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Remarks:

L-117 NSODDB3

Executive Secretary
5/21/87
29 MAY 1986

"J"

Compt would like a copy of NSDD 32.

Do you agree ☑

disagree ___

JOAN
When you are finished with this document, please return to ER if you don't need it. Also be sure you sign the cover sheet and return to ER.

Thank you.
**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

**Date:** 25-May 1982

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**REMARKS**

Per your request, attached is Item 5 from the 24 May DD

**Signature**

NSDD 32

L-117

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**DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions**

**FROM (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post):**

Executive Secretary

**Phone No.:**

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**OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-75)**

Prepared for ASA
Executive Registry

21 May 82

IN RELATION TO PD/NSC-53

PD/NSC-58
NSDD-5
NSDD-12
NSDD-13
NSDD-26

You should also read NSDD # 32, dated 20 May 1982, Subject:


Also, NSDD# 32, Supersedes PD/NSC-18 and PD/NSC-62 in their entirety.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

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Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/29 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000100070003-7
May 20, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: U.S. National Security Strategy

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on U.S. National Security Strategy.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

Attachment
Tab A NSDD 32
cc Chairman, PFIAB

CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
Review May 20, 1988
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET
May 20, 1982

National Security Decision
Directive Number 32

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

I have carefully reviewed the NSSD 1-82 study in its component parts, considered the final recommendations of the National Security Council, and direct that the study serve as guidance for U.S. National Security Strategy.

Our national security requires development and integration of a set of strategies, including diplomatic, informational, economic/political, and military components. NSSD 1-82 begins that process. Part I of the study provides basic U.S. national objectives, both global and regional, and shall serve as the starting point for all components of our national security strategy.

The national security policy of the United States shall be guided by the following global objectives:

- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.

- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts.

- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.

TOP SECRET
Review May 20, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/29: CIA-RDP90B01013R000100070003-7
To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation.

To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.

To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the U.S. military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources.

To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.

To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World.

To promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences.

In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will be guided by the operational objectives in specific regions as identified in Parts I and III of the study.

Threats to U.S. National Security

The key military threats to U.S. security during the 1980s will continue to be posed by the Soviet Union and its allies and clients. Despite increasing pressures on its economy and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet military will continue to expand and modernize.
The Soviet Union remains aware of the catastrophic consequences of initiating military action directly against the U.S. or its allies. For this reason, a war with a Soviet client arising from regional tensions is more likely than a direct conflict with the USSR. In a conflict with a Soviet client, however, the risk of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union remains.

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, and the persistence of traditional conflicts create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many parts of the developing world. The growing scarcity of resources, such as oil, increasing terrorism, the dangers of nuclear proliferation, uncertainties in Soviet political succession, reticence on the part of a number of Western countries, and the growing assertiveness of Soviet foreign policy all contribute to the unstable international environment. For these reasons, the decade of the eighties will likely pose the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since World War II and our response could result in a fundamentally different East-West relationship by the end of this decade.

The Role of Allies and Others

Given the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and the overwhelming growth of Soviet conventional forces capabilities, together with the increased political and economic strength of the industrial democracies and the heightened importance of Third World resources, the United States must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of allies and others to protect our interests and those of our friends. There is no other alternative. To meet successfully the challenges to our interests, the U.S. will require stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. U.S. defense programs will consider the status of these arrangements in the planning process.

A strong unified NATO remains indispensable to protecting Western interests. While encouraging all our NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal defense resources preferentially to capabilities which could support both out of area and European missions.

Outside Europe, the United States will place primary reliance on regional states to deal militarily with non-Soviet threats, providing security assistance as appropriate. If no other reasonable alternative exists, the U.S. should be prepared to intervene militarily in regional or local conflicts. In Southwest Asia, we will support the development of balanced and self-contained
friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles. However, the U.S. will remain the primary military power for directly resisting the Soviet Union.

In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts. We should also assist the Republic of Korea in becoming increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities.

Regional Military Objectives

In peacetime, our regional military objectives seek to deter military attack against the United States, our Allies and friends, and to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet influence worldwide. The security of Europe remains vital to the defense of the United States. This means that we must achieve significant improvements in NATO's conventional defense capabilities while also improving nuclear and chemical forces. For our part, the United States will maintain its commitments for forward deployment and early reinforcement. The security of Southwest Asia is inextricably linked to the security of Europe and Japan and thus is vital to the defense of the United States. A key peacetime military objective in Southwest Asia is to enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the U.S. in-theater and the threat of escalation.

Wartime planning must consider the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict would expand beyond one theater. Within this context, and recognizing that the political and military situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions, the following priorities apply for wartime planning: highest priority is North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting lines of communication. The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by the defense of U.S. Pacific allies and the lines of communication for the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and then the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa.

Specific policies for both peacetime and wartime regional military objectives are contained in Part III, Section C of the study.
Nuclear Forces

The modernization of our strategic nuclear forces and the achievement of parity with the Soviet Union shall receive first priority in our efforts to rebuild the military capabilities of the United States.

Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so dangerous and uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack.

The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear deterrent by developing a capability to sustain protracted nuclear conflict in accordance with guidance provided in NSDD-12, NSDD-13, NSDD-26, PD-53, and PD-58. The strategic force modernization program set forth in NSDD-12 is reaffirmed except as may be modified by new decisions in the basing mode for M-X. The U.S. will retain a capable and credible strategic triad of land-based ballistic missiles, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. While each leg of this triad should be as survivable as possible, the existence of all three precludes the destruction of more than one by surprise attack and guards against technical surprise which could similarly remove one leg of the triad.

General Purpose Forces

Our general purpose forces support U.S. national security policy in peacetime by deterring aggression, by demonstrating U.S. interests, concern, and commitment, by assisting the forces of other friendly nations, and by providing a basis to move rapidly from peace to war. In wartime, these forces would be employed to achieve our political objectives and to secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and allies.

The U.S. shall maintain a global posture and shall strive to increase its influence worldwide through the maintenance and improvement of forward deployed forces and rapidly deployable U.S.-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security assistance, and special operations.

In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union, the United States will seek to limit the scope of the conflict, avoid involvement of the Soviet Union, and ensure that U.S. objectives are met as quickly as possible.

In a conflict involving the Soviet Union, the U.S. must plan, in conjunction with allies, for a successful defense in a global war. Given our current force insufficiencies, however, we must plan to focus our military efforts in the areas of most vital concern.
first, undertaking lesser operations elsewhere. This sequential concept shall be a basic feature of our force applications policy. It is in the interest of the United States to limit the scope of any U.S.-Soviet conflict, but if global war with the Soviet Union ensues, counteroffensives are to be directed at places where the U.S. can affect the outcome of the war. Counteroffensives are not a substitute for the robust military capabilities necessary to protect vital interests at the point at which they are threatened in the first place.

Reserve Component forces shall be an integral part of U.S. military planning. The reserves provide major combat forces that complement and reinforce active units, and they provide the majority of the supporting forces required to sustain the total force in combat. During crises involving the potential deployment and sustained employment of sizeable combat forces, the National Command Authority will provide an early mobilization decision. Mobilization planning shall be included for all major contingencies.

In order to close the gap between strategy and capabilities, the U.S. must undertake a sustained and balanced force development program. First priority is to improve the operational capabilities of forward or early deploying forces and their associated lift. Second priority is to be accorded to U.S.-based late deploying forces and then third priority to expanding the force structure.

The capabilities of these forces are to be improved in the following general order of priority: by achieving readiness, upgrading C³, providing adequate sustainability, increasing mobility, and then by modernizing the forces.

Security Assistance

Security assistance is a vital, integral component of our national security strategy and is an essential complement to our own force structure in meeting our security objectives abroad. Security assistance programs are a most cost-effective means of enhancing the security of the United States. A priority effort shall be undertaken, to include the use of White House resources, to secure passage of security assistance legislative initiatives currently before Congress.

On a longer-term basis, we shall plan for steady real growth in the security assistance portion of the national security budget over the next five years; more extensive use shall be made of multiyear commitments; we will improve our anticipation of and
planning for Foreign Military Sales (with special emphasis on the Special Defense Acquisition Fund); and an effort shall be undertaken to rewrite or substantially revise the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. To implement these actions, appropriate working groups shall be established under the Arms Transfer Management Group, which will report its progress on a regular basis to the NSC.

Force Integration

The national security objectives of the United States can be met only if all defense resources are mutually supporting and thoroughly integrated and complement the other elements of U.S. national power.

An examination of our current and projected force capabilities reveals substantial risks that some regional objectives might not be achieved, some commitments to some allies might not be honored, and we might be forced to resort to nuclear weapons early in a conflict.

These risks are inherent in our current position. They must be recognized, allocated as best we can, and then be reduced by an orderly and consistent investment in our defense program.

Comprehensive and imaginative integration of all our capabilities is required to reduce future risks to our national security. Deterrence is dependent on both nuclear and conventional capabilities. Nuclear forces will not be viewed as a lower-cost alternative to conventional forces. At the same time, the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy.

With the growing vulnerability of our strategic deterrent, we must enhance the survivability of our offensive forces, and complement those efforts with effective programs to provide for continuity of government, strategic connectivity, and civil defense.

Armed conflict involving the US requires that the full capabilities of all our armed Services be organized, trained, and equipped so that all can be readily deployed and employed together. Responding to any large contingency will require some level of mobilization. We must expand the scope of mobilization and industrial capabilities and frequently review manpower policies to ensure adequacy of manpower.
Reports

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will include, as part of their periodic reports on the state of our defenses, a discussion of progress made in implementing the provisions of this directive.

Nothing in this directive is intended to supersede or alter the provisions of PD/NSC-53, PD/NSC-58, NSDD-5, NSDD-12, NSDD-13, or NSDD-26.

PD/NSC-18 and PD/NSC-62 are superseded by this directive.

Attachment

Tab A  NSSD 1-82 Study
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

April 1982

TOP SECRET
Review April 30, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Executive Summary

The full articulation of U.S. national security strategy requires the development and integration of an interlocking set of strategies which include diplomatic, information, economic/political, and military components. This study begins that process.

The national security policy of the United States will be guided by the following global objectives:

- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail.

- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts.

- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.

- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation.

- To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.

- To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the U.S. military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.
TOP SECRET

- To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources.

- To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.

- To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World.

- To promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences.

Threats to National Security

The key military threats to U.S. security during the 1980s will continue to be posed by the USSR and its allies and clients. Despite increasing pressures on its economy and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet Union continues to expand and modernize its military forces. Current Soviet leaders, moreover, are probably prepared to accept sacrifices to sustain this expansion, which they see as the most important element in the growth of their influence. The Soviets are concerned about current U.S. modernization programs, but probably anticipate that U.S. defense spending will be tempered by domestic resistance.

Conflict resulting from regional tensions that could again involve us in a war with a Soviet client is much more likely than a direct conflict with the USSR. In such a conflict, the risk of confrontation with the USSR would vary according to the situation; but, as a result of their expanded strategic military power, the Soviets are probably less adverse than in the past to take risks which might lead to such a confrontation. Such action is most likely in the region in which they have superiority, face unstable countries, and do not face U.S. allies--especially in Southwest Asia. Moreover, they may expect that the burden of avoiding such a confrontation is shifting to the U.S. We do not believe that at present the USSR is prepared to initiate military action directly against the U.S. or its allies but rather sees military power as the necessary backdrop for exerting pressure along the Soviet periphery and elsewhere, and for use, if necessary, in conflict with the U.S.
The Soviet buildup, combined with weak resistance, has also encouraged Soviet activities in the Third World. Using proxies and a diversified arsenal of arms, military training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and economic aid, the USSR, in opportunistic fashion, exploits indigenous unrest in many regions to undermine U.S. influence, to bring Soviet sympathizers to power, and to acquire additional military bases. A number of Soviet friends act as surrogates for the USSR and, in the cases of Cuba, Libya, the PLO, and Syria, as conduits for Soviet-bloc arms and training to groups that undertake terrorism.

In Europe, the USSR continues to strengthen its theater nuclear and conventional forces. Moscow is deeply concerned about unrest in Poland and engages in exploiting and encouraging U.S.-West European differences and the West European "peace movement". In East and Southeast Asia, the Soviets endeavor to contain China, and to hedge against the possibility of a Washington-Beijing-Tokyo military "axis" by the buildup of Soviet military might. Additionally, military threats to U.S. security in this region includes the possibility of aggression by North Korea or Vietnam.

In the Middle East, the most severe dangers are that Iran might succumb to increased Soviet influence and large-scale military intervention; that friendly states may be attacked by other local states—most immediately that the Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of the fighting and threaten other Gulf Arabs--; and that friendly governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets. In addition, acute Arab-Israeli tensions continue to threaten a war that would harm U.S. interests in the region.

In Latin America Communist exploitation of social and political unrest in Central America will continue to pose the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR. Military threats in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently quite small. There are, however, a number of potential flashpoints in Africa that impinge on U.S. security interests that could draw in the superpowers while others would probably not result in Soviet involvement.

The Role of Allies and Others

Given the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and the overwhelming growth of Soviet conventional forces capabilities, together with the increased political and economic strength of the industrial democracies and the heightened importance
of Third World resources, the U.S. must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of allies and others to protect our interests and those of our friends. While our ability to cooperate with allies and friends offers a potentially effective counter to Soviet threats, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

A strong unified NATO is indispensable to protecting Western interests. To attain this goal, the U.S. must press for implementation of key conventional enhancement programs and INF modernization. We must also continue to promote improvement in integrated logistical support (e.g., host nation support--HNS). For its part, the U.S. must maintain its NATO commitments for forward deployment and early reinforcement.

While encouraging all NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their peacetime marginal resources preferentially to dual-purpose capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. We likewise should urge such Allies to share the political and military burden outside Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or instead of) the U.S.

Outside Europe, the U.S. will place primary reliance on regional states to deal with non-Soviet threats, providing security assistance as appropriate. The U.S. will remain the primary power for directly resisting the Soviets. If no other reasonable alternative exists, the U.S. should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. The effectiveness of U.S. military capabilities for either Soviet or other contingencies will depend on access to facilities enroute and in the region of conflict, and on other tangible forms of support (e.g., HNS and prepositioning).

In Southwest Asia, the U.S. will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles.

In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts (including economic assistance), although we should not now ask Japan to expand its defense responsibility beyond the
protection of sea lines of communication out to 1000 nautical miles. We should assist the ROK to become increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities, while maintaining the current U.S.-ROK division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly U.S. airpower); and we should work to facilitate increased defense cooperation between Korea and Japan. We can also act to enhance the durability of the U.S.-Chinese security relationship, although significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union can only come if and as China can devote substantial additional resources of its own for that purpose.

Regional Military Objectives

The U.S. must plan, in conjunction with its allies, for a successful defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies. This means planning so that the Soviet Union would be confronted with a major conventional conflict and the threat of escalation. At the same time, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet conflict to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests.

While recognizing that the political and military situation at the time of war will dictate strategy decisions, and that a U.S.-Soviet conflict may well expand beyond one theater, the following priorities apply for global wartime planning: highest priority is North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting lines of communication (LOCs). The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by the defense of our Pacific allies, supporting LOCs and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa. Peacetime priorities may not parallel wartime priorities. Specific U.S. regional objectives are keyed to this global context.

In contingencies not involving direct Soviet aggression, our strategy is to rely on regional states to the extent possible.

In Europe, our primary objective is to strengthen NATO's capability to deter or defeat a Soviet attack. In wartime, the U.S. will support NATO strategy which requires forward defense with conventional forces supported by the possibility of nuclear escalation. In peacetime, U.S. objectives are to enhance deterrence through major improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities; to improve nuclear and chemical forces; and to obtain increased Allied defense contributions in Europe and Southwest Asia.
In the Near East/Southwest Asia, our principal objectives are to prevent the spread of Soviet influence; to protect Western access to oil; to maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage; and to support moderate states against aggression and subversion. U.S. military strategy is to deter Soviet aggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets in the theater; and to prepare for executing counteroffensives elsewhere.

In the Far East, our wartime objectives are viewed primarily in the context of a global war. They are: to maintain control of Pacific LOCs; to protect U.S. bases; to fulfill commitments to allies; in conjunction with regional states, to prevent the redeployment of Soviet forces from the Far East; and to secure Japanese self-defense including long-range LOC protection. In peacetime, we seek a more active defense partnership with Japan, a more durable U.S.-PRC relationship, and continued stability on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Western Hemisphere, our primary wartime objective is the security of the North American Continent, the Caribbean Basin and the Panama Canal. In peacetime, our objectives are to modernize North America's strategic air defense system; to reverse Communist gains in Latin America; and to increase U.S. military presence.

In Africa, our wartime objectives are to neutralize hostile forces in strategic locations and to protect Western access to the region's mineral resources. U.S. peacetime objectives are to obtain additional facilities access and transit rights, and to assist countries resisting Soviet-sponsored subversion.

Nuclear Forces

The overall objectives of U.S. nuclear forces policy as enunciated in NSDD-13 is reaffirmed. Specifically, our most fundamental national security objective is to deter direct attack—particularly nuclear attack—on the United States, its forces and its allies and friends. Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as to remove any incentives for initiating attack. The nuclear forces of the United States also, in conjunction with
conventional forces, contribute to deterrence of nonnuclear aggression and to support NATO strategy for the defense of Europe. This requires that we be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that the Soviets, or any other adversary, would be denied their political and military objectives. Should nuclear attack nonetheless, occur, the United States and its allies must prevail and in the process be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms favorable to the United States.

U.S. strategy to realize these objectives is founded on the ability to provide the initial, trans- and post-attack target coverage required by existing National level guidance. Similarly, the requirements for damage limitation, flexibility of options, crisis stability, escalation control, support of allied commitments, preservation of the continuum of conventional and nuclear deterrence, maritime nuclear employment and forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces were revalidated.

U.S. nuclear employment planning supports this strategy by ensuring the availability of the greatest amount of targeting flexibility to the NCA, strengthening the linkage between nuclear and conventional forces, limiting collateral damage, and maximizing the Soviet uncertainty regarding their ability to successfully execute a nuclear attack.

The resulting force requirements and the development and modernization program for our nuclear forces were found to be expressed and directed in NSDD-12 and NATO's modernization decision.

Arms control can complement military forces in support of U.S. objectives and national security.

General Purpose Forces

In conflicts not involving the USSR, the U.S. will rely primarily upon indigenous forces to protect mutual interests, with U.S. assistance as appropriate. U.S. conventional forces should have the capability of meeting Soviet threats. In either set of contingencies, the U.S. is particularly dependent upon the assistance of friends and allies. Because the Reserve Component is an integral part of U.S. capabilities, mobilization planning must be included in preparations for non-Soviet as well as Soviet contingencies. Where quick termination of conflict cannot be assured, the U.S. must confront adversaries with the prospect of a prolonged, costly, and ultimately unwinnable war.
We seek two fundamental objectives in peacetime: to deter military attack against the U.S., its allies, and friends; and to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet influence worldwide. These objectives require the U.S. to increase its influence worldwide through the maintenance and improvement of forward deployed forces and rapidly deployable U.S.-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security assistance, and special operations.

Current forces are adequate to maintain most peacetime forward deployments and to respond to minor crises and non-Soviet conflicts. However, major risks would exist in direct conflict with the Soviet Union. In a multi-theater war, lesser-scale operations will be required in secondary theaters.

In the event of direct Soviet aggression, if deterrence fails, our military strategy is to deploy military forces rapidly to the area to signal U.S. commitment and to deter further aggression. If this action does not deter further aggression, U.S. forces will conduct military operations in conjunction with regional allies with the aim of halting Soviet aggression. We will also take those steps necessary to prepare for the possibility of a global U.S.-Soviet conflict and, if necessary, execute counteroffensives at other fronts or places where we can affect the outcome of the war.

In order to close the gap between strategy and capabilities, the U.S. must undertake a major and balanced force development program throughout the decade. This program involves major improvements in readiness, command/control/communications systems, sustainability, mobility, and essential modernization. While specific priorities among the type of general purpose forces and among these categories of expenditures overlap in an often complex manner, general order of priority will be given to improvements of forward deployed forces, forces providing flexibility in deployment, such as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, other units earmarked for earliest deployment, and associated lift forces. Some force expansion is also planned for mobility forces, general purpose naval forces, and tactical air forces. Consideration should also be given to land force expansion.
Security Assistance

Security assistance is a critical instrument for achieving national security objectives such as power projection, deterrence and political influence. While the Administration has taken several initiatives to make the program more effective, further work needs to be done.

In the near-term, the FY 82 supplemental and FY 83 program will require high level Executive Branch support in order to secure Congressional approval.

Resources in real terms and as a percent of the defense budget have been declining for two decades. Although the Administration has begun to turn the situation around, the outlook for sustaining real future increases is uncertain. Further, we lack adequate grant and concessional aid to meet the security requirements of the poorer countries.

We need to be able to use more extensively multi-year commitments to permit long range planning and to enhance predictability. The Administration should pursue this issue vigorously before Congress.

Long lead times, rising prices and the lack of export versions of high technology items are undercutting the effectiveness of our programs. We need to take foreign country requirements into account in U.S. defense procurement and production planning.

In order to accomplish the above, we need to move carefully toward more extensive combined planning with host governments; recognizing there are political sensitivities involved.

The legislation governing security assistance is flawed: it is too inflexible and provides for too much congressional micro-management. While extensive changes may not be attainable this year, we can begin interagency work promptly and explore with Congress possibilities for change in FY 84.

Force Integration

By the end of the 1980s, we will have improved capabilities to deploy and sustain forces worldwide and a better manned and more balanced total military force. However, under any realistic conditions, the risks will remain great throughout the decade. We pursue a strategy which seeks to deter war, but if war is thrust upon us, to control escalation and to
prevail. No place overseas where our forces directly confront	hose of the Soviet Union do we have enough capability for
these purposes. Our defense capabilities entail substantial
risks that some regional objectives could not be achieved,
some commitments to some allies could not be fulfilled, and,
most importantly, we could be forced to resort to nuclear
weapons in response to conventional aggression. Risks can
and must be attenuated by marshalling all elements of our
national power.

Armed conflict involving the U.S. requires that the
full capabilities of all our armed Services be organized,
trained, and equipped so that all can be readily deployed
and employed together. Responding to any large contingency
will require some level of mobilization. Our ability to
swiftly reinforce forward forces, essential for all theaters,
depends on the contributions of our reserve forces. In any
event, our reinforcement capability is inadequate. Moreover,
even if our initial efforts to stop Soviet aggression were
successful, we would be less able to support a protracted
war than would the Soviets. We must, therefore, expand the
scope of mobilization and industrial capabilities and
frequently review the all-volunteer force to insure adequacy
of manpower.

Deterrence is dependent on both nuclear and conventional
capabilities. The deterioration of the nuclear balance has
eroded the credibility and utility of our nuclear "umbrella". That
danger is compounded by growing Soviet conventional
force capabilities. In redressing the imbalances, nuclear
forces should not be viewed as a lower cost alternative to
conventional forces. At the same time, the possible use of
nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy
to counter Soviet conventional aggression because it is
unlikely we will have sufficient conventional forces in
peacetime that will alone insure deterrence.

We are faced with growing vulnerability of our strategic
deterrent. As a result, we need to enhance the survivability
of offensive forces complemented by effective programs for
continuity of government, strategic connectivity, and civil
defense.

Over the longer term, control of space will be decisive
in conflict. The military potential of space must be exploited
in support of national security objectives.
# U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

PART I

National Objectives and the International Environment

Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States shall serve the following broad purposes:

-- To preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

-- To protect the United States -- its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack.

-- To foster the economic well-being of the United States, in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources.

-- To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the United States by maintaining and strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever possible and practicable, freedom, rule of law, economic development and national independence throughout the world.

(U)

The International Environment

United States national security policy will be guided by the following assessment of the current international situation and of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of our broad objectives.

The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future the most formidable threat to the United States and to American interests globally. The growth of Soviet military power over the

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Review April 30, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
last decade has called into question the ability of the United States and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet Union and its allies across the spectrum of conflict. At the same time, the Soviet policy of unparalleled global expansionism challenges the strategic interests and position of the United States around the world.

The loss of U.S. nuclear superiority means that the U.S. cannot depend on nuclear forces to offset its general purpose force deficiencies. This fact, expanded Soviet conventional capabilities and a growing capability to project their military power, have increased the relative importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities. The increased likelihood that a U.S.-Soviet conflict could be both global and protracted, heightens the need for a substantial U.S. industrial base for mobilization.

Building on their strengthened military position, the Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated political/military/economic strategy combining selective use of their own and proxy military and security forces, arms sales and grants, economic incentives and disincentives, manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations, diplomatic and arms control initiatives, and propaganda and disinformation activities. The near-term objectives of their strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally and to weaken the United States, first by blocking access to strategic resources and land and sea routes; second, by isolating the U.S. by fomenting disharmony with allies, friends, and neutrals, and third, by undermining political will in the west.

At the same time, the Soviets will continue to have important vulnerabilities. The economies and the social systems of the Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to exhibit serious structural weaknesses. The appeal of Communist ideologies appears to be decreasing throughout much of the world, including the Soviet bloc itself. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has revealed some of the limitations on the effectiveness of Soviet power projection capabilities. Non-Russian nationalities are growing relative to the dominant Russian population. Events in Poland have underlined, and could contribute further to, the internal weakness of most Warsaw Pact countries.
The passing of the Brezhnev era and the likelihood of an ensuing succession struggle will make Soviet policy less predictable. Political and economic vulnerabilities at home could induce new leaders to seek reduced tensions abroad. However, greater military strength and possibly a greater sense of international self-confidence among the younger generation of leaders could make them more willing to risk confrontation with the West.

In the Near East and Southwest Asia, the chronic instability of the region both within and among states, including the Arab-Israel conflict, the rise of militant nationalist and religious movements, together with an expanded Soviet presence, poses a critical threat to Western political, economic and security interests.

A critical stake in this region is the oil in the Persian Gulf. The western economic system needs ready access to it while control of this energy source by the Soviet Union would give it a strangle hold over the West and enormously ease the Soviet economic difficulties. Herein lies an issue of potential superpower confrontation.

The People's Republic of China remains hostile to the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese client, and appears to have begun an ideological evolution away from Soviet-style Communism. As such, China plays an important role in United States global policy toward the Soviet Union. At the same time, the uncertainties of China's future internal evolution and the possibility of a closer relationship with the USSR pose a latent long-term threat to U.S. and allied interests.

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient unproductive economies, rising expectations, rapid social change, the persistence of traditional conflicts and the prevalence of violence, create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many countries of the Developing World.

Acceleration of efforts by several nations to acquire nuclear weapons threatens the viability of the international non-proliferation regime, with potentially serious consequences for regional stability as well as for the security of the United States.

The unwillingness of our major allies to expand their military programs significantly and to rethink political and military strategies in the light of the increasing Soviet
threat are driven by economic requirements, domestic political conditions and differing views of the nature and objectives of the adversary. However, the economic strength and shared interests and values of the nations within the Western alliance are assets of great importance if effectively mobilized.

For all of these reasons, the decade of the eighties will pose the greatest challenge to the survival and well-being of the U.S. since World War II. Our response to this challenge could result in a fundamentally different East-West relationship by the end of the decade.

Objectives of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States will be guided by the following global objectives:

-- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict, to defeat such attack should deterrence fail, and to prevent or neutralize Soviet efforts to intimidate or coerce the U.S. or others through its military power.

-- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations that have potential strategic importance for us, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, by selective diplomatic and economic initiatives, by economic policies that enhance our influence, by helping to resolve regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests, and by expanded political action and information efforts.

-- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.

-- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation.
To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries.

To limit the growth of, and where possible, to reduce Soviet military capabilities by demonstrating the sustained commitment of the U.S. to increase its military strength, to redress any significant imbalance favoring the Soviet Union, pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements that limit Soviet power, and preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union.

To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources.

To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans.

To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World.

To promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences.

In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will be guided by the following operational objectives in specific regions:
In Europe, to preserve the NATO alliance, while strengthening NATO capabilities and, if necessary adjusting NATO strategy to deter and defeat the threat posed by dramatically improved Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces; to counter West European political trends that inhibit effective U.S. and allied action in this direction; to encourage the European allies to provide support for our objectives in other regions, particularly Southwest Asia; to work with the Europeans in their efforts to overcome the serious economic problems that have limited the freedom of action of certain Western governments; to increase the costs of, Soviet repression of popular movements and institutions in Poland and other East European countries; and to maximize prospects for their independent evolution.

In the Western Hemisphere, to blunt and contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; to reduce and if possible eliminate Soviet influence in Cuba; to discourage the USSR from using Cuba as a base for mounting a strategic threat to the security of the hemisphere; to strengthen U.S. political and military relationships with key countries; to promote sustained economic progress in the Caribbean Basin area, and to assist friendly governments in combatting Marxist-Leninist insurgencies.

In Africa, to defeat aggression, subversive and terrorist activities sponsored by Libya or other forces hostile to U.S. interests; to secure the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet proxy forces on the continent; to ensure U.S. and allied access to strategically important mineral resources, while promoting improvement in regional racial policies; and to establish a U.S. presence on the continent and adjacent areas.

In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances; to recognize our relationship with Japan as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in East Asia; to encourage Japan to increase its military capabilities
to be able to participate meaningfully with the U.S. in a rational division of labor in the Asia-Pacific area by attaining the self-defense power necessary to provide for regional security in the Northwest Pacific in this decade; to deter aggression by North Korea and Vietnam, and to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Vietnamese presence in Laos and Kampuchea; while maintaining our unofficial relationship and fulfilling our obligations to Taiwan, preserve a broad, effective working relationship with the PRC, and to encourage its interest in friendship with the U.S. and to strengthen its ability to resist Soviet invasion and intimidation, so that the PRC remains a strategic counter against the Soviet Union without posing a threat to U.S. and allied interests over the long term; to encourage the economic and political development of the ASEAN states as a source of stability within Southeast Asia; to strengthen the U.S. strategic relationship with Australia and New Zealand within the ANZUS framework.

[...]

In the Near East, Southwest and South Asia, to ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to gain and maintain sufficient influence and presence to support U.S. interests in the region; to preserve the independence of Israel and other key states in the region and to strengthen their ability to resist aggression or subversion by a regional or extra-regional power or movement; to gain the cooperation of countries outside the region in accomplishing our various objectives in the region; to enhance the possibility of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner that respects the security interests of all parties; to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; to deter or frustrate further military intervention or subversion by the Soviet Union, Soviet proxies, or regional states or movements hostile to Western interests; to ensure a network of military facilities in the region for the rapid introduction of sizeable U.S. forces; to encourage India to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union, and to establish stable relations with other states in the region; and to support the further development of a secure and independent Pakistan. (TS)
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

PART II

Implementing Strategies

The overall national objectives of the United States are to be implemented through an interlocking set of strategies that principally include the following:

-- diplomatic;
-- information;
-- economic/political;
-- military.

The full articulation of U.S. National Strategy requires the development and integration of each set of strategies into a comprehensive whole. The various instruments of U.S. national power and the strategies for their use do not stand alone; rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be effective, must be mutually supportive. Part I of this study provides the common starting point towards this end.

The overall study process will build upon this common starting point by means of individual study segments. Part III of this study will consider the military component only. The other components of U.S. national strategy as outlined above are the subject of companion studies being undertaken on an expeditious basis. Additional studies will also be undertaken concerning the role of intelligence, covert operations, and arms control in supporting the implementing strategies.

(C)
Throughout the 1980s the growing military might of the USSR, its gradually increasing capacity to operate far from its frontiers, and its willingness to provide military advisers and arms to radical governments and insurgency movements in the Third World will pose growing challenges to the US. The growth in Soviet strategic nuclear power and conventional military capability along its borders is especially striking. However, actual extensions of Soviet power have depended on perceived opportunities around the world, opportunities heightened by the absence of effective resistance. Moreover, it will become increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sustain their military buildup as their economic growth slows.

Despite the growth in Soviet strength, a premeditated US-USSR military conflict is much less probable than conflict resulting from regional tensions, especially in the Middle East, that could once again involve the US in a war with a Soviet ally or client. Without attributing to the Soviet leadership a propensity to assume high risks, increased relative Soviet power suggests that the USSR might take bolder action in lower-level crises than in the past.

The sense of enhanced security created by the Soviet military posture may encourage the USSR to continue to take advantage of local unrest in the developing world through proxies, the provision of arms, advisers, and the deployment of its combat forces in a few countries. It will continue to do so wherever Moscow perceives that it can undermine pro-Western governments, especially if this can be done without risking a confrontation with the US.

In addition, nuclear proliferation will become an increasingly serious problem in coming years as more countries acquire the ability to make nuclear weapons and, in some instances, actually do so.

During the 1970s, the Soviets achieved their long sought-after goal of superpower status alongside the US. However, Moscow did not regard "parity" or acceptance of "detente" as requiring adherence to a global code of conduct acceptable to Washington. Moscow has perceived the US as politically constrained not only by the trauma of Vietnam but by an inability to achieve domestic consensus on foreign policy. In turn, the Soviets have probed US resolve in the Third World, as witnessed by their military support ventures in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets have also exploited detente to promote divisions between the US and its NATO allies, and, most importantly, to encourage neutralism in West Germany.
The scale of Soviet investment in nuclear forces demonstrates their importance in Moscow's strategy. They believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses sufficient strategic capabilities to devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders state that nuclear war with the US would be a catastrophe that must be avoided and that they do not regard such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have not accepted mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it serves their interests, but they prefer possession of superior capabilities and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in a conflict with the US. A tenet in their strategic thinking appears to be that the better prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be deterred from attacking the USSR and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions.

The USSR will continue to improve the striking power and survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear offensive forces, overcome some of the weaknesses of its strategic defenses, and improve their supporting command, control, and communications systems. Because the Soviets rely heavily on ICBMs, the increasing vulnerability of their ICBM silos to improving US weapons will cause them to be concerned with the adequacy of their strategic force capabilities. The Soviets are expanding the capabilities of their SLBM force and are developing mobile ICBMs and a new swing-wing intercontinental bomber. Even with ongoing improvements in their strategic defenses, the Soviets will be unable to prevent massive damage to the USSR from surviving US strategic forces.

Soviet efforts in non-acoustic sensors for ASW and directed energy weapons could have profound consequences if major technological breakthroughs occur, although we do not foresee such successes in the near future. It is unlikely that the Soviets could develop prototype high-powered directed energy weapons for antisatellite applications until the late 1980s or for ballistic missile defense until the 1990s. Deployment of operational systems would require an additional several years to a decade. However, Soviet military capabilities in space will continue to improve, especially in the use of manned space platforms and in antisatellite capabilities.

The Soviets are attempting to prepare their leaders and military forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. Soviet leaders are aware that the course of a nuclear conflict will probably not go according to plans, but they have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in nuclear war, improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR.
The Soviets have vigorously modernized and expanded their theater and peripheral nuclear forces. They are now in a better position to escalate a European conflict and have acquired increased capabilities to use peripheral strike forces opposite China and throughout the Eurasian periphery.

Soviet leaders view their current strategic position as supporting the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the expansion of Soviet influence abroad. They do not believe that they currently enjoy significant strategic military advantages over the US, and they do not wish a major confrontation, but they are probably less fearful of this occurring than they were five years ago. Thus, although the Soviets are unlikely to initiate military hostilities in an area of central importance to the US like the Persian Gulf, they may be prepared to seize opportunities offered by instability in Iran or Pakistan, and they may increasingly expect that the burden of avoiding confrontation should shift to the US—reflecting the change in the "correlation of forces" since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Although they fear the possible consequences of US military modernization efforts, the Soviets seem willing to wait for current US determination to wane as a result of domestic opposition. None of the current contenders to succeed Brezhnev seems likely to depart radically from established Soviet priorities. The military establishment has great influence on current Soviet policy formulation and that influence may increase during a succession struggle. As a result, Brezhnev's immediate successors are unlikely to change the present emphasis on defense spending or decrease their efforts to project Soviet power.

In the conventional realm, the Soviets have significantly modernized their massive land and air forces opposite Europe and China. When fully mobilized after 30 days, the Soviets can bring to bear concurrently 124 divisions in Central Europe, 28 divisions against Iran, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf region, and 51 divisions against China. Significantly, the Soviets have separate forces for each of these theaters and can take major action in one theater without drawing down capabilities elsewhere. Although they have not developed forces specifically for overseas operations, they have developed an ability to project forces on a modest scale into the Third World, and this is one of the most rapidly expanding areas of Soviet capability. They are significantly increasing their airlift capability, VSTOL aircraft carriers and fast sealift capability. Most significantly, the USSR's 7 airborne divisions are maintained in a high state of readiness and are a potential tool of Soviet intervention. For the most part, however, the Soviets will continue to rely on surrogates in the Third World.
Complementing other efforts is Moscow's involvement in support of revolutionary violence worldwide. Some radical regimes have come to power with Moscow's aid, while others have done so largely on their own—for instance, in Nicaragua and Ethiopia—and later turned to the USSR for support. The USSR also directly or indirectly supports a number of national insurgencies and ethnic-separatist movements by providing them with arms, advice, military training, and political backing. In addition, the USSR and Eastern Europe support allied or friendly governments and entities—notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, South Yemen, Syria and Cuba—which in turn directly or indirectly aid the subversive or terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of violent revolutionaries. Overall, there will be increasing terrorist threats to US military and civilian personnel and facilities which will stem from disparate conditions, political causes, and groups. An increase in anti-American terrorism is expected in Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and, to a lesser extent, southern Africa.

The Soviets will undoubtedly attempt to increase hard currency earnings as well as promote political and strategic interests through arms sales. Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales, military technicians and advisers, and military training are important sources of political influence in the Third World. There has been an influx of large numbers of Soviet-bloc military technicians and civilian advisers in Third World Countries. In 1981 these totalled over 80,000 in the Middle East, about 10,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 11,000 in Asia. The amount of influence such assistance buys is arguable, but there is no question the arms sold enable the buyers to engage in stronger military actions. Although recipients of Soviet aid are capable of changing policies against Soviet interests—as shown by Egypt—the Soviets have gained political leverage, a potential basis for a greater military presence in the future, and, in some cases, actual battlefield experience. And the military training of large numbers of Third World nationals in the East Bloc provides Moscow with a potential cadre of sympathizers.

The Soviets have a number of military vulnerabilities in each of their five services. At the highest level, there are serious questions about the reliability of their NSWP allies. Their strategic bomber force is old and vulnerable to modern air defenses. Their SSBNs are relatively noisy, and their ASW systems are inadequate. Their strategic air defenses would in general perform poorly against low-altitude penetrators. Their general purpose forces also have deficiencies, for instance, in advancing under unforeseen and quickly changing circumstances. They also have logistical vulnerabilities, including a heavy reliance on rail transportation.
The Soviets face severe economic problems. Economic growth throughout the 1980s will probably be 2 percent or less per year. Contributing to this bleak economic outlook are slow growth in the labor force, slowing growth of energy production, prolonged foreign exchange stringencies, greater costs in extracting raw materials, and continuing difficulties in introducing new technology. Living standards in the USSR will probably stagnate owing to the growing defense burden and inefficient investment practices. As Soviet citizens perceive a decline in the quality of life, productivity growth will also decline unless dramatic economic reforms are introduced—an unlikely prospect. These problems will force Moscow to make difficult choices among priorities. While it will be increasingly difficult for it to sustain growth in military spending, the primacy of the military will continue in Soviet planning.

Although Soviet economic troubles are not dominated by a shortage of energy, the Soviet economy is consuming increasing amounts of energy at progressively higher cost. Oil exports, the biggest hard currency earner, are declining; oil and coal production at best is stagnant; only natural gas production is expanding. Moscow will have to decide among domestic needs for energy, politically sensitive—and highly subsidized—sales to allies, and oil sales to the West for badly needed hard currency.

The Soviets have several external problems. Hostility with China and turmoil along the USSR's borders (e.g., Poland and Afghanistan) reinforce its obsession with the need for order and friendly regimes along its frontiers. The potential for ideological contamination of its allies and friends, due to recent events in Poland and Afghanistan, also gives them cause for concern. Moreover, internal unrest and insurgency have come to plague a number of Soviet clients; these countries continue to consume scarce resources.

Parallel to Moscow's military effort, the Soviets will try to pursue an arms control dialogue with the West. The strategic arms control process in particular remains important as a means of constraining military competition with the US. A major Soviet motivation in this dialogue has been to reduce the possibility of a US technological breakthrough that might jeopardize Moscow's strategic nuclear status.

So far the Soviets have continued to constrain their strategic force programs in accordance with the SALT I Interim Agreement and the key provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty. If the Soviets conclude there is no prospect in the near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT, they may decide to go beyond the SALT II constraints. Among the earliest indications that they had decided to do so would be the failure to dismantle older systems as new ones are deployed, the testing of ICBMs with more RVs than permitted under SALT II limits, and the testing of more than one new ICBM. They are
well positioned for potential force expansion and could increase the number of MIRVed ICBMs, continue SSBN production without any SSBN dismantlement, increase Backfire production, and test and deploy new strategic systems. We are not able to judge whether, if the Soviets wished to expand significantly several of their nuclear force capabilities simultaneously, they would encounter constraints in the availability of fissile material. The history of Soviet willingness to sign long-term contracts for the sale of enriched uranium suggests that Moscow has not been concerned about potential shortfalls in nuclear material for weapons.

The Soviets probably want to preserve the ABM treaty without amendments for at least the next few years. They are concerned that the US could eventually deploy effective ABM systems. Also, their own systems are still under development, and they are probably not confident about how effective a widespread ABM defense might be. There are, however, uncertainties about US actions and Soviet technical capabilities beyond the mid-1980s that might cause the Soviets to revise their views of a widespread ABM defense.

To sum it up, it is doubtful that Soviet leaders perceive a "window of opportunity" in the next several years, but they very likely believe that schisms in the West and domestic inhibitions in the US provide them some latitude for additional actions. During the next 3-5 years, Moscow may attempt to secure political advantage from its military arsenal in anticipation of US force modernization programs. From the perspective of the present and probable future Soviet leadership, there will remain important deterrents to major military actions. These include the dangers seen in a direct conflict with the US, doubts about the reliability of their Eastern European allies, worries about Chinese exploitation of any Soviet losses, and an awareness of the greater Western economic capacity to support extended wartime operations. These concerns clearly do not preclude action abroad but they constrain them.

Europe

For the foreseeable future, it will be a Soviet objective to acquire and maintain forces capable of winning a war in Europe, whether conventional or nuclear, and the Soviets have kept a clear numerical edge over NATO. NATO's strength and the instability in Eastern Europe make the Soviets very unlikely to initiate military hostilities against NATO, but they will use their military advantages to exert political pressure on NATO members and probably also to continue to encourage US-West European differences. This effort has been especially strong against the key NATO ally, West Germany, which remains divided from East Germany and so is especially susceptible to Soviet influence.
The Soviets intend any European conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in place at the outset of hostilities. They prefer to achieve theater objectives without using nuclear weapons. They apparently believe that a theater nuclear war would arise either if NATO used nuclear weapons to avoid losing a conventional war—circumstances in which the Soviets would plan on preemptive use of their nuclear weapons—or, less likely, if the Warsaw Pact had to use nuclear weapons to halt a NATO break-through. In such a conflict the Soviets would use, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, peripheral and some intercontinental range missiles and aircraft against NATO's forward-based nuclear forces.

The military balance in Europe poses a problem for Soviet policy. The Soviets know that, if they appear too threatening, they risk galvanizing NATO sentiment in favor of renewed defense efforts. Thus, Moscow has pursued a dual policy: improving its military strength—including SS-20 deployments and procurement of Backfire bombers—while engaging in arms control talks, attempting to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and undertaking a massive propaganda campaign—supplemented by covert activities—designed to undermine public support for NATO's defense effort, particularly INF. Such Soviet efforts concentrate on West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

Potentially the most threatening problem for the USSR is the questionable reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in a war with the West, and recent events in Poland have made it more pressing.

The military balance in Europe and NATO will be affected by developments in Western Europe. Strains within NATO and the possible estrangement of some West European neutrals from some US policies are likely to make US relations with these countries more contentious. The West European allies will seek increasingly to coordinate their policies in order to present the US with agreed alternatives to disputed US positions. This tendency toward divergence within the Alliance may increasingly hinder NATO as a mechanism for determining and coordinating security policy.

East and Southeast Asia

The Far East is second only to Europe in strategic importance for Soviet military policy. In contrast with Europe, the USSR directly borders its major potential enemy. Furthermore, the Soviet supply line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is dangerously close to a hostile China.
In the coming few years, Soviet military power in East Asia will seek to contain or reduce China's influence, decrease American and Japanese influence, discourage anti-Soviet policies on the part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system.

The most immediate threat to peace in Asia that could involve US forces is in Korea. North Korea is dedicated to reunifying the Peninsula on its own terms, and the decade-long North Korean military buildup is aimed at promoting a military option. The US security commitment and US military presence, the strength of South Korea's military forces, the stability of its government, and the desire of the Chinese and the Soviets to maintain the status quo, are substantial deterrents to a North Korean move. However, these factors may not be sufficient to prevent a North Korean attack, particularly if the US were preoccupied elsewhere.

Moscow's principal concerns in Southeast Asia are to contain China and diminish US influence. For their sizeable economic investment in support of Vietnamese policy, the Soviets have already realized substantial returns. They have a highly visible advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have gained access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities. These facilities enable the Soviets better to support Indian Ocean deployments and to expand intelligence collection capabilities in the region. Even though Vietnam is a major drain on Soviet economic resources, Moscow probably will seek greater influence in Southeast Asia.

Action by Vietnam against Thailand is the most likely cause of expanded regional conflict in Southeast Asia. Vietnamese forces might strike into Thailand if Hanoi concluded that it could no longer tolerate Thai support of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla forces in Kampuchea. A Vietnamese attack would have severe consequences, especially in view of US and Chinese security ties to Thailand and the USSR's commitment to Hanoi. China might initiate a second border war with Vietnam to tie down Vietnamese forces. Soviet forces might then apply pressure on China. A Sino-Soviet conflict would sorely test the evolving US-Chinese relationship, forcing the United States to decide whether it wished to be involved and, if so, how.

Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is reasonably secure, the Soviets probably expect no change in China's hostile posture toward the USSR. At the same time, they expect intensified US pressure on Japan to assume a greater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically against the USSR. They have also seen a reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to maintain sizeable forces in South Korea.
Whether the Far East would be a defensive theater for the Soviets in a global war or whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on their political objectives and the military situation in other theaters. In general, the Soviets would want to avoid a "two-front" war. In a strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Soviets would probably seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the US would be faced with coercive threats or military operations designed to prevent the use of Japanese bases.

China has deployed a small force of ICBMs and MRBMs and is developing an SLBM. A shared Chinese-US assessment of the Soviet threat is likely--not certain--to ensure that this missile force remains trained on Soviet targets. The same circumstances also lead China to support most US interests in the trilateral strategic relationship among the US, China, and the USSR. Only a sharp and prolonged retrogression in Chinese-US bilateral ties would change this equation significantly and cause China to reemerge as a threat to US interests in its own right.

The Near East, South, and Southwest Asia

There are a large number of potential military threats to US interests in this region. The Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the war between Iran and Iraq have made the Persian Gulf area the dominant US strategic concern in the Middle East. The most severe danger is that Iran might succumb to increased Soviet influence or a large-scale military intervention with the Soviets using the 1921 Soviet-Iran treaty as a legal pretext.

Other potential dangers in the region are that friendly states may be attacked by other local states--most immediately that the end game of the Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of the fighting and threaten other Gulf Arabs--and that friendly governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets.

However it might happen, Soviet political or military control of the principal oil supplies to the West European and Japanese economies could threaten the dissolution of our alliance system by subjecting our allies to Soviet pressure. In addition, the Soviets might view control over some of the lowest cost energy in the world as a potentially important contributor to easing their serious economic difficulties. If friendly governments, dependent on Soviet support, were to assume power in one or more oil-rich states, the Soviets could acquire a valuable flow of hard currency.
The most immediate threats to US interests in the Gulf region are from Islamic revolutionaries in Iran and the potential of direct Iranian military attacks on Gulf regimes, or more likely, acceleration of Iranian-sponsored subversion. In addition, Pakistan may be subjected to increased Soviet pressure and possibly military action in retaliation for its support of the Afghan insurgents. The Soviets already have sought to intimidate Islamabad by diplomatic warnings, by condoning, if not provoking, a number of attacks by Afghan helicopters on Pakistani border outposts, and by supporting anti-government terrorist elements.

The tensions around the Gulf have sharply reduced for the present the number of Arab forces that could be arrayed against Israel. Even without this advantage, Israel will maintain its wide margin of military superiority over the Arab states. Although this superiority would serve to deter a premeditated Arab attack, actions in Lebanon or elsewhere could lead to a wider conflict in which the possibility of Soviet intervention must be considered.

Another threat is posed by Libya, with its sizeable equipment inventories, interventions in Africa, and support for subversion and terrorism. Although Qadhafi may from time to time modify his activities, his efforts to undermine moderate regimes and Western influence in the area will continue. Nevertheless, the Libyan military will remain ineffective in exploiting its plethora of weapons in conventional combat.

Like Libya's military adventures and support for subversion, the war in the Western Sahara and developments in Morocco and Algeria will remain a lesser threat to US interests than the conditions around the Persian Gulf and the threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

Tensions between Pakistan and India will remain, fed in part by Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program aimed primarily at the development of a nuclear weapons production capability. India will become increasingly concerned and might undertake either a military strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities or the production of its own nuclear weapons as, in New Delhi's calculation, Pakistan begins to acquire significant quantities of weapons usable fissile material. Any Indian attack could rapidly escalate into a full-scale war.

Latin America

The threat environment in Latin America through the mid-1980s will be dominated by Communist exploitation of social and political trends in Central America. However, it is most unlikely that the USSR would be prepared to engage in a major confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean or Central America.
Cuba is capable of taking independent action as well as operating in concert with the USSR—or in response to its wishes. Perceiving a weakening of US influence and capability and opportunities to undermine US prestige, Castro since 1978 has increased assistance to revolutionaries in the region. The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has gradually expanded its involvement—efforts complemented by some East European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and the PLO. Unless faced with important new costs or inducements, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.

Soviet-Cuban military ties have led to a continuous Soviet upgrading of the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, have enabled the USSR to make extensive use of Cuban facilities, and have resulted in Soviet-Cuban collaboration abroad. By now, the principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America are to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and to use Nicaragua as a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in the region. External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build the region's largest standing army, and this buildup is intimidating governments in the region and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of revolution.

The threats to US security interests from Cuba are compounded by its capability for effective military action within the Caribbean region. While there is little likelihood of Cuban offensive military action against the US, there are a number of US targets vulnerable to Cuban actions, such as harassment of various sea and air routes. It is, however, unlikely that Cuba would undertake such drastic action unless it felt directly threatened by US activity. Cuba might act, however, at the insistence of the Soviets during a time of general war.

A continuation of present trends could result in victory for the extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory would heighten prospects for revolutionaries in Guatemala and elsewhere in the region. It may be that those Communist and radical Arab forces providing external support and management help to the insurgencies intend to make Central America a battleground over the next few years which would distract, weaken, and undermine the United States in other parts of the world. These scenarios could bring revolution to Mexico's border and to Panama, and this region will come to have even greater significance for US security interests if present trends continue.

Elsewhere in the hemisphere, there is little direct military threat to the US, but other troubles for US security interests. There has been a trend over the last 15 years away from close traditional ties with the US which has been reflected in a reluctance on the part of many Latin American governments to accept US leadership or to cooperate with the US on a number of political, economic, and security issues. A neutral or hostile position on the part of Latin American nations could have
significant negative consequences for the US, particularly in the case of the larger, more important countries like Brazil and Argentina which have the military potential to contribute to US defense objectives or will have the potential to develop nuclear weapons during this decade.

There is a potential threat to the Panama Canal and its facilities which are vulnerable to a variety of actions that could disrupt operations or close the Canal for varying lengths of time. In addition, traditional antagonisms between countries such as Argentina and Chile, although unlikely to lead to major or sustained armed conflict, could produce border clashes and short-term hostilities. Political and economic instability in Latin America will continue to provide opportunities for direct or indirect Soviet involvement in the future.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently quite small and involve the possibility of local conflicts or domestic instabilities broadening to draw in the superpowers on the side of local clients. For the most part the problems are indigenous: racial animosities and ethnic and tribal communalism.

Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create for the US in the next several years, the most acute could be:

-- Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing military assistance--either directly or through the Cubans--to Soviet clients in the event of internal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability in Chad or Sudan.

-- Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if threatened with internal collapse.

-- Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third country--with or without Soviet encouragement.

-- Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.

-- An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region.

-- Stepped-up Cuban and Soviet involvement with southern African states which may increasingly rely on Moscow and Havana to counter South Africa's military posture.
Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is unlikely to endanger long-term Western access to strategic metals or oil. The Soviets would not be able to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals for themselves, or—barring a collapse of political order in South Africa—to impose a prolonged denial of them to the West. Rather, the USSR seeks to promote political objectives and to enhance the USSR's future strategic capabilities in the area. While not necessarily entailing Soviet involvement, there are other potential flashpoints that may impinge on US security interests in Africa through the mid-1980s (e.g., Ethiopia's activities in the Horn, South Africa's domestic and foreign policies, and internal conflict in Zaire).

Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily assure heightened future Soviet influence. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and by the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek economic ties with the West. And in the 1980s the Soviets will be vulnerable to Western counteraction in areas of current Soviet influence.

Continuing Uncertainties

Although the future portrayed here is fraught with problems for the US, it is quite possible that on balance this assessment is too optimistic. Soviet willingness to employ military force on a larger scale than they have so far might be substantially increased by the late 1980s if events move in their favor more strongly than suggested above: the US does not sustain its military buildup, the growth of "peace" sentiment in the US, the spread of neutralism in Western Europe—especially West Germany—a deterioration in Sino-US relations, or greater disarray in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

The following are the key intelligence issues of continuing concern for further collection and analysis:

-- Will the Soviets continue to remain within SALT limits for their strategic forces even though existing agreements have expired?

-- Are the Soviets likely to break out from the ABM treaty? How would they respond to a US abrogation of this treaty?

-- Is it likely that the Soviet Union would significantly reduce defense spending in response to domestic economic problems? How severe will these problems be? Will there be any radical change in the policy objectives of the current and post-Brezhnev leaders?
-- Is any major change likely in the current situation in the Far East, to include Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet-Japanese-US relations, and the Korean Peninsula?

-- Is it likely that the USSR will exploit opportunities or weaknesses in Iran, Pakistan, or elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region by means of direct military intervention?

-- Will the Soviets react to INF deployments in Western Europe with similar deployments in Cuba?
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

PART III, SECTION B

The Role of Allies and Others

Since the establishment of a Western security framework in the years immediately following World War II, global power relationships have shifted in several ways. First, there has been a shift in the U.S.-USSR nuclear balance from clear U.S. superiority to a state of rough parity with the prospect of U.S. inferiority. Equally marked, however, is the altered balance, especially in economic and political terms, between the U.S. and its industrial allies. The latter group (NATO Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) now produces a considerably larger share of the world product than the U.S. In addition, the post World War II decolonization process has made the industrial democracies increasingly dependent for a number of critical resources upon nations of the Third World, some of which are vulnerable to Soviet and proxy activity and many of which find it easier to blame their problems on the West than to face up to them directly.

As a result of these changes, the U.S. must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of our allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military power, and to protect interests threatened from other sources as well. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

Europe

A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protection of Western interests. Although U.S. conventional military power together with our nuclear umbrella remains a large and significant component of the NATO arsenal, the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe has meant both that our NATO Allies are better able to contribute to their own defense and that they expect to have a greater voice in Alliance decisions.

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Western interests require the improvement of the defense capabilities of all members of the Alliance, even during periods of economic difficulty. The U.S. must emphasize the need for Allies to achieve measurable, real increases in annual NATO defense spending and improve their forces to re-dress imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We should maintain -- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities adequate to defeat Soviet/Pact aggression should deterrence fail. While nuclear forces, particularly U.S. nuclear forces, are essential to deterrence, they do not constitute a balanced defense force and should not be allowed to serve as an excuse for avoiding conventional defense improvements. We should, therefore, press for Alliance implementation of key conventional enhancement programs, e.g., force goals, LTDP (particularly readiness, reinforcement, reserve mobilization, air defense, logistics, EW, and C3), armaments cooperation, and host nation support. The Alliance must also continue to move forward on the INF modernization program, while the U.S. and the Soviets continue to negotiate an INF Agreement in Geneva.

Concomitantly, the U.S. should adhere to its forward deployment and early reinforcement commitment of having ten Army divisions with corresponding Air Force and Marine support in Europe within ten days of a reinforcement decision. Notwithstanding the fact that our NATO Allies contribute a majority of the active ground combat and tactical air forces and two-thirds of the total (active and reserve) NATO force structure, U.S. force commitments -- particularly ground combat and tacom missions -- are required by the sheer magnitude of the direct Soviet threat which is unparalleled in any other strategic theater. Allied doubts about our willingness to maintain a significant ground and tacom commitment would undercut our efforts to press them to improve their own conventional capabilities and would risk lowering of the nuclear threshold.

In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, member nations must be prepared to cooperate and integrate their defense efforts beyond current levels, sometimes at the expense of national preferences. To that end, we should pursue opportunities with our Allies for the development and production of interoperable and/or standardized armaments which yield increased combat effectiveness and more efficient use of defense resources. At the same time, we must recognize that there are limits on standardi-
zation (e.g., the desire of each major NATO nation to design and procure its own tanks and tactical aircraft). Our goals should be realistic and emphasize interoperability as a complement or an alternative to standardization.

As a further effort at cooperation and integration, we have obtained or are seeking host nation support (HNS) from our NATO Allies. Germany has agreed to establish a 93,000 man contingent in their Army reserve to provide wartime HNS for U.S. forces. The UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have agreed to provide extensive HNS. In addition, we have signed Line-of-Communications (LOC) and Collocated Operating Base (COB) agreements with many NATO countries which also involve substantial HNS. Our European Allies also have agreed to make available some of their own civilian airlift and sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply of Europe (although there is room for further improvement in this area).

Because of their geographic location and industrial resources, we should continue to support the sovereignty, independence and neutrality of the European neutral/non-aligned countries. Accordingly, we should assist these nations in developing sufficient conventional military capability to protect their territorial integrity and independence, while accepting the fact that their policies dictate they maintain a distance between East and West.

In addition, the U.S. and its Allies must be prepared to conduct unconventional warfare operations in Eastern Europe to take advantage of Soviet political vulnerabilities in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact. Unrest in Poland and other Eastern European countries offers fertile ground on which NATO might build in wartime through psychological and other operations.

Rather than attacking the Alliance directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regions outside Europe where there is less risk of superpower confrontation, while at the same time hoping to erode NATO's political consensus. The region in which events could most severely test Alliance cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA), where the West faces two interrelated threats.

The larger threat is that of direct Soviet military intervention. Only the United States has the power to deter or counter Soviet intervention in SWA. With the exception of naval
forces, European support in such a contingency would be more significant politically than militarily. The more proximate threats, however, arise out of regional conflict and domestic instability in the regional states. European powers, acting in concert with regional states, have the capability of responding to some lower order threats and may in some cases be better placed to do so. Additionally, intervention by European instead of American forces would generally be a less escalatory step and would provide less of a pretext for Soviet intervention in a regional conflict.

Thus, in addition to asking the Allies to improve their defense posture in Europe (including, in some cases, compensation for U.S. forces diverted to SWA), we must continue to urge those Allies in a position to do so (primarily the UK and France) to share the political and military burdens outside Europe in areas where regional conflicts and internal strike as well as Soviet threats could harm Western interests. Such burden sharing outside Europe should include being prepared to fight along side (or instead of) the U.S. Such Allied assistance out-of-area could, in some cases, compensate for specific U.S. force deficiencies against the Soviet threat (e.g., French minesweeping capabilities for SWA contingencies). We should also pursue bilateral arrangements with some of the Allies (e.g., combined contingency planning such as took place with the UK and France during the first phase of the Iran-Iraq War).

In Turkey, we must provide major security assistance support for the Turkish defense modernization effort. We need also to complete negotiations on and to improve Turkish co-located operating bases (COBs). During negotiations on the NATO COB program, the Turks have emphasized that use of these bases will be limited to NATO contingencies. It is neither necessary nor desirable to force the SWA issue with Turkey now, since improvements in Turkish capabilities and facilities would make a contribution in both NATO and SWA contingencies. At the same time, a satisfactory outcome of the COB negotiations and further progress in the Turkish modernization effort, together with the more general effort to engage NATO further in Southwest Asian security issues, will prepare the ground to draw Turkey more deeply into Southwest Asian security planning and possibly gain Turkish support for using their bases for Southwest Asian contingencies.

Within Spain, we must ensure that its integration into NATO is accompanied by a renewal of the bilateral arrangements (similar to the Turkish or Portuguese models) which place our
military presence there on the firm basis of mutual security interests. At the same time, Spanish inclusion under NATO's security umbrella should facilitate the task of persuading Spain to support out-of-area NATO actions, e.g., en route access.

We also need mobility support (both lift and facilities access) for U.S. forces that might be deployed to either NATO or SWA. Building upon their political and economic relations with countries in SWA, the Allies can provide security, economic and training assistance to local states. According to their capabilities, certain Allies can cooperate in maintaining peacetime military presence, conducting combined exercises in SWA, and enhancing their capabilities for military operations in the event of hostilities. In addition, we would expect former colonial powers to play a leading role in external security assistance in Africa.

En route access is a function that every strategically located NATO nation can contribute, especially the UK, the FRG, France, the the nations of the Southern Region (including Spain). In addition to our own efforts, we should also encourage the Allies to help improve Turkish military capabilities given Turkey's role in European defense and its potential contribution to security in Southwest Asia. Equally important, we should foster among all NATO members a political climate which applauds rather than criticizes out-of-area efforts and which eventually gives specific credit (e.g., through NATO force goals) for such efforts.

We must, however, recognize that only a few European countries, primarily the UK and France, have the capabilities to influence events outside Europe, and even they are not fully committed to out-of-area combined security efforts. The FRG has the capabilities, but is inhibited by its history and the current legal interpretation of its constitution from such a role, except for economic and, in some cases, security assistance.

In brief, our strategy should be one which encourages all Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal resources to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. At the same time, our own efforts in other regions (e.g., SWA) of necessity are relatively independent of what our Allies contribute.
Southwest Asia (SWA)

The security environment in SWA bears little resemblance to that in Europe. The greater likelihood of regional conflicts and/or internal instabilities considerably complicates the problems of security planning. Moreover, not only is there no formal security framework, but the Arab-Israeli and other regional conflicts sometimes set our regional friends against one another. Nonetheless, while an alliance structure is unobtainable, a set of well-defined bilateral security cooperation relationships should be pursued.

For direct response to regional (non-Soviet) conflicts and local instability, the U.S. will rely primarily upon forces indigenous to the region (or in some cases, UN peacekeeping forces), with the possibility of ultimately backing them up with quick reaction forces from the U.S., if necessary, and from our European Allies, if possible and appropriate. For non-U.S. contingency forces, U.S. lift may be necessary. Such a division of responsibility is both politically advisable and necessary to preserve the flexibility of U.S. forces for involvement in contingencies with the Soviets.

In order to contain such crises and ensure that direct U.S. military involvement is not required or is minimal, regional states will require capabilities which are sufficient to respond to contingencies without outside augmentation. To that end, regional states will need access to arms, logistical support, technological expertise, and training. Some states, e.g., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Pakistan, will require security assistance to pay for these arms and associated transfers. Some will also require economic assistance to help maintain stability, absorb the impact of military spending, and deny opportunities which could be exploited by the Soviets and their proxies. The United States, together with other external allies and the more affluent states of the region, must be prepared to provide such assistance.

Should external military assistance be necessary to maintain the security of a friendly regional state in the face of non-Soviet threats and/or to foreclose opportunities for subversion or intervention by Soviet surrogates, the prime candidates to aid embattled governments should be other regional states. To ensure that such capabilities exist within the region, the U.S. will support the establishment and maintenance of appropriate regional contingency forces by certain key regional states. The U.S. would have to be prepared to provide the necessary lift for such forces.
If additional or alternative assistance is necessary, U.S. allies from outside the region, e.g., the UK or France, may, if possible and appropriate, be preferable to the U.S. both politically (for the recipient) and in order to avoid escalating to the possibility of a superpower confrontation. U.S. lift support may be necessary, however. In any case, the U.S. should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It should not be necessary, however, to tailor significant U.S. forces to hedge against such contingencies.

In response to the threat of direct Soviet aggression (which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlighted), only the U.S. can provide the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to deter or counter a Soviet attack. However, the U.S. cannot stand alone. Without the cooperation and participation of friendly regional states and external allies, we are unlikely either to deter the Soviets or to contain conflict to the region. In this regard, the capabilities of regional states (and possibly of certain European Allies) to respond to lower order (non-Soviet) contingencies will also contribute to deterring or countering the Soviets. In particular, friendly regional air defense capabilities can cover the initial projection of U.S. forces into SWA. Israeli capabilities could also provide a considerable benefit in contingencies involving direct Soviet attacks into the region and in a war involving U.S. and Soviet Naval/Air Forces in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the U.S. will have to provide the primary forces for resisting the Soviets.

Moreover, because of continuing political sensitivities in the region, it is important that U.S. rapid deployment capabilities be perceived as focusing on the Soviet threat. Such emphasis by the U.S. should make easier the task of drawing our European Allies into regional security efforts and should help allay regional concerns regarding unsolicited U.S. involvement in purely local/regional security affairs.

Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, however, their willingness to appear closely associated with the U.S. is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the closeness of U.S.-Israeli relations. Consequently, access, HNS, and prepositioning will have to be pursued with both persistence and flexibility.

As in Europe, the U.S. cannot militarily help regional states in opposing the Soviets without access to regional
facilities and support from host governments. To maximize the value of facilities access both for deterrence and during contingencies, such cooperation must, if possible, be manifest in peacetime through public agreements, contingency planning and/or exercises. In some instances, infrastructure improvements will also be necessary, most likely involving U.S. military construction funds. In addition, both to demonstrate cooperation politically and to enhance capabilities militarily, the U.S. must seek host nation logistical support (HNS) and facilities at which to preposition certain types of U.S. equipment and supplies.

In Egypt, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, we will need to maintain and develop the facilities to which we have access, as quickly as possible. In Saudi Arabia, contingency discussions between USMTM and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA) should seek to identify as quickly as possible the facilities and support which would be available to deploying U.S. forces. Saudi concerns regarding more visible contingencies, e.g., the threat from Iran and recent associated events, may improve the prospects for engaging them in a more purposeful dialogue with us on security cooperation.

Following on our strengthening of U.S.-Pakistani security relations over the past year, we should continue to examine the possibility of facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for both regional contingencies and in the event of Soviet aggression against Pakistan (taking care not to increase Indian anxieties about, or to incite retaliatory actions against, Pakistan in the process). An access agreement and plans for improvement and utilization of Moroccan air facilities should be completed as soon as possible. A decision whether to seek access to Sudan is needed. The potential contribution of en route access in Sub-Saharan Africa should also be evaluated.

Overall, given the combination of military requirements and political feasibility, we should concentrate U.S. defense resources allocated for facilities access and improvements in the region in Egypt and Oman. If, however, the political feasibility were to increase, Saudi Arabia (to the extent that U.S. resources were necessary) and Turkey should receive the same priority as Egypt and Oman.

To bolster both our capability and our credibility with regional states regarding our intent to participate in their defense against Soviet threats, the U.S. will need to maintain
an important peacetime presence in the region. In the near-
term, we will maintain U.S. presence by continuous naval
deployments in the Indian Ocean and operations in the Persian
Gulf, as well as by periodic Army and Air Force deployments
to the region to participate in combined exercises with local
friends and external allies. In the longer-term, we must seek
arrangements to allow forward deployments of U.S. ground, naval,
and air forces in the region, including forward elements of the
RDJTF, should the political environment permit.

In conclusion, we should support (through our own and allied
security assistance) the development of balanced and self-contained
forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats,
with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Pakistan for regional
contingency roles. We should size and structure U.S. forces for
contingencies involving the Soviets and publicly portray those
forces as intended for such missions. Additionally, with respect
to Soviet contingencies, regional states can provide certain types
of logistical support, and both regional states and external allies
can augment our combat capabilities, as well as provide en route
or in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that
in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be providing a hedge
against the possibility that we may have to intervene in local or
regional contingencies.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin

The amount and extent of the Japanese defense effort is
limited by its constitution and history. Nevertheless, Japan
and the U.S. have agreed on a division of defense responsibili-
ties. Japan's Prime Minister has indicated that Japan can provide
legally for the self-defense of its territory, its surrounding
seas and skies, and the sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles
from the Home Islands. The Japanese should be encouraged to
contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts. To
the extent that their contribution does increase, it will
increase the flexibility to use U.S. forces for other missions
in the Pacific or elsewhere.

Beyond expanding their self-defense effort to enhance the
overall air/ naval balance in the North Pacific, the Japanese
are being asked to provide wartime Host Nation Support in the
form of facilitative assistance to U.S. forces in Japan. Studies
of such assistance to U.S. forces engaged in a Korean contingency
began in January 1982. It is expected that other scenarios
will be considered subsequently, and longer-term goals should include discussion of topics such as Japanese provision of mobility assets (e.g., civil aviation and merchant marine) for U.S. deployments to Southwest Asia. Public discussion of such goals should be avoided, however, until such time as the GOJ has prepared the appropriate political and legal foundation.

As we expect a favorable Japanese policy decision on defense technology transfers in the next several months, we should make a major study of mutual defense needs which might be served by U.S. and Japanese industry working together on weapons-related projects. We should continue to press Japan to bring its POL, munitions, other war reserve stocks and related infrastructure up to full inventory objective levels. As a priority, Japan should also increase further its overseas development assistance, particularly to critical states in Southwest Asia such as Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, and Turkey though not at the expense of its defense effort.

In addition, we should attempt to facilitate greater defense cooperation between Japan and Korea, recognizing that any significant level of cooperation is unlikely in the near-term. While we should not now ask Japan to assume any other active defense roles beyond its current geographic area of responsibility, we should seek an expansion of Japan's defense perspective in the longer-term. We should, however, concentrate on ways to make increased Japanese resources available to ourselves and others for defense purposes. NSSD-6 on Japan should include consideration of specific functional and geographical areas in which the Japanese security contribution should be concentrated.

The PRC causes the Soviets to devote resources against it that might otherwise go elsewhere. In addition, it provides a constraint upon Vietnamese actions against Thailand. It also lends political-military support and Third World credibility to U.S. opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola (though not in other areas such as Latin America).

We can enhance the durability of the U.S.–Chinese strategic relationship and improve Chinese capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union by supplying appropriate arms and other military technology, by associated training, and by military exchanges. However, over the short-term and mid-term, it is unlikely that we can bring about significant improvement in Chinese military
capabilities so long as China is unwilling or unable to allocate substantial resources of its own to that purpose. We also should seek closer U.S.-PRC coordination on security relations with Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en route access through China for a Pacific airline of communication to Southwest Asia. The U.S. and the PRC might also cooperate to support Soviet equipment inventories of states we are seeking to draw away from Soviet arms relationships.

In addition to Japan and the PRC, the ROK also plays a beneficial role in supporting U.S. interests in East Asia. Our policy should be directed at making the ROK increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities. At present, by virtue of its strong armed forces, the ROK, together with forward deployed U.S. forces now in the region, maintains stability on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the basic strength of its economy (despite its current problems) is such that the ROK should be able to pay for a significant percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future, backed up by the continuation of the U.S. force presence, security guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would also be helpful. Any increases in Korean defense investment, however, should maintain the current division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly U.S. tacair).

In the Southeast Asian region, Australia and New Zealand are allied with us in a solid ANZUS relationship. Both Australia and New Zealand are seeking to improve security cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore bilaterally, and through the Five Power Defense Arrangement which includes the UK. Such cooperation strengthens deterrence against the Vietnamese/Soviet threat in the region. Australia also could provide expanded base and other support facilities, in addition to its potential direct military contribution in the Indian Ocean as well as the Southwest Asian region.

The Philippines and Thailand are also treaty allies which are important to U.S. security interests in Asia. The Philippines provide a major and perhaps irreplaceable U.S. base network for support of our military posture in the region and en route access to Southwest Asia. Thailand can also provide en route access. In return, the U.S. helps these two countries deal with their security problems and supports Thailand as a buffer against Vietnamese expansionism, essentially through security assistance.
As in Southwest Asia, the U.S. relies in Southeast Asia primarily on local states to deal directly with internal instability, with U.S. and other security assistance as necessary. Should external threats or externally supported security problems require direct outside assistance, the U.S. would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government's own efforts with the forces of other states of the region, while seeking to maintain our own flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

The increasing Soviet threat in East Asia at a time when extra-regional demands on U.S. forces, (e.g., Persian Gulf) also are increasing dictates greater reliance on each regional state to provide for its own defense, with U.S. security assistance where required. However, recent fears of U.S. withdrawal from the Pacific -- now quiescent -- could resurface quickly if U.S. pressure on East Asian states for greater defense efforts were seen as a ploy for reducing U.S. forces and commitments.

**Latin America**

The primary direct Soviet threat in this region emanates from Cuba. In a major contingency or war against the Soviet Union, U.S. military forces would be responsible for neutralizing Cuba as a potential base for operations against the U.S. or its lines of communication. Should Nicaragua serve as a staging area for threats against the Panama Canal or Caribbean or Pacific lines of communication, the U.S. would also be responsible for neutralizing that threat. In the South Atlantic and South Pacific, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might contribute to the defense of sea lines of communication, through access for U.S. forces and the employment of their own naval forces. Additional analysis, however, is required to determine the parameters of such cooperation.

As in Southwest and Southeast Asia, the U.S. would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. To aid such efforts, we must be prepared to provide political support and emphasize security and economic assistance. In some instances, we may seek facilities access to allow us to project power into the region. We should also seek to keep the remaining UK, French, and Dutch presence in the region.

Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention
of external allies. In fact, the Europeans, except for the British, have been opposed to our policy in Central America, and we should seek their political neutrality if we cannot gain their support.

U.S. military forces, therefore, represent the essential back-up should local forces be unable to counter the insurgencies. We should, however, make a maximum effort to employ U.S. forces under a multilateral umbrella, whether under the Rio Treaty or a sub-regional grouping such as the Central American Democratic Community of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Africa

The Soviet Union mainly seeks to gain advantage in Africa through the use of surrogates, chief among them Libya and Cuba. Because of Libya's international behavior, the U.S. has sought to rein in its activities through political and military means. While we would prefer to deal with Libyan threats exclusively through friendly states and must help those states to strengthen their military capabilities so they can stand up to Libya, we must be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation warrant it.

Because the possibility of confrontation with the Soviets is greater in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (stemming from conflicts in other regions) and because the threats from Soviet surrogates (Libya and Ethiopia) are also greater in this area, our support for and reliance on friendly states of the North African littoral and the Horn region is greater. In Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and perhaps Zaire and Liberia, in return for our providing security assistance, host nations can provide facilities access (either en route or final destination) to ensure that Western interests can be defended with U.S. or Allied rapid reaction forces.

Against other local and regional threats, we rely primarily on local and regional forces. We are prepared to assist with security and economic assistance, and we ask our external allies and affluent friends to do the same. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. France, the UK, and Belgium are the major actors in that regard. We may also support regional peacekeeping efforts such as the OAU in Chad. U.S. lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security efforts probably would be necessary.
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

PART III, SECTION C

Military Objectives

The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to employ military force to achieve our political objectives and secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. In doing so, the U.S. must plan, in conjunction with allies, for a successful defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies. This means planning so that the Soviet Union would be confronted with a major conventional conflict and the threat of escalation. At the same time, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet conflict to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests. Contingency planning should, however, include options for military actions in regions of clear U.S. advantage to dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack. In this context, the threat of counteroffensives elsewhere is an essential element of U.S. strategy, but is not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend U.S. interests in the area in which they are threatened. Moreover, a decision to expand a war geographically must take account of the facts that the Soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on other fronts at least as attractive as ours, and that geographic expansion and nuclear escalation considerations are linked.

In contingencies involving direct Soviet aggression, the U.S. would expect to play a major role in defending U.S. and allies interests. In lower order, non-Soviet contingencies, we plan to rely on regional states and other friends and allies to the extent possible to deter or counter threats to common interests.

Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocation

Due to the global military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters, the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict would expand beyond one theater to other theaters must be recognized and planned for. This does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously on all fronts. Rather, this means procuring balanced forces and establishing priorities for sequential operations among theaters to ensure that we, in conjunction with our allies, apply our military power in the most effective way. While

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recognizing that the political and military situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions, the following priorities will apply for wartime planning:

- The highest priority is the defense of North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and Caribbean SLOCs), followed by the NATO areas and the LOCs leading there to.

- The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by defense of U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs for the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa.

In areas other than NATO and Southwest Asia, U.S. actions will be designed to protect essential U.S. interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.

Priorities for peacetime resource allocation may not always correlate to the above wartime priorities since special emphasis on specific capabilities may be required.

Equitable Burdensharing. Many nations with living standards equal to the U.S. contribute markedly less to the common defense. In 1982 and beyond, U.S. "quiet diplomacy" must be much firmer in insisting upon increased defense efforts by affluent nations which possess the potential to do more in the defense realm.

Regional Objectives

In the event of war with the Soviet Union, regional objectives provide only rough guidelines and must be viewed in a global perspective.

Europe

The security of Europe is closely linked to that of the United States. The unprecedented challenges to Western security, coupled with a continuing growth in economic interdependence, mandate a firm commitment by nations on both sides of the Atlantic to the coalition warfare strategy of NATO. While intra-Alliance problems such as burdensharing
and anti-nuclear movements exist, it will remain important that we continue to recognize that the defense of Europe is vital to the national security of the United States.

NATO strategy MCL4/3 stresses defense along the forward edge of NATO territory, supported by the possible NATO initiation of nuclear escalation if NATO is losing conventionally. This nuclear linkage -- and uncertainty -- is important to deterrence. But the Europeans must not be permitted to use nuclear linkage as an excuse for not funding conventional defense forces. Our policy should be to support MCL4/3, while stressing that nuclear parity means a strong conventional defense is necessary for deterrence as well as for defense. While improvements are required across the full spectrum of the Alliance's military capabilities, a major increase over current efforts is especially required from all other members with regard to conventional capability. Without such an increase the nuclear threshold could be lowered and the Allies become more vulnerable to nuclear threats as the Soviets continue increasing their capabilities. Additionally, NATO should enhance deterrence through closer Allied coherence, and clearer expression of political will.

Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military objectives for the European region:

**Wartime Objectives**

- To protect the territorial integrity of Western Europe.

- To defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with conventional forces in a forward defense, and to deter Soviet use of chemical or nuclear weapons in accordance with current NATO strategy.

- To fully engage all NATO members in the conflict.

- To be able to sustain a war at least as long as the Warsaw Pact can.

- To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wage war by engaging Pact forces on their own territory, disrupting their LOCs, and fragmenting the cohesion of the Pact alliance.

- To establish and maintain control of Atlantic LOCs.
Peacetime Military Objectives

- To enhance deterrence through improvements in NATO's conventional defense capabilities while also improving nuclear and chemical forces.
- To achieve increased Allied contributions to the defense of Western Europe and from Allies capable of doing so increased contributions in other areas of mutual benefit, to include Southwest Asia.
- To secure a more effective division of labor within NATO through cooperative efforts, such as Host Nation Support Agreements.

Near East/Southwest Asia

The United States has two primary national security interests in the region. The first is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-military hegemony in the region. This requires that the U.S. support the sovereignty of regional states friendly to the U.S. The second is to maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.S., in concert with intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be prepared to meet threats of any magnitude, from internal subversion to large scale Soviet aggression.

In this context, defense policy has three overriding objectives:

1. Deter Soviet overt military aggression and protect Western access to oil. To do this, U.S. defense planning has three tiers. First, we must plan for and demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force -- quickly into the region to prevent a Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be obtained to support RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon them for realistic combined planning must be unrelenting. Second, if deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviets in the theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The third tier of Defense planning is to prepare for executing counter-offensives on other fronts where the U.S. has advantages. Throughout this planning process, the potential for this conflict to become global must be recognized and planned for.
For at least the next several years, we are unlikely to succeed in achieving our objectives against a determined Soviet attack in Southwest Asia. Furthermore, it is questionable whether either superpower could restrict to one theater a war which would impact critically upon the economies of the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan.

2. Maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any realistic combination of Arab foes. The latest SNIE concludes that Israel's military superiority is much stronger today than at the time of the 1973 war and projects that it will be much stronger in FY 87 than today. As the most militarily powerful state in the region, Israel's assistance would be of considerable benefit in the course of a conflict with the Soviets, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, as augmentation for the Southern Flank.

3. Support moderate states against external aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales to help strengthen substantially the self-defense capabilities of key states in the region.

To accomplish these objectives for the region, the U.S. expects regional states to contribute to the extent possible to their own defense as well as assisting in supporting the employment of U.S. forces. Allies will be expected to offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be encouraged to contribute militarily to meeting specific threats if such participation would not substantially reduce their war fighting capability in their home region and would provide a beneficial contribution to the conflict.

Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military objectives for the Near East, Southwest and South Asia region:

**Wartime and Crisis Objectives**

- To secure the oil fields, transshipment points and sea lines of communications essential to Western security. (This includes threats of all magnitude from internal subversion to Soviet aggression.)

- To preserve the independence of Israel.

- To engage friendly regional states, Western Allies and other extra-regional states in the execution of our strategy.

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Peacetime Military Objectives

- To prevent Soviet hegemony and extension of influence.

- To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater and the threat of escalation.

This language is understood to mean that it is a peacetime military objective to develop a capability for in-theater military operations consistent with the Southwest Asia force goals of the FY 84-88 Defense Guidance, while recognizing that funding shortfalls may result in lesser capability.

- To maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any realistic combination of Arab foes.

- To support moderate states against external aggression and subversion.

- To ensure access to a network of military facilities in the region for the rapid introduction and sustainment of sizable U.S. forces.

- To obtain overflight, 'anding, bunkering and access to enroute facilities for the deployment and support of U.S. combat forces.

- To obtain military contributions (including agreements for combat forces) from selected Allies in support of U.S. objectives in the region.

- To maintain a strong naval presence in the area, together with as substantial a presence on land as can be managed given regional sensitivities and political constraints.

- To increase peacetime planning with regional states for wartime contingencies, including host nation support, prepositioning and combat roles for indigenous forces.

Far East

Our foremost peacetime objective in the Far East is, in conjunction with our allies and other friends in the region, to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence in East Asia and the Pacific. Asian security relationships are
fundamental to offsetting successfully Soviet global ambitions. U.S. strategy in East Asia and the Pacific is predicated on the stabilizing relationship between two security anchors. One anchor in Northeast Asia depends on cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and Japan, as well as the U.S. relationship with China. The other anchor in the Pacific Basin binds the U.S. to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the somewhat more loosely to the remainder of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and allied force improvements and strengthened U.S. security relationships are required to establish and maintain an effective defensive network secured at both ends of the region. A direct U.S.-Soviet conflict in Asia is unlikely except in the context of a global war. Therefore, although other contingencies in the region could involve U.S. forces in hostilities short of U.S.-Soviet conflict, regional wartime objectives in Asia listed below are those supportive of global wartime objectives.

**Wartime Objectives**

- To maintain control of the Pacific lines of communication, including those to the Indian Ocean, and the bases needed to support the global strategy.

- To fulfill commitments to the Asian allies, given particular emphasis to protection of U.S. bases in the region, obtain allied support in the conflict, and seek to preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy forces for use against NATO.

- To have Japan provide for its own defense, including SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles, and if possible, contribute more broadly to regional defense efforts.

- To have the PRC maintain military initiatives that would fix Soviet ground, air and naval forces in the USSR's Far Eastern territories.

**Peacetime Military Objectives**

- To transform our relationship with Japan into an active defense partnership in which Japan significantly increases its own defense capabilities and, over time, contributes more broadly to regional defense.

- To continue to develop our relationship with the PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, enhance the durability of U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation for closer future cooperation as appropriate.
- To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on the Korean Peninsula to ensure stability there, and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in defeating hostile forces. Enhance deterrence, primarily by assisting the ROK to become increasingly self-sufficient in its defense capabilities.

- To increase peacetime planning with our allies for wartime contingencies.

- To have other regional states assume a greater share of the responsibility for the common defense and assist them in improving their capabilities to fulfill it.

- To improve the support of regional states for U.S. power projection from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

- To prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from achieving a dominant presence in Southeast Asia from which to foster actions inimical to our interests and those of our allies.

**Western Hemisphere**

The defense of North America is this nation's primary security concern. Since World War II, defense of the Western Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. would maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, develop closer relations with Canada and Mexico, and foster collective security arrangements among Latin American countries. It is becoming increasingly clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone conclusion. The U.S. must continue to build on interests shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America not as a Third World area removed from the traditional focus of U.S. strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future bears directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole.

Latin America, and especially the Caribbean/Central American region, is an area with which we are closely associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and Mexican borders, our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and the critical Panama Canal waterway. Nearly half of our trade and two-thirds of our imported oil pass through the Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the Caribbean to Europe.
The South American continent is also a focus of major U.S. interests. Though strategically less pivotal to us than the Caribbean, South America includes several nations with which we enjoy long-standing close relations and which are among our most important trade partners. In addition, the east coast of South America faces the South Atlantic sea routes which represent a major petroleum lifeline for Europe and the United States.

Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To defend North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and the contiguous Caribbean Basin).

- To neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in the Caribbean Basin.

- To control LOCs in the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and South Pacific including the Panama Canal.

- To prevent further aggression and subversion against regional states by forces hostile to U.S. interests.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To modernize the strategic air defense system for North America.

- To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada and other areas in Latin America.

- To broaden regional military-to-military contacts and seek the active military cooperation of key countries in regional territorial defense, in the security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantic and South Pacific sea lines of communication and in facilitating air and ocean movement.

- To maintain, or acquire as needed, base and facilities access, logistical support, and operating, transit, and overflight rights.

- To increase the level and exercise tempo of U.S. military presence in the region.

Africa

Africa's mineral resources (including oil), plus its strategic location astride the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf, make it of prime importance in economic (and therefore
political) terms; the military requirement for the West is essentially preemptive: to deny the Soviets (and Libya) control over key African states and territory from which they could interdict the supply of minerals and oil from Africa and the Middle East. In case of a military struggle for control of the Middle East, Africa is important as a strategic territory for the movement of major Western forces to the area via the Mediterranean, across North Africa, or across Central Africa. It is also equally important, as a base for facilities from which both air and naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet naval threats to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, around the Cape, and the south Atlantic.

In peacetime, in addition to being a major source for minerals important to U.S., West European, and Japanese industry, Africa remains an important area for the political contest of Western and Soviet Bloc values in the Third World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must play a larger role in meeting, the Soviet/proxy challenge. Principal elements currently available are economic, security assistance, and special operations. Successful implementation of a counter-Soviet strategy in Africa will also require the development of a climate of supportive Congressional and public opinion, and the restoration of substantial "internal security" and covert action capabilities.

Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To employ air and naval forces to neutralize Soviet or other hostile forces (especially Libya) in strategic locations in the region and adjacent waters.

- To protect access to and deny Soviet use of the region's mineral resources, key facilities, and LOCs.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To gain base access and transit rights in pro-Western African states for the deployment and subsequent support of U.S. forces to Africa, Southwest Asia, South Atlantic, and contiguous areas and work to deny the Soviets similar access.

- To assist countries throughout Africa that are the targets of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian aggressive, subversive or terrorist actions.
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION D

U.S. Nuclear Forces

The basic national guidance on U.S. nuclear force employment and acquisition policy is provided in NSDD-13, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, signed in October, 1981. NSDD-13 was this Administration's initial review of U.S. national nuclear policy and superceded the Carter Administration's PD-59. This section has reexamined that guidance and found it to remain valid. The following discussion of U.S. nuclear policy is fully consistent with NSDD-13.

It should be noted that given today's forces and related command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I), not all elements of our strategy are fully executable. NSDD-12, Strategic Forces Modernization Program, signed in October, 1981, outlines this Administration's program for improving our capability to execute national strategy. It mandates improvements in the areas of: strategic C3I to improve the survivability and endurance of our ability to control our forces and our basic connectivity to those forces at all times; our offensive forces themselves to increase their survivability, endurance, and effectiveness; and our active and passive capabilities to limit damage to the U.S. through strategic defense. The improvements outlined in NSDD-12 will not be fully completed until well into the next decade.

By July 1982 the Department of Defense will provide a Master Plan which identifies where specific capability shortfalls exist and how specifically we intend to synchronize our employment and acquisition policies to minimize risk.

Objectives

Our most fundamental national security objective is to deter direct attack—particularly nuclear attack—on the United States, its forces and its allies and friends. The nuclear forces of the United States also, in conjunction with conventional forces, contribute to the deterrence of non-nuclear aggression and to support NATO strategy for the defense of Europe. Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as to remove any incentives for initiating attack. This requires that we be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that the Soviets, or any other adversary, would be denied their political and military objectives. Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur,
the United States and its allies must prevail and in the process be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms favorable to the United States.

**Strategy for Nuclear Forces**

The United States remains committed to a deterrent use of military strength; our objective is to deter aggression or to respond to it should deterrence fail. As a consequence our strategy is designed to insure the realization of our objectives after the enemy has seized the first initiative to deny him his political and military goals and to counterattack so strongly that we inflict an unacceptably high cost on the enemy. Specifically, our strategy will reflect the following elements with respect to nuclear forces:

**Initial Target Coverage.** We will deploy and maintain forces capable, under all conditions of war initiation, of attacking a wide range of targets. U.S. strategic nuclear forces must be able to render ineffective the Soviet (and Soviet allied) military and political power structure through attacks on nuclear and conventional military forces, political/military leadership and associated control facilities, and industry critical to military power. This includes the ability to deny the Soviet Union a military victory at any level of conflict.

**Target Coverage Throughout Protracted Conflict.** U.S. nuclear forces will be survivable and enduring in order that we can maintain sufficient forces throughout a protracted conflict period and afterwards. We must have the capability to inflict unacceptable levels of damage against a broad range of targets of the Soviet Union and its allies. This will provide the Soviets strong incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-out attack on our cities and economic assets.

**Target Coverage for Protection and Coercion.** We will maintain in reserve, under all circumstances, survivable nuclear offensive capability for protection and coercion during and after a prolonged nuclear conflict. We must deny the Soviet Union or any other country the opportunity to coerce the United States, our allies or third countries, or to dominate the post-war situation.

**Damage Limitation.** U.S. nuclear forces, by offensive actions and in conjunction with active and passive defense measures, should be capable of limiting damage to the United States and its allies.

**Strategic Defense.** U.S. nuclear forces, in conjunction with conventional forces should seek to:

--- control access to U.S. airspace in exercise of our sovereignty;

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-- preclude a surprise precursor attack by air breathing weapons which could disrupt our prompt retaliation;

-- provide active defense against atmospheric attack to limit damage to the U.S. as specified above;

-- provide post-attack privacy from hostile reconnaissance;

-- provide the capability to negate targets in space and ensure our rights of free access to space;

-- and support passive defensive measures against both atmospheric and ballistic attack.

Range of Options. We will maintain the capability for a full range of options, and, by holding at risk targets which are important to an aggressor, demonstrate the risks inherent in initiating or continuing aggression.

Crisis Stability. Our force posture should minimize the extent to which Soviet nuclear threats could be used in a crisis to coerce the United States and our allies, and should ensure that in crisis conditions the USSR has no incentive to initiate a nuclear attack and that the United States is not under pressure to do so.

Escalation Control. U.S. nuclear weapon employment plans should provide the NCA with the ability to conduct military operations at all levels of conflict in ways that will be militarily effective and will maximize the chance of controlling escalation. Plans for the controlled use of nuclear weapons should seek, in conjunction with other political and military actions, to:

-- provide the U.S. and its allies with leverage for a negotiated termination of fighting;

-- reverse an unfavorable military situation for a sufficiently long period to cause an enemy to pause and provide him the opportunity to reconsider the consequences of his continued aggression;

-- diminish the enemy's expectations of success both by the direct military effect of the attacks and by evidencing U.S. willingness to respond as appropriate, while indicating clearly the limited character of the U.S. response executed to that point;

-- convince an enemy that previously calculated risks and costs were in error and that early termination of the conflict or a reconsideration of his course of action is the most attractive alternative;

-- and leave the enemy with sufficient remaining political, and economic resources clearly still at risk so that he has a strong incentive to seek conflict termination.
Support for Alliance Commitments. The United States will maintain nuclear forces to support our alliance commitments including those expressed in agreed NATO strategy (MC 14/3).

Preserving the Defense Continuum: Regional Role of Nuclear Forces. We must ensure on a worldwide basis that nuclear forces are available in various regions to establish and maintain a continuum of deterrence with a force posture and associated employment plans which reflect the facts that:

-- non-strategic nuclear forces provide the essential link between the conventional and the strategic nuclear forces;

-- nuclear forces cannot be viewed as a substitute for a strong conventional warfighting capability; the use of nuclear weapons would represent a basic qualitative change in warfare;

-- nuclear forces will be configured to provide a wide range of options, from highly selective and limited strikes up to and including general nuclear release;

-- SIOP planning must not become dependent on a contribution from non-strategic nuclear forces for achievement of key objectives;

-- nuclear forces, as with all force elements, must have the capability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in a nuclear or chemical environment;

-- U.S. nuclear forces may be used to place at risk targets in geographic areas other than that in which the main thrust of aggression is being made in order to draw enemy resources away from the initial theater of operations;

-- U.S. nuclear capabilities must support planning for counteroffensives to threaten the aggressor including Soviet and Warsaw Pact assets.

-- and release authority for the use of nuclear weapons will be neither immediate nor automatic.

Maritime Nuclear Employment. Response to Soviet nuclear attacks at sea will not necessarily be limited to the sea. Therefore, nuclear assets must be available and capable of putting at risk selected targets vital to the Soviets in order to confront them with massive uncertainties when considering nuclear release at sea.

Forward Deployment of Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces. Forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces will be made to:

-- provide for maximum flexibility and capability for forward defense by their continued deployment in Europe and in the Western Pacific;
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-- provide for early deployment from peacetime locations in a crisis for survivability. Such deployments should be as far forward as is consistent with their range and expected use;

-- reflect the fact that the only currently deployed non-strategic nuclear land-attack system outside Europe and Korea are carrier-based, and as such they should be planned for possible use in conflict scenarios involving Soviet forces or Soviet nuclear weapons support;

-- and maintain adequate stocks of nuclear weapons in those theaters that pose high risks of developing into nuclear conflict, such as Europe and Korea. The ability to deploy non-strategic nuclear forces rapidly, and to reinforce that deployment, into those areas in which non-strategic nuclear forces are not normally deployed, will be maintained.

Nuclear Employment Planning

Types of Planning Required. In order to provide the greatest degree of flexibility to the NCA and to regain the initiative necessary to realize our objectives, U.S. nuclear employment planning will include:

-- preplanned options against targets in the Soviet Union, its allies, and other potential enemies; these options will be the primary vehicles for selective use of nuclear forces;

-- rapidly developable selective use options to provide the capability to attack significant targets that emerge during a conflict and to integrate nuclear and general purpose force options;

-- the capability to plan adaptively. We must establish an improved capability for identifying and destroying military leadership targets, including those which are hardened, mobile, and reconstituted.

Planning Guidance. Planning should be developed which will strengthen the linkage between U.S. strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces.

Methods of attack on specific targets should be chosen to limit collateral damage consistent with effective accomplishment of the attack objective. Where appropriate, overall plans should include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage.

While it will remain our policy not to rely on launching our nuclear forces in an irrevocable manner upon warning that a Soviet missile attack has begun, we must leave Soviet planners with strong uncertainty as to how we might actually respond to such warning.

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And we must be prepared to launch our recallable bomber forces upon warning that a Soviet nuclear attack has been initiated.

Plan non-strategic nuclear forces primarily for selective use in direct defense with priority given to stopping the thrust of enemy offensive action, or for escalatory options with emphasis on interdiction and attack of second echelon forces, including theater nuclear delivery capacity and C3I assets. Use of non-strategic nuclear forces in SIOP support roles will be planned as a secondary function.

To the extent feasible, and without unacceptable degradation of our ability to execute the SIOP, strategic nuclear forces which are capable of executing non-strategic nuclear options may be tasked for those missions; however, release of strategic nuclear forces to such missions is not automatic, and non-strategic nuclear planning should not depend on strategic force contributions.

In order to maximize the uncertainty of Soviet Union risk assessments and employment planning, United States non-strategic nuclear forces deployment and normal operations will maintain a survivable retaliatory strike capability and a high state of readiness to support rapid response to NCA direction. Operations, to include C3I and exercises, will be conducted to minimize the likelihood of, and incentives for, a Soviet pre-emptive strike.

Resulting Force Requirements

U.S. nuclear forces and supporting C3I also must be:

-- capable of assuring warning and attack characterization and capable of controlling the forces in the prosecution of the war;

-- capable of responding to any initial attack on the United States with preplanned strike options;

-- capable of carrying out controlled nuclear counter-attack over a protracted period while maintaining a reserve of nuclear forces sufficient for trans- and post-attack protection and coercion;

-- capable of attacking a full range of targets, to include hard and superhard installations, both on a time urgent and on a sustained basis;

-- and capable of being integrated effectively with general purpose forces to achieve theater campaign objectives.
Nuclear Force Development and Modernization

U.S. nuclear forces development and modernization should be designed to continue to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies. The cornerstone of our modernization efforts is the program enunciated in NSDD-12 and the NATO decision to modernize its deterrent force. Consequently, our programmatic steps must:

-- provide greater emphasis on a multiplicity of nuclear systems and basing modes to strengthen the overall capability of our nuclear forces;

-- provide forces and associated C3I that achieve greater survivability, endurance and effectiveness through active and passive measures;

-- include a subset of strategic offensive forces and associated C3I systems that have a high probability of enduring survival in a nuclear war to provide protection and coercion in the post-major exchange situation;

-- implement, as the highest priority for non-strategic nuclear force modernization, the program to modernize NATO's armory with deployment of GLCM and of Pershing II;

-- give high priority for non-strategic C3I systems which assure the ability to execute nuclear strike plans. This must be followed by the integration of national and tactical capabilities which contribute to the acquisition and tracking of second and third echelon mobile targets, poststrike reconnaissance and damage assessment of those targets;

-- provide a national level C3I system that has a high probability of assuring connectivity between the NCA, and forces, and sensors;

-- provide for modernization of strategic defense including air and space defenses; a vigorous research and development program will be conducted on a ballistic missile defense system;

-- emphasize development programs for nuclear warheads which reduce the usage of special nuclear materials; and for modernized nuclear systems having improved military effectiveness, safety, security, survivability, and endurance; and for upgrading stockpile weapons to enhance safety and security.

-- and recognize that either threshold or comprehensive bans on the testing of nuclear devices can have a significant impact on the achievement of the above and on the reliability of our existing nuclear stockpile.
Relationship to Arms Control

Arms control can complement military forces in support of U.S. objectives and national security. It is essential that arms control agreements provide the opportunity for the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed to potential adversaries to execute the U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

PART III, SECTION E

General Purpose Forces

Force Application

Policies for General Purpose Forces

Conventional Force Objectives

Peacetime. In peacetime, general purpose forces serve US policy objectives by deterring aggression against the US and its friends and allies, by demonstrating US interest, concern, and commitment, by assisting the forces of other nations to develop their own capabilities, and by providing a basis to move rapidly from peace to war. To accomplish these objectives, both in the near term and beyond, the US must have both active and reserve forces to provide the total warfighting capability.

Low Intensity Conflict. Total US conventional forces should have the capability to meet a broad range of Soviet-inspired and non-Soviet threats by:

- Supporting security assistance programs and providing foreign military training in support of the internal defense efforts of our friends and allies as they seek to shoulder the responsibilities for their own security.

- Providing appropriate support and support forces to supplement the military combat capabilities of friends and allies in their efforts at internal defense.

- Providing, if necessary, US combat forces to supplement the capabilities of indigenous forces when other means are ineffective, in the context of a statement of clear US political objectives and national will.

- Maintaining area-oriented special operations forces capable of supporting the internal defense of friendly countries.
US-Soviet Conflict. US conventional forces should have the capability for meeting the Soviet global threats by:

- Defeating Soviet aggression in many regions: Europe, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the LOCs, with the priority by region to be determined by the extant situation.

- Putting the Soviet interests at risk, including those in the Soviet homeland.

- Seeking to terminate hostilities quickly and decisively on terms favorable to the United States. Where quick termination cannot be assured, the United States must confront adversaries with the prospect of a prolonged, widespread, costly, and ultimately unwinnable conflict. The US must have forces which are capable, after a prolonged conflict, of denying the Soviet Union or any other country the opportunity to coerce the US or allies or to dominate the post-war situation.

Policy Guidelines for Force Application

Regional Wartime Priorities

General Policies. Forces are and will remain insufficient for simultaneous operations in a global conflict with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the political and military situation at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions, and the sequence of force employment may not necessarily be dictated by previously established priorities. Within this context, the following policies are applicable for both the near-term and mid-term.

It is in the interest of the US to limit the scope of any conflict with the Soviet Union.

Counteroffensives will be directed at places where the US can affect the outcome of the war. The United States should not consider counteroffensives in other areas as a substitute for robust military capabilities to protect vital interests at the point at which they are threatened.

Planning for Sequential Operations. US actions in other parts of the world will be designed to protect essential US interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia. In the event of war with the Soviet Union originating in Europe, the need for sequential operations may limit the
deployment of augmentation forces to Southwest Asia or to the Pacific. For war with the Soviet Union originating in the Pacific, forces available for augmentation to Europe or Southwest Asia would be reduced. For war with the Soviet Union originating in Southwest Asia, forces available for subsequent employment in Europe or the Pacific would be reduced. Supporting plans should exist for lesser scale operations in secondary theaters during a major war in a primary theater.

Regional Instability. Economic, religious, political, and ethnic instabilities in much of the world impinge directly on US interests and, at times, provide opportunities to the Soviet Union to project direct or indirect military power and influence to the affected locations. In this environment, and for the foreseeable future, the United States may be faced with the need to respond to crises or conflict in a single country or region in which there is no direct Soviet involvement.

In responding to internal or intraregional conflict situations, the US will rely primarily upon indigenous forces to protect their own interests. At the same time, the planning process should not prejudge the direction of US support. Each set of circumstances will stand on its own merits.

For planning purposes, the actual commitment of US combat forces will be made, in any case, only when other means are ineffective, political objectives have been established, US political will has been made clear, and appropriate military capabilities are available.

Whether US support is to be security assistance, military support, US military presence, or introduction of US combat forces, US actions should be designed to supplement the military capabilities of the forces being helped.

Coalition Framework of US National Security Policy. As a nation with global interests, the US is particularly dependent upon the assistance of friends and allies. There is no doubt that successfully meeting the challenges to our interests will require stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. Our strategic reserve of US-based forces cannot be deployed, employed or sustained without significant support from allies and friends. Therefore, it will be the policy of the United States to:

- Seek agreements to permit overflight and access to ports and airfields during peacetime and in time of crisis.
- Encourage the upgrading of selected allies and friendly facilities that might be used by US forces during crisis or war.

- Continue to secure host nation support agreements for forward deployed forces and those forces scheduled for deployment in the event of crisis and war.

- Urge our inter- and intraregional Allies and friends to join us in further developing a credible deterrent to aggression.

- Seek additional contributions from our NATO allies to improve the reinforcement capability of US-based combat and support forces.

US defense programs will consider the status of these coalition programs in the planning process.

Mobilization Policy. Reserve Component forces are an integral part of US capabilities. The reserves not only provide major combat forces that complement and reinforce active units, but they also provide the majority of the supporting forces required to sustain the total force in combat. Mobilization planning must allow adequate responses under conditions of ambiguous warning. These responses must be repeatable, sustainable, and able to achieve mobilized manpower objectives.

- Objectives. Existing Presidential callup authority or partial mobilization may be necessary in a conflict not involving the Soviets to provide sustaining forces for the conflict and to backfill essential capabilities normally required in the European theater. In a crisis with the Soviets and before initiation of hostilities, the US should consider full mobilization as a precautionary measure to deter conflict and protect vital interests. Any mobilization will include actions to prepare for total mobilization, if necessary. The initiation of conscription to meet personnel requirements must be an integral part of mobilization planning.
- Policies. Given the reliance our force structure places on reserve components, during crises involving the potential deployment and sustained employment of sizeable combat forces, an early mobilization decision will be provided by the National Command Authorities. Mobilization planning is an integral part of capability planning and as such is based upon the same policies and priorities as those used for force application and development.

STRATEGY

Peacetime

In peacetime, US military strategy for general purpose forces is designed to support our overall national security strategy by the peacetime application of military power. In the broadest terms, we seek to achieve two fundamental objectives: first, to deter military attack against the United States, its allies and friends; and second, to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet influence worldwide. Both of these objectives require the United States to increase its influence worldwide.

Forward deployments, rapidly deployable US-based military forces, assistance and special operations, and the demonstration of our rapid deployment capability through periodic exercises serve both objectives. These components, taken together, comprise our peacetime military strategy.

Forward Deployments. Current US forward-deployed forces will be maintained in peacetime to provide a capability for timely and flexible response to contingencies and to demonstrate resolve to honor US commitments. US forward-deployed force presence will be postured to facilitate the transition from peacetime to wartime posture, to foster military and non-military relations, to demonstrate US power and interest, and to assist in the retention of US rights, authorizations, and facilities abroad.

US ground, naval, and air forces will remain deployed overseas in Europe, in the Western Pacific, in Southwest Asia, and in Panama. Naval forces will maintain a presence with combatant forces in the North Atlantic, the Caribbean Basin, the Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia regions.
Interruption deployments will be made to waters contiguous to Latin America, Africa, and Southwest Pacific. Ground and air deployments will be made periodically to Southwest Asia as political considerations permit. US naval, air, and ground forces may also deploy to other selected areas worldwide on a periodic basis.

Flexible Forces/Rapid Deployment. The US will maintain a strategic reserve of US-based forces which can rapidly deploy where necessary to protect interests worldwide.

Assistance and Special Operations. In peacetime, the US may provide military support to forces of other countries. Assistance may also be appropriate to resistance forces within some countries in which the Soviet Union or its proxies have achieved some degree of control. The US should provide assistance with a minimum of delay or dislocation of US units. Moreover, the US should be able to use the assets of DOD and other agencies to conduct special operations to support friendly governments and resistance movements.

Assistance programs should include the expansion of US foreign military training. This will assist indigenous friends and allies to defeat insurrections, to maintain stability, and to reduce diversion of US military capabilities.

The US should take steps to strengthen US security assistance programs to provide Third World friends and allies with the means to meet subversion and surrogate conventional threats, thereby reducing diversion of US military capabilities and precluding Soviet extension into critical strategic locations.

Exercises. The rapid deployment capability of US combat forces to regions where the US has essential interests will be periodically demonstrated. Where possible, these exercises will include Allied and friendly participation.

Wartime

Current general purpose forces are adequate to maintain most peacetime forward deployments and to respond to minor crises and non-Soviet conflicts. There are, however, attendant strains on manpower and readiness to maintain these capabilities. These forces currently contribute to deterring direct aggression in Europe, Southwest Asia, or Northeast Asia.
Because of the continuing increases in Soviet conventional force capabilities, major risk would confront US forces if they should become engaged in direct conflict with Soviet forces in any of those theaters. Current general purpose forces are not adequate to assure success in the event of simultaneous conflict with the Soviets in more than one theater.

Strategy Guidelines

Conventional Conflict Not Involving the USSR. The United States will seek to limit the scope of the conflict, avoid involvement of the USSR, quickly end US military involvement, and ensure that US military objectives are met. A partial mobilization may be necessary to provide reinforcements and sustaining capability and to backfill those capabilities normally assigned an early NATO role.

Threatened regional allies must provide combat forces to the extent of their capabilities. US forces will provide air, naval, logistic, and advisory support. If necessary, US ground combat troops could be deployed.

Depending on the nature of the conflict, US combat force participation may involve a demonstration of force, protection of US lives or critical resources, interposition between contending parties, or direct combat.

Direct US military involvement should cease when the threatened ally is able to conduct successful operations without assistance. Logistic support will continue until the threatened ally can end the conflict on favorable terms.

Conventional Conflict Involving the USSR. While US allies are expected to contribute to the defense of their own interests, US forces will be employed to limit or counteract Soviet involvement. Before or upon initiation of direct US-Soviet hostilities, the United States will take precautionary actions worldwide to protect its vital interests from Soviet counter-escalatory threats and will undertake mobilization steps, preparing for total mobilization if necessary. If deterrence fails, US military strategy is to:

- Deploy military forces rapidly to the area to signal US commitment and to deter further aggression.
- Failing to deter further aggression, conduct military operations in conjunction with regional allies with the aim of halting Soviet aggression.
Take those steps necessary to prepare for the possibility of a global US-Soviet conflict and, if necessary, execute counteroffensives at other fronts or places where we can affect the outcome of the war.

Near-Term Shortfalls. Current forces are generally adequate to execute the strategy described above for the non-Soviet case. US military strategy envisions that a war with the Soviet Union may be global in nature and possibly protracted. The strategy is intended to limit a United States-Soviet confrontation to conventional warfare, while maintaining appropriate nuclear and chemical deterrents.

Because there is a serious disparity between Soviet conventional forces and US conventional forces, the United States does not now possess a credible capability to achieve all military objectives simultaneously. Thus, in the near term, execution of the strategy involves a considerable degree of risk.

The inability to simultaneously employ sufficient force in Europe, Southwest Asia, and essential lines of communication will likely require the United States to choose between geographic escalation, nuclear escalation, or an unacceptable outcome in a vital theater. Use of nuclear weapons in any theater must, however, take into account the fact that the Soviet Union has theater nuclear advantages. Moreover, in a multi-theater war there is no way to be sure that the enemy will restrict any retaliatory use of non-strategic nuclear forces to the theater in which we initiate their use.

Mid-Term Shortfalls. The political and military situation at the time of war will continue to dictate strategy decisions. Continued real growth will permit some force expansion as programmed forces achieve desired readiness, sustainability, and modernization levels. These improvements will enhance the likelihood of being able to achieve wartime objectives in one theater.

However, the execution of our wartime strategy in a global conflict against the Soviet Union will still be characterized by difficult choices among theaters. We will remain unable to meet the requirement for simultaneous global operations.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Given the Soviet threat, there is a substantial risk that current force capabilities are insufficient to attain the military objectives enunciated in this section. Notwithstanding
substantial improvements over the course of the next five years, US military forces will remain unable to carry out fully US wartime military strategy.

The most significant factor contributing to this reality is the need to devote the bulk of available resources to assure the responsiveness and fighting capabilities of existing forces. On the one hand, we must maintain a credible deterrent today; on the other hand, we cannot assume that there will not be a war in the near term. At the same time, defense programs must also achieve balanced force improvements if we are to close the gap between strategy and capabilities.

The priorities for force development which follow are intended to provide broad guidance for the difficult decisions in resource allocation necessary in a fiscally constrained environment. The operational capabilities (e.g., readiness, sustainability, etc.) which must be enhanced are those subelements of total military capability in which emphasis must be placed to reduce risk. They should not be regarded as discrete categories which are mutually exclusive. Indeed, they overlap in an often complex and not readily identifiable manner. For example, the procurement of repair parts contributes directly to both readiness and sustainability. The priorities which follow take into account these interrelationships.

Priorities for Existing and Programmed Forces

First priority is to improve the operational capabilities of forward deployed forces, forces providing flexibility in deployment, such as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), other units earmarked for earliest deployment, and their associated lift forces.

Second priority will be improving the operational capabilities of those US-based forces not earmarked for earliest deployments.

Third priority will be expanding force structure.

Priorities for Operational Capabilities Improvement. Force capabilities will be improved in the following general order of priority:

- Achieving necessary readiness. US forces must be prepared for war at any time. Since the warning time we can safely assume is shorter than the lead times needed to correct readiness deficiencies, it
is necessary that we maintain high peacetime readiness. Moreover, warning is likely to be ambiguous, requiring responses that can be repeated and sustained until the ambiguity is resolved. Readiness and the perception of it enhance deterrence as well as being critical in responding successfully.

- Upgrading C³. Given their essentiality, command/control/communications systems should be selectively improved, the survivability of critical nodes enhanced, and operational procedures rigorously exercised.

- Providing adequate sustainability. Given the expectation of short warning, provisions for sustainability must be made in advance. We cannot foretell the duration of any conflict, but the goal is to ensure support of the forces from the initiation to the end of the hostilities, and hence, in the mid-term, to be at least equivalent to the sustainability of the forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

- Ideally, we should have sufficient stocks on hand to sustain the forces until such time as defense production could support our wartime demand rates. In most cases, we do not have this capability and, given the projected funding availability, it is unlikely to be attained in the mid-term. Therefore, sustainability improvement programs will focus on raising stockage levels, expanding industrial preparedness, and restarting or maintaining production capabilities in the industrial base.

- Increasing mobility capability. Inter- and intratheater mobility should be increased until balanced with the required deployment schedule of current forces.

- Maintaining essential modernization. Investment (R&D plus procurement) in systems for all forces should provide for acquisition to preclude a decline in force capability in the FY 84-88 or FY 89-95 period (except where policy or other changes are made).

Force Structure. Modern warfare requires force structure that is balanced between combat and support forces and among all essential combat arms. Currently, large portions of our combat forces cannot be brought to bear on an enemy in a
timely enough manner nor sustained in combat. Increased
capabilities to deploy forces, protect the LOCs, control the
seas, and seize ports are necessary to enhance responsive-
ness and the flexibility of current land, air, and amphibious
forces. Thus, striking a better balance in our current
force capabilities to meet global objectives requires expansion
as well as improvements in naval, mobility, tactical air,
and sustaining support forces. Consideration should also be
given to land force expansion.

Chemical Warfare. In view of the overall military balance
between the US and the Soviets, we cannot rely on other
components of our military capabilities to deter chemical
warfare. The US has been unable to eliminate the chemical
threat through negotiations or unilateral US restraint.
Consequently, to deter, the US needs to improve its defensive
and retaliatory CW capabilities sufficiently to deny the
Soviets the significant military advantage they would gain
from using chemical weapons.

The objective for the retaliatory element is to maintain the
safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that denies a
significant military advantage to any initiator of CW.
Therefore, US forces will continue modernization initiatives
for the production of binary chemical munitions to achieve
and maintain a credible deterrent.
This paper discusses the role of security assistance* in US foreign and defense policy and identifies issues for further consideration.

Security assistance is a critical element in supporting this Administration's national security objectives. It is designed to extend US influence abroad, to help deter conflict, and if deterrence fails, to enable friends and allies to defend themselves. Security assistance provides US forces with access to bases and overflight and other rights enabling coordinated operations of US and friendly forces. Security assistance also strengthens the US economy and the defense production base.

It should be clear from the above that security assistance is one of the hardest currencies circulating in the international security community and it must be emphasized that the Soviet Union fully appreciates this fact. The USSR has demonstrated a capacity and flexibility in the arms transfer business that in many important respects exceeds our own. This is particularly marked in their ability to offer quick delivery and concessional financing.

By contrast the US security assistance program is not able to meet satisfactorily the ambitious set of objectives set forth above. There are several reasons:

-- resources are inadequate and often of the wrong kind;

-- the annual budget cycle constrains both long-range defense planning with aid recipients and coherent FMS procurement planning by the Defense Department;

-- procurement lead times, high cost and potential technology compromise have seriously reduced the responsiveness of the security assistance program; and

*Security assistance consists of Foreign Military Sales credits (FMS), grant military assistance (MAP), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Economic Support Funds (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
legislative restrictions in the various acts covering security assistance reduce Executive Branch ability to react appropriately to emergencies or unforeseen events. Congressional earmarking, advance notification, and other oversight and control provisions make it very difficult to get the best possible return out of the security assistance resources Congress makes available.

Fulfillment of the global and regional objectives set forth in earlier sections of this study -- including support of key Southwest Asian states, maintenance of existing alliance relationships, strengthening our friends in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia -- depend in part on the availability of security assistance resources. Security assistance is an essential complement to our own force structure in meeting our security objectives abroad.

Resources

Security assistance is and will remain a critical element of our foreign and defense policy and, as such, will require significant budget resources for the indefinite future. While eight countries* account for over 85 percent of the 1982 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program new and important recipients continue to appear -- the states of Central America and the Caribbean being a recent case in point. The marginal return for the dollars spent on small programs can be extremely high. This is particularly true of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, but applies equally to the modest FMS programs that now exist in Latin America and Africa. In the large programs such as Korea and Turkey, security assistance becomes a potent force multiplier -- an important characteristic where the US has explicit security commitments. In the small programs, the resources usually buy basic transportation, communications, and other military capabilities for dealing with low-level external threats and internal security problems.

During the 1950s, the security assistance budget ranged from 5-10 percent the size of the defense budget, and was provided primarily as outright grants. In recent years, our assistance has increased from $4.3 billion in FY 1980, when it equalled 1 percent of the US defense budget (an all-time low) to $7.5 billion in FY 1982, but it is still only about 1.5 percent the size of the defense budget. One direct effect of this decline in purchasing power is that, except for Egypt and Israel, no country program is large enough to cover the purchase of modern fighter aircraft, something that a number of countries, like Turkey, desperately need.

*Israel 37%; Egypt 23%; Turkey 9%; Greece 7%; Korea 4%; Spain 3%; Tunisia 2%; Sudan 2%.
We have begun to turn the situation around by raising resource levels to meet urgent requirements. The FY 1983 budget calls for an increase of $1.2 billion or 16 percent over FY 1982 appropriations, which itself represents a significant increase over its predecessor. However, the political climate for sustaining needed increases this year and in the future is uncertain. The FY 1983 request will be a major test for the Administration; positive results will help to establish a firm foundation for the program for the next several years.

Beyond the issue of levels, there is a need for a better mix of assistance:

-- a higher proportion of grant aid to FMS credits;

-- of the FMS credits, authorization for a certain portion at 3 percent interest instead of market rates now running about 14 percent (currently we have no authority to offer concessional interest);

-- revised costing rules for FMS-financed training and increased use of the IMET program because of their high returns for each dollar spent.

-- maintenance of significant levels of Economic Support Funds (ESF), which provide balance of payments support for countries devoting significant resources to defense. (Seventy percent of the current funds are absorbed by Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, leaving very little for other worthy recipients.)

Our assistance programs are not meeting the needs of the 1980s. In FY 1982, grants fell to 50 percent of the total program, and most of this was for ESF, little grant money was available for FMS programs. Needs for increased security assistance rarely arise in prosperous countries; however, the requirement for increased concessionality, grant aid, economic assistance, and IMET grows as our support is required in a large number of economically weak countries.

Multi-year Commitments

We also need the ability to make more extensive use of multi-year commitments to permit longer-range planning and predictability in our programs for the benefit both of the US and recipient countries. Multi-year commitments assist the US in planning procurement, thus helping to keep production
lines going and unit costs down. Foreign security assistance recipients are also better able to manage the acquisition of expensive and complex weapons systems, rationalize force planning, and develop a sense of confidence in US support.

Currently we have three types of multi-year commitments in security assistance programs:

-- formal Executive Branch commitments over a specific period as part of formal base agreements (e.g., Spain, Philippines, Portugal);

-- an Executive Branch "best effort" commitment (e.g., Zimbabwe and Pakistan); and

-- "cash flow" arrangements with Israel and Egypt, which presume outyear funding at levels no less than those of the current year.

All of these multi-year commitments nonetheless depend on annual appropriations by Congress. It is unlikely in the future any more than in the past that Congress will compromise its budgetary flexibility by guaranteeing funding levels in outyears. Thus, we do not see multi-year commitments as a legislative issue but rather a determination by the Administration to exercise its right to make such "commitments" in the interest of conducting a more rational foreign policy and to defend that right vigorously on the Hill.

Procurement and Security Assistance

Because of budgetary uncertainties and legal restrictions, neither the military services nor the Defense Department systematically take foreign requirements into account in terms of sizing the production base or planning production runs. Thus, to meet urgent security assistance commitments, our own forces must often absorb unplanned diversions. We do not take full advantage of the fact that security assistance procurement could provide smoother production runs, an expanded industrial base, shorter leadtimes, and reduced costs for us. Security assistance procurement also enables us to maintain a production base for current systems that are being replaced, while the new production capability is coming on line. We must develop an approach to US defense procurement and production planning that prudently takes into account likely requests by foreign governments. For example:

-- we can demonstrate that a certain percentage of our production capacity for specific systems historically serves security assistance requirements; thus we should plan on it from the beginning.
where sensitive technologies are involved that we do not want to release worldwide, we should plan from the outset to provide export versions of new equipment.

where a current model is being replaced we should examine the opportunities offered by co-production/co-assembly arrangements abroad. These arrangements offer an alternative to selling front-line equipment and provide a fall back for ourselves. To make this work, we would have to be willing to permit the use of FMS credits to buy equipment produced abroad and be prepared to defend this decision on the Hill.

The Special Defense Acquisition Fund

The purpose of the newly-established Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) is to allow the Defense Department to buy defense articles in anticipation of eventual foreign sales. The SDAF, operating as a revolving fund, will enhance the President's ability to fulfill urgent requirements quickly. It will reduce procurement leadtimes both for delivery of equipment to foreign customers and paybacks to US forces when equipment is diverted from production or withdrawn from stocks. The SDAF can be used to smooth production rates or extend the production line of older equipment still in demand (e.g., the M-60 tank).

The SDAF account has been established, but we are limited to a capitalization level of $600 million by the end of FY 1983. Moreover, we do not yet have authority to spend. We are seeking such authority and an increase in the size of the fund to $900 million. Both deserve and will need strong support from White House and Cabinet officials.

Although consideration has been given to a higher capitalization target, a $900 million level gained through three consecutive years would allow a test of SDAF effectiveness. Since most production cycles run in the two- to three-year time frame, money from the sale of SDAF procured items would begin returning to the fund in the third year of operation. This could permit planning for procurement in the fourth year without new capitalization. However, the potential need to procure an intermediate fighter aircraft in addition to high-cost air munitions and Army equipment demand a minimum capitalization level of $900 million if we are not to continue the pattern of diverting equipment intended for our own forces.
The major example of an emergency diversion was when US war reserve stocks in Europe were decimated in order to rush tanks and other items to Israel during the 1973 war. This pattern has continued: Since 1978, almost seven battalions of tanks have been diverted or withdrawn from the Army. Similarly, the tactical aircraft equivalent of 1.5 fighter wings has been diverted or withdrawn from the Air Force. Diverted equipment is, of course, paid back, although this may take as long as three years.

Combined Planning

Our ability to improve production planning and to use the SDAF efficiently will depend heavily on our ability to forecast both demand and resources over a three-to five-year period. This in turn suggests a requirement for far more extensive combined planning with major recipients of security assistance and also with those countries rich enough to finance purchases by themselves.

We have successfully conducted such combined planning for several years with Korea and Jordan, and we are beginning it with Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Morocco. There are others we will need to engage in this effort. Such planning may require expansion of security assistance organizations overseas and broader authorities for them.

Success will be gradual, since few third-world countries have strong planning capabilities, and estimating future resource availabilities will be difficult. Moreover, there are certain liabilities involved. Combined planning carries with it implications of commitments that may be impossible to fulfill. In addition, such planning must invariably touch on sensitive systems and technologies (e.g., advanced aircraft, precision guided munitions) that could raise serious Congressional reactions, whether or not the systems were ever sold. The US will have to accept security risks in providing available threat analyses to foreign countries. In addition, we will have to make available comparative performance, cost and other data on specific systems, even though we might not ultimately be willing to sell all such systems to the country in question. A genuine joint planning activity will require comparative data if countries are to make rational decisions. We are developing procedures to accomplish this end.
Finally, it should be noted that countries may for political or other reasons be reluctant to engage in complete planning. In any event, combined planning will serve little purpose if we cannot respond decisively when country decisions are made and formal requests put forward. This brings us back to the weaknesses of the current production base, delivery lead times, and resource limitations. All of these must be improved in tandem if we are to fulfill the ultimate goal of putting needed equipment in the hands of friends and allies in a timely way.

**Legislation**

There are a number of flaws in the legislation governing security assistance. For example, by its nature, a portion of security assistance should be available to respond to emergencies. Heretofore, Congress has balked at appropriating any significant sum of unallocated money for this purpose, although it has provided limited emergency drawdown authority under strict Congressional control. We should be prepared to make an energetic effort to persuade Congress to provide such contingency funds.

The analysis and input that goes into the formulation of the budget is well over two years old before any money is actually disbursed and at least twice that before materiel is actually delivered. Moreover, the budget is formulated and presented to Congress on a country basis, that is, each country is allocated a certain level of assistance and that level is defended in the hearing process. Once that budget is passed, it is extremely cumbersome to reprogram resources from one country to another as priorities change. And it is virtually impossible when Congress earmarks funds, as it does in the case of Israel and Egypt.

While Congress is unlikely to give up earmarking, we should try to get relief from rigid reprogramming procedures, easing of conditions for emergency drawdowns, and a reduction of Congressional micro-management of the arms transfer process. We should also try to get rid of burdensome and largely meaningless reporting requirements, country specific conditions (e.g., Angola), restrictions on police training, differing methods of computing costs for cash and grant training, and similar outdated or inappropriate provisions of law. It should be noted that the Congressional veto authority over arms sales, which is one of the most intrusive aspects of Congressional oversight, may be settled by the Supreme Court in a related legislative veto case later this year. It is not something, however, that we are likely to be able on our own to negotiate out of the legislation.
Very few of these changes are attainable this year because of the 1982 election. However, late this fall, prior to the reconvening of Congress in January 1983, it should be feasible to begin to explore with the appropriate Congressional staffs a proposal to revise extensively, rationalize, or conceivably even rewrite both the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

**Issues**

1. FY 1982 Supplemental and FY 1983 Program -- Should we initiate a top priority Administration drive to win Congressional approval for our FY 1983 program and other security assistance related legislation as an integral part of the overall budget strategy. Success would enable us to meet top priority strategic objectives and establish a firm foundation for the program for the next several years. Failure, on the other hand, would set back the Administration's efforts to strengthen American security interests and could have disastrous international ramifications.

2. Resources -- Should we plan for steady real growth in the security assistance program over the next five years? The importance of security assistance to our foreign and defense policies suggests not only that real growth will be essential if we are to meet our national security objectives, but that the rate of growth perhaps should be indexed to that of the defense budget.

3. Multi-year Commitments -- Should we make more extensive use of various forms of multi-year commitments (formal Executive Branch commitment, best-effort, cash flow)? Even with the vulnerabilities associated with commitments that depend on annual Congressional appropriations, such commitments do have the virtue of establishing the reliability of the US and of allowing more rational force planning, procurement, and program management for both the US and the aid recipient.

4. Procurement -- Should we improve our security assistance planning activities and extend combined planning activities to more countries? Such planning could improve estimates of future resources and equipment demands, and consequently our own procurement planning, including the integration of foreign military sales into US service procurements. Such planning would also serve to nudge countries toward greater compatibility and cooperation with US forces.

5. Legislation -- Should we undertake a major effort to rewrite and rationalize the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act? The present legislation is technically complex and confusing and contains restrictions, prohibitions, and procedures that work not only against the objectives of security assistance but also seriously complicate the management of the program. Early 1983 would be an appropriate time to submit any major revision or rewrite to the Congress.
For at least the remainder of the decade, the objectives of US national security policy cannot be met without risk. Our interests are global, and they conflict with those of a state which pursues worldwide political and economic policies inimical to our own. The Soviet Union maintains the largest military establishment in history, and now possesses the capability to project its military forces into Latin America and Africa as well as into countries on the Eurasian periphery. Their ability to establish or to maintain military presence (and a certain degree of political control) in various countries beyond the Warsaw Pact, such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, Cuba, and Grenada, aggravates our defense problems. Compared with our own forces, in general, theirs will continue to be quantitatively superior and, in many cases, qualitatively equivalent. As a result, there is a dangerous imbalance in military strength which would favor the Soviet Union in several important contingencies (e.g., Southwest Asia, Europe). Even if we and our allies sustain 7% real growth in our defense efforts, this imbalance cannot be rectified before the end of the decade. Even then, the change in relative strength will depend upon future Soviet build-ups.

Our political and social heritage militates against our raising and supporting large forces in peacetime, and impels us rather to seek security in our national genius for technological innovation and industrial efficiency, and in our alliances. But requirements for domestic development and welfare will continue to weigh heavily upon our national decisions of overall resource allocation, and will constrain our force structure, and the pace and extent of our force modernization. While the same factors affect our allies, uncertainty about their resolve puts into question not only their collective ability to sustain in peacetime the needed response to the continuing Soviet military build-up, but also their reaction in a crisis or war.

We pursue a strategy which seeks to deter war, but if war is thrust upon us, to control escalation and to prevail. No place overseas where our forces directly confront those of the Soviet Union do we have enough capability for these purposes. Rather, deterrence rests on our ability to reinforce rapidly our forward deployed forces, and upon their evident capability, when reinforced, to inflict heavy losses in the event of aggression. Were a global war to break out, we could not reinforce everywhere at the same time. Rather, we would have to fight in some regions and avoid combat in others so as to help gain force superiority for counteroffensives in places and at times of our choosing. Such policy is, however, dependent on force mobility and ability to selectively mass our forces.
own force insufficiencies made all the more important effective coalition warfare, with allied forces deployed in coordination with our own. Initially, our purpose would be to slow, interdict, disrupt, and attrite the aggressors to gain time for mobilizing and deploying for counterstrikes, while maximizing nuclear capabilities to deter the Soviets from using their nuclear weapons and complement, as necessary, our other military capabilities. We would then launch operations calculated to achieve our objectives.

Our defense capabilities, in short, entail substantial risks that some regional objectives could not be achieved in the initial stages of a conventional war, risks that some commitments to some allies could not be fulfilled, and most importantly, risks that we could be forced to resort to use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that the United States improve its capability to mobilize additional forces rapidly and to expand defense production rapidly. Such a defense expansion would have to augment both conventional and nuclear forces. The purpose would be to reverse any setbacks during the initial campaigns by changing the balance of forces in our favor, or in favor of our Alliances. This very capability to mobilize and expand defense production will also help to strengthen deterrence.

Our risks can be attenuated if the US concerted all elements of its national power--political, economic, military, and national will--toward achievement of its security objectives. Our defense effort alone, unsupported by other policies, cannot cope with the threats to our vital interests during this decade. While the political and economic elements are beyond the purview of this study, they are nonetheless essential to national security, and, as ensuing discussions will make evident, must be considered together with military elements.

Requirements for Integration

To optimize the potential of US forces, national security policy must direct the following:

Unified Forces. Modern warfare demands that we be prepared to use the full capabilities of all our armed Services in a truly unified effort. No one Service or one element within a single Service is sufficient to support the full gamut of modern warfare requirements.

Balanced Forces. Sustaining combat requires balance among combat and support forces. Neglect of any form of support severely limits the operational range and endurance of combatants. Balance is also needed between air, sea, and land forces; active and reserve forces; and forces based overseas and in the United States. Moreover, all must be organized, trained, and equipped so that all can be readily deployed and employed. Included must be mobility means
necessary to deploy forces rapidly and resupply them, and requisite communication and intelligence means. In this respect, provisions for readiness, training, sustainability, modernized weaponry, and force structure require adroit defense investments: modernization can upgrade readiness and sustainability. Where force structure is out of balance between combat and support forces, acquisition of support structure can enhance readiness and sustainability. Funding priorities must go to functions that are most out of balance with strategy. For example, current emphasis is being placed on the strategic modernization plan, mobility, and naval forces.

**Total Force, Active and Reserve.** US forces are presently structured for these basic tasks:

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- Peacetime operations (training, deterrence, presence, vigilance), including overseas/CONUS rotation.

- Response to minor contingencies.

- Global warfare with the USSR.

We have insufficient active forces to fight a global war, or even to meet major lesser contingencies. The United States maintains an active duty force structure to deter conflict, to respond to minor contingencies, and to delay the achievement of an enemy's objective until US mobilization becomes effective. These forces are, however, dependent upon responsive, well-trained, and well-equipped reserves for all but the most minor contingencies, especially for airlift, medical, and other types of support. We must, therefore, bring more reserve units to a higher readiness status through equipment procurement and personnel increases. Decisions as to which capabilities to maintain in the reserve component should consider political as well as fiscal needs. Currently, there is an inordinate dependence on many types of support forces in the reserves, which unbalances active forces, and reduces overall readiness, responsiveness, and global flexibility. Responding to any large contingency will thus require some level of mobilization and expansion of force structure.

**Mobility**

Chart 1 represents general purpose combat force structure and forward deployments. They are positioned out of regard for US presence, political acceptability both at home and abroad, and the need to maintain a pool of forces in the US both to respond flexibly to reinforce critical regions during contingencies and to sustain overseas units by rotating personnel and equipment. There is no prospective theater of war in which forward deployed forces would not have to be reinforced should war threaten. Our ability to swiftly reinforce them is the very heart of deterrence.
Chart 1

Chart 2 portrays the general case for force generation in an overseas theater and is based on empirical data relating to specific theaters: forces ready to fight are a function of time, the amount of forward deployed forces, equipment and supplies prepositioned in-theater, and the availability of airlift and sealift. Forward deployed forces will be our first line of defense. They could be the only line unless pre-conflict measures have implemented an early reinforcement decision. Initial land-based reinforcements will, in most hypothesized circumstances, arrive by airlift. However fast, this is a very limited capability over great distances. The availability of prepositioned equipment and supplies can expand the impact of airlift capabilities by requiring only the movement of personnel and high value or unstorable equipment or otherwise reducing immediate transportation requirements. Fast sealift, which consists of ships that are readily available, are easily
loaded, and travel in excess of 20 knots, can arrive in theater prior to the arrival of conventional sealift. The latter will provide the vast majority of movements in a long contingency. However, where airlift may be effective within hours, conventional sealift may require weeks. Because of the mass delivery capability of sealift, pre-conflict measures to load and even sail ships may be essential to providing effective opposition and defending our objectives. These capabilities must be integrated with force movement requirements and made adequate to meet the inter-theater and intra-theater deployment, employment, and sustainability requirements of global war. The present difficulty is depicted by the dashed line. Our ability to put additional forces in the field falls significantly short of the requirement based on current lift capability and expected warning times. Improvements in all areas which contribute to enhanced mobility are crucial, each makes a unique contribution to our capacity to respond to an overseas contingency.
There are significant decisions that will be required in an actual deployment of forces. The difficulties are likely to be compounded when one or more theaters are competing for available lift and sustaining capabilities. Because of the number of possible scenarios, our limited forces, and the uncertainty surrounding Soviet intentions in any conflict, mobility enhancements offer a hedge against incorrect deployment of forces and provide the means for their redeployment. This is provided through a mix of lift capability and highly mobile forces.

To be effective globally, our military mobility forces must have the capability and flexibility to provide rapid and sustainable support for independent operations in geographic regions where little or no modern, sophisticated airports or seaports are available. Even if our forces are capable of traveling thousands of miles, if they cannot disembark and transit a port or travel the remaining hundreds or even dozens of miles to an objective area, the operation will be unsuccessful. Responsive intra-theater mobility will be vital to battlefield success, especially in the case where total enemy forces outnumber our own.

Mobilization

Active duty forces are our primary line of defense during peacetime and small contingencies. Even so, they are routinely augmented by reserve forces and civil assets in a great variety of functions. However, when preparing for a major crisis, exercising the Presidential 100,000 selective reserve callup authority will probably be required. Our reserve airlift and support forces are essential for any sizable deployment of general purpose forces. When a major crisis occurs, three levels of mobilization are available, depending on the severity of the situation: partial (1 million personnel), full (all reserve forces), and total (expansion beyond existing force structure). Effective mobilization capabilities, if exercised early in a major crisis, can serve as a deterrent. However, due to the requirement for Presidential or Congressional approval and the major associated fiscal and economic impacts, mobilization at any level is a very significant action.

Our near-term security concerns are often driven by our estimates of the speed with which the Soviet forces might threaten our interest, constrained as we are by the inadequacies of our current military capabilities. However, if our initial efforts to forestall or stop Soviet aggression were successful, we would find ourselves unable to support our forces for protracted conflict. In this respect, they can now outlast us. We must, therefore, expand the scope of our mobilization and industrial planning to consider protracted conflict.

To strengthen deterrence of Soviet aggression, or to cope with aggression should it occur, it is important to strengthen and to develop preparation for mobilizing the armed forces and for carrying

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out a massive, rapid expansion of defense production. We must increase the responsiveness of our industrial base, especially our surge capability, and that of our national mobilization programs. Although the ability to fight a protracted conflict is dependent first upon adequate initial warfighting capability, programs addressing the early demands of a conflict must not be funded to the exclusion of the capability needed to endure and eventually prevail. Expansion to enhance military capabilities in peacetime also provides the basis for expediting the attainment of needed wartime production levels. Together with our own efforts, our friends and allies need to strengthen the responsiveness of their own industrial and mobilization bases. We must recognize that a political decision may be taken to massively expand our forces and defense production well in advance of a major involvement of US forces in war. It is important that the planning and the industrial base exist in order to reduce the time required to implement such a decision.

Providing the manpower for active and reserve forces, especially the latter, will remain problematic. The decisions to maintain all-volunteer force and draft registration must be frequently reviewed in light of the threat and the changing economy. While present trends are favorable, they may not remain so when the economy improves. Even if the combination of high pay and emoluments and poor performance in the economy remain, the declining number of 18 year olds in the coming decade and programmed force growth may make a return to the draft essential. The availability of adequate numbers of trained manpower is the key both to maintaining deterrence and providing the training base for wartime expansion. An effective Selective Service System is necessary to sustain our mobilized force.

Lower Level Conflicts

Our ability to influence the outcome of low level conflicts not directly involving the United States depends, in part, on the peacetime relationships we have established with the factions involved. An integrated program of economic aid and military assistance can enhance US influence to prevent crises and conflicts from developing and increase the ability of friendly states and factions to defend themselves without involving US combat forces or to establish some degree to compatibility between US and indigenous forces in order to improve our capacity to work together in combat, if necessary. These outcomes can be facilitated by properly implemented security assistance programs. In the absence of an effective security assistance program, the likelihood of conflict increases, the likelihood of direct US involvement in conflict increases, and the effectiveness of US and regional forces decreases. The object of these programs must be to insure that US interests are protected in the most efficient and effective manner possible. Moreover, we must insure that no power vacuums and other sources of instability are created that tempt the Soviets or their surrogates.
Deterring or avoiding conflict requires that we are aware of the potential sources of discord and disharmony. We require comprehensive, objective intelligence not only of Soviet capabilities, preparations, and intent, as well as those of the states in potential conflict regions, but also those of our friends and allies and the vulnerabilities and desires of all concerned parties. We need this intelligence to reduce the period of ambiguity prior to a potential conflict and to increase the time in which the US can implement such measures as raising readiness conditions, callup or mobilization of reserve forces, movement of resources and forces forward within a theater, increased reconnaissance activity, or precautionary reinforcement of a theater. These actions should be accompanied by diplomatic activities to include prudent expansion of intelligence sharing with affected friends and allies.

The inherent danger of pre-conflict measures is that they could provoke instead of deter conflict. Therefore, they must be integrated with appropriate diplomatic consideration to insure that no side feels impelled to wage war. These signals must make it clear to potentially hostile nations or forces that, by aggressive acts, they may bring their forces into battle with US forces and, in the case of the Soviet Union, risk a wider war or risk provoking US use of nuclear weapons. The latter case, by itself, is a deterrent, since it would mean crossing a distinct conflict threshold.

While our responses to crises must always have diplomatic direction with the hopes of averting or curtailing hostilities, economic and indirect military contributions can further US interests without bringing US forces into direct combat. Specific examples are the provision of military training, hardware, supplies, medical assistance, and airlift. However, our willingness to respond to the needs of other states must be tempered by our own depleted stocks. The Special Defense Acquisition Fund will help in this regard as will our current build-up to higher levels of production. Training and other less direct involvement of US forces may be enhanced by the use of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Forces can also be used to precede, complement, or enhance the effectiveness of regular forces, especially when the employment of more conventional forces is inappropriate due to political, terrain, or economy of effort considerations. Wherever non-combatant assistance can be provided, through security assistance, crisis settlement, or other aid, the costs must be weighed against those of direct intervention which are bound to be greater than any other aid program.

Undoubtedly, one effective element of national power must be our national will to stand by friends. The perception of steadfast support and the confidence of trust with the United States has the proven potential to resolve crises or maintain a friendly state's will to resist and to persuade an aggressor to consider other, less provocative courses of action.

Should our vital interests be threatened in conflict not involving the Soviet Union and should local or regional forces prove unable to contain the threat, the US will be prepared to use its own forces.
Worldwide Conflict

Current US military capability does not permit us to engage successfully in simultaneous multi-theater operations. As a result, our military response must be based on regional priorities as described in Section C, the nature and sequence of the initial attack, the degree of preparation by both ourselves and our allies prior to the initiation of conflict, and the possibilities for nuclear war.

A timely deployment of military force provides the possibility of deterring war, or of limiting conflict to a low level both in terms of forces engaged and intensity. A flexible global force projection capability can present the Soviets with effective opposition at the point of attack or, if we choose, another region important to the Soviets. The difficulty for the United States is that we will probably be forced to react to any crisis or aggression with great speed to avoid a fait accompli. However, in many scenarios involving Soviet forces, current US mobility capability cannot deliver sufficient forces soon enough to sustain them. Thus, our mid-term actions to increase the readiness and sustainability of our current forces, increase mobility assets, and strengthen our mobilization and industrial base are necessary first steps. We seek to be able to respond to a major threat in any region, and to reduce the Soviets' ability to force the United States into a choice of the surrender of vital interests, the spreading of the war to other theaters, or the employment of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack.

Nuclear and Conventional Force Integration

To deter, especially in light of our current conventional inferiority, nuclear forces must be capable of responding flexibly, confronting the enemy with the risk of further escalation in the event deterrence fails, and presenting a credible response. This implies an ability to execute a broad range of possible responses to achieve military objectives, to control escalation, and to terminate conflict on favorable terms at the lowest possible level of violence. It also implies that our response would not be inhibited or deterred by the counterthreat posed by the Soviet Union. At present, the relative nuclear balance has eroded the credibility and utility of our nuclear "umbrella". This means that the US may be increasingly unwilling to escalate to the nuclear level in accordance with our strategy. The danger of having less viable escalatory options is compounded by Soviet conventional force capabilities, and the consideration that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, even if by only the use of low yield, limited range weapons, the possibilities for controlling escalation are diminished. A further danger lies in Soviet use of chemical weapons which might impel us to cross the nuclear threshold.

The visible inclusion of strategic systems in general war planning and exercises increases the credibility of our nuclear deterrence (NSDD-13 provides Presidential guidance on this issue). The uncertainty of intent and the possibility of misinterpretation associated with the use of any nuclear weapons dictate that extreme
caution be used when deciding on their use. Specifically, the use of strategic systems in a role other than strategic nuclear exchange or non-strategic systems against strategic targets may carry particular danger of generating an escalatory response. However, the advent of new long range non-strategic nuclear systems (e.g., PERSHING II, GLCM) and increased flexibility on the employment of strategic systems blurs traditional distinctions between the two. This will increase our potential adversary's uncertainty. The role of our declaratory policy is to create uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets as to the nature of our nuclear options. This uncertainty, however, does not imply that we cannot employ nuclear weapons in a manner that can be understood by our adversaries in support of escalation control or that there is uncertainty in our minds as to the role of nuclear forces in our general war planning.

The risks of nuclear war initiation are too great to permit nuclear forces to be viewed as a lower cost alternative to conventional forces. The use of nuclear forces to salvage a deteriorating conventional situation must be reserved for situations in which interests truly vital to the continuation of our fundamental security and freedoms are threatened and, most importantly, in which the use of such forces will not cause our position to deteriorate still further. The policy for the initial employment of non-strategic nuclear forces must carefully weigh the full implications of such employment, and an objective reevaluation of the nature of our threatened interests.

It is unlikely that we will ever in peacetime attain a conventional force posture that alone can assure deterrence or achieve our military objectives in a major conflict. Therefore, the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy. While strong conventional forces play a major role in deterring nuclear conflict by providing response options other than capitulation or nuclear war, a strong nuclear capability decreases the probability of a Soviet conventional attack due to the potential for escalation to nuclear war. For these reasons, negotiations for the control or limitation of any arms must consider the implications on our integrated forces and the overlap potential of all systems.

In certain regions, such as NATO Europe, our interests are so vital that the United States is committed to the use, if necessary, of nuclear force to counter aggression. The United States should, however, avoid creating relationships with other states that have as a basic tenet the substitution of our nuclear capability for indigenous conventional forces. US commitments for the possible use of nuclear weapons must balance the deterrent value of such commitments with the danger that we could be drawn into escalatory actions when our fundamental objectives are not directly threatened. These commitments also undermine the incentives to these states to build or maintain adequate conventional forces.

**Strategic Defensive Force Integration**

In the face of the growing vulnerability of land-based missiles and hardened targets to ICBM and potentially SLBM attack, we need to enhance the survivability of land based systems. An active ballistic missile defense, if technologically feasible and affordable, is one measure
that could enhance survivability. The United States should pursue the development of effective BMD technology, evaluate its role in our overall strategic posture, and preserve the options to modify or withdraw from international agreements that would limit the deployment of a BMD system. However, we must recognize that our near and mid-term strategic vulnerability cannot be solved by BMD. Therefore, planned improvements to strategic offensive forces which enhance survivability must continue.

Strategic defenses need not be impenetrable to enhance our nuclear strategy. They can still enhance deterrence by increasing both our civil survivability as well as the certainty that sufficient offensive strategic power will remain after an attack. This would reduce Soviet perceptions of advantages to be gained by initiating a nuclear attack.

A modernized retaliatory capability must also be combined with an effective program for continuity of government (PD/NSC-58), survivable telecommunications (PD/NSC-53) and a credible civil defense program (NSDD-26) which provide for population protection, and defense of key defense industries. Taken together, these amount to a more credible warfighting potential, thereby enhancing deterrence.

Military Use of Space

Space systems currently provide surveillance and communications for land, sea, undersea, and aerospace operations. Over the longer term, control of space will be decisive in conflict, and nations will vie for its control. The United States, with its increasing dependence on space-based systems, must maintain the capability to operate in space throughout the conflict spectrum, while denying any enemy the use of space in war, especially as autonomous space warfare systems are developed. The question is not whether space will be a medium for warfighting, but when, and who will dominate.

The military potential of space must be exploited in support of potential combat operations in the air, on land, and on and under the sea. The integration of this potential, as well as the interface with the civilian space community, should be reviewed for possible assignment to the Secretary of Defense.

Civilian space systems, equipment, and personnel training should incorporate the capability to support military requirements in wartime and be made available to support military operations of conditions require.

Complementary Measures

The costly realities of our own defense build-up, domestic opposition, and uncertain allied cooperation dictate that we strive to restrict the Soviet build-up. It is not enough merely to plan for a steady increase in US and allied defense spending, at present or even higher projected rates. Such a policy would be both dispirited and risky. With the momentum of a massive 20-year defense build-up, the Soviets could continue to outpace us during this decade. Our
political support for the continued growth in defense spending might be lost if the competition appeared like a futile "arms race," with no end in sight. Hence, as an essential complement of our defense effort, we need a policy to engender and sustain pressure on Soviet defense spending (such as efforts to restrict Western credits and military technology). In addition, measures are needed to generate or encourage political pressures on the Soviet government, so as to deflect it from its relentless pursuit of great military power.

The transfer of advanced Western technology to the Soviet Union and its allies undermines Western national security efforts in all other areas. For years, whatever edge we had over the Warsaw Pact was primarily of a qualitative nature. Uncontrolled, or even loosely controlled, transfer of Western technology to the Warsaw Pact allies merely accelerates the elimination of that edge. We must, therefore, act in concert with our Allies to insure that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact do not benefit from the technological and industrial efficiencies and advances that we have developed. In particular, we must act with greater care to limit the flow of dual use technology, whose military applications often are not obvious to the West while they are a boon to our potential adversaries.

Risk Assessment

The decade of the 1980s will be a very dangerous period for the West due to the variety of conditions outlined in Section A. Recent increases in Defense expenditures that allow the United States to begin redressing the shortfalls between forces and requirements and reverse the trends of the previous decade of declining US military strength in the face of growing Soviet capabilities are a welcome first step toward reducing those dangers.

Near-Term Risks. US forces, in conjunction with appropriate allied forces, must be capable of dealing with Soviet aggression on a worldwide basis. The resources required to accomplish this objective have not been provided in previous years. The resulting risks will be greatest in the following areas: the balance between the US and USSR strategic nuclear forces; the balance of non-strategic nuclear forces; the relative conventional force generation capabilities of the United States and the USSR in regions of vital interest; lack of sufficient mobility assets to meet global strategy requirements for flexibility; the lack of material to sustain forces until industrial-based production rates can be increased to satisfy demands; and the need for modernization of nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces. All are essential to our strategy and, in short, we are deficient in nearly every area. Addressal of these risks must be balanced with the need for increased force structure and readiness against a continually more potent and dangerous Soviet threat.

Nuclear Forces. Although the US no longer possesses clear nuclear superiority, the programs to modernize and upgrade US nuclear
deterrent capability will provide enhanced prospects, albeit not
superiority, for viable nuclear deterrence into the 1990s. Without
these investments, the risks of nuclear blackmail that unduly
restrict our international political latitude and nuclear war,
would dangerously increase by the second half of this decade.

General Purpose Forces

Current general purpose forces are adequate to maintain most peacetime
forward deployments and to respond to minor crises, but attendant
strains on manpower and readiness to maintain these capabilities
remain. These forces currently contribute to deterring direct Soviet
aggression in Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. However,
because of the continuing increases in Soviet conventional force
capabilities, major risks would confront US forces if they should
become engaged in direct conflict with Soviet forces in any of those
theaters.

Regarding global conflict with the Soviets, current general purpose
forces are not adequate to assure success in the event of major
conflict. A most pressing difficulty is our current inability to
transport currently available forces to potential crisis regions
in a timely manner and sustain them in combat. If engaged and
another crisis occurs elsewhere, land and air forces cannot be re-
deployed rapidly to the other regions, nor may they be reinforced
or adequately sustained due to lack of sufficient lift.

By the end of the 1980s, US force posture, although still involving
significant risk, will have improved capabilities to deploy and sustain
general purpose forces worldwide and a better manned and more
balanced total military force within realistic resource constraints.
However, the relative risk faced today may endure if the Soviets
continue their current pace of force capability development.

Throughout the decade, our capabilities to successfully oppose the
Soviets in any global region will remain dependent upon the
productive use of available warning time, timely decisions, and
the adequate readiness, manning, and equipping of US and allied
forces that will enable them to deploy rapidly and fight effectively.
An inherent risk will remain should the US become involved in any
theater. Forces available for ensuing crises in other geographic
regions will be greatly reduced and deployment times increased.
However, the programmed increased capabilities, sustainability,
and readiness of US forces for global deployment and employment
will better serve to deter actual tests of our military prowess.
As Chart 3 indicates, our current defense program does not achieve the force levels required to secure our national objectives with a high degree of certainty. The FYDP leaves us with a set of inadequacies which may tempt the Soviet Union to press its advantage. If the FYDP is fully funded, and if the military component of our national strategy as outlined in Part III is fully addressed, the risks are considerably reduced. If, however, these conditions are not met, and if funding falls below the FYDP, the risk will remain high.

**FORCE REQUIREMENTS**

- **REQUIRED TO MEET OBJECTIVES**
- **INTERMEDIATE FORCE LEVELS**
- **FIVE YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM**

* BASED ON THREAT AND STRATEGY

**FISCAL YEARS**

Chart 3

**Continued Assessment.** Based upon the projected threat throughout this decade and into the 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide an annual assessment of the effectiveness of current and programmed US forces, and force levels and capabilities required to attain national security objectives with reduced risk. This assessment will identify risks inherent in current and programmed capabilities. These required force levels and risk assessments will be used to guide the development of annual peacetime defense programs and as the basis for rapid total mobilization that would be required in any sustained global conflict.

**Strategy Alternatives.** Within the scope of our generalized global strategic approach, there are numerous opportunities and near-term requirements to examine alternative approaches that deal with the threats to our vital interests. Such alternatives cannot resolve or eliminate the need for improvements upon the current military force posture. At best, they can only redistribute risks, for
clearly, in view of the worldwide Soviet threat, the demands of any viable strategy will overtask our military capability throughout this decade. However, the potential for technological breakthroughs, use of space, exploitation of cruise missile technology, ongoing force improvements, and the ever-changing international order suggest that we cannot remain bound by a single strategic view. Approaches, such as the counter-offensive options, should be developed to improve the opportunities to defend our vital interests within expected constraints. In all cases, these must be a compendium of integrated political, economic, and military policies.