THE UK REP TO THE
1991 NPT CAUCUS HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT AN UNDERSTANDING
TO THIS EFFECT HAD BEEN REACHED DURING THAT CAUCUS.
GORDON SAID THAT THE US HAD NEVER AGREED TO THIS.

8. PREPCOM CHAIRMANSHIP AND SECRETARIAT

ALL AGREED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE SIMPLEST TO RELY ON
CURRENT GEOGRAPHIC GROUPS (EAST WEST AND
NEUTRAL/NONALIGNED) IN DETERMINING PREPCOM CHAIRMANSHIPS
AND OTHER CONFERENCE LEADERSHIP POSITIONS (THE QUESTION
OF CONFERENCE PRESIDENCY WAS NOT SUBSUMED UNDER THIS

DISCUSSION.) THIS CAN BE REASSESSED IF NECESSARY.
MAYORSKI SUGGESTED THAT PAST PRECEDENT BE FOLLOWED WITH
RESPECT TO ASSIGNING PREPCOM CHAIRMANSHIPS, I.E., THE
WEST SHOULD PLAN TO PROVIDE THE CHAIRMAN FOR THE FIRST
PREPCOM. GORDON AND DONNELLY INDICATED THAT THERE WAS
NO WESTERN CANDIDATE AT THIS TIME. NO OTHER REGIONAL
CANDIDATES FOR PREPCOM CHAIRMANSHIPS WERE DISCUSSED.
WITH RESPECT TO THE STAFFING OF THE PREPCOM AND
CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT, DONNELLY CONFIRMED THAT DEREK
BOOTHBY WAS INTERESTED IN SUPPORTING THE SECRETARIAT FOR
THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE. MAYORSKI RESPONDED THAT
BOOTHBY WAS CLEARLY THE BEST CANDIDATE AND IT SHOULD GO
WITHOUT SAYING THAT HE WOULD SERVE AS THE SECRETARY OF
THE PREPCOM. IF THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT HE

WOULD BE A DESIRABLE CANDIDATE FOR SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE CONFERENCE ITSELF, THE RF WOULD UNDERTAKE TO TALK TO
USYG PETROVSKY ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING BOOTHBY
NAMED AS SECRETARY OF THE PREPCOM, WITH THE AIM OF
MAKING HIM SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE.

9. CONTENTS OF PREPARATORY WORK

A. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION: MAYORSKI CHARACTERIZED AS
USELESS THE BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS TRADITIONALLY PREPARED
FOR NPT REVCONS. ALL AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS
ADVISABLE TO LET SUCH PAPERS BE PREPARED AGAIN FOR
1995. DONNELLY ASKED WHETHER THE DEPOSITARIES SHOULD
PROPOSE OTHER PAPERS BE PREPARED, OR SHOULD PRODUCE
THEIR OWN PAPERS ON TOPICS SUCH AS PROGRESS UNDER

ARTICLE VI, OPTIONS FOR EXTENSION, AND SETTING OUT THE
CASE FOR THE TREATY AS A WHOLE. MAYORSKI THOUGHT A
SINGLE DEPOSITARIES PAPER ON ARTICLE VI WOULD BE USEFUL
AND ASKED THE OTHERS TO GIVE SERIOUS THOUGHT TO
PRODUCING SUCH A PAPER. GORDON SAID THAT AT THIS POINT,
THE US WOULD PREFER TO WRITE ITS OWN PAPER.

B. DRAFT CONFERENCE AGENDA: GORDON NOTED THAT THE 1991
MEXICAN DRAFT UNGA RESOLUTION HAD PROVIDED FOR THE
PREPCOM TO DRAFT THE CONFERENCE AGENDA. MAYORSKI NOTED
THAT IN THE PAST THE CONFERENCE AGENDA HAD BEEN DRAFTED
IN THE FIRST PREPCOM. THE U.S. OFFERED TO CIRCULATE A
DRAFT CONFERENCE AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION AT THE SEPTEMBER
DEPOSITARIES MEETING.

10. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

A. LOCATION: RUSSIAN AND UK REPS EXPRESSED A
PREFERENCE FOR NEW YORK AS THE VENUE FOR THE 1995
CONFERENCE. GORDON INDICATED THAT THE U.S. WAS PREPARED
TO ACCEPT NEW YORK AS THE SITE FOR THE CONFERENCE IF
THAT WAS WHAT THE PARTIES WANTED. HE POINTED OUT,
HOWEVER, THAT NEW YORK WAS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: JUST AS
WE COULD USE THE GREATER REPRESENTATION AT THE UN TO
ROUND UP SUPPORTERS OF THE NPT, SO COULD THOSE SEEKING
TO LIMIT THE TREATY'S EXTENSION.

B. OPENING DATE: ALL AGREED THAT THE 1995 CONFERENCE
SHOULD BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE
TREATY'S TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY, MARCH 5, 1995.

C. DURATION: MAYORSKI SAID THAT A FOUR WEEK CONFERENCE
WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRECEDENT OF PAST REVCONS.

DONNELLY COUNTERED THAT THIS SEEMED TOO LONG AND
SUGGESTED THE DEPOSITARIES PROPOSE A TWO WEEK
CONFERENCE. BOTH THE US AND RUSSIAN REPS THOUGHT THIS
WAS UNREALISTIC. ALL FINALLY AGREED THAT AT THE CAUCUS
IN THE FALL, THE DEPOSITARIES WOULD ENLIST THE HELP OF A
"FRIEND" TO SUGGEST THAT THE CONFERENCE BE HELD FOR
THREE WEEKS. A FOUR WEEK CONFERENCE WOULD THUS BECOME
THE FALLBACK POSITION. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE
1995 CONFERENCE SHOULD BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE, AND
SHOULD NOT EXCEED FOUR WEEKS.

D. COMMITTEE STRUCTURE: THE DEPOSITARIES AGREED THEY
COULD ACCEPT THE STRUCTURE OF THREE MAIN COMMITTEES USED
IN PAST REVCONS: IN PART AS A WAY TO FACILITATE ANY
REVIEW THE CONFERENCE MIGHT UNDERTAKE. MAYORSKI SAID HE
SAW NO NEED FOR A SEPARATE, NEW MAIN COMMITTEE ON THE
EXTENSION OF THE NPT AND THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE
EXTENSION DECISION COULD BE HANDLED BY A GROUP OF
FRIENDS OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE
LAST PREPCOM ADDRESS THE EXTENSION DECISION WITH A VIEW
TO FORWARDING A RECOMMENDATION OR DECISION TO THE
CONFERENCE. BOTH US AND UK AGREED THAT WHILE A FRIENDS
GROUP MIGHT BE A USEFUL VENUE FOR ADDRESSING THE

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EXTENSION DECISION; A FINAL DECISION ON THIS SHOULD AWAIT THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE. THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRIENDS OF THE PRESIDENT WILL BE A FUNCTION OF THE PRESIDENT. ---

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E. SCALE OF EXPENDITURES: TRADITIONALLY, THE NPT DEPOSITARIES HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT OF THE COSTS OF NPT REVIEW CONFERENCES (FOR 1990 THE USSR PAID 16.05 PERCENT; THE UK CONTRIBUTED 6.13 PERCENT AND THE U.S. PAID 32.82 PERCENT). MAYORSKI UNDERLINED RUSSIA'S SERIOUS FINANCIAL SITUATION AND NOTED THAT THE RF HAD RECENTLY NEGOTIATED A LOWER UN ASSESSMENT. WITH THIS IN MIND, HE SOUGHT THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES ON THE EXISTING SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS FOR NPT CONFERENCES. THE OVERALL BREAKDOWN OF COSTS WOULD HAVE TO BE REVISED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RECENT ACCESSIONS BY A NUMBER OF STATES INCLUDING CHINA AND FRANCE. (NOTE: FRANCE DEPOSITED ITS INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION TO THE NPT ON AUGUST 3, 1992 IN WASHINGTON.) DONNELLY SAID THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE TO INCLUDE FRANCE AND CHINA IN THE DEPOSITARIES SHARE OF COSTS, PERHAPS THEIR AND OTHERS ASSESSMENTS COULD BE USED TO REDUCE THE DEPOSITARIES OVERALL CONTRIBUTION BELOW FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT. GORDON THOUGHT THAT TO BE AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION THAT NEEDS TO BE EXPLORED. MAYORSKI URGED THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES TO KEEP THIS ISSUE

OPEN PAST THE FIRST PREPCOM. GORDON RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO HAVE THIS ISSUE RESOLVED BY THE FIRST PREPCOM, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF CURRENT UN INTEREST IN OBTAINING ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR CONFERENCES.

F. ASSURING MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION AT THE 1995 CONFERENCE

GORDON STATED THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS TO ASSURE THAT A STRONG MAJORITY COMMITTED TO A PARTICULAR

EXTENSION DECISION -- HOPEFULLY THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION -- BE PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE. ALL AGREED. THE SELECTION OF NEW YORK AS THE VENUE FOR THE 1995 CONFERENCE MIGHT FACILITATE THAT. MAYORSKI SUGGESTED THAT THE DEPOSITARIES APPROACH EVERY NPT PARTY TO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION TO AND EMPHASIZE THE CRUCIAL NATURE OF THE CONFERENCE. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE DEPOSITARIES ANALYZE A LIST OF ALL PARTIES THAT DID NOT ATTEND PREVIOUS REVCONS TO SEE WHERE BETTER EFFORTS COULD BE MADE TO ENCOURAGE THEIR PARTICIPATION. ALL AGREED THAT THE TREATY REQUIRED THAT A MAJORITY OF ITS PARTIES, NOT JUST OF THOSE PRESENT AND VOTING, WAS NEEDED TO TAKE A DECISION TO EXTEND THE NPT. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO IDENTIFY EARLY ON THOSE STATES PARTY THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE THE NECESSARY MAJORITY FOR THE EXTENSION DECISION. DONNELLY SUGGESTED THAT A RESOLUTION COULD BE PURSUED AT THE NEXT CSCE SUMMIT ENDORSING THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT. GORDON NOTED THAT THE U.S. WAS IN THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING PARTIES' VIEWS ON THE EXTENSION QUESTION. THERE WERE ONLY A HANDFUL OF STATES, AT THIS POINT, THAT WERE ON RECORD WITH A POSITION ON EXTENSION. IN THIS REGARD, HE NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE G-7 SUMMIT DECLARATION ENDORSING INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT.

11. CONFERENCE MANAGEMENT

[REDACTED]

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B. COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN: ALL AGREED THAT THE CHAIRMEN FOR THE MAIN COMMITTEES, IF THEY ARE REESTABLISHED, COULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR THE PREPCOMS, AS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE AT NPT REVCONS. ALL AGREED THAT THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE COULD ASSUME MUCH GREATER IMPORTANCE THAN IT HAS HAD AT REVCONS IF IT BECAME ENGAGED IN DRAFTING THE EXTENSION DECISION, AND THAT GIVING THE

COMMITTEE SUCH A ROLE PROBABLY OUGHT TO BE AVOIDED.

C. FRIENDS OF THE PRESIDENT: THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A FRIENDS OF THE PRESIDENT GROUP COULD BE USEFUL IN HANDLING THE EXTENSION DECISION AND THAT THE SELECTION OF THE "FRIENDS" WAS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT. GORDON NOTED THAT AT THE 1990 NPT REVCON THE FRIENDS OF THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN DRAWN FROM THE TWENTY-SIX VICE PRESIDENTS. MAYORSKI SUGGESTED THAT THE DEPOSITARIES SHOULD CONSULT WITH THE PRESIDENT TO ENSURE THAT HIS FRIENDS GROUP WAS APPROPRIATELY REPRESENTATIVE AND INFLUENTIAL.

12. CONFERENCE RULES -- ORDER OF DISCUSSING ISSUES

MAYORSKI ARGUED VIGOROUSLY THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO TAKE THE EXTENSION DECISION BEFORE THE REVIEW OF THE TREATY IS CONDUCTED. OTHERWISE, THERE IS A REAL RISK THAT THE EXTENSION DECISION WILL BE LINKED TO THE OUTCOME OF THE REVIEW OR TO EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CONSENSUS FINAL DOCUMENT. ALTERNATIVELY, THE CONFERENCE COULD FIRST CONDUCT ITS REVIEW; SECOND, ADOPT A DECISION ON THE EXTENSION OF THE NPT; AND THIRD, DISCUSS AND SEEK TO ADOPT A FINAL DOCUMENT. BOTH GORDON AND DONNELLY AGREED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THERE BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE EXTENSION DECISION AND THE REVIEW PORTION OF THE CONFERENCE. HENCE, IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT THERE BE A CLEAR MAJORITY FOR AN ACCEPTABLE EXTENSION OUTCOME AT

THE OUTSET OF THE CONFERENCE. DONNELLY ALSO ARGUED THAT HANDLING THE EXTENSION AND THE REVIEW SIMULTANEOUSLY

COULD BE A WAY TO DECOUPLE THEM. GORDON SAID UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD AN EXTENSION DECISION BE DEPENDENT ON A CONSENSUS FINAL DOCUMENT REVIEWING THE TREATY.

13. EXTENDING THE NPT

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ALL THE DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT WAS THE DESIRED OUTCOME OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE AND THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF THE PARTIES FOR THAT OUTCOME BEFORE THE CONFERENCE BEGINS. ALL AGREED THAT THE NPT REMAINS IN FORCE UNTIL THE CONFERENCE TAKES A DECISION ON EXTENSION, AND THE CONFERENCE CANNOT CONCLUDE UNTIL A DECISION IS TAKEN. IT COULD THEORETICALLY RECESS, HOWEVER, IF ADDITIONAL TIME WERE NEEDED TO REACH A DECISION. GORDON SAID THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THERE COULD BE MORE THAN ONE LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE EXTENSION OUTCOME AND PROMISED TO PROVIDE A LIST OF SUCH OUTCOMES BY THE NEXT DEPOSITARIES MEETING. GORDON ALSO SUGGESTED THAT THE DEPOSITARIES NEEDED TO IDENTIFY THOSE OUTCOMES THAT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. DONNELLY NOTED THAT A BIG ISSUE WOULD BE CONDITIONALITY, THAT IS, WHAT SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS MIGHT PARTIES SEEK TO ATTACH TO THE EXTENSION. THE U.S. HAD PREVIOUSLY OFFERED TO PREPARE A PAPER ON THAT SUBJECT. MAYORSKI ALSO ASKED FOR THE DEPOSITARIES VIEWS ON WHETHER THE CONFERENCE RULES OF PROCEDURE SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A STATE NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE TO VOTE FOR THE EXTENSION DECISION. BOTH GORDON AND DONNELLY EMPHASIZED THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH PROXY VOTING. GORDON NOTED, MOREOVER, THAT THE TREATY DID NOT APPEAR TO

PROVIDE FOR A DECISION TO EXTEND THE TREATY BY OTHER THAN THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS.

14. OVERVIEW OF THE NPT

A. SCOPE OF REVIEW: MAYORSKI OFFERED THAT THE REVIEW PORTION OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE SHOULD COVER ONLY THE PRECEDING FIVE YEARS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TREATY'S PROVISION FOR FIVE YEAR REVIEWS. GORDON AGREED THAT A FIVE YEAR TIME FRAME FOR THE REVIEW WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL IN CONNECTION WITH DEBATE ON ARTICLE VI, SINCE THE ARMS CONTROL RECORD IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN SUCH A STRONG ONE. MOREOVER, THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CAN ARGUE THAT THE ARTICLE VI CALL FOR THE CESSATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE HAS BEEN FULFILLED. HOWEVER, A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR RETROSPECTIVE OF THE NPT

WOULD DEMONSTRATE ITS SUBSTANTIAL SUCCESS IN PREVENTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN PROMOTING THE PEACEFUL BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PARTY TO THE NPT. GORDON SUGGESTED THAT THE GENERAL DEBATE PORTION OF THE 1995 CONFERENCE COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR STATES TO COMMENT ON THE TREATY'S TWENTY-FIVE YEAR RECORD, WHILE THE REVIEW PORTION OF THE CONFERENCE COULD BE LIMITED TO THE PRECEDING FIVE YEARS. THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT THIS WAS A SOUND APPROACH TO THE SCOPE OF REVIEW ISSUE.

B. CONNECTION WITH THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS: THE DEPOSITARIES AGREED THAT RECENT ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS

WOULD CONTRIBUTE POSITIVELY TO THE 1995 CONFERENCE, BUT THAT SOME MAY ATTEMPT TO SHIFT THE FOCUS OF THE ARTICLE VI DEBATE TO THE WILLINGNESS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO ELIMINATE ALL THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS. MAYORSKI SUGGESTED THAT THERE BE A "SOFT BUT CONVINCING" EXPLANATION THAT THE NPT IS NOT A TREATY ON GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, BUT RATHER ONE DESIGNED TO ARREST THE DANGEROUS THREAT POSED BY THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ALL AGREED THAT THE ARGUMENTS WILL BE DIFFERENT IN 1995 THAN HERETOFORE, AND THAT THESE ARGUMENTS WILL PROBABLY BECOME CLEAR DURING THE PREPARATORY PROCESS.

C. PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION: MAYORSKI OPENED DISCUSSION OF THIS ITEM BY SAYING THAT THE DEPOSITARIES COULD EXPECT SERIOUS CRITICISM ON EXPORT CONTROLS FROM THE NONALIGNED AND THAT AN EFFORT WOULD BE NEEDED TO EXPLAIN RECENT EXPORT CONTROL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME. HE OPINED THAT ARTICLE IV MAY BECOME MORE PROMINENT JUST AS PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL REDUCED THE CONTROVERSY OVER ARTICLE VI. US REP STOIBER SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN IRAQ MAY HELP QUELL CRITICISM OVER EXPORT CONTROLS. RATHER, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE MORE TRADITIONAL LAMENT ABOUT INADEQUATE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO THE IAEA FOR ITS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. DONNELLY NOTED THAT FURTHER EFFORTS BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG), AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT NONTRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS SUCH AS ARGENTINA MIGHT JOIN THE NSG COULD AFFECT THE ARTICLE IV DEBATE. GORDON SAID THAT IT WOULD

BE NECESSARY TO REBUT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE NORTH SEEKS TO DENY TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOUTH BY MAKING CLEAR THAT SUPPLIERS ARE INTERESTED IN EXPORTING TECHNOLOGY, BUT NEED TO SAFEGUARD IT AGAINST POTENTIAL MISUSE. ALL AGREED.

15. PROPOSALS ON IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPT

A. STRENGTHENING SAFEGUARDS AND RESPONDING TO VIOLATIONS: MAYORSKI EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE FACT THAT IRAQ'S VIOLATIONS OF THE NPT WERE HANDLED OUTSIDE OF THE TREATY REGIME AND NOTED THAT THERE WAS NO PROVISION IN THE NPT THAT PRESCRIBED A RESPONSE TO VIOLATION OR AUTHORIZED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO DO ANYTHING IN THIS EVENT. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE DEPOSITARIES CONSIDER INTRODUCING LANGUAGE INTO A CONFERENCE FINAL DOCUMENT THAT SET OUT THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE PARTIES IN THE EVENT OF A TREATY VIOLATION. GORDON AND DONNELLY POINTED OUT THAT ANY EFFORT TO LAY OUT A PRESCRIPTIVE RESPONSE TO NPT VIOLATIONS COULD LEAD TO PRESSURES TO AMEND THE TREATY AND THIS WAS MOST UNDESIRABLE. GORDON SUGGESTED, INSTEAD, THAT A FINAL DOCUMENT, IF THERE WAS ONE, COULD CONTAIN AN ENDORSEMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE IN IRAQ AND COULD NOTE THE PRECEDENTIAL NATURE OF THIS ACTION. DONNELLY ASKED THE OTHERS TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE THE UNSC DECLARE THAT A BREACH OF THE NPT WOULD CONSTITUTE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. MAYORSKI, HOWEVER, QUESTIONED UNSC AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE NPT VIOLATIONS. HE ALSO ASKED THE DEPOSITARIES, IN VIEW OF THE NPT'S

NEAR UNIVERSALITY, TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING A SECRETARIAT OR OTHER NPT MACHINERY TO DEAL WITH FUTURE TREATY VIOLATIONS. ALTHOUGH SKEPTICAL, GORDON AND DONNELLY AGREED TO BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT AT A FUTURE DEPOSITARIES MEETING NEXT YEAR.

B. SPECIAL INSPECTIONS: MAYORSKI ASKED FOR AN EXPLANATION OF THE CALL IN PRESIDENT BUSH'S NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE FOR CONSULTATIONS ON MULTILATERAL FUNDING FOR SPECIAL INSPECTIONS. GORDON RESPONDED THAT THIS POINT WAS AIMED AT IDENTIFYING RESOURCES TO SUPPORT CONTINUED SPECIAL INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ.

C. SECURITY ASSURANCES: MAYORSKI SAID THAT FOR THE MOMENT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION ON NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES (NSA), BUT POSSIBILITIES EXISTED, IN HIS VIEW, FOR IMPROVED STATEMENTS BY ALL THE

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DEPOSITARIES. IN THIS EVENT, HE SUGGESTED THE
DEPOSITARIES GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A
JOINT STATEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES OR WITH THE OTHER
NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (FRANCE AND CHINA). GORDON

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WOULD RESIST ANY ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE EXTENSION DECISION
CONTINGENT, IN ANY WAY, ON SUCH A REPORT.

INDICATED THAT THE LONGSTANDING US NSA REMAINED A FIRM
AND RELIABLE STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY BUT THAT A
REASSESSMENT OF THIS STATEMENT MAY BE APPROPRIATE OVER
THE NEXT THREE YEARS LEADING UP TO THE 1995 NPT
CONFERENCE. DONNELLY INDICATED THAT THE UK HAD BEEN
LOOKING AT ITS NSA BUT SAID THERE WAS NO CHANGE AT THIS
TIME. DONNELLY SAID THAT HE BELIEVED NSAS WOULD BE AN
ISSUE AT THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE BUT WONDERED WHETHER IT

WOULD BE A VERY IMPORTANT ONE. MAYORSKI ARGUED THAT A
CHANGE IN THE RESPECTIVE NSAS WOULD BE MOST PRODUCTIVE
IF IT CAME CLOSER TO THE CONFERENCE SO THAT IT WOULD NOT
BE POKETED EARLY. ALL AGREED THAT IT WAS LIKELY THAT
EGYPT WOULD RESURRECT THE ISSUE OF POSITIVE SECURITY
ASSURANCES BUT THERE SEEMED LITTLE THAT COULD BE DONE TO
IMPROVE THE 1968 ASSURANCE ADOPTED BY THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL.

D. PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES FROM MILITARY
ATTACK: MAYORSKI QUERIED THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES ON THE
PROSPECTS FOR A CHANGE IN APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE,
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING THREAT TO NUCLEAR
INSTALLATIONS FROM TERRORISTS. HE REMINDED THE US AND
UK OF THE INITIATIVE PUT FORWARD IN 1990 BY HUNGARY AND
POLAND. THE US AND UK WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT THIS WAS
NOT AN ISSUE THAT COULD BE PRODUCTIVELY DEBATED AT THE
1995 CONFERENCE. GORDON SUGGESTED THAT SINCE THE
INITIATIVE IN 1990 HAD COME FROM "FRIENDS," PERHAPS
THESE FRIENDS COULD BE APPROACHED AND DISCOURAGED FROM
INTRODUCING EXTRANEOUS ISSUES INTO THE EXTENSION
CONFERENCE. MAYORSKI DID NOT JOIN THE POINT, BUT AGREED
AS A GENERAL MATTER THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE
DISCOURAGED FROM INTRODUCING ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY RELATED
TO THE NPT INTO THE CONFERENCE DEBATE.

E. PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNEs): MAYORSKI
SOLICITED THE VIEWS OF THE OTHERS ON WHETHER THEY
ANTICIPATED ANY INTEREST IN 1995 ON THIS SUBJECT,
INCLUDING A POSSIBLE EFFORT TO DELETE ARTICLE V FROM THE
TREATY. GORDON REITERATED US OPPOSITION TO ANY PNEs.

AND DONNELLY NOTED WITH CONCERN THAT THE RUSSIANS SEEMED
TO HAVE THE GREATEST CURRENT INTEREST IN PNEs (I.E., THE
CHETEK CORPORATION), AND THAT THE UK WAS NOT INTERESTED
IN PURSUING THE POSSIBILITY AT ALL. MAYORSKI RESPONDED
THAT CHETEK DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE
ANY CHETEK PROJECTS. THE US AND UK SAW NO REASON TO
AMEND THE NPT ON THIS POINT; PAST PRACTICE OF HANDLING
THIS ISSUE IN A LOW-KEY MANNER CONTINUED TO APPEAR TO BE
THE BEST COURSE.

16. FORMAT AND STATUS OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT

MAYORSKI DESCRIBED THE OPTIMUM OUTCOME OF THE 1995 NPT
CONFERENCE AS ONE IN WHICH THERE IS A DECISION ON AN
ACCEPTABLE EXTENSION OUTCOME AND CONSENSUS AGREEMENT ON
A FINAL DOCUMENT THAT REFLECTS THE REVIEW PART OF THE
CONFERENCE. GORDON RESPONDED THAT IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE
BEST OUTCOME FOR THE CONFERENCE WAS ONE IN WHICH THE
PARTIES DECIDED TO EXTEND THE NPT INDEFINITELY. A
SUBSTANTIVE FINAL DOCUMENT WAS NOT NECESSARY AND SHOULD
NOT BE USED AS A MEASURE OF THE SUCCESS OF THE
CONFERENCE. THE U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN EFFORT TO
PRODUCE SOME KIND OF FINAL REPORT; HOWEVER, THE U.S.

17. NPT CAUCUS ON THE MARGINS OF THE 1992 UNGA

THE DEPOSITARIES HELD A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ABOUT
WHAT WOULD TRANSPIRE DURING THE CAUCUS OF NPT PARTIES

THAT WILL BE HELD ON THE MARGINS OF THE 1992 UNGA. ALL
AGREED THAT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE CAUCUS WAS THE
ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION ON THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE AND
ITS PREPARATORY COMMITTEE. BEYOND THAT, IT WOULD BE
REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE CAUCUS BEGIN TO DISCUSS
THE NUMBER, TIMING, AND VENUES OF THE PREPCOMS AND THE
CONFERENCE.

18. NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

GORDON INFORMED THE OTHER DEPOSITARIES THAT THE US IS
ACTIVELY PURSUING AN EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE THE MORE THAN
FORTY NPT PARTIES THAT HAVE NOT YET CONCLUDED THEIR
ARTICLE III SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS TO DO SO. WHILE THESE
ARE, IN EVERY CASE, COUNTRIES WITHOUT NUCLEAR
FACILITIES, THE SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATION UNDER THE NPT
APPLIES TO ALL PARTIES REGARDLESS OF THEIR NUCLEAR
STATUS. THE UK AND RUSSIA AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE
IMPORTANT TO HAVE ALL OF THESE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS
CONCLUDED BY 1995.

19. NEXT DEPOSITARIES MEETING

THE U.K. AND RUSSIA ACCEPTED THE US OFFER TO HOST THE
NEXT DEPOSITARIES MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE IAEA
GENERAL CONFERENCE IN VIENNA (SEPTEMBER 21-25, 1992).
THE DEPOSITARIES ALSO AGREED TO MEET WITH FRANCE AND
CHINA ON THE MARGINS OF THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE TO
DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE. THEY

AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A SEPARATE

MEETING, AS WELL, BETWEEN THE DEPOSITARIES AND FRANCE
(I.E., LIKE-MINDED NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES). THE US SIDE
OFFERED TO ARRANGE THOSE MEETINGS.

20. DELEGATION LISTS

REPRESENTING THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION WERE BORIS MAYORSKI,
CHAIRMAN, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION; V. SLIPCHENKO,
DISARMAMENT DEPT.; A. IVANOV, ATTACHE, DEPT. OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION; A. KHOZIN, ATTACHE, DEPT. OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION; V. VAVILOV, DEFENSE
MINISTRY; E. SHYLKIN, MINATOM; V. FORTAKOV, MINATOM.
ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BRAD GORDON HEADED THE U.S.
DELEGATION WHICH INCLUDED AMBASSADOR TO UK ORGANIZATIONS
IN VIENNA, JANE BECKER; CARL STOIBER, DES/NTS; DOROTHY
DONNELLY, DOE; SUSAN BURK, ACDA; AND KAREN MALZARN, US
EMBASSY. THE UK DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY BRIAN
DONNELLY, NON-PROLIFERATION AND DEFENCE DEPT., FCO AND
INCLUDED PETER BATEMAN, NON-PROLIFERATION AND DEFENCE
DEPT., FCO; ANDREW BARLOW AND KATHERINE MCLEOD (TITLES
TO BE OBTAINED). EAGLEBURGER

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