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By S NARA Date 12/11This document is of 2 pages
No. 6 of 11 copies, Series ASECRETMEMORANDUM

To: ~~The Secretary~~

Through: S/S

From: EUR - C. Burke Elbrick

Subject: NATO Atomic Stockpile

RAF

for your
files

DM

Background

1. You will recall that Foreign Minister Pineau suggested at the Bonn NATO Ministerial meeting last May, the creation of a NATO stockpile of atomic weapons, and you replied that this was an interesting idea and that it would receive most serious consideration by the U.S. (respective statements attached at Tab A). On June 12, during the permanent Council's review of action required as a result of the Bonn meeting, the U.S. Representative stated his Government was examining the question and would report to the Council when conclusions were reached. The Belgian Representative stated he hoped this would be within a reasonable time period.

2. On May 21, following the Western European Chiefs of Mission meeting in Paris, Ambassadors Bruce, Houghton, Perkins and Whitney recommended to you (Tab B) that the U.S. act affirmatively on the NATO stockpile suggestion. General Schuyler (General Horsted's Chief of Staff), Mr. Timmons and I participated in the discussion from which the Ambassadors' recommendation emerged.

3. On June 26 (Tab C) and July 2 (Tab D) you wrote to Secretary of Defense Wilson on this subject, urging that Defense expedite its study of the matter and transmitting our views on the manner in which a NATO stockpile could be constituted and could function.

4. At your press conference on July 15 the question of a NATO stockpile arose and you discussed the matter at some length (Tab E).

5. We have now received a letter from Defense referring to your letters of June 26 and July 2 (Tab F). It is singularly unresponsive. In subsequent informal discussions with Defense we were told Mr. Quarles wished the matter handled "on the Secretarial level". On August 30, Mr. Quarles told Mr. Murphy he would be glad to have the matter discussed in a preliminary manner between representatives of the two Departments, prior to a formal meeting. There the matter stands.

RecommendationsSECRET

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Recommendations

1. That you inform Mr. Wilson or Mr. Quarles, either at the September 5 meeting or separately, that you strongly feel the question of a NATO stockpile should be pursued as a matter of urgency. Before doing this, it is recommended that you read the paper at Tab O entitled "Extent of NATO's Commitment to an Atomic Strategy". This paper summarizes developments since 1954, when MC-45 was adopted, shows how the U.S. has taken the lead in developing an atomic strategy in NATO, and indicates the steps the U.S. has taken to create an atomic capability in the forces of our NATO allies. In the light of this history it is not surprising that our NATO allies are now asking to know what arrangements we have in mind to make the actual atomic warheads and bombs available to them in the event of hostilities. If you do not have the time to read all of Tab O, the principal points are summarized in Part V - Conclusions.

2. That you designate Messrs. Smith, Reinhardt and myself as the Department's representatives to discuss the NATO stockpile proposal with appropriate representatives from Defense.

Concurrences

G - Mr. Murphy
 C - Mr. Reinhardt
 S/AK - Mr. Smith

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STATEMENTS BY FOREIGN MINISTER PINEAU AND SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES ON THE
NATO ATOMIC STOCKPILE AT THE NAC MINISTERIAL
MEETING - MAY 2 - 4, 1957

FOREIGN MINISTER PINEAU

May 2, 1957 - Afternoon session:

"Le troisième problème - et il a fait couler beaucoup d'encre au cours de ces derniers jours - c'est celui de l'implantation des armes atomiques en Europe, et ceci pose essentiellement le problème de l'implantation des armes atomiques en provenance des Etats-Unis. De nombreuses difficultés sont soulevées par ce problème, qui ne sont d'ailleurs pas exactement les mêmes pour tous les pays membres de notre Organisation. En ce qui concerne les accords bilatéraux que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis pourrait passer avec tel ou tel des gouvernements membres de notre Organisation, je ne sais pas qu'il y ait des difficultés majeures en ce qui concerne les véhicules porteurs d'engins atomiques, mais il y a certainement des difficultés considérables du fait même des lois américaines pour la livraison à des pays déterminés des charges que transporteraient éventuellement ces engins. Ceci pose un problème difficile, en particulier pour nos amis américains. Cela pose aussi des problèmes difficiles pour d'autres pays, et les polémiques qui ont eu lieu récemment dans l'Allemagne de l'Ouest et auxquelles je m'excuse de faire allusion mais nous sommes ici pour traiter le fond du problème, nous le montrent bien, il y a dans certains pays une réticence que l'on peut comprendre pour des raisons psychologiques et pour des raisons de propagande à stocker des armes atomiques sur un territoire déterminé.

"Sur le plan français, le problème ne se pose pas tout-à-fait de la même manière que pour nos amis allemands, car - je m'excuse de le dire avec franchise - s'il y a un peu dans l'opinion publique allemande une petite crise de neutralisme, nous avons de notre côté une petite crise de nationalisme, cela peut arriver à l'un ou à l'autre alternativement, mais enfin pour le moment nous en sommes à ce point, et la difficulté française serait un peu différente. La difficulté française serait essentiellement de stocker des armes atomiques sans que l'opinion publique française ait l'impression que ces armes pourraient en toute éventualité servir à la défense de notre territoire. Autrement dit, que ses stocks atomiques pourraient constituer des cibles pour un agresseur éventuel sans que nous puissions nous servir de cette même arme atomique pour répondre audit agresseur. Et par conséquent cela nous amène à insister très vivement auprès du gouvernement américain pour une formule qui exigera

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peut-etre une modification des lois americaines actuelles mais qui n'est pas aussi inacceptable, à l'égard du Congrès américain, que certains accords bilatéraux : c'est celle d'essayer d'intégrer au maximum les armements atomiques dans notre Organisation. Autrement dit, que l'armement atomique soit un armement intégré à la disposition du Commandant en chef de l'Organisation NATO. Ainsi, nous donnerions à nos populations l'impression qu'en échange du risque que certains d'entre nous courent, particulièrement du fait du stockage des armes atomiques, nous disposons en commun des moyens de riposte. Et vis-à-vis de notre opinion publique, du point de vue allemand, ce ne serait pas des armes atomiques à la disposition d'un pays déterminé, et du point de vue français ce serait la possibilité d'avoir une compensation à ce stockage dont l'opinion publique peut un jour mesurer et même exagérer les dangers."

SECRETARY DULLES

May 9, 1957 - Morning session:

"Thirdly, it was suggested that an integrated NATO atomic stockpile at the disposition of the Supreme Allied Commander might obviate the political problems with regard to stocking weapons in Europe. This is an interesting idea and it will receive our most serious study and consideration. It raises a number of serious military and political problems in addition to the legal situation in the United States to which President Eisenhower alluded. Until the idea has been studied with care, I hope we can agree that the idea will not be discussed with the Press or put forward in public lest there be disappointment in case it is not found after further study to be possible."

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5 ASECRETEXTENT OF NATO'S COMMITMENT TO AN ATOMIC DEFENSE POSTURE IN EUROPEI. NATO Defense Strategy

During 1953 NATO Supreme Commanders initiated a series of "Capabilities Studies". These studies were essentially a re-examination of NATO strategy and tactics in light of the prospective availability of nuclear weapons to Soviet bloc and NATO forces. In November 1954 the Military Committee approved MC 48, "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years". In this document the Military Committee recommended a new pattern of NATO defensive strength based on the availability of "atomic delivery forces adequately protected from initial attack and constantly ready to launch or initiate counter attack". At the Ministerial Meeting the following month the Council approved MC 48 "as a basis for defense planning and preparations by the NATO military authorities, noting that this approval does not involve the delegation of the responsibility of governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities". The US took the lead in securing approval of MC 48 and had to overcome considerable reluctance on the part of some NATO countries.

In November-December 1955 the Military Committee approved and the Council noted MC 48/1, which confirmed and rounded out, particularly in respect of naval forces, the strategy and measures set forth in MC 48. In March 1956 the NATO Atomic Information Agreement entered into force, permitting NATO to obtain certain information on atomic matters from the US under the Atomic Energy Act. During the spring and summer of 1956 the UK and several other NATO countries voiced concern over the cost of NATO forces modernization and doubts over certain aspects of NATO defense strategy. The ensuing discussions in the Council culminated in the approval at the Ministerial Meeting in December 1956 of a Political Directive to the NATO military authorities calling for a review of NATO defense planning "to determine how, within the resources likely to be available, the defense effort of the Alliance and of each individual member can best achieve the most effective pattern of forces". The Directive stipulated that "the shield forces must include the capability to respond quickly, should the situation so require, with nuclear weapons to any type of aggression. They must, of course, also have the capability to deal with the situation envisaged in paragraph 4b above (infiltration, incursions, or hostile local actions) without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons".

In April 1957 the Military Committee approved the first two of three military papers developed in response to this Directive, namely MC 48/2, "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area", and MC 48/2, "Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept". The defensive measures recommended in these papers are first and foremost "fully effective nuclear retaliatory forces of all services" and "land, sea and air forces... counting on the use of their nuclear weapons at the outset". The third

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paper, MC 70, "The Minimum Essential NATO Force Requirements", is now under development. An initial, unapproved version of SHAPE's contribution to the paper ("Force Posture Allied Command Europe, 1960-62") stresses the requirement for ground-to-ground, ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles, stating "land forces must be capable of participating in a full-scale nuclear war should it come", able "to call down nuclear fire on the enemy at the earliest possible moment"; "the primary role of the air forces is to launch a nuclear counter-offensive against the enemy air and missile delivery capability within SACEUR's zone of responsibility; and "naval forces will make a significant contribution to the nuclear counter-offensive".

The decision in December 1954, repeatedly reaffirmed since, that NATO defense planning must be based on the employment of nuclear weapons in case of major attack rests on the compelling facts (a) that the Soviet bloc forces facing NATO are known to possess such weapons; (b) that NATO's only hope of effective defense against numerically superior opposing forces, even if those forces did not possess nuclear weapons, is possession of the most effective weapons; and (c) that compact forces utilizing the latest weapons are the only kind of forces NATO can afford under existing political-economic limitations on defense efforts. The continued validity and, indeed the continued existence, of the shield in Europe is dependent on the continued validity of the assumption of availability, and employment if necessary, of nuclear weapons.

During the negotiations over the past months in London among the Western Four leading to the Working Group paper on disarmament which was tabled in the Subcommittee last week, the British and French made a major issue of not prohibiting the possibility of transferring nuclear weapons from existing stockpiles. It was finally agreed to meet the British and French position in this respect. Accordingly, in the Working Group paper, in Paragraph 4C1, it is provided that:

"C. From the date of the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes provided in Paragraph IV A 1:

"1. Each party undertakes not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except where under arrangements between transferor and transferee, their use will be in conformity with Paragraph III."

The purpose of this language is clearly to protect the development of arrangements such as the NATO stockpile.

II. Equipment of US Forces in Europe

US forces in Europe have been progressively equipped with atomic-capable weapons. 280 mm atomic cannons were furnished US forces in Germany as

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early as 1953, followed by Corporal and Honest John in 1954 and Matador in 1955. At the present time US forces in Europe include 6 Corporal battalions, 6 280 mm atomic cannon, 3 Honest John battalions, 6 Nike battalions, 3 Matador squadrons, and some 40 tactical bomber squadrons capable of carrying atomic weapons. By 1960 the planned figures are 5 Corporal, 6 280 mm, 3 Honest John, 3 Redstone, 6 Lacrosse, 10 Nike, 3 Matador and 37 tactical bomber squadrons. Though certain of the surface-to-surface missile units are mobile and therefore capable of use up to a certain distance as needed on the central front, these units are basically confined to the US sector in Germany. Allied forces in the NATO shield are of course aware of their relative weakness due to the fact that they are only now beginning to receive atomic-capable weapons, and our own forces are inadequately supported on their flanks due to this weakness.

III. US Military Assistance Program for other NATO Countries

The US has firmly or tentatively programmed some \$300 million worth of new atomic-capable weapons (mainly missiles and advanced aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs and warheads) for European NATO countries under the FY 1956 and 1957 Military Assistance Programs, and another \$300 million is tentatively allocated for those countries from the FY 1958 program. A further \$280 million has been or is expected to be sold to NATO countries, primarily Germany and the UK. These atomic-capable weapons include Honest John, Nike, Matador, Corporal, and conversion kits which will enable fighter-bombers to carry atomic bombs. Only a very small proportion of the total of approximately \$600 worth of these new weapons has been delivered but significant deliveries will be made during 1958 and much larger quantities in 1959. The US announced in the North Atlantic Council in December 1956 and March 1957 that it would provide training in employment of these weapons, including training of selected NATO units in techniques of delivery of atomic weapons. All NATO personnel are now receiving training at advanced weapons training centers in the US and 253 more will have started training by the end of the year, reaching a total of 2200 by mid-1959. (These figures relate only to Nike; training programs in the use of F-84 atomic conversion kits, F-100 aircraft and Matador are now being prepared.) NATO country force plans for the coming three years reported in 1957 Annual Review submissions depend heavily on programmed deliveries of atomic-capable weapons and training assistance and, of course, on the availability in time of emergency of the necessary atomic warheads and bombs.

IV. Production of Atomic-Capable Weapons in Europe

In addition to the UK with its modest production program of actual atomic bombs and warheads, France, Germany, Italy and several other industrial more advanced European countries have initiated development and production

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programs of atomic-capable weapons, coordinating their efforts on a bilateral basis and in NEU and NATO. The US offered last December to furnish samples of certain atomic-capable weapons under production in the US with accompanying technical information to interested industrially and financially qualified NATO countries to assist them to undertake the production of such weapons in their own territories. Italy, France, the Netherlands and Norway have requested assistance under this offer and necessary preliminary security and industrial surveys are being made as the first step in getting the programs under way. Although it is not clear how large an atomic-capable weapons production capacity will be developed in Europe, or how rapidly, the political as well as military pressures in this direction are great and there is every reason to believe that in spite of financial handicaps a substantial capacity will be developed. The UK is the only Western European country that is now able to produce, in addition to atomic-capable weapons, the actual atomic bombs and warheads. It is estimated that the French could start production of simple nuclear weapons within less than two years.

V. Conclusions

The political, psychological, strategic and economic factors referred to in this memorandum all lead to the conclusion that some concrete action must shortly be taken by the US to assure the other NATO countries that arrangements will be made so that atomic bombs and warheads can be made available to their atomic-capable forces in the event of hostilities.

To recapitulate, the situation is this:

1) Since 1954 the U.S. has taken the lead in formulating and obtaining NATO approval of the doctrine upon which current NATO strategy is based. In its simplest form, this doctrine says that NATO deterrent and defensive planning counts on the use of atomic weapons in case of Soviet attack. In no other way could NATO resist the numerically superior Soviet forces. Current NATO planning assumes an integrated atomic capability in the shield forces.

2) US forces in Europe committed to NATO are being progressively equipped with atomic weapons.

3) The US has recognized that the atomic capability cannot be confined to US forces alone. An attempt to do so would appear to the other NATO countries as a unilateral US decision that they should only be equipped with increasingly outmoded weapons, and, in more general terms, as a US attempt to exclude them from a most important area of decision-making.

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