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## Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

31 JUL 1986

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

This is an assessment I requested shortly after the crisis at Chernobyl. I believe our sensor performed pretty well considering the national priority afforded targets of this type. For your information PFIAB has expressed an interest in any collection critique done on Chernobyl.

Richard J. Kerr Deputy Director for Intelligence 25X1

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## OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC AND WEAPONS RESEARCH

Directorate of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

29 July 1986


NOTE TO: DDI

This is the evaluation of Chernobyl collection you requested. I prepared this memo with many crucial inputs from CRES. Although the memo has taken longer than anticipated, I literally let the smoke clear a little before drafting it. From my standpoint this was the right decision. I think all of us now feel better about the adequacy of our collection than we did immediately after the crises.

DD/SWR


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	Cy 6 of 14 31 July 1986	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Deputy Director for Intelligence	
FROM:	Deputy Director of Scientific and Weapons Research	
SUBJECT:	Collection on Chernobyl Disaster	
action to implem	equested: For your information only. We are taking ent the recommendations to improve	
	munity responsiveness in future crises like the which we believe by and large was effective:	
Nevertheless, we manage our colle	need to pursue the possibility of enhanced IR tipoff, ction requirements better, and improve our ith US Government agencies outside the Community on	
Nevertheless, we manage our colle communications w this type of cat.  2. Backgrouwell known before extensively on the such reactors in Soviets published.	need to pursue the possibility of enhanced IR tipoff, ction requirements better, and improve our ith US Government agencies outside the Community on	
Nevertheless, we manage our colle communications w this type of cat.  2. Backgrouwell known before extensively on the such reactors in Soviets published reactor complex.	need to pursue the possibility of enhanced IR tipoff, ction requirements better, and improve our ith US Government agencies outside the Community on astrophe.  Ind: The characteristics of the Chernobyl reactor were the incident. The Soviets have published the RBMK, and we have followed the construction of all the Soviet Union. Ironically, in February the idea slick public relations article on the Chernobyl	

ion of the disaster came
which indicated a possible
acility. Later Swedish ty was coming from the e was asked to use weather
the radioactivity. Spurred al concern the Soviets Chernobyl reactor. This
1200 EDT on 28 April and rt giving the location of
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## Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

30 July 1986

NOTE TO: DD/OSWR

Bob:

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This is a good job. I hate to make you redo the piece, but I don't think it is necessary for the Director to approve the 25X1 actions you have recommended. I would rather say that this memo is for his information and we will implement the actions outlined

I would also 25X1 lead off by saying that we will take the necessary actions to implement the following and then list the three tics.

25**X**1

Richard J. Kerr
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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Directorate of Intelligence

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29 July 1986

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