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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL
1999

13 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: AMLASH/1/Dainold

TIME & PLACE: 1730-1900 Hours, 29 October 1963, Paris, France

PARTICIPANTS: AMLASH/1, Dainold, Ontrich

1. Dainold using alias James Clark was introduced to AMLASH/1 as an emissary from the policy level of the United States Government. Dainold informed AMLASH/1 that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and assumes sufficient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it is prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only after a ~~genuine~~ real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position to request U.S. (probably under OAS auspicious) recognition and support. It was made clear that the U.S. was not prepared to commit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as such an uprising can be extinguished in a matter of hours if the present government is still in control in Havana. As for the post-coup period, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be turned back but will support the necessary economic and political reforms which will benefit the mass of the Cuban people.

2. AMLASH/1 made the following comments in response to questions posed by Dainold:

a. The majority of the Cuban population is against Castro but mainly because of fear do nothing about it. Castro's primary support comes from the young teenage militia group.

b. Many high ranking military officers are anti-communist and many are convinced Castro must go, but they are afraid to organize a group against Castro or to even talk against Castro to other people. Fear and Castro's control of the governmental apparatus, security, military, defense committees, economy, etc., make it extremely difficult to organize a coup against him.

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c. If Castro falls the military will probably break up into four or five groups. Without Fidel Castro the present regime will disintegrate. Unless there is strong and immediate U.S. support the situation can easily become chaotic.

d. The problems of a post-Castro Cuba will be gigantic not only from the military point of view but also from a psychological, as the revolution has deeply penetrated every aspect of Cuban life including the dismemberment of the family.

e. Only a strong government will be able to cope with the situation, this in his opinion certainly rules out any government by committee.

f. If the U.S. does not take much stronger measures in Latin America generally and in a post-Castro Cuba it will be difficult to win against the communist efforts in this area. AMLASH/1 had no specific suggestions to offer.

3. Nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the Dainold meeting. After the meeting AMLASH/1 stated he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him.

NESTOR D. SANCHEZ
SAS/EOB

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