

CONFIDENTIAL

AN: D900535-0206

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 19444 01 OF 04 121542Z ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 INR-05 SS-01 ADS-00 01C-02 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 EB-01 DODE-00 H-01 IO-19 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 CBME-00 550-01 HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 PM-01 ITC-01 OPIC-08 OMB-01 NRRC-01 PA-01 STR-18 INRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 SP-01 SNP-01 JUSE - 00 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 DPR-01 7096 W ---242625 1215512 /46

O 121526Z JUN 90 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2172 INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION O1 OF C'I MOSCOW 19444

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, OPRC, ECON, ETRD, UR, US SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE SUMMIT

SUMMARY

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE OFFICIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, AS EXEMPLIFIED BY GORBACHEY'S JUNE 12 REPORT TO THE SUPREME SOVIET, IS VERY POSITIVE. GORBACHEV PARTICULARLY EMPHASIZED THE SUMMIT'S IMPORTANCE FOR SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. WHILE SOVIET COMMENTATORS NOTE THAT THIS MEETING WAS LESS DRAMATIC THAN PREVIOUS SUMMITS, AND POINT OUT THAT AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT REMAIN, THE VERY FACT THAT SUCH SOVIET-AMERICAN DIALOGUE IS NOW ROUTINE IS VIEWED AS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD. THIS SUMMIT IS SEEN AS TRULY MARKING THE END OF THE COLD WAR, DPENING A "NEW EPOCH" IN SOVIET-AMERICAN CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 19444 01 DF 04 121542Z

RELATIONS. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS ARE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

18 | FPO | ODER

1 | PELEASE | DECLASSIFY | MR CB888 Only |
DENY | DELY | MATART |
DELETE Non-Reuponate | MI CB888 Only |
DELETE NON-REUPONATE | MI CB888

CONFIDENTIAL
STILL GROPING TO DEFINE THIS NEW "PARTNERSHIP
(#)
SEEKING CLUES FROM THE U.S. SIDE. SOVIET
COMMENTARY ON THE SUMMIT EMPHASIZES THE DEVELOPING
"TRUST" BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND CREDITS THIS NEW
ATMOSPHERE AS ENABLING THE ADMINISTRATION TO SIGN A
POLITICALLY RISKY TRADE AGREEMENT.

3. FOR THE AVERAGE SOVIET, THE SUMMIT STORY COULD NOT COMPETE WITH CONCERNS OVER FOOD SUPPLIES AND THE ELECTION OF YELTSIN TO THE RESER PRESIDENCY. FROM HERE, ESPECIALLY JUDGING FROM THE TELEVISION COVERAGE, THE SUMMIT SEEMED PART OF A GORBACHEV POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TO GAIN SUPPORT AT HOME. AT THE SUPREME SOVIET, GORBACHEV EMPHASIZED THE STRONG SUPPORT HE FOUND IN WASHINGTON AND AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN GENERAL. SOME ELEMENTS AMONG THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION, UNHAPPY WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE SUMMIT, MAINTAIN THAT THE U.S., RATHER THAN "BETTING ON GORBACHEV," SHOULD SUPPORT THE MORE RADICAL REFORMERS. END SUMMARY.

"A NORMAL, CALM DIALOGUE"

4

4. SOVIET COMMENTARIES HAVE WIDELY NOTED THAT, WHILE THIS SUMMIT WAS PERHAPS NOT AS "DRAMATIC" AS PREVIOUS MEETINGS, THE FACT THAT THE U.S. AND SOVIET SIDES NOW VIEW SUCH MEETINGS AS "ROUTINE" REPRESENTS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. "IZVESTIYA" (JUNE 4) MAINTAINS THAT THE SUMMIT WAS SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE IT WAS "A NORMAL, CALM DIALOGUE," WHICH, WHILE NOT CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 19444 01 OF 04 121542Z

RESOLVING ALL THE ISSUES, GUARANTEED THAT THEY WILL NOT BECOME SOURCES OF NEW TENSION. WRITING IN THE "MOSCOW NEWS" (JUNE 17), COMMENTATOR VIKTOR KREMENYUK MAINTAINS THAT THE SUMMIT WAS "A CLEAR SUCCESS," ADDING THAT THE DISCUSSIONS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS WERE IMPORTANT, EVEN THOUGH NO DOCUMENTS WERE SIGNED. "NEW TIMES" (JUNE 1) POINTS OUT THAT WHILE SOME SAY THE "EUPHORIC" STAGE IS OVER, IN REALITY SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE ENTERED A CALMER

CONFIDENTIAL PERIOD AND ARE NO LONGER CHARACTERIZED BY UNPREDICTABILITY; THE "NOW OR NEVER" APPROACH TO SUMMITS IS A THING OF THE PAST.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

5. THE SOVIET MEDIA HAS TRUMPETED THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS MARKING THE END OF THE COLD WAR. THERE SEEMS NO DOUBT THAT "THE FINAL CHORDS OF THE COLD WAR HAVE BEEN SOUNDED" ("MOSCOW NEWS"). "NEW TIMES," NOTING THAT "THE COLD WAR IS OVER," POINTS OUT THAT "IT IS SAID THAT MOSCOW HAS LOST, THAT GORBACHEV IS ENTERING THE TALKS FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS." DISMISSING SUCH TALK AS "NONSENSE," THE ARTICLE ASKS WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE PREVIOUS "STRENGTH" OF THE SOVIET UNION. A PRE-SUMMIT TELEVISION DOCUMENTARY, TRACING THE HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS PRESENTED A RELATIVELY EVEN-HANDED TREATMENT OF THE COLD WAR PERIOD, STRESSING THAT BOTH SIDES WERE AT FAULT FOR THE DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS.

GROPING TO DEFINE THE NEW RELATIONSHIP
/----CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 19444 01 OF 04 121542Z

NOTE: (#) OMISSIONS. CORRECTION WILL FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 19444 02 OF 04 1215422 ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 INR-05 SS-01 010-02 CIAE-00 EB-01 DODE-00 H-01 10-19 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 L-03 COME-00 SSU-01 HA-09 LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 OPIC-08 PA-01 OMB-01 PM-01 ITC-01 STR-18 NRRC-01 JUSE-00 SP-01 INRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 SNP-01 PRS-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 DPR-01 **∕096 W**

O 121526Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2173
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION OZ OF O4 MOSCOW 19444

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR
TAGS: PREL, OPRC, ECON, ETRD, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE SUMMIT

"NEW TIMES" ASSERTS THAT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT IS THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FOR THE FIRST TIME ARE BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED NEXT AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR. RUBEZHOM* (JUNE 8) MAINTAINS THAT THE SUMMIT *OPENS THE WAY TO BUILD A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R." THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE GROPING FOR A WORKING DEFINITION OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP AND APPEAR ANXIOUS TO FIND CLUES FROM THE U.S. SIDE. IN A RECENT MEETING, AN EMBASSY CONTACT WHO RELIABLY EXPRESSES OFFICIAL CONCERNS REPEATEDLY PRESSED EMBOFF FOR AN EXPLANATION OF A STATEMENT BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESWOMAN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS "NO LONGER AN ENEMY BUT NOT YET A FRIEND." POLLS OF AMERICANS' VIEWS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE VIEWS OF U.S. CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 19444 02 OF 04 121542Z

COMMENTATORS ON THE SUMMIT HAVE BEEN REPORTED EXTENSIVELY.



CONFIDENTIAL

"TOWARDS PARTNERSHIP"

7. THE SOVIET MEDIA SEEMS TO BE SEARCHING FOR NEW SLOGANS TO DESCRIBE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. THE CONCEPT OF "PARTNERSHIP" APPEARS TO BE EMERGING AS THE FAVORITE. "ZA RUBEZHOM" NOTES THAT WITH THIS SUMMIT, THE POSSIBILITY APPEARED FOR THE TWO SIDES TO GO FROM "CONFRONTATION AND RIVALRY TO COOPERATION AND PARTNERSHIP." "LITERATURNAYA GAZETA" (JUNE 6) HEADLINES ITS SUMMIT STORY "WORTHY PARTNERS." THIS IDEA OF "PARTNERSHIP" HAS BEEN EXTENSIVELY ECHOED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY. CONTACTS, IN REGARD TO ISSUES RANGING FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT PROJECTS IN SMALL AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

"GROWING MUTUAL TRUST"

8. A COMMON THEME OF SOVIET REPORTING ON THE SUMMIT IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF "MUTUAL TRUST." IN ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT, "PRAVDA" (JUNE 9) MAINTAINS THAT THE TWO MOST IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS, THE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS PROBLEMS, "WERE MADE POSSIBLE BY PERSONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE GROWING MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES." PRESIDENT BUSH'S WILLINGNESS TO SIGN THE POLITICALLY RISKY TRADE AGREEMENT "OPENING CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 19444 02 OF 04 121542Z

HIMSELF TO ATTACKS FROM THE RIGHT," IS SEEN AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE INCREASE IN TRUST.
"IZVESTIYA" (JUNE 4) NOTES THAT THE TWO PRESIDENTS ARE NO LONGER FEARING THAT ONE IS USING THE OTHER FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES AND HAVE "TRUST IN THE FRIENDLY, SINCERE INTENTIONS OF EACH OTHER, EVEN IN THE CASES OF DISAGREEMENT WHICH REMAIN." "WHILE THE FUNDAMENTAL SENSE OF 'TRUST BUT VERIFY' REMAINS IN EFFECT, IN SOME ESSENTIAL ISSUES WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ARE BEGINNING TO TRUST EACH OTHER."



CONFIDENTIAL PROBLEMS REMAIN

9. SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON THE SUMMIT HAVE BEEN CAREFUL TO NOTE THAT SERIOUS DIFFERENCES REMAIN BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. A "PRAVDA" (JUNE 9) COMMENTARY CAUTIONS THAT THERE ARE STILL COMPLICATIONS, AND "WE DO NOT WANT TO INDUCE EUPHORIA IN OUR READERS." "ZA RUBEZHOM" NOTES THAT "WE CANNOT CLOSE OUR EYES TO CONTINUING DIFFICULTIES WITH THE U.S., THEY WILL ALWAYS BE THERE." "NEW TIMES" POINTS OUT THAT WHILE AGREEMENT ON RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS WILL BE A TRULY HISTORICAL EYENT, THERE WILL NEVERTHELESS STILL BE MORE SUCH WEAPONS IN EXISTENCE THAN THERE WERE 20 YEARS AGO WHEN THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS FIRST BEGAN.

THE INTERNAL DIMENSION

10. SOVIET COMMENTATORS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EVALUATE THE SUMMIT OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE EXTENSIVE,

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 19444 02 OF 04 1215422



CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MDSCOW 19444 03 OF 04 121543Z ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 AID-01 INR-05 SS-01 01C-05 CIAE-00 EB-01 DODE-00 H-01 10-19 EX1M-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 SS0-01 HA-09 L-03 LAB-04 CTME-00 TRSE-00 PM-01 ITC-01 OPIC-08 PA-01 GMB-01 STR-18 NRRC-01 INRE-00 FRB-03 USIE-00 JUSE-00 SP-01 SNP-01 PRS-01 P-02 T-01 DPR-01 7096 W ----242652 1215482 /46

O 121526Z JUN 90
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2174
INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 MOSCOW 19444

E.O. 12356: DECL: DADR TAGS: PREL, OPRC, ECON, ETRD, UR, US SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE SUMMIT

DETAILED COVERAGE OF THE SUMMIT BY SOVIET TELEVISION (WELCOMING AND DEPARTURE CEREMONIES WERE BROADCAST IN THEIR ENTIRETY) ALMOST SEEMED LIKE PART OF A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN AIMED AT COUNTERING THE EXPOSURE BORIS YELTSIN WAS RECEIVING AS NEWLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE RFSFR. NUMEROUS QUOTES FROM AMERICAN "EXPERTS" SUPPORTING PERESTROYKA AND THE STABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION HAVE APPEARED IN THE SOVIET PRESS. "NEW TIMES" (JUNE 1) CARRIES AN ARTICLE BY CANADIAN PUBLICIST ILYA GEROL WHICH CITES WESTERN EXPERTS ON THE DANGERS OF A DIVIDED SOVIET UNION.

11. IT IS EVIDENT HERE, EVEN IN OFFICIAL CONTACTS, THAT FOR THE AVERAGE SOVIET, INTEREST IN THE SUMMIT TOOK A BACK SEAT TO FOOD SUPPLY PROBLEMS AND THE CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 19444 03 0F 04 121543Z

ELECTION OF YELTSIN. "ZA RUBEZHOM" SEEMED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS IN ITS ARTICLE ON THE SUMMIT,

. . .

CONFIDENTIAL MAINTAINING THAT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ARE NOT "ADEQUATELY REFLECTÉD IN OUR CONSCIOUSNESS." TWO DANGERS ARE SEEN IN THIS, THAT PUBLIC OPINION WILL UNDERESTIMATE THE INCREASING IMPACT OF EXTERNAL POLITICAL FACTORS ON THE FATE OF PERESTROYKA, "WHICH NEEDS A FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, " AND THAT "LIMITING OPENESS TO THE **QUTSIDE WORLD WILL ENCOURAGE CONSERVATISM AND BLACK** AND WHITE VIEWPOINTS."

- 12. GORBACHEY, AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF HIS JUNE 12 REPORT TO THE SUPREME SOVIET, EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUMMIT FOR SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. HE SPOKE AT LENGTH ON THE ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS, AND DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN AND CANADIAN BUSINESS LEADERS. GORBACHEY CITED THE STRONG SUPPORT FOR PERESTROYKA AMONG THE "MASSES" OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO RECEIVED HIM WARMLY, "EVEN WITH SOLIDARITY. * PRESENTING A VERY POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON, GORBACHEY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DIFFERENCES REMAINED ON GERMANY, BUT SAID THAT THE WEST WAS AT LEAST NOW BEGINNING TO GIVE SOME CONSIDERATION TO THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT.
- THE REACTIONS OF THE DEPUTIES TO GORBACHEY'S REPORT ALSO EXHIBITED A PREOCCUPATION WITH DOMESTIC ISSUES. DEPUTIES CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR TESTING IN KAZAKHSTAN AND NOVAYA ZEMLYA ASKED ABOUT THE NTT PROTOCOLS. QUESTIONS WERE ASKED REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 19444 03 OF 04 121543Z

SOCIAL PROGRAMS BY CUTS IN STRATEGIC ARMS AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM EASTERN EUROPE. ESTONIAN DEPUTY IGOR GRAZIN TOLD POLOFF AFTERWARDS THAT GORBACHEV'S TRIP WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT ENABLED HIM TO SEE THE DEPTH OF SUPPORT FOR THE BALTIC STATES IN THE U.S. AND CANADA.

GRAZIN RAISED TENSIONS IN THE CHAMBER BY SUBMITTING A QUESTION POINTING OUT THAT THE BALTIC ISSUE STILL STOOD IN THE WAY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT. IN A MEASURED RESPONSE,

CONFIDENTIAL GORBACHEV REITERATED HIS STAND THAT BALTIC INDEPENDENCE MUST PROCEED WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, BUT, AS BALTIC DEPUTIES POINTED OUT LATER, HE REFRAINED FROM RULING OUT A POSSIBLE DIALOGUE WITH BALTIC REPRESENTATIVES.

15. COMMENT. THE ENTIRE POLITBURO AND CPSU SECRETARIAT WAS PRESENT IN THE PACKED CHAMBER FOR GORBACHEY'S REPORT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF LIGACHEY, RYZHKOV, YAKOYLEY, AND ZAIKOY. END COMMENT.

DISSENTING VOICES /------

16. SOME OBSERVERS HERE TAKE A MORE JAUNDICED VIEW

OF THE SUMMIT. IN A CONVERSATION WITH POLOFF,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL


PAGE 01 MOSCOW 19444 04 OF 04 121543Z ACTION EUR-01

ADS-00 AID-01 OIC-02 INFO LOG-00 INR-05 SS-01 CIAE-00 EB-01 DODE-00 H-01 10-19 EXIM-06 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 COME-00 HA-09 SSB-01 L-03 LAB-04 TRSE-00 CTME-00 PM-01 ITC-01 BPIC-08 PA-01 OMB-01 STR-18 NRRC-01 INRE-00 USIE-00 JUSE-00 SP-01 SNP-01 FRB-03 PRS-01 E-01 P-02 T-01 DPR-01 7096 W ---242665 1215482 /46


O 1215262 JUN 96 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2175 INFO MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C G N F I D E N T I A L SECTION OF CY MOSCOW 19444

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, OPRC, ECON, ETRD, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIET REACTIONS TO THE SUMMIT



CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDINTIAL



This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, nsarchiv@gwu.edu