



Embassy of the United States of America

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MEMORANDUM

February 28, 1990

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TO: Richard J. Chidester, Legal Section Chief  
El Salvador U.S. Embassy

FROM: Arthur M. Sedillo, TDY Criminal Investigator  
U.S. Embassy Mexico City

SUBJECT: Jesuit Murder Investigation

The following chronological narrative of the murder of the six Jesuit priests and two domestic employees on November 16, 1989, San Salvador, El Salvador, has been prepared from the defendants' and some of the material witnesses' statements. Even though some of the defendants' statements may contradict each other, an analysis of all the statements and the SIU investigation indicate that the activities during this time frame occurred as reported in this memorandum.

At the conclusion of the narrative, I have stated my observations or recommendations which you may want to consider for further investigation or other actions deemed necessary by your office.

1. On the afternoon of November 13, 1990, Col. Guillermo Alfredo BENAVIDES Moreno received a telephone call from El Salvador Armed Forces Hqs. "ESAF" (Estado Mayor) Col. Joaquin Armando CERNA Flores designating Col. BENAVIDES as "Chief of Security Command of the Military Complex". In accordance with this designation, Col. BENAVIDES was assigned additional manpower including a Commando Company from the Atlacatl Battalion.

2. On November 13, 1989, at 1600 Hours, Atlacatl Battalion Senior Duty Officer notified Company Commander Lt. Jose Ricardo ESPINOZA Guerra to proceed with his company to the military school in San Salvador. Lt. ESPINOZA, accompanied by his executive officer Sub Lt. Gonzalo GUEVARA CERRITOS and one hundred and thirty five (135) men departed the Atlacatl Battalion Hqs. and arrived at the military school at about 1800 Hours. At the school, Lt. ESPINOZA reported to the School Director, Col. BENAVIDES and Assistant School Director, Col. Camilo HERNANDEZ. After this, in compliance with instructions from Atlacatl Battalion Hqs., Lts. ESPINOZA and CERRITOS reported to ESAF Hqs.

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3. At the ESAF Hqs., the "Senior Chief of the Third Complex" (not further identified) ordered Lt. ESPINOZA in the following manner and according to ESPINOZA'S statement: "GO TO THE UCA UNIVERSITY, WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF TERRORIST DELINQUENTS ARE INSIDE THOSE FACILITIES." Lt. ESPINOZA was given additional instructions that in the event he did not find any terrorists in the UCA campus, he was to conduct a general search of the facilities. After receiving radio frequencies and the location of other military units operating in the same general area, Lts. ESPINOZA and CERRITOS returned to the military school at 1920 Hours.

4. On 11/13/89 at 1945 Hours, the Commando Company exited the military school through the south gate and marched towards the UCA. They entered the UCA campus through the south pedestrian gate which was open. Once inside the campus, the company divided into previously assigned patrols to conduct security in different sectors of the campus.

5. Prior to initiating the search, a sergeant that was controlling the UCA entrance called Lt. ESPINOZA via radio informing him that a "Charlie Coyote", subsequently identified as Salvadorian Army Lt. Hector Ulises CUENCA OCAMPO, was at the gate and wanted to talk to Lt. ESPINOZA. Lt. ESPINOZA met with Lt. CUENCA OCAMPO and learned that this Lt. had been sent by ESAF Hqs. to join Lt. ESPINOZA in the UCA search. Lt. CUENCA OCAMPO participated in the search with Lt. ESPINOZA and after the search, departed to an unknown location without giving Lt. ESPINOZA any explanations.

6. Lt. ESPINOZA and the patrol unit that was accompanying him contacted UCA Rector Jesuit Priest Ignacio ELLUCURIA and two other priests. Upon informing the Rector about their mission to search the priest's residence, Rector ELLUCURIA was reluctant to allow the search of their residence stating that this was their private domain. Lt. ESPINOZA informed the Rector of their authority to search that specific area under the present "State of Seige" status. Rector ELLUCURIA accompanied Lt. ESPINOZA on the search of the priest's residence. When the search of the residence was completed, Lt. ESPINOZA told Rector ELLUCURIA that he would not have to accompany them on the rest of the search because they were only going to conduct a superficial search of the rest of the campus and would only check the buildings with unlocked doors. According to Lt. CERRITOS' statement, he did not participate in the residence search and shortly after that search had been completed, Lt. ESPINOZA ordered the troops to return to

the military school. When the troops arrived at the school, Lts. ESPINOZA and CERRITOS reported to School Assistant Director Col. HERNANDEZ, who in turn provided a vehicle for the Lts. to go and report their findings to ESAF Hqs.

7. On January 30, 1990, the present UCA Rector Priest Miguel Estrada told me that on November 13, 1989, he had picked up the former UCA Rector ELLUCURIA at the San Salvador International Airport who had arrived from Spain at 4:30 P.M. Rector Estrada said that he vividly recalled the exact time and events during that specific time frame because after picking up Rector ELLUCURIA, they had taken some friends home from the airport; and, because of this delay, the priests were worried that they would not be able to get back to the UCA campus before the 6 P.M. wartime curfew. He said that they arrived at the UCA main vehicle entrance gate at 5:45 P.M. and were momentarily detained by a military patrol that was stationed at that location. The patrol's supervisor, which may have been an officer, approached the vehicle and upon observing Rector ELLUCURIA, stated, "IT IS YOU, RECTOR ELLUCURIA. YOU HAVE RETURNED," and then permitted them to enter the campus. Rector Estrada said that they had not given any importance to this military contact because the presence of military in the area of the UCA was of logistical importance to the military due to the proximity of the military school, Estado Mayor, and a local military family community.

8. Regarding the November 13, search incident, Rector ESTRADA said that one of the Jesuit priests had made notes of the search, which included a suggestion made by Rector ELLUCURIA to Lt. ESPINOZA that they should continue with their search early in the morning so that with the benefit of daylight, their search would be more thorough. Lt. ESPINOZA did not accept the suggestion.

9. Several of the military material witnesses and defendants attest in their statements that they had been assigned patrol duties in the area of the UCA campus since early in the afternoon on November 15, 1989. Some of the statements indicate that the motive for these reconnaissance operations were due to information that FMLN guerillas were bringing some of their injured personnel into the UCA campus. The patrol teams were instructed not to let anyone enter the campus.

10. On 11/15/89, at 1900 Hours, Lt. ESPINOZA claims that his troops were dispersed throughout several sectors of the military school and surrounding areas. During this time frame, he was accompanied by Sub. Lt. CERRITOS, Sub Sergeant ACORRALADOR and the sergeant's patrol unit at the principal entrance to Colonia General Manuel Jose Arce.

11. On 11/15/89 at about 2215 Hours, Lt. ESPINOZA received orders via radio to return to the military school. He returned with part of his troops and left the rest patrolling around the UCA area. In his statement, Lt. ESPINOZA claims that he was not able to contact the troops left behind; but Sub. Lt. CERRITOS' statement contradicts Lt. ESPINOZA in that Lt. CERRITOS recalls Lt. ESPINOZA had reported to Col. BENAVIDES the exact location where Lt. ESPINOZA had assigned the troops that had remained near the UCA.

12. While at the military school, at about 2230 Hours, Lt. ESPINOZA and the troops obtained their rations from the Battalion Logistic Officer for their scheduled assignment of the following day (at 6:00 A.M.) in Colonia Zacamil.

13. On 11/15/89 at about 2300 Hours, Lt. ESPINOZA was ordered to report to Col. BENAVIDES' office; and while enroute, he encountered Lt. YUSSY MENDOZA VALLECILLOS who was also called to attend the same meeting. Lt. MENDOZA asked Lt. ESPINOZA, "Where is Lt. CERRITOS? My Col. BENAVIDES wants to talk to both of you." Lt. ESPINOZA sent for Sub Lt. CERRITOS who shortly after joined them.

14. On 11/15/89 at about 2315 Hours, Col. BENAVIDES joined the three Lts. in the building lobby and asked them to follow him to his office where they would be able to confer in private. According to the three Lts., Col. BENAVIDES made the following statement to them:

LT. ESPINOZA'S VERSION: "THIS IS A SITUATION WHERE IT IS THEM OR IT IS US. WE ARE GOING TO START WITH THE LEADERS; AND INSIDE OUR SECTOR, WE HAVE THE UNIVERSITY AND ELLACURIA IS THERE." (Directing the following to Lt. ESPINOZA) "YOU SEARCHED AND YOUR PEOPLE KNOW THE AREA, USE THE SAME PROCEDURE THAT YOU USED ON THE DAY OF THE SEARCH. AND YOU MUST ELIMINATE HIM. AND I DON'T WANT ANY WITNESSES. LT. MENDOZA WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE OPERATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEMS."

SUB LT. CERRITOS VERSION: " O.K. GENTLEMEN, WE ARE PLAYING ALL FOR ALL, EITHER IT IS US OR IT IS THEM, SINCE THESE HAVE BEEN THE INTELLECTUALS THAT HAVE DIRECTED THE WAR FOR A LONG TIME, THEY HAVE TO BE ELIMINATED. (Directing his remarks to Lt. ESPINOZA)" YOU KNOW WHERE THE PRIESTS SLEEP AND I DON'T WANT ANY WITNESSES. LT. ESPINOZA WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE OPERATION."

LT. MENDOZA'S VERSION: (When he walked into the Col's office, the other two Lts. were already there with Col. BENAVIDES) Upon seeing me, Col. BENAVIDES placed his hand on my shoulder and said, "LOOK MENDOZA, YOU ARE GOING TO ACCOMPANY ESPINOZA ON A MISSION. HE (referring to ESPINOZA) ALREADY KNOWS THE DETAILS OF THE MISSION."

15. After the aforementioned meeting the three Lts. proceeded to their respective areas to prepare themselves and the troops for the execution mission. Lt. ESPINOZA briefed his patrol commanders; and then he, accompanied by Sub.Lt. CERRITOS, Sgt. SOLORZANO and Cpl. "ACORRALADOR" walked to Lt. MENDOZA'S quarters, borrowed a camouflage bar and painted their faces.

16. On 11/16/89 at about 00 Hours 10 minutes, the three Lts. and part of the 36-man troop boarded two pick-up trucks and were standing by to proceed to the UCA campus when Lt. MENDOZA came out of the military school carrying an AK-47 rifle and magazines for the same weapon. He approached the troops and asked which soldier was familiar with the operation of that weapon. Soldier Oscar Martinez AMAYA GRIMALDI aka "PILLIJAY" stated that he was familiar with the operation of the AK-47. Lt. MENDOZA handed the weapon to AMAYA as he told him, "YOU WILL BE OUR KEY MAN." AMAYA accepted the weapon with the knowledge that he had just been designated to carry out the actual killings. Sgt. SOLORZANO obtained weapon cleaning gear for AMAYA who had complained that the AK-47 was dirty and would probably not function. After the rifle was cleaned, AMAYA boarded one of the trucks and stood by for their departure to the UCA campus.

17. On 11/16/89, at about 00 Hours 15 minutes, the first two truckloads arrived at a prearranged location which was near some old buildings close to the UCA campus. While the three Lts. were waiting for the arrival of the rest of the troops from the military school, they radioed the patrols that they had left guarding the UCA area. Once these other patrols arrived, Lt. ESPINOZA ordered Sub Lt. CERRITOS to brief the arriving troops on their new mission. Reportedly, Lt. MENDOZA interceded, insisting that he would brief the troops. According to Lt. MENDOZA'S statement, Lt. ESPINOZA briefed the troops. Cpl. Angel PEREZ Vasquez indicated in his statement that during the briefing the troops had been told that once the executions were accomplished, a flare grenade would be shot as a signal for all the troops to leave the UCA campus. Lt MENDOZA had also instructed them to simulate a confrontation by shooting up the area in front of the priest's residential two-story building. Once the second group arrived from the military school, the entire troop started marching towards the UCA campus.

18. The troops walked past the Cine Colonial to Mediterraneo Street and on to the UCA pedestrian entrance. Some of the soldiers had forced the gate open and all the troops walked until they reached the priest's two-story building. According to Cpl. Angel PEREZ VASQUEZ, some of the troops surrounded the building.

19. AMAYA GRIMALDI stated that he accompanied Lt. ESPINOZA and MENDOZA through the west side of the chapel. They walked up some stairs that led to a cyclone gate and fence. AMAYA jumped the metallic fence and continued walking under a roofed walk-way that led to the priest's dormitories, walked through a lawn area and along the side of the residence. He hollered into the residence, "LET'S SEE AT WHAT TIME YOU WILL COME OUT OF THERE. ACCORDING TO YOU, I HAVE TIME TO BE WAITING FOR YOU." AMAYA said that at that moment he observed a person dressed in a brown colored sleeping outfit. The person told AMAYA to wait awhile, that the door would be opened. AMAYA claims that the person did not open the door and left the soldier waiting. AMAYA aka "PILLIJAY" heard someone shout, "PILLIJAY, THEY ARE COMING OUT OVER HERE." When AMAYA looked around, he saw that the same person he had previously seen was outside standing next to Sgt. Oscar SOLORZANO, Sub Sergeant Antonio Ramiro AVALOS VARGAS and others. The other priests started to come out of the building. They were a total of five (5) male subjects. AVALOS ordered them to lay face down on the lawn in front of the residence.

20. At that time, AMAYA saw Lt. ESPINOZA and MENDOZA who were about 10 meters from AMAYA's position. AMAYA then saw AVALO VARGAS shooting the persons closer to him at which time AMAYA started shooting three of the priests closer to him. He shot them in the head first and then shot them in other parts of their bodies. AMAYA said that he used the AK-47 and AVALOS VARGAS used a M-16 rifle. After the shooting, AMAYA heard Lt. MENDOZA'S voice ordering Cpl. COTTA HERNANDEZ to drag the cadavers inside the building.

21. AVALOS states that when he made the priests lay face down, he saw Sgt SOLORZANO and four other soldiers walk back into the residence in search of more priests. At about the same time, AVALOS was called by Lts. ESPINOZA and MENDOZA, who at the time were standing near the stairs leading to the gate and entrance to the priest's property. AVALOS walked towards them at which time Lt. ESPINOZA asked him, "AT WHAT HOUR ARE YOU GOING TO PROCEED?" AVALOS understood the Lt's remark as an order to kill the priests. AVALOS returned to where AMAYA was guarding the priests and whispered into AMAYA'S ear, "PROCEED". AVALOS shot the two priests nearest him and observed AMAYA shoot the other three.

22. After they had shot the priests, AVALOS heard shots inside the residence where Sgt. SOLORZANO and the other four had entered. According to AMAYA, he had seen a sixth priest walking in the hallway towards the south door in the direction where the five priests had been killed. AMAYA said that he heard the priest say, "DON'T GO KILL ME. I DON'T BELONG TO ANY ORGANIZATIONS." AMAYA said that as he left that area, he heard shots inside the hallway and AMAYA claims that at those moments, the sixth priest must have been killed. According to Cpl. Angel PEREZ Vasquez regarding the sixth priest, he remembers seeing him. The priest was a taller person, dressed in white. The person came out and saw the cadavers and returned into the building where he met several soldiers who told the priest, "COME OVER HERE, COMPA."; but, the priest ignored them. The priest was going to enter one of the dormitories when a soldier shot him. PEREZ walked into the room where the priest had been shot; and according to PEREZ, the shot priest, who was laying on the floor, grabbed PEREZ'S leg and PEREZ reportedly shot the priest four more times. PEREZ said that he could not identify the soldier who had originally shot the priest.

23. According to Sgt. Tomas ZARPATE Castillo, on the night of the execution, Lt. MENDOZA had ordered him to guard the first doors that led to the kitchen or dining room of the priest's residence. When he had walked a few meters past the gate and under the roofed walk-way, Lt. MENDOZA gave him additional instructions not to permit anyone out. ZARPATE looked inside the building and with the moonlight, could see two women. One was sitting on the bed and the other was laying down. Some moments later, ZARPATE heard noises and shots. He also claims to have heard an authoritative voice holler, "NOW". At that moment, ZARPATE shot the two women. He shot them several times to make sure they were dead and then he exited the area through the cyclone gate.

24. After AVALOS and AMAYA had killed the five priests, AVALOS walked towards the gate and met soldier Jorge Alberto SIERRA ACENCIO, who at the time was guarding that area. They heard moaning from inside the building. They checked inside and found two women who had been shot but not killed; therefore, AVALOS ordered soldier Jorge Alberto SIERRA ACENCIO to shoot them again to make sure they were dead. Soldier SIERRA ACENCIO shot the women several times until they stopped moaning. SIERRA ACENCIO subsequently became a deserter and is a fugitive in this investigation.

25. When the flare was shot, the troops left the UCA area. Several of the material witnesses and codefendants stated that they saw a soldier carrying a large suitcase from the priest's residence. The soldier enroute to the UCA gate handed the suitcase to Lt. MENDOZA'S assistant, subsequently identified as soldier Jose Heriberto HERNANDEZ Valle. HERNANDEZ later on claimed to have lost the suitcase; but other material witnesses state that HERNANDEZ, in compliance with Lt. MENDOZA'S orders, had placed the suitcase in one of the pick-ups.

26. Several of the material witnesses and codefendants stated that they observed or were involved in simulating a combat confrontation in front of the priest's residence after the priests had been killed. Some of the witnesses also observed Sub. Lt. CERRITOS write something on a sign and ordered a soldier to hang it on the entrance to the UCA gate.

27. Once the troops had exited the UCA campus, they requested the military school via radio to send the pick-up trucks to come and pick up the troops. Once the trucks arrived, some of the soldiers boarded them and the rest of the troops were ordered to walk back with Sub. Lt. CERRITOS to the military school. When the two trucks arrived at the military school, Lts. MENDOZA and ESPINOZA reportedly went into the military school building. Soldier AMAYA went to the Military Duty Officer's post to turn in the AK-47 and to pick up his issued M-16 rifle and other gear.

28. On 11/16/89, at about 0600 Hours, the Atlacatl Commando Company under the command of Lt. ESPINOZA and Sub Lt. CERRITOS went to join their Battalion in the area of Colonia Zacamil.



OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. In paragraph 1, Col. BENAVIDES mentions Col. Joaquin Armando CERNA Flores. Is this officer the same as the "Senior Jefe de Completo Tres" from whom Lt. ESPINOZA received orders on 11/13/89 to search the UCA? On 2/1/90, I asked SIU investigator Lt. P. this question with a negative response.
2. I firmly believe that circumstantial evidence exists indicating that the Nov. 13-16 incidents are interrelated. To prove or disapprove this theory, several investigative leads including the following should be developed:
  - A. Ever since the Atlacatl Company was assigned to the military school under the temporary command of Col. BENAVIDES, Lt. ESPINOZA was given additional instructions to report to the Estado Mayor. During the same time frame, other companies were assigned to the military school. Did these other units have to report to the Estado Mayor similar to Lt. ESPINOZA? If they did not have to go through the same chain of command, it would appear that the Atlacatl Commando Company was preselected for the UCA special mission.
  - B. Reference is made to paragraph 3. The Estado Mayor Chief of the third complex told Lts. ESPINOZA and CERRITOS, "GO TO THE UCA. WE HAVE INFORMATION THAT AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF TERRORIST DELINQUENTS ARE INSIDE THOSE FACILITIES." A review of several statements provided by the material witnesses, codefendants and voluntary witnesses has established that the military units, including the Atlacatl Company had control of the UCA campus and surroundings since early afternoon of 11/13/89. As a result of the surveillance activities prior to the search of the UCA, the concerned military authorities had a reasonable assurance that there were no terrorists on the UCA campus.
  - C. To further substantiate the presence of military within and around the UCA area prior to the search was the present Rector Estrada and deceased Rector ELLUCURIA who were confronted by a military unit on 11/13/89 at 5:45 P.M. after the priest's arrived from the international airport.
  - D. Witness Sandra Portillo Hernandez Herrera de Soto reported to Rector Estrada on the afternoon of 11/15/89 several sightings of military personnel in the priest's residence and immediate surrounding areas. Rector Estrada told the witness not to worry because the military had taken custody of the UCA campus; since the search of 11/13/89.

E. When Lt. ESPINOZA et al. were about to initiate the search of 11/13/89, one of his sergeants called him via radio asking him to report east of the UCA pedestrian gate to meet with Lt. CUENCA Ocampo. The area between the pedestrian gate and east of that location is enroute to the northern UCA vehicle gate. Could it have been that it was Lt. CUENCA Ocampo who contacted the priests earlier on that date? It is interesting to note that when I asked SIU investigator Lt. P. about CUENCA OCAMPO and the contact between the military and the Rector on the afternoon of 11/13/89, the investigator appeared a bit nervous about my question. He told me that Rector Estrada was lying regarding the alleged contact. He then told me that Lt. CUENCA OCAMPO had become an informant in the development of this investigation and that the informant had provided valuable information implicating the defendants in this case. CUENCA OCAMPO'S assistance had been kept confidential in the interest of his protection. I had previously established a good working relationship with Lt. P. and when I asked him these specific questions, the day before I left San Salvador, I got the impression that SIU knew more about Lt. CUENCA OCAMPO than what the investigative unit had reported to the U.S. mission. Reference is made to paragraph 5. In ESPINOZA'S statement, the officer seems to be concerned that CUENCA OCAMPO popped up at the search scene at the last minute and without previous communications from the Estado Mayor or Col. BENAVIDES that he would be joining the search. What information does the U.S. mission have about CUENCA OCAMPO? Who is his commanding officer? Is SIU protecting him for fear that others will be implicated in this case?

F. Realizing the combat conditions during 11/13/89, would the Estado Mayor send Lt. CUENCA OCAMPO alone to the UCA area to join Lt. ESPINOZA et al? SIU Lt. P. told me that Lt. CUENCA OCAMPO happened to be walking in the area of the UCA when he had seen members of the Atlacatl Unit and had decided to join them. This is hard to believe.

G. Rector Estrada told me that one of the priests that had been murdered had accompanied Rector ELLUCURIA and Lt. ESPINOZA during the 11/13/89 residential search and the priest had made some notes regarding this incident. In those notes, the priest documented that when the soldiers had terminated the residential search, Rector ELLUCURIA had suggested to Lt. ESPINOZA that they should continue with a more thorough search of the campus on the following morning

taking advantage of daylight but that the Lt. had not followed up on this recommendation. Since these notes are still available and the author is dead, it would be impossible to fabricate them after the fact; therefore, this information is additional circumstantial evidence that the main interest of the 11/13/89 search was restricted to the priest's residence.

H. Evidence has been established that since the time the Atlacatl Unit was contacted on 11/13/89 at their battalion headquarters until 11/16/89 at 0600 hours, the unit was involved in the search, subsequent surveillance and in the murder of the Jesuit priests and domestic employees. On 11/16/89, 0600 hours, the Atlacatl Company reportedly joined their battalion at Colonia Zacamil. When they joined their battalion, had they terminated their temporary assignment under the command of Col. BENAVIDES? If the answer is "yes", it would appear that the Atlacatl Company assignment to the military school was a premeditated action targeting the UCA incidents. Who gave the order for the Atlacatl Company to join their battalion after the murders had been committed? We should keep in mind per paragraph 11, on 11/15/89 at about 2215 hours, according to ESPINOZA'S statement, the battalion logistic support had provided the Atlacatl Unit with rations so that they would leave the military school early the following morning.

I. Reference is made to paragraph 14. ESPINOZA'S version of what the Col. ordered him regarding the murder of Rector ELLUCURIA. "WE ARE GOING TO START WITH THE LEADERS; AND INSIDE OUR SECTOR, WE HAVE THE UNIVERSITY AND ELLACURIA IS THERE." When I interviewed Rector Estrada, he told me that he had additional information that other religious leaders had been targeted by the military for assassination on the same night that the Jesuit priests had been killed. He said that one of those targets had not been located because the religious person had recently moved. Further reference is made to recent cable indicating that the news media has reported that Chief of Staff Col. Ponce and others had had a discussion regarding the immobilization of terrorist leaders within a respective sector. Is this sensationalistic reporting or fact?

3. Evidence provided by the material witnesses and codefendants indicate that the senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) Sgt. SOLORZANO had some physical involvement as a co-conspirator in the murders of the priests. He provided

the cleaning gear for the AK-47 rifle having knowledge that it was going to be used to kill the priests. He supervised and conducted the actual removal of the priests from their dormitories to the area where they were subsequently murdered. With four other soldiers, he returned to the dormitories locating the sixth priest and had him shot. Even though this priest was subsequently shot again, the previous action by Sgt. SOLORZANO cannot be excused. Why wasn't this sergeant indicted? I noticed that one of the SIU prosecuting attorney's name is SOLORZANO. Are the two related?

4. While I was at the post, I kept mentioning the possibility of a conspiracy beyond the indicted defendants. I based that probability strictly on my professional findings in the course of reviewing SIU and mission files, interviewing SIU and other investigators; and most importantly, studying the statements of the material witnesses, codefendants and others. I feel that if the UCA search and subsequent action would have been limited within the command of Col. BENAVIDES, I would feel that the extent of the involvement was limited to presently indicted defendants. I am still reviewing and typing translated statements which will be the subject of subsequent reports to your office for any action you may deem necessary.

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