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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)  
 STATE-DEFENSE CONFERENCE WITH SACEUR ON  
 "NEW APPROACH" ATOMIC PLANNING  
 6 October 1954 - 3:35 p. m. - Room 2E-859  
 The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

STATE-DEFENSE CONFERENCE WITH SACEUR ON

"NEW APPROACH" ATOMIC PLANNING

6 October 1954 - 3:35 p. m. - Room 2E-859

The Pentagon, Washington, D. C.

In Attendance:

DEFENSE

Asst. Secy. of Defense H. S. Hensel

Gen. J. L. Collins, USA

Vice Adm. A. C. Davis, USN

Rear Adm. G. W. Anderson, USN

Maj. Gen. H. B. Loper, USA

Brig. Gen. K. Truesdell, Jr., USAF

Brig. Gen. C. H. Bonesteel, USA

Col. H. A. Schmid, USAF

Col. Frank Elliott, USAF

Lt. Col. J. S. Billups, USA

Lt. Col. C. F. Heasty, USA

Lt. Col. R. B. Wilson, USA

STATE

Dep. Under Secy. of State R. Murphy

Amb. W. W. Aldrich

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STATE (continued)

Mr. R. R. Bowie

Mr. C. B. Elbrick

Mr. B. T. Moore

Mr. W. J. Galloway

Mr. J. Palmer

Mr. J. J. Wolf

SACEUR

Gen. A. M. Gruenther, USA

Col. L. Kimzig, USA

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. . . The State-Defense Conference with SACEUR on "New Approach" Atomic Planning was convened at 3:35 p. m., in Room 2E-859, the Pentagon, with Vice Admiral A. C. Davis presiding . . .

VICE ADM. DAVIS: I think Admiral Radford may be rather late. I suggest we go ahead. I am in the position of trying to chair this meeting because Mr. Hensel has just returned this morning from the "Battle of London" and hasn't had much chance to read all the details.

The primary reason, of course, for this is to get our ducks in a row with our views, getting Defense and State in a row for agreeing at the highest level and then taking major decisions to the President. We've worked very hard for a long time on the working staff level on this whole subject and we have had considerable success in getting and staying in agreement and particularly in drafting the paper which on the international staff level has been distributed to the Military Committee on the "New Approach" problem. It has at this point been subject to agreement on the German contribution, has the blessing of the Joint Chiefs, has the blessing of State and the Standing Group on the staff level. There are only three copies of this. I think State has one. You (General Gruenther) have one, I think, this yellow paper, and we have one, but there is nothing in the agenda paper

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which is in conflict with the thinking. Everything is in step.

If everybody has copies or most everybody has copies of these agenda items and their discussion, it ought to be fairly simple to see what I think is the primary question, look at it, which is how best and most tactfully to inoculate our NATO friends with the idea of the atomic weapon concept and what the speed and effort should be in that regard and just how to go at it. And we all feel that General Gruenther's views on practically every part of each of these items are important and we also want to consider as we go along what there might be which might justify referral to the Joint Chiefs to make sure that we do keep in step.

It's also important to remember that, if there is anything in this sort of plan, we have to do everything we can to keep up the schedule. I think the schedule is reasonable if we don't strike any real snags.

Now, the proposed objectives -- it seems to me and it seems to all of us that the following might be an outline of our objectives. You'll find this on page 2 of Tab B:

"To develop in the NATO alliance a nuclear capability as the best deterrent of Soviet aggression; to seek, without jeopardizing the NATO alliance

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or its deterrent effect to have the NATO prepared to take immediate military action in the event of aggression, including the use of nuclear weapons; and to obtain by virtue of 2 above or by supplementary arrangements the necessary U. S. operating rights required to support defense plans."

It doesn't seem to me that there is any question about what our objectives are. The problem is how to reach them, but I wonder if there are any comments on those proposed objectives? If not, let's take a look at agenda item 2 on my page 1 of tab B, which is, "The Proposed Program regarding Psychological Preparations." I doubt if it is necessary to read these through because everybody has them. Do you have any comments on these, General Gruenther?

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: Can I make just one preliminary remark, Al? Just before I left London, I saw General Schuyler and I talked to him about this ideological preparation and I remember particularly our conversations in July where you indicated you felt a certain amount of psychological preparation had to be done with respect to the European nations, and I got the impression from Schuyler that a considerable amount of work along that line had already been done in your talks with industrial groups and representatives of various nations and then perhaps the most important thing from a psychological

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standpoint was for the United States really to adopt a firm position and then go forward with the other nations, and he seemed to envision that it was very difficult to make much more progress than you have done to date until the United States took a firm position.

I just wanted to make those remarks that you'd cover that in whatever you had to say.

GEN. GRUENWELDER: Mr. Hensel, I'd like to cover the whole subject, which is going to be items 2, 3, and 4, because my brains can be picked very quickly on all of them without the even phase (?) proposition, and I think I can state the problem as we see it rather briefly.

There are in this paper certain suggestions in regard schedules. I am not going to talk about those schedules at all because I think it may be said that I am perhaps in disagreement with the whole idea and therefore the question of schedules becomes academic because I read into this a certain sense of urgency on the part of the United States to push forward on this subject, and I feel there is a grave danger in pushing forward too soon. Thus, this is drafted in terms of weeks. I visualize it in terms of months and many months, and my view is that, as of this time next year, we might well be considering the proposal that is being put forward now, but I think it is just that

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far ahead of schedule. So that's my basic idea.

Now, what is the problem? You have outlined the objectives with which I agree completely. Question: How to meet them. My view on how to meet them is to proceed on the "New Approach" studies. In other words, this yellow piece of paper, to have that considered by NATO, the North Atlantic Council, and that begins to get all of these ducks lined up. The psychological approach begins to get into line and you get in NATO the basic concept which is that you have to fight this war as an atomic war and that atomic weapons have to be used initially whether the enemy uses them or not.

Now, once you get that accepted, you have achieved a very major part and you've solved a very major part of the problem. These others begin to come into line.

I think it would be a big mistake, even assuming that you could get this yellow piece of paper approved in December, to follow up with -- they have listed here in one piece of paper four steps:

- (a) Bilateral negotiation.
- (b) Multilateral negotiation.
- (c) SACEUR to do the negotiating.
- (d) To get it incorporated into an alert.

My view is that all four of those are premature. If you followed what I think, namely, that as of a year from now

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that you might get this conditioning, I wouldn't care which of those you did. I would put the ones that were least desirable to have SACEUR get into it. I would think that it would be wrong for him to do it. In other words, of the four possibilities that you listed here, possibilities 3 and 4 would be at the bottom of my priority list. I don't think SACEUR should be in that business. So if you can get this yellow piece of paper adopted, you're practically home.

Then what is the job? Then is the job to get a passage of time where these countries begin to accept the use of atomic bombs as a conventional means and they stop being afraid of it.

Now, I would say that in anything less than a year -- take a country that I know a little bit about, Denmark. There isn't a Chinaman's chance of getting Denmark to agree on-the-line to atomic warfare in less than a year. Why do I say a year? Well, it is just one I pull out of a hat. It may be three years, for that matter. Now, in the meantime, you can creep up on the Danes on this thing, and we've done a good deal of creeping up.

Just two weeks ago, we had a group of Danish correspondants come down and every group that we have that comes to SHAPE -- and we have had more than fifty of them in the last year, and we have been doing this for a year -- part of

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the routine is, "Gentlemen, in any war of the future we are going to have to use atomic bombs unless you, your country, is willing to make up the deficit in conventional forces, but, as we see it, we don't think you are going to make it up because already you are kicking about taxes, and this is going to be more manpower, more everything, and so we just don't think you are. The alternative is to go against Soviet conventional forces where you are outnumbered, where even if war does not come, you are always from a power position operating at a grave disadvantage, and we think there is no other solution."

Now, we have tried this with all kinds of groups at considerable length. Just three weeks ago, a group of churchmen came over from England and we tried it on them -- from a little town of Andover, and they wrote a letter to me -- all the whole group signed this -- and said, "We have never understood this before," not that there is anything magic about the way we have put it over, but nobody had ever taken the trouble to put it over with them before.

Today's Wednesday. Two weeks ago today, we had a group of French industrialists. It happened to be one where I talked about controls. That's what the press picked up because it was current, but the real success of that meeting was on the atomic bomb business. At least twenty of the sixty came up and said, "We have never understood this before."

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Now, I don't say by speaking it you are going to be able to do it, but I say by continually wearing away on this problem we will solve it because we haven't had a single group come yet that we haven't sold it.

Now, specifically, I am thinking of this, not only the talking of it, but if we can get this plan approved, we will start implementing plans for this thing. We then get the Dane working on it and he works on a plan in a northern headquarters. It becomes part of the national doctrine. Before you know it, Rasmus Hansen is advocating it himself and working on plans, and so it is that type of operation that I visualize, and I think it can be solved in that line rather than any fixed schedule of the rapidity of which this one is.

Now, I recognize that has certain disadvantages from the standpoint of the United States. Well, what are those disadvantages? Well, the United States, first of all, wants, since it is moving and since it is the operating agency of most of these atomic weapons -- it doesn't want to be hanging on a clothesline here wondering about arrangements. But I think, generally speaking, we can make those arrangements. We have made arrangements already with U. K. which are satisfactory. We have made arrangements with France which are satisfactory. And I think where the others

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are necessary we can make them.

Now, we have had two meetings at our headquarters where we put out a briefing, 24 April, for the Foreign Ministers and we laid it on the line and said to them in addition, "You gentlemen here have already approved the use of atomic weapons." Well, they obviously said, "The hell we have." And we said, "By limiting us to these forces and besides the enemy which is shown on this chart here, so you, in effect, made the decision already. You may not know you made the decision, but we want you to know we think you made the decision." In the discussion period nobody contradicted. Mr. Bech, the Luxembourg fellow, said, "I think we have too." Staf got up and said, "I can't imagine anything else."

On the 26th of July, we had the permanent representatives of the Council out for a little exercise we were having in the field, so I took this occasion to tell them about the same thing. So that started again. The Belgian, Mr. Andre de Staercke, got up and said, "I think we ought to put this on paper." That started a good argument. Really, in effect, what he was saying was, what I think his position is -- he saying, "I think we ought to sign on the dotted line right now." Well, you ought to have seen the boys shy away from that one! Portuguese Ambassador de Tovar made a speech

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and said, "General Gruenther, you are the one to decide whether to use atomic bombs. My advice is don't tell us about it. If you do wrong, we're going to cut your throat anyhow. For God's sake, you go ahead and do it. Don't put these problems up to us. The governments don't want them. They aren't ready so I disagree with Ambassador de Staercke. That put Ismay on the spot. He got up and said how difficult it was to get the positions in his position with the British Chiefs of Staff. They tried the latter part of the Thirties to work up an automatic case of procedure in case of war for just British decisions. The war came on them with those decisions untaken and they had to start arguments all over again when the war was on. They said, "That isn't they way it should happen."

I just want to tell you how tough it is to get in advance. The Dane whom I'm always looking at didn't say anything. He said, "Please don't put that to my government now." He said, "They would never buy it." If you let it ride and if you keep working on them, they will buy it before they know it. They will find they have purchased it and never know what has hit them.

I just give that as a general summary because it is within that philosophy that, if I were advising the United States, I would advise the United States to get that yellow piece of paper through and then let nature take its

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course on a much more gradual system than I envisage is written in these papers.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Well, Al, is there really so very much difference between that and this proposal, which is getting the yellow paper through primarily?

GEN. GRUENTHER: Well, I read the schedule though and, if the schedule has for its only purpose getting the yellow paper through, I am for getting that through at any time. It's a matter that General Collins is, of course, much more qualified to talk on because he has charge of a major part of U. S. implementation in getting it through. But if that's the entire object here, to get the yellow paper through, then I buy it all.

However, I read more into it than, well, take item 4, agenda item 4, where you get the question of, shall SACEUR do it, or whatnot? I would say that is quite premature because, after you get the yellow paper through, then, as to whether SACEUR does it or somebody else, it's a bit academic.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: Is this yellow paper Joe's study on the "New Approach"?

GEN. COLLINS: It's not my study, Bob, but this is the Standing Group report, draft report to the Standing Group on the three capability studies, SACEUR, SACLANC's and Channel Commands; don't you see? And this paper was

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circulated the other day on agreement between State and Defense as a staff paper only. We have maintained our position in this regard, that is, officially, the United States Chiefs were not passing on this paper, either pro or con, until the question of German participation was clarified. Now, we have maintained that. Actually, the British and the French knew perfectly well that we were participating in this, and I am quite sure they have also had sense enough to warrant not doing this independently at the level of lieutenant colonel or colonel.

Actually, this paper now includes in my judgment and is in consonance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance to me and does include the major Joint Chiefs' points, in fact, all the points that were raised by State representation in discussion with me.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: And the British and French.

GEN. COLLINS: Also the British and French views. I think it is a paper that has been given considerable thought, I assure you, considerable thought, and I personally recommend that we stick to it. Now, I have so recommended to the Chiefs that they give me final guidance on this by the 10th of November in order that by the 15th of November we would then be prepared. We will have received by then from the other non-Standing Group countries

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their comments on this paper. We hope that they will be minor in character and that, say, by the 23rd of November we would be able to get out a final draft of this which I would keep in touch with our own Chiefs on during this process so that by about the 23rd of November we could have a Military Committee meeting right here in Washington and get final Military Committee meeting approval on this. If that is done, then we could have this ready for distribution to the Ministers on the 1st of December.

If we can stick to that schedule -- that has nothing to do now with the other part that General Gruenther has been talking about. I am only speaking of the schedule with respect to this paper. If we can complete our schedule as I have outlined, it would have many advantages in that it would give to the Ministers, at least two weeks before the normal December meeting, a paper that they can really have taken a look at and, if the Military Committee will back it, then it means that the Chiefs of Staff of all fourteen countries, or thirteen countries that have armed forces, will get behind this, don't you see, and support it with their political leaders, which I think is of tremendous importance as a preparatory thing to the actual meeting in December.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: Let me get that clear. Al, are you suggesting that we shouldn't try to bring this to

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a head in the Council meeting in December but wait until sometime in the spring?

GEN. GROENDEER: No. I suggest that this paper be brought to a head as soon as it is convenient to do it.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: That is December, isn't it -- no sooner?

GEN. GROENDEER: If General Collins decides they've got a paperwork proposition of getting it around. They do that and that solves this problem. Now, there is -- I don't mean to say I am trying to simplify this paper out of existence that you have here. I recognize that there is also a problem of the exchange of information on atomic information. That, to my mind, is a separate problem, and I would go so far as to say that I think that that should be carried on even if this paper is delayed, because it is conceivable that, giving the Ministers two weeks to study this paper, they may say, "Well, now, this is awful tough here. You fellows have been studying these papers since the first of July and you give me, Denmark, two weeks to study it. I'm not prepared to study it," which may bring up in the minds of the United States, "Well, maybe we'd better hold up on implementation of the Atomic Energy Act because there is a type of philosophy in some of the papers -- we all consider this as a package deal. I recommend against

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the package deal and recommend against the quid pro quo argument in connection with exchange of information because we are going to have a hard enough time anyhow because the revision of the Atomic Energy Act has been badly misunderstood, badly misunderstood for me. For example, I had ~~the~~ no idea we wouldn't even take step one until the third of January when the so-called committee goes up to the committee of Congress. These allies are thinking the bill passed on 19 July -- they thought on 20 July they'd start getting information. When they find it will be closer to the 20th of next July, why, their view of the world and the beneficial effects of atomic energy are going to start chilling a bit. We are catching that right now. The fellow needling the devil out of me is Embrey, who has responsibility on it, and he's a first-class needler and he is beginning to think this is a phoney, and when he finds out, which I didn't know until a week ago, that the earliest you could have this to go was, in Congress, the third of January and expect it to be approved by the third of February.

GEN. COLLINS: It's going to sit there.

GEN. GRUENTHER: It's going to sit there thirty days. The third of February is the absolute minimum he could get step one of this. I know that there is in this paper -- there is more to it than just getting this through,

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but I separate the projects. In other words, that is, No. 1, simultaneously when the calendar rolls around to the third of January, I hope this agreement doesn't have a damn thing to do with that piece of paper, that it goes independently of it.

GEN. COLLINS: If I could revert to one of your statements, to the fact the Ministers may object to having only one or two weeks, it isn't as bad as that. This paper has already been distributed to their Chiefs of Staff. The permanent representatives were told at the meeting in Paris on the 15th of September that this was going to be done. I feel certain they are all eagerly awaiting seeing this. Not just the Chiefs of Staff will see it, but, as in our case, the Department of Defense, the Department of State -- they have seen it and so will the Ministers see it. I think the Ministers of some of the countries probably have already read it, so actually they will have had a long time to have digested this. But, on the other hand, in contrast to procedures that we have had heretofore, what we have done is to arrive in Paris one day and the next day the Military Committee comes up with a document and says, "Here, you guys approve this." Well, we couldn't possibly do it with this paper, so that is the reason from the beginning we have endeavored to give as much time for consideration to this,

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not solely to Standing Group countries, but to other countries as well.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Al, I think we are pretty well in step. That discussion at the end was really intended to take account of all necessary preparation, etc., that you have described, but if you really -- maybe I ask my question a little unfairly -- but really do believe we should face the Council with the yellow paper at the next NATO meeting, then I think we are really quite in step in being careful, and will remember what you said. I think another thing that is very interesting about it is that, if people do have a chance to be told, they do have a little sense.

GEN. COLLINS: I wonder if I could pick this up again for a minute, Mr. Chairman, in support of what General Gruenther has said, general support of what he said. I had a chat recently with General Foulkes, who is the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs, and I outlined to him -- it was the day that we spoke to the Military Representatives Committee here -- I outlined to them in general terms the character of this paper, emphasizing that it did not come up with a bill of particulars on which the Council would have to take immediate action but that it did list broad categories of things which must be done as a minimum measure which would lead to an effective defense of Western Europe.

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In the original draft of this paper we had made specific reference to the proposition that a commitment on the part of any country which committed forces to SACEUR carried automatically a commitment to permit the use of atomic weapons in support of those forces. That has been much toned down in this document. Those of you who have had a chance to read it know.

Foulkes made this suggestion. He said, "Well, as a matter of fact, the Council has already implicitly taken action which authorizes the SACEUR to use these weapons." I said, "When and where?" And then he referred me to a document which I promptly looked up, and it is DC-6. That is Defense Committee Document No. 6/1, which antedated the present Council but which was approved. The date of this document is '49 -- Dec. 1, '49. Now, this was later approved on the 6th of February by the North Atlantic Council itself, so this is now a Council document.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: The 6th of last February?

BRIG. GEN. TRUESDELL: '50.

GEN. GRUENTHER: '50. They didn't know what was hitting them. I sat at that meeting. It was just a conglomeration of words.

GEN. COLLINS: Listen to this statement:

"These are military measures to implement the defense concept and -- "

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This is under the heading of "Basic Undertakings."

(Continuing) -- "over-all defense plans must provide in advance of war emergency specifically for the following basic undertakings in furtherance of the common objective, to defend the North Atlantic area. The successful conduct of these undertakings should be assured by close coordination of military action as set forth in over-all plans and insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons without exception. This is primarily a U. S. responsibility, assisted, as practicable, by other nations."

Now, that is down in black and white. I wasn't at the meeting. Maybe Al would disagree with my good friend, Charles Foulkes. They wrote this definitely with the business of using atomic weapons in mind. And so I say, Al, I am simply speaking in general support of your approach.

It seems to me that if we can get approval of this thing in December, it would have this great advantage that from then on out would be NATO putting pressure on these countries to come up with agreement on these bilateral negotiations or trilateral negotiations rather than merely the United States insisting that it be done, and I would

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think from a political point of view that that would have certain advantages.

On the other hand, I don't think this would be in conflict with what General Gruenther has in mind. It is my personal judgment that this paper will call for a really full-out discussion for the first time in a Council of this basic problem. I just don't think that can be escaped. I think it would be inadvisable to attempt to escape it. Now, we might not be in agreement there. I just think that any intelligent man that reads this paper will realize the tremendous significance of it and that it is going to be inescapable that the matter be discussed in Paris, not with the idea of taking definitive action at that time -- I thoroughly agree with you there -- but if the Council says that they agree to the matters that are listed in the enclosure, the last two pages of this paper, then they are putting their approval on the utilization of atomic weapons immediately. Now, they may decide that they don't want to take that action; don't you see? But I am afraid, Al, that as this report is drawn, unless it is changed between now and the first of December, that it is going to be inescapable to have that debate and the Ministers will be faced with the problem of saying, "Well, now, wait a minute. When we say we approve -- " Let me see the wording.

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Our recommendation is, "Approve in principle" -- that's good diplomatic phraseology. It leaves an out.

"Approve in principle the measures in the enclosure to the report as being those most necessary to adapt our military forces for a future major war and note that the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has prepared a detailed list of program recommendations which he will use as a basis for further study and action."

But these fellows are going to give pause even before they approve in principle these things.

GEN. GRUENTHER: On that I should say this. I am not fighting the proposition of having this discussed at the NATO meeting in December. Wonderful. That's fine, what I want to do. When it comes to that particular paragraph in there, that sort of approval I want. That sort of approval I think in fact we will get because it doesn't put any specific thing where he signs on the dotted line, "I, the Prime Minister of Norway, do solemnly say, when I make forces committed under Article V of the North Atlantic Committee, it is simultaneously with that that I understand clearly that it is atomic warfare." He doesn't have to say that. That's what he wants not to have to say on the 15th of December.

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GEN. COLLINS: I agree with you.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: If you take this schedule of events, being designed to get this yellow paper approved as ministerial policy, have we left out anything? Forget about the dates. Keep in mind that we're shooting for December 15. Have we left out anything that ought to be done or have we got anything there you advise not to do? I don't think we are going to get everything quite within the time limit you thought. Let's change it and be clear we are just shooting to get that done. We are hoping this talk on agreements and exchange of nuclear information marches along side by side, not as quid pro quo, but also tends to get into the new session.

GEN. GROENTHER: No, but again the expert on that will be Joe here because he is the fellow who is writing the papers and nursing them through so I would defer to his judgment on that. As far as we are concerned --

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: I want to get both of you --

GEN. COLLINS: I think we are in accord.

GEN. GROENTHER: As far as we are concerned, I have no --

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: All right. From that angle also, having in mind your views of the psychology over there, you may be a little closer to that than Joe is.

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GEN. GRUENTHER: Well, maybe. I am closer to the people.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: I want to get both of you on the thing.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Yes. I don't think, as far as I can tell, that Joe and I are in any disagreement unless I said something to which he disagrees.

GEN. COLLINS: No, no. The only point I want to be sure -- and Al has clarified that -- is that he would welcome, as I would welcome, and I think it's inescapable, a really full-fledged, high-order discussion of this, of the problem that is presented in this paper. I just think that is all to the good if we will have it on proper lines in December.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: I wonder if you have any comments? You followed this so closely for State.

MR. ELLERICK: I was going to say that we agree. I don't see how it is possible to escape discussing it. As General Gruenther said, it is quite a different thing agreeing in principle and signing your name to a firm commitment for action, so I don't think that that should present such a great problem for us at the Council meeting.

When we were discussing this here before, our pre-occupation was not so much, in fact not at all, with the

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military requirement which is stated in this paper, but with the timing and the approaches which General Gruenther has been talking about. I think we have taken care between us of that preoccupation in the draft paper.

GEN. COLLINS: Of course, the reason why the paper was prepared in the terms that it originally was prepared was that that was in accordance with the instructions that we had to attempt to have that written into the paper. That is the guidance that I received and that did have the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, that reference to Article V has been removed from this paper.

It is rather interesting that both the British and French representatives on the Standing Group were perfectly ready to accept the language that we originally wrote in here. However, when it came back, the British representative had instructions to tone down that thing and to eliminate references to Article V, and the French similarly had instructions, not quite as tight as those which the British representative had.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Of course, but, see, the French one now I am absolutely positive never got to Mendes-France.

GEN. COLLINS: Oh, no.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Of course, this is the No. 1 point the Soviets are going to wage their propaganda on now. I

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think this has to be evaluated largely from the propeganda standpoint. You have to meet the Soviet propoganda by another line, and one of them is to gradually get these fellows to accept this, and that's about as good an answer as you can get to the Soviet line, because they're coming in on this women and children argument and they're going to play it on all keys. Mr. Vishinsky, a week ago today, started No. 1 in the United States on it by putting this very soothing document of his forward, except he was vitriolic in his criticism. Why he didn't start out his talk, "In all *Humility* we have advanced this cause in the cause of peace . . . ." He deliberately had a speech full of bitterness on it, which he didn't have to do. ~~He~~ <sup>*Humility*</sup> and bitterness don't go together, but they're going after it.

GEN. COLLINS: I do think we must all recognize the fact now, if we do not push forward rapidly toward getting more definitive agreements, both for use of bases and also for use of weapons off bases -- and I'm speaking now of guided missiles, atomic cannon, and things of that character -- and having something of that sort written into the alerts, until we do that in the event of war, which I personally don't think is going to happen in this interim -- if war should come, then we could be at a very serious disadvantage because it would take some time before we could

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initiate counter-atomic measures. We have just got to clearly understand we are taking that risk now. I don't think we ought to gloss it over.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: Apropos that, one thing General Gruenther said surprised me in my ignorance, that agreements in the U. K. and France are satisfactory.

GEN. GRUENTHER: When I say that they're satisfactory, I would say this, that they're workable, and the use of the word "satisfactory" may be an overstatement.

They have done this -- the U. K. -- and I think this is going to come into any agreement that we get whether we get it one year from now or two years from now -- the fellow who owns the real estate is going to exercise some option over when the attack takes place from there and it is going to take some time before we have that clear.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: Until we can build up the conviction this is really in their interests more than it is in ours.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Yes, so saying "satisfactory" is because I think that the people who were operating it are thoroughly cognizant of it now. Take the U. K. The U. K. -- my estimate of the U. K. is this -- the U. K. is getting ready to build up a bomber for us which has no purpose at all except to drop atomic bombs. They might as well put it in the pasture if they're going to do that, and they're

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spending on these bombers a lot of dough, and it has no other function in the world except to drop atomic bombs.

AMB. ALDRICH: As I understand it, they're trying to get our consent to have the bombers use those bombs in case anything broke.

GEN. GRUENTHER: As a matter of fact, they came over to see me and said, "We don't know what shape to make the opening."

AMB. ALDRICH: That's right. They talked to me about that.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Don't remind me of Plan "K."

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: Al, what do you put behind Mendes-France's determination at the nine-power conference to leave France free <sup>for</sup> of construction <sup>and</sup> of production of atomic weapons? Scenery?

GEN. GRUENTHER: I think it's this prestige question again. They want to be in the big league with the U. S. and U. K.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: You don't think it represents any real planning?

GEN. GRUENTHER: No; I don't think so.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: It represents some little acceptance of the importance of it; doesn't it?

GEN. GRUENTHER: Say that again. It represents what?

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ASST. SECY. HENSEL: Some little acceptance of the importance of those weapons.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Oh, yes; I think he accepts the importance of them all right.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: I thought I detected a wide area of ignorance, as I enjoy in my own case, of the technique involved in those weapons. I don't think Mendes-France has the vaguest idea.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: I didn't mean to say he didn't.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: Which makes a difference in the approach.

GEN. GRUENTHER: He is particularly -- one of his strong points is not the military field! He knows very, very little about the military field.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: That's what I would say.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: He is probably best at selling (inaudible)!

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: Mr. Bowie had a point about the <sup>NSC</sup> security meeting of October 8, did you say?

MR. BOWIE: A paper on Europe called for a certain study to be submitted by the 28th to take care of the case where the program laid down in the NSC paper couldn't be carried through. One was for a study how rapidly we should proceed to try to get specific commitments for our allies.

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I think what General Gruenther said would be helpful in that connection. One of the items we studied is to what extent the United States required formal agreement permitting the use of nuclear weapons. Pressing such formal agreements, we'd seriously impair allied plans and agreed strategy. Some of the things you said bear on that.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Well, I say on that my view is rather strong, that it's got to go along a bit slower than I visualize most of the people who have been dealing with the subject here feel. I feel there is a difference of opinion on timing that is rather significant, different divisions between what I think and the planners who have been working on it here.

I do also want to bring out the point Joe makes, that you involve a risk in that. The funny thing is the risk if this thing takes place. We are operating bases from the control of two countries right now. One is France. The other is the U. K. And in both of those cases I think we're going to get the approval very quickly to launch any attacks that come from their real estate. How you solve it on over-flights and whether or not you plunge into an atomic war, you might follow the advice of the [REDACTED] go ahead and drop them and explain later, or maybe it is

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better to discuss it, but that is the advice of the [REDACTED] b1  
Strangely enough, there was not a great deal of difficulty OSD  
on that after he came forth with that unique suggestion.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Everybody agrees we ought to do it fast but, on the other hand, we don't want to risk never getting there at all by not going too fast. That's all there is to it.

I wonder if anybody has any specific comments on any of the points in these agenda items. I think this general discussion has practically cleared it all up, but there might be some specific comment.

MAJ. GEN. LOPER: I should like to develop just a little bit more of the philosophy of the integration of atomic weapons in the NATO forces as expressed in the yellow paper. Just to what extent is this integration contemplated and what measures are necessary back here to insure at least a legal authority for that integration?

VICE ADM. DAVIS: What does "integration" mean, first of all?

MAJ. GEN. LOPER: Yes.

GEN. COLLINS: Al, do you want to talk about that or want me to?

GEN. GRUENTHER: Were you asking him a question -- what does "integration" mean?

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VICE ADM. DAVIS: I think he wants to know, first of all, what does this word "integration" mean.

GEN. GROENTHER: I am willing to take a shot at this. Before I do, what are you talking about, legal authority, Doc?

MAJ. GEN. LOPER: It first has to do with the exchange of information, whether the areas of exchange of information set forth here by NATO are going to be adequate for integration as meant by this paper. That is my first question.

GEN. COLLINS: Al, I think it would be better if I started this discussion and you see whether you agree or disagree because we use this term "integration" and the specific place, for example, the first time it is used in the document, says:

"To be able to carry out certain tasks it is necessary to do certain things, and one of these things is "develop forces in being in Europe which would be capable of effectively contributing to success in the initial phase" --

That is, the phase during which there'd be a rapid exchange of atomic weapons by the two sides.

-- "end of preventing the rapid overrunning of Europe. To do this, these forces must be highly

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trained, mobile, have an integrated atomic capability, and be properly positioned in depth. In this respect the importance of obtaining a German contribution to these forces cannot be too strongly emphasized."

In a footnote we said the ability to integrate -- by "integrated atomic capability" we meant:

"the ability to integrate the delivery of atomic weapons with the delivery of present-type weapons. This involves an integrated intelligence system, communications, and tactical doctrine."

There was a good deal of discussion whether we had any idea of turning weapons over to the French, British, Italians, Greeks, for delivery. That was not our idea. At no time has anyone of the non-U. S. people that worked on the development of this paper suggested any such thing.

General Gruenther has just recently had a maneuver in the British area in which three or more battalions of 280 mm. guns participated and they played through <sup>allied units</sup> (inaudible). These weapons and comparable weapons in our judgment -- that is, the judgment of the Standing Group now -- will have to be placed under the control of non-U. S. personnel. That is, they would be assigned the support, perhaps, of the 1st Army which is the British Army or they, some of them, might be

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assigned to support the French Army to the south, but they would be in the hands of United States personnel completely.

However, the way I visualize it is that General Gruenther might allocate to the support of the 1st Army so many weapons for certain general purposes. Now, if anybody has any idea that General Gruenther or any other person in his position could give immediate approval and specific approval every time you wanted to shoot an atomic shell or fire a guided missile or deliver an atomic weapon by fighter bombers, he's just asking the impossible. It can't be done, not in my opinion. That's what we mean by "integrated atomic capability." These things can serve their purpose best, tactically, now. That's really what we are talking about. If everybody understand how to use them, the selection of targets, what is a good target, what is not a good target, the timing, logistical business, and all that is thoroughly understood, that's all we mean by an "integrated atomic capability." We didn't want to write that all down so did it in three lines. That's the best we could do in a brief statement.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: I think that's a good one, on page 7.

GEN. GRUENTHER: When you asked the question was the legal aspect adequate, I presume you were referring

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to the draft agreement which is going to be submitted to this Congressional committee on 3 January. Is that what your question was directed specifically to?

MAJ. GEN. LOPER: I would think, as indicated in these papers, it was intended this would cover all NATO nations.

GEN. GROENWYHER: You are referring to what?

MAJ. GEN. LOPER: Agreement with the categories of information to the exchange. That applies to all NATO nations. In addition, certain bilateral agreements might be required for those nations with greater technical know-how and greater capability. It was in that connection I was inquiring what the integration meant, whether it meant anything different from one nation or another. If Britain desires to carry the bomb, if we give that information, that is information not necessary to the rest of the nations, but it might be information which we would like to give to them.

GEN. GROENWYHER: I would think it would be along that line that the development would come.

Mr. Ernst is in Paris still and he is working with our staff on some suggestions for improving this, at least our views on how you might more nearly meet some requirements that we have.

On this question whether or not the British would

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get specific information, it is my idea it would be a bi-lateral one. I don't know what they're doing about fixing those bomb bays now.

MAJ. GEN. LOPER: They're not supposed to be getting information enough to do it.

GEN. GRUENTHER: I don't know how they'd do it. They're spending enough dough.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: They're certainly able to take a glimpse of our bombers over there.

GEN. COLLINS: There's one other angle on this thing. When I said I was in general agreement with General Gruenther, I was speaking as a U. S. representative of the Standing Group; in no sense, as a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have no authority to speak for them and I am not sure Admiral Radford or the Chiefs would fully agree with the view General Gruenther is taking. I would not say they don't support it, I don't know. I am not the fellow to determine that. The point of view about speed of doing this and necessity of getting ahead -- that sort of thing. The Chiefs did agree, however, with this modification of this paragraph and the elimination from this paragraph of the specific reference to Article V. To that extent they have given me instructions and have expressed agreement with the idea that the thing should

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not progress too rapidly. I wanted to make clear, however, I am not competent to speak for the Joint Chiefs in this matter.

MR. BOWIE: This may be getting too far ahead of the story. Do you see any difficulty in the future from the fact that we will have a situation with the NATO neighbors will be wholly dependent on atomic weapons and we will be in sole control of those weapons?

GEN. GRUENTHER: I see considerable trouble coming up, if you move ahead "X" years -- I don't know what "X" is -- and it is going to be very ticklish problem. Their attitude now is very good and take this case of the atomic cannon that we moved up for these maneuvers -- no argument about that at all. But as you get into a concept that atomic weapons are conventional, you are going to have a considerable bit of pressure on that score.

AMB. ALDRICH: General, am I not right in thinking that the British have in the back of their minds the desire themselves to make atomic weapons in the fairly near future?

GEN. GRUENTHER: Oh, I think so; I think without a doubt.

AMB. ALDRICH: Is that not also the concept the French are beginning to get?

GEN. GRUENTHER: They are beginning to get it. I would say that it has a bearing on what Mr. Hensel asked

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earlier because, you see, the French have an atomic installation of their own now.

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AMB. ALDRICH: They had that in mind in the London conference and trying to get out from under the limitation that was discussed under the Brussels Pact. I am sure they did.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Of course, I think ten years from now the concept that will have developed by that time compared to what we are discussing here, we will be thinking that we were talking about bows and arrows.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: I wonder if we couldn't now get away from these terms "conventional" and "unconventional." I never have quite followed the logic back of the use of those words.

GEN. GRUENTHER: I think that is a good point.

GEN. COLLINS: We have tried, Bob. Nobody yet has been able to come up with a brief set of words, don't you see, that can convey the idea.

Going back to what Mr. Bowie said, the specific point that you raised was raised by the French at one of the Standing Group meetings, and it was raised by Gen. Stehlin, who made the point that since it was apparently inevitable that there would be a close integration of atomic weapons and the so-called conventional weapons, and since the United States had a monopoly on the atomic weapons, that as things went on the basic defense structure would become so dependent

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upon an integrated system that in fact the defense of Europe would be dependent upon the United States' decision whether to use these weapons, or not to use them, and that, therefore, this still was a question in the minds of the French about whether they should have some kind of say in this.

I said, "Well, Paul, I just can't imagine -- it seems to me that the thing that is concerning you is whether at the last minute the United States should say, 'We are not going to use these weapons.'" I said, "I just can't imagine that we would be spending the money on these things that we are doing and committing our forces to Europe if we didn't intend to use these weapons," and that ended the discussion.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: What they want, though, is not only a veto on our use, but authority to order us to use them.

GEN. COLLINS: Perhaps, but I don't take that last one too seriously.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: We can except the last part a little more easier than the first one.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Yes.

MR. BOWIE: I think it is likely to give rise either to turn over weapons to them, or make firmer commitments that the Air Force is going to be there.

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GEN. GRUENTHER: Something along that line is coming, and take a country like Turkey now, you see. They haven't begun to know exactly what is hitting them yet, but they come around and ask every now and then, "I wonder if we can get some of these atomic cannon," and they will think of it in terms of a cannon, because they can see those.

GEN. COLLINS: Guided missile. Progress is being made--again to reinforce what Gen. Gruenther said earlier-- in the discussions that I have had personally with the Norwegians and also with the Danes, this question has arisen about their relative defenselessness and the fact that nobody is going to defend Norway except Norwegians, or to defend Denmark, and I have made the point -- I said, "Oh, you are wrong about that, because unquestionably" -- I said, "I can't say definitely, but unquestionably the United States strategic Air Force will take action which will materially add to the defense, particularly of Norway."

Now, they get used to that, and that sort of thing will, I think, go a long ways toward the gradual acceptance of this idea, particularly if we have maneuvers in which these weapons are used.

GEN. GRUENTHER: One thing I want to ask, I would like to get clarified in my mind here, I have adopted in my own working a policy which is that talk on this subject is a

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good idea. Now, there can be a difference of opinion whether that is a good idea, or not. I am personally convinced that it is a good idea; but I was told that at a meeting of the Security Council here a couple of months ago that there was a contrary view expressed, and certainly if that is so, I am out of step. Are you aware that there is a contrary view?

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: I am aware of that Security Council meeting that you spoke of. We understand that it isn't quite as clear as we had heard it, and I am trying to run that down.

GEN. GRUENTHER: I see. I don't want to --

MR. BOWIE: I wonder whether that wasn't a comment to the effect that we didn't want to be atomic rattling? I mean, that seems to be probably directed to a rather different --

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: I think we have to run that down, but in the meantime --

MR. BOWIE: There have been several statements to that effect; we shouldn't be in the position of appearing constantly to threaten everybody with the atom. But that is a different problem, I think.

GEN. GRUENTHER: Yes. I just wanted to be sure I wasn't out of step on this.

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GEN. COLLINS: The amazing thing to me, though, Al, is that none of these statements of yours have hit the press. You haven't said that it was off the record when you talked to them, did you?

GEN. GRUENTHER: No.

GEN. COLLINS: Yet it hasn't come into the press. We haven't seen yet a headline saying, "Gen. Gruenther said yesterday that the atomic weapons will be used immediately whether the Russians use them, or not." How is it that hasn't happened? You say that off the record here in Washington, and I assure you that it will be in the headlines the next day.

GEN. GRUENTHER: However, I haven't been off the record on it at all.

GEN. COLLINS: That is the amazing thing. That being the case, Al, as you were saying this, this thought came to my mind: You say that all of these people have said, "We never understood this before." Now, if it is good on a small scale, the time will come when perhaps it would be better -- I am not sure that it has arrived yet -- to switch from the small scale to the far broader scale in which we do publicly say. That one is a matter that I do think would call for very careful consideration, but I personally agree with what you are doing. I am amazed, as

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I say, that it hasn't gotten into the press.

GEN. GRUENTHER: In U.K. it got in the press. In my talk in London on June 8th, I did say this -- I didn't follow up and say we will use it whether the Soviets use it, or not. I didn't say it that way, but I said, "In the event of active aggression, we at our Headquarters believe that atomic weapons will have to be used. We are not the ones who make policy and our policy masters may overrule us on that, but I would like to have you know what we think about it."

I got 31 letters on that. Twenty-seven of them were favorable, four of them were unfavorable, two of them vitriolic and signed by X or Y, or something like that. One of them is still coming after me -- Littlehearte is after me. Littlehearte thinks that it is wrong.

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: It is a good result of the academic discussion about the bombing of open cities we had right before World War II, wasn't it?

VICE ADM. DAVIC: I wonder if we haven't had pretty well a meeting of the minds here. It seems to me there is very general agreement to go ahead on the yellow paper and go ahead as fast as possible on the disclosure of information agreement, and don't do anything to face our NATO friends with your plan for immediate, positive decision

unless you think the time is ripe. In the meanwhile, try to create the proper climate.

Isn't that just about the summation of all this?

(General concurrence was indicated)

DEP. UNDER SECY. MURPHY: That harmonizes with State's view, except we have not discussed this in any detail with the Secretary.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Now, I am not sure whether you made any comment, or not. You know very well Adm. Radford's views as to our boasting on this instead of hitting with a hammer.

REAR ADM. ANDERSON: I think this has got to be referred to the Chiefs.

ASST. SECY. HENSEL: We have already exchanged little nods back here and we will get out a memo to the Chiefs to make sure they get it.

VICE ADM. DAVIS: Subject to that, it seems to me we have pretty well cleaned up the problem.

. . . The meeting adjourned at 4:43 p. m. . . .

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