OPERATION "LEONARDO"

1.- OBJECTIVES:

To establish contact with elements within the Government, Rebel Army and Militia, in order to panalize into action their present anti-communist feeling and induce those who maintain a passive attitude but who are potentially susceptible to turn against the Regime, to act now. The future plan of action and the size and development of the present operation would be determined after first contacts are made and information thus gathered, is evaluated. However, "Leonardo" should be considered as merely a first step towards coordination of anti-Castro elements within the Cuban Government, for producing an internal upheaval.

It is the opinion of people with contacts in Cuba, that the moment to act is now, because the conditions for action are ripening steadily. Reliable information from the Island points out to the gradual internal softening of the Castro Regime, to tensions existing among its members, and to the effect President Kennedy's words had in the highest governmental Cuban circles who are said to have acknowledged with sympathy his phrase that "I am confident that all over the island of Cuba, in the Government itself, in the Army, in the Militias, there are many who ... have viewed with dismay the destruction of freedom faith and who are determined to restore that

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freedom so that Cuban people may once more govern themselves". This phrase is the leit-motif of "Leonardo".

2. MODUS OPERANDI:

AMTRUNK-2

LEONARDO I: Two men, Enrique Cayado Rivera 24, and Antonio Garcia Perez 29, would disembark near Punta Jijira, between Boca de Jaruco and Santa Cruz del Norte. At this very place (Punta Jijira) a small farm, property of Antonio Garcia Perez is located, where his father and a local laborer are living. Garcia father's car is always on the premises and would be used to take the two men to Havana. Enrique Cayado's family is in Havana and one of his friends, Elsa Maria Negrin, secretary of Jose Rebellon, leader of University Students Federation (FEU), can be counted to serve also as his cover and guide. In order to determine the present attitude of military and civilian officials who have possibilities to organize or speed up the internal upheaval, the following contacts would be used: (A) Dr. Jorge Vals; (B) Comandante Jose Duarte; (C) Miss Juanita Castro Ruz.

Jorge Vals and Jose Duarte have widespread contacts within the Government and it is known that Juanita Castro, Fidel Castro's sister, is also helping the underground. She is currently in Mexico.

Enrique Cayado and Antonio Garcia would return to the U. S. after two or three weeks, with messages, opinions and suggestions from their contacts in Cuba.

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LEONARDO II: Three disembarcation points are planned for this operation: a) the outer keys off Santa Clara Bay (Matanzas province), b) keys off Caibarien, c) keys off Corralillo area (Las Villas province). Santa Clara Bay keys are thought most advisable as they are inhabited by fishermen and charcoal workers only and military patrols visit them very infrequently, because of extremely difficult living conditions there. Two men employed in this mission: Dr. Nestor Moreno 41, and Miguel Diaz y Selgue 23, would use one of the fishermen (who are known to be willing to work against Castro and had worked with them before), to go to the mainland and proceed to Cardenas with the message to arrange a meeting with Comandante Ramon Guin or a person he designates. The round trip to Cardenas might take two or three days. If conditions are favorable and a meeting can be arranged at once, the two men would go inland. However, if the rendezvous with Cuban contacts cannot take place immediately, they would have to return to Key Sal or any other base and go back on the date or dates previously fixed by the message. Through Comandante Guin, who works in INRA and travels around the country, and through anti-Castro army and civilian elements already active in Cardenas and Marti, the following army officers would be contacted initially: Comandante Guerra, Comandante Parra, Comandante Jose Pinares, Capitan Manuel Avila, Capitan Lawton. From there on the contacts would be enlarged.

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The above mentioned officers were approached before Pig's Bay and agreed to participate in Rebel Army uprising in Las Villas province as a part of internal-external anti-Castro plan. After Play Giron, which upset that plan, they remained in the Government and are said to be disposed to do it again.

3.- EUQIPMENT:

A 25 or 27 speed boat which can navigate in shallow waters and can cruise at 40 knots. Identification documents, Cuban money and small amount of arms. Data about Cuban sea patrols in Havana and Matanzas provinces, equipment for communications, once contacts are established.

4.- GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

It is considered that although the majority of officials whom the participants of the missions plan to talk to have no political ambitions and will act against Castro for purely ideological reasons, minimum of assurances and promises have to be offered. It is also a concensus ~~of opinion,~~ that once initial steps are successfully accomplished an additional number of persons should be used for the development of "Leonardo", working always in operational coordination. Each of them are known to have friends within the Cuban Government and their personal and representative

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intervention could help swaying many men of the Regime who would trust more the seriousness of the enterprise. The following men are suggested for participation in the next stages of "Leonardo";

(1) Dr. Raul Chibas, ex-Rebel Army Major.

(2) Raul Barandels, ex-Rebel Army Captain, Rubert Matos group.

(3) Aldo Vera, ex-Rebel Army Major. ASSASSINATED 1976

(4) Enrique Barroso Dorta, ex-Rebel Army Lieutenant.

(5) Julio Cesar Alonso, ex-Cuban Navy Captain.

(6) Mario Fontela, ex-CTC leader, has contacts with Rebel Army and agrarian leaders in the provinces.

(7) Reinaldo Cruz (Simon), ex-Cuban Air Force capt.

(8) Francisco Ilias, ex-Militia Captain.

(9) Dr. Antonio de la Carrera, ex-secretary of former president Manuel Urrutia.

(10) Humberto Armada, ex-captain Cuban Army and Air Force.

(11) Antonio Perez, ex-Cuban Marine officer.

(12) Alvaro Romero, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(13) Pablo Campos, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(14) Gutierrez Menoyo, ex-Rebel Army Major.

(15) Berta Ferrer, ex-member of anti-Batista underground, knows a large number of Rebel Army officers having beeñ in Sierra Maestra.

(16) Jose Lopez Castillo, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(17) Alberto Padilla, ex-INRA functionary.

(18) Dr. Hiram Sanchez, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(19) Dr. Manuel Marinas, a negro anti-Batista leader, has great prestige among Havana former underground.

An additional list can be furnished upon request.

All of the above are former members of 26 of July Mov., Students' Directorate (DRE) and II Escambray Front, and have friends in Havana and in the provinces.

The details of this operation have been discussed only with Dr. Nestor Moreno and Enrique Cayado.

Miami, February 3, 1963

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