

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**
2016-0852-M (1.06)
3/6/2019 KBH

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Presidential telephone call to South Korean
President Kim -- October 14, 1994, 6:23 p.m.
- 7:11 p.m. EDT

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Daniel Poneman, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director for
Nonproliferation and Export Controls

President Kim Young Sam

Interpreter: Tong Kim, Stephen Niemerski,
Matthew Wallack and Karen Dragone

Notetaker:

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: October 14, 1994, 6:23 p.m. - 7:11 p.m. EDT
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

President Clinton: Hello, how are you?

President Kim: Hello, how are you?

President Clinton: Fine, it is nice to hear your voice.

President Kim: I am very delighted to listen to you.

President Clinton: Thank you. First, I want to say that I know Tony Lake and Dr. Chung have talked about the serious problems raised by the recent *New York Times* article. I am glad they put that unfortunate incident behind us.

I expect that in the future we will resolve any differences privately and that we will coordinate our public positions. I believe that is essential to keep our alliance strong and to avoid letting others divide us.

I understand that our people in Geneva are in constant contact, talking together many times each day.

Our negotiators have made every effort to reflect your government's positions, and have constantly sought your advice and acted on it as much as absolutely possible.

We now may be close to a draft agreement in Geneva, consistent with the principles and the objectives agreed between us, that protects and advances our mutual national security interests.

The exact details of the settlement are still being worked out, but I understand that it will commit North Korea to the following things:

- to return to the NPT;
- to fully comply with IAEA safeguards, including allowing access to additional sites such as the two suspected waste sites;
- not to reprocess plutonium;
- to dismantle its existing nuclear facilities
- to let us monitor and ship out its spent fuel;
- to accept South Korea-type light water reactors; and
- finally, negotiators are pushing hard for North Korea to implement its denuclearization agreement with South Korea.

You and I agreed that we would be firm on principles and we would seek an agreement that does not require that we trust the North Koreans. Whatever the exact terms of a final settlement, I assure you it will live up to our agreement and will enhance our mutual security.

We also agreed that we would be flexible on timing, as long as the North Koreans agreed to our objectives and I have authorized my negotiators to proceed accordingly. In the final settlement, North Korea must provide full transparency of its nuclear program before the light water reactor project is completed.

Further, there will be checks at each stage to guarantee that North Korea takes the steps it has committed to before the LWR project moves forward. As you know, your support for this project is essential to secure DPRK action to resolve the nuclear problem.

If the talks in Geneva do produce a draft agreement, then I will ask Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Gallucci to travel to Seoul next week to consult with you on the draft agreement and

on next steps we should take and hope you will receive them as my personal representatives.

This concludes the points I want to make. Now I would like to hear from you.

President Kim: Thank you very much for the kind and detailed explanation of the Geneva talks. With regard to the *New York Times* article, I received a report from Dr. Chung regarding his discussion with Lake. I entirely agree with the discussion they had. We need to continue to coordinate to avoid exposure of our differences. We should coordinate internally on any differences if they exist. I will continue to push for internal coordination with you. The *New York Times* article was done in a very indirect conversation. Recently though, through my CNN interview, I expressed my message, which I believe Kim Jong-il must have watched.

Thank you very much for the kind explanations on developments of the Geneva talks. Speaking of our media, there are little differences between our explanation and media reports. Yesterday and today the media carried articles on the Geneva talks. They expressed criticism over how an agreement like this can be possible. They criticize my government. My assessment, Mr. President -- I have been in office one year and seven months -- to me this is the most critically important crisis of my presidency and the civilian government in Korea. Of course, there are always people who will be opposed. Twenty percent are opposed to what I'm doing. This is OK in a democracy. The problem includes those people, the very group that supported me, the conservatives, the middle class, and intellectuals and the pro-Americans. They used to support me but now they have become critical, they have turned their backs against me and the United States. It has become a problem for effective national government.

You explained to me what is already known in the media in Korea. The question is how can we calm the public and deal with public opinion. I have been thinking. Most importantly we need to calm down our public opinion and persuade people to accept the Geneva agreement. We have been working on this day and night for the past two or three days. One of the major headlines read, "Where has nuclear transparency gone? What has happened to the inter-Korean dialogue?" The key point is that it is difficult to accept a solution between the U.S. and North Korea without inter-Korean dialogue as a condition. Without dialogue conditions, the U.S.-North Korea agreement is insufficient.

I believe the U.S. does not want a secret deal with North Korea. I do not insinuate that the U.S. is striking a secret deal with

North Korea and excludes South Korea. But, it is very difficult to persuade public opinion without inter-Korean dialogue in the Geneva agreement.

With regard to my last point on North-South dialogue, I have sent a message through my CNN interview, the desirability of inter-Korean dialogue was most recently passed to North Korea. I raised the issue to Kim Jong-il through my CNN interview. He has not yet taken leadership. It is my position that he will. The death of Kim il-Sung postponed the inter-Korean talks. If Kim Jong-il is inaugurated, it would be natural to pursue inter-Korean summit. Dialogue should be resumed, including the previous arrangement for dialogue. I understand the vice president of CNN has advised and alerted Kim Jong-il to be waiting for my interview. He ought to know our position. So far some of my close advisers have mentioned North-South dialogue. But for me, it was the first time I mentioned that I would consider or be interested in meeting with Kim Jong-il for a summit.

President Clinton: Let me respond. I appreciate your forthright and candid comments. I know we both have political critics on this issue. Obviously this is the big issue for you. I believe the agreement will respond to our goals to have North Korea rejoin NPT, accept IAEA inspections and dismantle their dangerous facilities. And we will ensure nuclear transparency. I understand South Korean public opinion says North-South dialogue is needed and wanted badly. I want it, too.

In your speech tomorrow you have the opportunity to increase North Korean willingness to accept the Geneva agreement. You could bring around the public political environment to meet security interests we both want.

President Kim: As I mentioned to you before, Mr. President, the situation in Korea is very serious. Before, I thought if a U.S.-North Korea agreement was reached, I would give a press conference the next day. But where we stand now is the most severe confrontation since the establishment of the civilian government. The biggest crisis is suspicion of a U.S. deal with North Korea. I think we should do it differently to calm down public opinion if agreement is reached. We have decided to take the following steps to calm public opinion. Our foreign minister will give a press interview with the aim to subside (sic) public opinion. The press interviews are necessary to calm the public. Tomorrow is Sunday and the deputy prime minister for unification minister will have a press interview. Hopefully the atmosphere will be calmer after that. I will then decide the timing as to when I will explain my thoughts to the public.

Many in the U.S. support the agreement. There is no question we should prevent war on the peninsula. We should have inter-Korean dialogue. The settlement of dialogue would be in our favor. North Korea feels the need to reach an agreement as soon as possible, it seems the U.S. is also in a hurry for an agreement.

I have much respect for your efforts in Cuba, Haiti and Iraq. Especially Iraq, you showed strong resolve and because of that your popularity has increased and is now very high. Congratulations to you on these results but North Korea is an enormous task and an issue of importance to U.S. and South Korea. We should retain traditional relations, but I do not believe North Korea will carry out any agreement even though they will say they have reached an agreement.

In final conclusion, you should reaffirm your strong commitment and send a strong message of U.S. commitment to Korea. North Korea should announce it will abide by the agreement and U.S. should make strong demand that North Korea implement the agreement. I do not believe North Korea. I would not trust North Korea despite an agreement.

Defense Secretary Perry, as an envoy, should discuss follow-up and make strong statements on security measures. You should instruct Perry to stress strong U.S. commitment to Korea to ensure that North Korea does not miscalculate.

I'd like to make one more point. I first thought I would give information at press conference and I was going to announce agreement was result of my agreement with you. But the situation has changed. Our media could not provide deep details of agreement. What you told me has already been reported in the media. What you explained has already brought enormous criticism. It would be wise not to make public our talk. Now you should give first press conference then I will discuss my opinion. Those that support the U.S. are now very critical. I can't over emphasize that you make strong commitment from Perry too. That would be very helpful to persuade people in our country. There has been so much dissatisfaction with my government because of this problem that we cannot carry out normal affairs of state.

President Clinton: I do. I will support it, as will Secretary Perry. I look forward to working with you on this issue. Good night.

President Kim: Mr. President, thank you very much. I would like to stress once again it would help enormously if you express very solid conditions. Public opinion is coming down not only on South Korea, but the U.S. too. I think our conversation has been

very meaningful. It has served as an opportunity for full understanding.

I appreciate Ambassador Gallucci's efforts. We will try our best to win this situation. I understand the difficulty Ambassador Gallucci has had. I look forward to visiting with you under more pleasant circumstances during the APEC summit. Give my best to Mrs. Clinton. Good night, I hope everything goes well in the end.

President Clinton: Thank you. I look forward to see you in Johanta. My very best to Mrs. Kim. Thank you for your support and good night.

-- End of Conversation --

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