12/29/76



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



To:

ARA - Mr. Harry W. Shlaudeman

From:

ARA - Frederick Smith, Jr.

EXCISE

Subject:

Further Steps in the Case of Charles Horman

The attached memorandum recommends further interview of former Chilean intelligence officer Rafael Gonzalez and a high-level approach to the U.S. intelligence community, particularly the CIA, to try to determine whether any U.S. intelligence activities may have in any way contributed to Horman's death. Admittedly, this is a sensitive thing; but I see no other alternative if we want to satisfy ourselves — and others — that we have done all we can to determine the truth of the matter.

With respect to interviewing Gonzalez, I suggest that it be done (at least in part in Spanish) by an FSO in the political section who is fluent in Spanish, and that it be recorded. If Gonzalez refuses to be recorded (he appears to be mike-shy), I suggest that consideration be given to having the interviewer appropriately wired. (In view of Gonzalez' status as a permanent resident of the U.S., such a course of action should be checked out with L with respect to the Privacy Act and any other legal considerations.) The main thrust of the questions would, of course, concern the identification of Horman and of the alleged American intelligence officer supposedly present at the time of the Lutz incident, and

Horman. Therefore, the interviewer should not be an officer who would be inhibited from asking such questions. (I would be happy to prepare some questions to be put to Gonzalez regarding the Lutz incident. Perhaps someone more knowledgeable about the intelligence situation in Chile could prepare others.)

Chile Project (#\$199900006)
U.S. Department of State

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Exemption(s) ____/ & 3 , 46



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
Unless we are prepared to accept the somewhat general denials by the Agency, we Enguld go back to them. If one concludes -- as I do -- that the GOC was directly responsible for Horman's (and Teruggi's) death, it is difficult to believe that the GOC would have felt sufficiently secure in taking such drastic action against two American citizens without some reason, however unjustifiably inferred or inadvertently given, to believe that it could do so without substantial adverse consequences vis-a-vis the USG.



I do not believe that any further approaches to the GOC on Gonzalez or otherwise on the Horman case are called for, at least at this time. The GOC appears cemented into its position on the Horman case, including all aspects of it. I also do not believe that we should at this time pursue the Sandoval lead. To do so might seriously endanger his source (apparently his brother), and confirmation of Horman's presence at the National Stadium or other information we might obtain from him would seem at this point to be maraginal to our main concern.







DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM

TO:

ARA - Mr. Harry W. Shlaudeman

FROM:

ARA - Frederick Smith, Jr.

SUBJ:

Death in Chile of Charles Horman

You asked that I make a thorough examination of the Department's files regarding the death in Chile in 1973 of American citizen Charles Horman in the aftermath of the coup of September 11, and make recommendations as to what further steps, if any, should be taken in view of the un--resolved questions surrounding Horman's death and, particularly, the recent statements of Rafael Augustin Gonzalez, former Chilean intelligence officer now in asylum in the Italian Embassy in Santiago, implying that the USG (i.e., CIA) played a role in Horman's death (at the hands of the GOC). Although my examination of the files focussed on material relating to Horman, it inevitably touched on the case of Frank Teruggi, the other American citizen killed at about the same time in Santiago, whose case is in many ways linked with and pertinent to Horman's and with respect to whose death there exists an almost equal number of unresolved questions.

I have not attempted to make any evaluation, as such, of the allegations that the Embassy inadequately discharged its responsibility for consular protection of and assistance to American citizens during the coup period. That appears to have been sufficiently hashed over. Nor have I attempted to reach any conclusion on how, when, where and by whom Horman was killed, except to the extent that those questions are pertinent to the credibility of the GOC's denials of responsibility and the question of any USG involvement.

The files I have examined are those in ARA-LA/BC, SCA/SCS (which include the Embassy's consular files on Horman and Teruggi shipped to the Department on March 30, 1975), the Visa Office and one in INR. I am not aware of the contents of any oral communications that may have taken place on this case (e.g., between the Department and the Agency, between the Embassy and the GOC), except to the extent that these may be reflected in the files I have examined.



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It should be noted that, particularly with respect to the circumstances of the death of Horman (and, to the extent that I examined relevant material, of Teruggi), the files are replete with fragmentary, second or third-hand, often contradictory, reports and statements, as well as gaps in information. It is, therefore, difficult to try to piece together a coherent chronology that one can feel confident is reasonably accurate. Nevertheless, I have tried to do so because it seems to me essential to an understanding of the case. (I have also footnoted sources, although realizing this makes it somewhat tedious for both reader and writer.)

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Background and Chronology

Charles Edmund Horman was born in New York City on May 15, 1942, and graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy and from Harvard (magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa). He apparently worked at a number of jobs, largely involving writing and filmmaking, prior to travelling in Latin America in 1971-72. He is described by family and friends as a highly intelligent, liberal, mild-mannered, gentle individual who, while fervently believing in the "Allende experiment," was not a political activist.

In Chile, he is variously reported to have been working on an animated children's cartoon (apparently at Chile Films, headed by Eduardo "Coco" Paredes Barrientos, former intimate of Allende, Director of Investigaciones under Allende, and suspected MIRista who was killed in La Moneda with Allende); writing on the history of Spanish and American imperialism in Chile and doing research for a book on Chile's "transition to socialism; "6 writing a short study on the Schneider _assassination (which showed a CIA role in the Schneider kidnapping); 7and working, with Frank Teruggi, as a parttime translator for Professor Richard Fagen of Stanford who was in Chile in 1972-73 as a consultant to the Ford Foundation.⁸ Along with Teruggi, he was associated with North American News Sources, a clipping service that also reportedly published a small leftist, pro-Allende, magazine.9 ing to Mrs. Horman, Sr., she and her husband would clip stories on Chile from U.S. newspapers and mail them to Charles. She said Charles reported receiving them resealed.)10 Presumably during this period, he participated in the production of, in collaboration with others (e.g., Don Bray of California State University), a film -- "Chile: With Poems and Guns" -- that dealt with exploitation of Chile by Spain and the U.S. and with the achievements of the Allende regime. 11

On September 10, Horman travelled from Santiago to Vina del Mar with Miss Terry Simon, a friend of the Hormans visiting from New York, to show her the seaside sights. 12 On September 11, they met Lt. Colonel Patrick J. Ryan, USMC, of the U.S. Naval Mission at Valparaiso, appearing to be tourists stranded by the coup. They discussed the general situation with him on several occasions, including their desire to return to Santiago, particularly Miss Simon's desire to return to New York.13 Colonel Ryan and other U.S. military in Vina extended various courtesies to them and advised Horman and Miss Simon against returning to Santiago.






But they persisted in their wish and, on September 15, were given a ride back to Santiago by MilGroup Commander Captain Ray E. Davis, USN,who was on a regular visit to Vina and who left them at the Embassy at about 1700.14

Horman and Miss Simon apparently inquired at the Embassy that afternoon regarding ways to depart Chile and were referred to the Consulate but did not go to the Consulate that day. They apparently checked into a hotel, and did not join Joyce at the Horman house at 4126 Vincuña MacKenna (to which the Hormans had moved on September 7 16) until the next day. There the three discussed the situation, and Joyce and Charles examined their books and other material for items that might be considered as casting suspicion on them. (Joyce implies that they destroyed any such material but indicates that the study on the Schneider assassination was not among those destroyed.) 18

On the morning of September 17, Joyce went food shopping while Charles and Miss Simon went to the Embassy and then to the Consulate, although Charles apparently waited outside the Consulate while Miss Simon registered herself (but not Charles) and made inquiries about leaving Chile. Subsequently, Miss Simon and Charles parted, Miss Simon returning to her hotel, Charles to the house on Vicuna MacKenna. 19 Joyce was prevented by the curfew from returning to the house and stayed with a friend. When she did return the following morning, she found the house ransacked and Charles missing, along with many of their books and other belongings. 20

According to neighbors, between 1600 and 1700 on September 17, a private (non-military) truck came to 4126 Vicuña MacKenna. Ten to 15 men in Chilean Army (not Air Force or Carabinero) uniforms led by a man wearing Captain's or Lieutenant's insignia got out, tried the gate and, finding it locked, jumped the fence and broke the lock. They entered the house, removed Horman and a box of books and papers from the house, and loaded them on the truck. The truck left in the direction of downtown Santiago (not in the direction of the National Stadium). At about 2300 the same day, the same truck and two other trucks returned to 4126 Vicuña MacKenna, carried out some suitcases and a large box from the house, loaded them on the trucks and departed towards downtown Santiago. 21 (On the other hand, one neighbor said that he had talked to an unidentified woman who stated that she happened to be entering a taxi near





4126 Vicuna MacKenna at the time Horman was picked up, that the taxi happened to follow the truck toward the National Stadium, and that she later saw what she believed to be the same truck near the Stadium.)22

At 0800 on the following morning, September 18, a former neighbor of the Hormans in the area where they lived prior to moving to Vicuña MacKenna received a telephone call from a man who identified himself only as a Chilean intelligence officer. He stated that SIM had detained a gringo with a beard and asking why the gringo had her name and telephone number. The neighbor responded that she assumed he was referring to Charles Horman who had her telephone number because he and his wife frequently used her telephone. was also asked if she knew that the gringo worked in pictures (yes), and if she was aware that the gringo was a leftist extremist (no). 23 On the same morning, a call was received at a house owned and previously occupied by Warwick Armstrong, ----a friend of the Hormans, from someone who did not identify hilself but who suggested that Armstrong go to the nearest police station where they were holding a friend of his who makes films. He did not go, 24 but later that day he called the Consulate reporting that Horman had been missing since late the previous day and possibly had been detained. 25 (On September 25, Chilean Military Intelligence specifically denied the calls had been made by them. 26)

On the following day, September 19, Joyce Horman reported her husband's disappearance to the Consulate. Later that day, the Consul visited the National Stadium and had the list of detainees checked for Horman's name with negative results. On September 20, Chilean Army 'Intelligence responded to the Defense Attache's inquiry earlier in the day by stating that military intelligence had no knowledge whatsoever of Horman and that he was not at the National Stadium or other detention centers. On his visit to the National Stadium that same day, the Consul could not find Horman's name or variation thereof on the list of detainees. None of the eight Americans detained at the National Stadium and released September 26 had seen or heard of Horman.27


(On September 24, our Embassy was notified by the GOC that a body that had been brought to the morgue on September 22 appeared from fingerprints to be that of Frank Teruggi. It was identified as Teruggi by a friend, Steven Volk, on October 2. Teruggi and his roommate, David Hathaway, had been arrested at their apartment on the evening of September 20




by Chilean carabineros and taken to the National Stadium for questioning. According to the GOC, Teruggi was arrested on September 20 for curfew violation, released the evening of September 21, and his body found in the street September 22. Death was attributed to multiple gunshot wounds; 28

In the weeks that followed, various elements of the Embassy continued to make inquiries through various channels and at all levels of the GOC concerning Horman. None was productive, all responses from the GOC being to the effect that it had no record of Horman and that he was not detained by the GOC. (On October 3, the Ministry of Foreign Relations advised the Embassy that Horman had been detained at the National Stadium on September 20 for violation of curfew but released on September 21. Subsequently, the GOC retracted this assertion. 29) The Embassy tried to track down various leads (some from anonymous callers, virtually all second or thirdhand) without success. Some indicated that Horman (or, at least, an American) had been killed at the National Stadium, although some appear to be as or more likely related to Teruggi. Among the leads was a statement made on or about September 30 by Enrique Sandoval, Jefe de Gabinete in the Ministry of Education during the last six months of the Allende regime, to the Acting Director of the A.I.D. Mission, Judd Kessler. Sandoval, who had been briefly detained at the time of the coup, told Kessler, who had previously mentioned the Horman and Teruggi cases to him, that someone he knew in the Chilean military had said that Horman and been in the National Stadium and either that "he had been killed there" or "was dead."31 This lead appears not to have been pursued. (It now appears, four years later, that Sandoval's source was his brother, a Chilean Army Colonel who is said to have been a top official at the National Stadium during this period³² and who may now himself be detained by the GOC.³³)

On October 18, the Embassy was informed by the GOC that a previously unidentified body that had been picked up on the street by the military and delivered to the morgue at 1335 on September 18 had been identified through finger-print records as that of Charles Horman. Death was attributed to bullet wounds. The failure to earlier identify the body (which had been interred in the Santiago cemetery on October 3) as that of Horman was attributed to an error in classification of the fingerprints taken from the corpse. 35





Even prior to the identification of Horman's body, the GOC, in a communication to the Embassy's Defense Attache, took the position that most likely Horman was abducted by extremists posing as Chilean military, and reiterated that neither Chilean armed forces nor Carabineros had conducted any search operation at 4126 Vicuna MacKenna on September 17 and that, in any event, all such forces conducted such operations with at least two vehicles, pursuant to regulations. 36

On October 15, General Lutz, Director of Chilean Army Intelligence, introduced another theme when he orally advised the Embassy's Defense Attache that the GOC had knowledge that Teruggi was in Chile to spread false rumors to the outside world about Chile and the situation there. 37 This theme was reiterated in an unaddressed, unsigned memorandum on Horman and Teruggi delivered to the Defense Attache on October 31 from General Lutz' office which, while concluding that both Horman and Teruggi were killed while out of military control, possibly by extremist sniper or guerrilla action, noted that there was evidence of an organization to which North Americans were linked whose objectives were to help extremists and to discredit the Junta and the Embassy in its relations with the Junta. The memorandum stated that there was evidence that Teruggi, at least, belonged to this organization. The same note was struck by an official of the Foreign Ministry in a conversation with an Embassy political officer when he stated (as he apparently had hinted to the officer before) that Horman and Teruggi had been deeply involved in leftist activities "in the Communist industrial areas" and suggested that they had been killed by their own leftist comrades.

In its note of December 13, responding to the Embassy's previous request for a full investigation and report on the deaths of Horman and Teruggi, the Foreign Ministry reported that an exhaustive investigation had failed to disclose the circumstances of Horman's (or Teruggi's) death but speculated that his death was caused by snipers or extremists using military uniforms. The note quoted from the report of the autopsy (stated to have been performed on September 25) that estimated that death resulting from multiple bullet wounds occurred at 0945 on September 18. The note also quoted from the report of a ballistics expert who was stated to have examined the body on December 5 (unbeknownst to the Embassy, the body was apparently exhumed on October 18) and concluded that the six bullet wounds all corresponded "to shots fired from a long distance." (In the note, the words "larga distancia" are underlined.)




Numerous further requests by the Embassy for a more complete and satisfactory explanation of the deaths of Horman and Teruggi finally elicited the response from the Foreign Ministry by note of February 6, 1974, that it had exhausted all its resources and was unable to provide any further explanation than that contained in its December 13 note. 41

The GOC had informed the Embassy, in late October, that regulations prohibited the shipment of Horman's body because of its condition (noting that it had remained at the morgue for 15 days without preservation and had been buried for 15 days before exhumation), and took the position that it would either have to be cremated or reduced to a skeleton. Despite Embassy requests on many occasions and at many levels, "the GOC refused to grant an exception to the regulations. Finally, on March 13, a Chilean Navy counterintelligence officer approached a MilGroup officer and in the course of their conversation emphasized the importance to Chile of the acquisition from the U.S. of TOW missiles. When the MilGroup officer mentioned the problem of the return of Horman's remains, the Chilean officer indicated he might be able to help. He called the following day to advise that he had authority to effect the return. 43 Less than a week later the GOC informed the Embassy that an exception to the regulations had been granted and that Horman's remains could be returned to the U.S. 44

On March 21, a man identifying himself as Lt. Colonel Rafael Gonzalez, Chilean Air Force, came to the Consulate urgently seeking a consular officer to accompany him in making the necessary arrangements for the shipment of Horman's remains. Vice-Consul James Anderson accompanied Gonzalez to the Registro Civil, the cemetery (where, Gonzalez said, Horman had been reinterred January 2) and to the morgue, after which Gonzalez gave Anderson papers which he said would permit the exhumation and return of the body to the U.S. 45 The return of Horman's remains was accomplished shortly thereafter.

In September, 1975, a Chilean identifying himself as Rafael Agustin Gonzalez entered the Italian Embassy in Santiago, seeking and obtaining asylum. Gonzalez told the Italians he was an officer of the Chilean Air Force and had worked for many years in Chilean intelligence. Since the





coup, he had become disillusioned with intelligence work because of the many abuses committed by DINA. Because of his protests against such abuses, he had been threatened with death by DINA, and thus decided to seek asylum. His wife and son entered the Embassy the following day. In the ensuing months, the Italian Embassy contacted several other embassies to see if they would grant visas to the Gonzalez family, without success. On two occasions, the Embassy thought that it had arranged with the GOC for safe conducts for the Gonzalez family, but both times "something intervened" to prevent their issuance. 46


Initially, Gonzalez indicated a desire to go to some country other than the U.S. However, in late 1975, our Embassy learned, probably in connection with the application of Mrs. Gonzalez for a U.S. immigrant visa, that Gonzalez had the status of a permanent resident alien of the U.S. It also became known that the Gonzalez' six-year old son, Sergio, was a U.S. citizen on the basis of his birth in the U.S. during one of Gonzalez' numerous stays in the U.S. subsequent to his initial entry in 1964. He stated he had been employed, in the U.S. by the GOC primarily as an intelligence agent under various covers until his recall to Chile in April 1973.

In March 1976, the presence of Gonzalez, his wife and son, became public knowledge through stories in the press.

Gonzalez was interviewed by our Embassy in March concerning his permanent resident status. During the interview, Gonzalez claimed he had information, including documentation, linking the CIA with DINA operations against subversive elements in Chile.

I flatly denied such involvement, noting it had a record of Gonzalez' approaches to CIA in early and mid-60's with offers of collaboration with the CIA. According to nothing materialized, indicating it had questions about Gonzalez' mental stability.


Numerous further approaches by the Italian Embassy to the GOC in late 1975 and early 1976 for a safe conduct for Gonzalez and his family (one in connection with an offer of Italian visas to them) were rebuffed by the GOC, the latter taking the position that since no charges were pending against Gonzalez he should apply for a passport and an exit permit like any other Chilean citizen. The Italian Embassy then turned to our Embassy, urging that the U.S. ask the GOC to grant safe conducts to the Gonzalez family to travel to the U.S.51 In April, our Embassy advised the Chilean Foreign Ministry, informally, that if the GOC decided to permit Gonzalez to leave Chile, the U.S. would accept him and his family. The Foreign Ministry gave no indication Gonzalez would be allowed to leave Chile. 52




Apparently in an attempt to publicize the plight of Gonzalez and his family and, thus, to pressure the GOC to grant them safe conduct out of Chile, the Italian Embassy permitted Washington Post reporter Joanne Omang and CBS stringer Frank Manitzas to interview Gonzalez in the Embassy on June 7, 1976. Approximately half-way through the interview (which was conducted in English and which, to that point, dealt with DINA, Gonzalez' background, and his reasons for seeking asylum), he was asked if he had heard about "the two Americans that were killed in Chile." Gonzalez replied that he "knew that Charles Horman was killed. Because he knew too much. And this was done between the CIA and the local authorities." In his somewhat rambling responses to the questions that followed, Gonzalez stated that: he had seen "the guys" that brought Horman from Valparaiso to Santiago; he had been called to the office of General Lutz, Army intelligence director, several days after the coup at which time he had seen a bearded man outside General Lutz' office in the custory of two Chileans who ridentified the prisoner to Gonzalez as Charles Horman; in General Lutz' office were Colonel Barria (Lutz' deputy) and an American, in addition to General Lutz and Gonzalez; in their presence, Gonzalez heard General Lutz say that Horman "knew too much" and "had to disappear." Gonzalez also stated he was involved with Horman again in early 1974 in connection with the return of his body to the U.S. He said he had heard nothing about another American being killed. 53

In the follow-up interview the next day, Gonzalez reiterated to the reporters his description of General Lutz' statement. He also stated that he assumed the civilian in General Lutz' office was an American CIA agent by his (non-Chilean) clothes and his manner, although the man did not speak. In connection with the decision of the GOC to return Horman's body (allegedly because Senator Javits was blocking the transfer of equipment for the Chilean Army until the GOC agreed to its return), Gonzalez said that he sought out James Anderson whom he considered a CIA agent to accompany him to obtain Horman's body. 54

Upon learning of the press interview, an Embassy Consular officer interviewed Gonzalez on June 8. Gonzalez generally confirmed his statements concerning General Lutz' order regarding Horman. He indicated that he assumed he had been called to Lutz' office as a potential interpreter. He also indicated that he was assigned in March 1974 to handle the






return of Horman's body because of his knowledge and experience and because he could recognize Horman, having seen him outside General Lutz' office. In this interview, Gonzalez was vague as to the precise date of the meeting in General Lutz! office (as he had been in the press interview), stating only that it was several days after the coup. He did not mention (nor was he asked about) the presence of Colonel Barria and the "American agent." But in the latter part of the interview, as he rambled on about his past, his and his family's current plight, and his anti-communism and antifascism, he indicated that he had worked with American intelligence in the past, mentioning a Mr. Wilson in the Political Section of the Embassy in the late 1950's who was succeeded by a Mr. Wright. He also mentioned a Rudy Gomez. On two occasions during this part of the interview, he asked that someone from the Political Section be sent to talk to him. 55

To clarify perceived discrepancies between his press interview (reported in a June 10 article in the Washington Post) and his interview with the Consular officer, Gonzalez was reinterviewed by the Consular officer on June 11. He told the Consul he did not want to discredit the press in any way because the press had helped make his plight known to the U.S. public, thus possibly pressuring the USG to obtain his safe conduct out of Chile. With respect to the presence of others in General Lutz' office, Gonzalez qualified the statements in his press interview, stating to the Consul that he was not positive but "almost certain" of the identity of Colonel Barría (Colonel Victor Hugo Barria) and that he only "guessed" that the other man was an American agent by his manner and American-style shoes. With respect to why he had been chosen to assist in the return of Horman's body, he stated merely that he had been ordered by his superior to do so (but he declined to name the superior). He also stated, in response to the Consul's query, that he had not mentioned the Horman case in his several previous interviews with the Consul on visa matters because the subject never came up. 56 (The Italian Charge had informed the Consul on June 8 that Gonzalez had never mentioned the Horman case to him or his staff. 57)

In the course of another interview by the Consular officer on June 22, Gonzalez was asked how he knew it was Horman he had seen outside General Lutz' office. Gonzalez replied that as he walked through the anteroom he saw a prisoner being guarded by two Chilean soldiers in camouflage uniforms. He asked them who the prisoner was, and they replied that it was an American named Horman. Gonzalez also stated that he was





still not certain that the other Chilean officer in General Lutz' office was Colonel Barria or that the civilian was an American intelligence agent. He also stated he knew nothing about an American named Frank Teruggi.58 At some point during this interview, Gonzalez indicated that he had known Vice Consul James Anderson socially since 1972, that he believed Anderson to have a "dual role" and to have had frequent contact with Chileans active in causing the "economic collapse of Chile." He also mentioned knowing, without elaborating further,

While public and Congressional interest in the U.S. was heightened by a June 20 article in the Washington Post ("The Man Who Knew Too Much") on the Horman case, incorporating the Gonzalez accusations, and a shorter story on Frank Teruggi's death, 60 the Embassy pressed the GOC, both by formal note and oral demarches by the Ambassador and others, for comments on the Gonzalez charges. 61 In its oral responses and, finally in its note of July 2, the GOC noted that, conveniently for Gonzalez, General Lutz was dead (he died of natural causes in 1974), that Colonel Barria categorically denied that any conversation or meeting such as that alleged by Gonzalez ever took place, and questioned Gonzalez' mental stability. 62

Shortly thereafter, by way of a formal note and oral demarches by the Ambassador, the GOC was requested to grant safe conducts to Gonzalez and his family so that they could depart Chile for the U.S.63 (By this time, after several changes of mind, the Gonzalezes had decided that Mrs. Gonzalez and the child would not leave the country without Gonzalez.) A similar approach was made to the Chilean Ambassador in 🕆 Washington. 64 In its formal reply, the GOC stated flatly that Gonzalez would not be permitted to leave Chile; that the GOC was seeking suitable employment for Mrs. Gonzalez so that the family need not be separated; and that the GOC was initiating a complete investigation into Gonzalez' activities. 65 In his conversation with the Ambassador, Foreign Minister Carvajal advised that he had himself met Gonzalez the day after the coup at which time Gonzalez volunteered a long list of communists and terrorists that he thought should be


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detained, offering his help to the intelligence services. Carvajal noted that Gonzalez had exhibited such aberrant tendencies (a.g., strong fixations against homosexuals and Jews) that he was turned down by the Air Force. Carvajal also stated that he had known General Lutz well as a man of careful correctness who would never have made the statements attributed to him by Gonzalez. 56

Gonzalez' Credibility

Gonzalez' Claims Regarding His Background -- In his March 31, 1976, interview with our consular officer concerning his visa status, Gonzalez stated that he entered service with the Chilean Air Force (FACH) in 1954 as a civilian covert agent in the intelligence branch; that he first entered the U.S. in 1963 on a student visa; became a permanent resident in 1964; was on leave from FACH 1964-65; was employed in Chile by the governmentoperated Chilean Development Corporation (CORFO) 1966-69; was assigned to Chilean Consulate General in New York 1970-71; worked at the Chilean Consulate General in New York 1971-72; returned to Chile in 1973 and remained there except for two brief stays in the U.S. (primarily to perserve his permanent resident status). He states he maintained his status as a civilian covert agent until January 1974 when he was named a captain in FACH. (He says that because of his actions in uniform at the time of the coup, he could no longer perform covert activities.) He retired from FACH in January 1975 after 20 years service. Documents . presented to the consular officer by Gonzalez apparently substantiated his military service. 67 Visa Office records confirm several aspects of his claimed status and presence in the U.S. do not contradict any of Gonzalez' statements in this regard.

Although the GOC, while confirming Gonzalez' employment with CORFO, took issue with the Embassy's description of Gonzalez as a retired FACH officer, 68 our Embassy considered this largely a technical distinction and concluded, from official documents produced by Gonzalez, that he worked in the U.S. and other countries in a covert capacity and in a similar or somewhat more public capacity for the for the GOC in Chile. 69 Information on Gonzalez' background for him is not inconsistent with his



claims of employment by the GOC. 70

Gonzalez' statements in his press interviews of June 7 and 8 regarding his past employment by the GOC, including with CORFO and the Chilean Consulate General in New York, are generally consistent with his March 31 statements to our consular officer. 71

Gonzalez' Claimed Connection with the CIA

In his June 8 -9 press interview, Gonzalez stated that he never worked for (received money from) the CIA, but that he had contacts with them. ("If I ever have a contact with the CIA it was because my superiors sent me to deliver something or pick up something.") In various statements in the interview, he claims that a CIA-controlled group in Chile followed him and tapped his phone. He also claimed that in the U.S. the CIA sought information about him through his wife by hypnotizing her. In his June 8 interview with our consular officer, he volunteered the information that over the years he worked with Wilson, Wright and Rudy Gomez, implying they were

officer, Gonzalez claimed having known James Anderson and that he had a "dual role." 74 In his press interviews, he indicated that he had specifically sought out Anderson to accompany him to obtain the release of Horman's body. 75 Anderson's memorandum for the record on this incident implies Gonzalez was previously unknown to him. 76 However, a recent states that Anderson says he met Gonzalez twice — once in late 1971 or early 1972 when Gonzalez applied for a tourist visa at the Consulate (which Anderson denied because of Gonzalez' past residence in the U.S.) and once when Gonzalez came to the Consulate in connection with the return of Horman's body in early 1974.

Gonzalez said he did not know how Horman was killed, and that he, Gonzalez, was picked to deal with the Embassy on the return of Horman's body because he spoke English, an explanation that Anderson, understandably, found curious.)

With respect to referred to by 63 Gonzalez in the June 22 interview with the consular officer

only as an embassy officer "with a short beard" whom he knew,

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Gonzalez' Mental Stability

The files reflect numerous statements by Chilean officials to the effect that Gonzalez is mentally unbalanced. Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Valdez described Gonzalez to Ambassador Popper as a man of unstable mentality. 80 Foreign Minister Carvajal told our Ambassador that Gonzalez displayed such aberrant tendencies that he was turned down by the Air Force and he could be expected to invent stories such as that about General Lutz' alleged order regarding Horman. He also cited Gonzalez' taking asylum in the Italian Embassy as evidence of paranoia. 81 Foreign Ministry Director Lawin 123 Foreign Ministry Director Lavin told our Ambassador' that the GOC was awaiting the arrival of a medical certificate showing Gonzalez was a psychopath for inclusion in their reply to our note on the General Lutz incident. He later told the Ambassador that the GOC had decided not to allude to Gonzalez' mental state in the note since it would probably be interpreted as self-serving. 83

Our Embassy's attitude on the question of Gonzalez' mental state appears somewhat ambivalent. The Embassy states that it believes that Gonzalez "probably has some kind of mental imbalance or fixation" although "he has shown a sharp intelligence and lucidity in his interviews with consular officer, and on July 6 he showed him a letter from two psychiatrists attesting to his mental




stability." The Embassy notes his reputation in Chilean military circles is one of high unreliability and concludes that any statement from him "should be treated with care." 84

A principal basis for the Embassy's conclusion is a long letter dated April 26, 1976, from Gonzalez to President Pinochet the burden of which is that Gonzalez' troubles stem from his attempt to combat a homosexual "mafia" in the Chilean Armed Forces that includes many senior officers in various forces and government departments. 85 The Embassy notes that, apart from the general incredibility of the letter, one of the senior Army generals named as a homosexual is "well known for his intense and exclusively heterosexual activity." 86

The files contain three verbatim texts of interviews with Gonzalez -- the June 7 and 8 press interviews and . the June 8 interview with the consular officer. Gonzalez frequently rambles far afield in his responses (in some instances, ruminating molologues), sometimes bordering on the incoherent. His statement concerning the CIA hypnotizing his wife, at least if taken literally, appears incredible. But apart from the latter -- and putting aside his accusation regarding General Lutz -- his statements are generally consistent and intelligible. They do show a man under great stress, and one who is not entirely at home in the English language in which all the interviews were apparently conducted. In the interviews, Gonzalez keeps returning to his plight and that of his family (his ill son, their living for nine months in a 12' by 12' room), displaying what seems to be some reluctance at discussing matters relating to Horman. (Although it is not known what discussions may have taken place between Gonzalez and the reporters before the interviews were recorded, it should be noted that the Horman case was raised by the reporters, not Gonzalez.)

Although in the press interviews Gonzalez does not elaborate on why he was so fearful (of DINA), he explains that he chose the Italian Embassy because they received more asylees than any other and because a year before a woman was killed by DINA and dropped inside of the Embassy garden -- Gonzalez reasoning that "they couldn't do a murder again in the same Embassy." When asked why he couldn't leave the country (clandestinely), Gonzalez replied



that he could if he were single but not with his wife and child, referring to an apparently unsuccessful attempt that he knew of. He states he did not seek asylum in the U.S. Embassy because "the American Embassy are supporting this government." But despite his fears of the CIA, he said he would not be afraid to go to the U.S. if his case is publicized in the U.S. because then "I don't think that they ... will have the guts to touch me there," citing the interest of Senator Church and others in CIA activities. 87

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Gonzalez had serious mental proprems or was mentally unbalanced and were concerned because of his knowledge of intelligence activities. 88


In connection with possible sponsorship of the Gonzalez family, the Department (ORM) got in touch with

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who was a neighbor and close friend of Gonzalez and his parents in Santiago,

expressed the view that Gonzalez is not mentally unstable. 89

oreset.



GOC's Credibility

Although direct GOC responsibility for the death of Horman would not, in itself, indicate any USG role in his death or prove Gonzalez' accusations, the GOC's credibility is a pertinent issue with respect to both matters. And its disclaimer of responsibility for Horman's death is, in many respects, difficult to credit. The GOC states that, after an exhaustive investigation, it has concluded that no elements of the GOC were involved in the abduction and killing of Horman and that it can only surmise that he and Teruggi were killed by random gunfire or deliberately by their fellow extremists because they did not join the fight or were otherwise considered to have betrayed the cause. While the information in the files is not totally conclusive (nor entirely uncontradictory), the weight of the evidence in the files, quite apart from Gonzalez, is to the contrary.

Horman appears to have been sought out at a residence he and his wife had occupied for only a week by some 10-15 armed men dressed in Chilean Army uniforms who took him and some of his belongings away in the truck in which they had come. The same or a similar group returned later that afternoon in two trucks and took away other material from the Horman residence (but left two bottles of Scotch). 90 The following morning calls clearly / relating to Horman and indicating he had been detained were received by a former neighbor and by a friend whose telephone numbers Horman presumably had in his possession. (Others can comment more knowledgeably on the frequency of extremists disguising themselves as soldiers and how the pattern of their activities compares to the above scenario.)

Although the Sandoval information indicates Horman may have been at some point in the National Stadium, his name appeared on no list of American detained there nor did any of the Americans detained there see or hear of him. (Nor did Teruggi's name appear on any such list, although there is ample evidence — and the GOC admits — he was detained in the Stadium.) In any event, less than 24 hours after his abduction, Horman was killed and his body delivered to the morgue (according to GOC records). One might conclude



that he (like Teruggi) was, in Gonzalez' words, "a special case." 91

The GOC report on Horman's death raises serious questions of credibility. It purports to place the time of Horman's death at 0945 on the morning of September 18 on the basis of an autopsy performed after the body had been lying unpreserved in the morgue for a full week. Moreover, it purports to establish that Horman died as a result of multiple bullet wounds inflicted by shots fired (impliedly by automatic weapons) "from a long distance"- this based on a ballistics report prepared after examination of the body eleven weeks after death during which time the body had been interred in the ground and had lain in the morgue for extended periods without preservation both before and after burial and exhumation.

In many respects the GOC report on Teruggi's death is even more difficult to believe. According to the GOC, Teruggi was arrested for violation of 2000 curfew on September 20. Yet, according to Teruggi's roommate, David Hathaway, he and Teruggi were both arrested without an order of arrest at 2015 in their home (presumably not a violation of any curfew), taken, with some books found in Teruggi's room, to a temporary holding area and, later that night, to the National Stadium where they were interrogated, separately, by an Army officer. Hathaway was asked little about himself but mainly about Teruggi including about Teruggi's membership in a leftist (but unspecified) political party. 92 But Teruggi was not asked similar questions about Hathaway. Teruggi was taken from their cell around 1800 on September 31 for a second round of questioning (according to others detained at the National Stadium, an unusual procedure) and not seen again alive by Hathaway. According to the GOC, Teruggi was cleared of suspicion and released that night and apparently later shot, presumably for violation of curfew or by marauding extremists. His body was found in the street and delivered to the morgue on September 22. Hathaway states that no foreigners were released within one day of their arrest (this is consistent with the statement of detained Maryknoll priest, Joseph Francis Doherty) 93 nor in the evening before curfew. 94 Finally, the GOC report says that Teruggi died of some seventeen bullet wounds.

According to Steven Volk, a friend of Teruggi's who identified his body in the morgue on October 2, Teruggi's nude body, which Volk says he examined closely, had only three wounds - two gun-shot wounds, both in the head, and an open slash on the neck. 95

It is not evident from the files that there is any disparity between any visual observation of Horman's body that may have been made by Embassy representatives and the GOC autopsy report. (Indeed, the files indicate that no copy of the Horman autopsy report has been received despite numerous Embassy requests for it.) One could speculate that the real reason for the long delay by the GOC in releasing Horman's body was to insure that no such disparity could be observed, rather than a reluctance to make an exception to Chilean health regulations.

In any event, the dubious validity of the GOC's version of Horman's (and Teruggi's) death raises serious questions about the credibility of their refutations of Gonzalez' allegations.

USG Role in Horman's Death?

Apart from Gonzalez' statements and accusations, there is no evidence in the files that any element of the USG played a responsible role, directly or indirectly, in the death of Charles Horman. The CIA, in clearing a letter to Senator Kennedy, stated, through INR, that the Agency did not at any time supply information concerning Horman (or Teruggi) to the Junta or to any of the Chilean security forces. 96 Through INR, the DIA and FBI state that they have no information on Horman. 97 (INR files contain two 1972 FBI reports relating to Teruggi and his attendance at a national conference of the Committee of Returned (Peace Corps) Volunteers whose subject was "Conference on Anti-Imperialist Strategy and Action" and his membership in the Chicago Area Group on the Liberation of the Americas." 98


The files contain no information supporting Gonzalez' guess or assumption that the individual that he claimed to have seen in General Lutz' office was an American intelligence agent. Nor do the files contain any information supporting his statements concerning CIA involvement, such as that Horman's death was engineered "between the CIA and local authorities." (In the consular interviews subsequent to his press interviews, Gonzalez was not asked about his claimed relations with personnel part or what was the basis for his statement that the CIA was involved in Horman's death.)

Why Horman and Teruggi?

It appears that between twenty and thirty American citizens were detained by the GOC at the time of and immediately after the coup of September 11. Yet only Horman and Teruggi were killed, and the evidence in the files strongly indicates that they were deliberately killed by the GOC. There is little information in the files regarding Horman's (or Teruggi's) activities in Chile, much less the activities of the other Americans that were detained. (Nor is there any evidence in the files what it was about which Homran "knew too much.") It is, therefore, not possible to say to what extent Horman's (and Teruggi's) activities may have set them apart, in the eyes of the GOC, as special threats. It

appears Marxist literature was found in both their homes. Horman's film and research and writing activities have a common, pro-Allende thread, and his and Teruggi's political inclinations are clear. And a vigilant intelligence service could presumably have gathered ample information in this regard without help from foreign sources. (The files do not indicate to what extent an anti-Allende intelligence or security force may have been functioning before the coup. But the Junta clearly had or quickly acquired derogatory information on Horman and Teruggi, and frequently mentioned it to Embassy personnel [as a justification?].)


Perhaps such information was enough to convince the Junta that they were "special cases." Nevertheless, it appears strange that, given the obvious and important political considerations involved, the GOC would believe it could kill Horman and Teruggi without serious repercussions in its relations with the U.S. Persumably, as Gonzalez stated, the GOC "wouldn't go and race to kill an American ... because here they have been very careful of the lives of an American citizen." 99 If an explanation exists, it does not appear in the files and must be sought elsewhere.



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Recommendations:


- l. That Rafael Augustin Gonzalez be interviewed with a view to obtaining further information regarding the alleged order by General Lutz that Charles Horman be killed and the presence at the time of the person Gonzalez assumed to be an American intelligence agent. Gonzalez should also be asked if he knows of any information furnished to Chilean intelligence (pre or post coup) by U.S. sources regarding Homran or Teruggi or other American citizens.
- 2. That high-level inquiries be made of intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, to try to ascertain to what extent, if any, actions may have been taken or information may have been furnished, formally or informally, to representatives of the forces that now constitute the GOC, either before or immediately after the coup, that may have led the Junta to believe it could, without serious repercussions, kill Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi.





- Information provided to Embassy by Joyce Horman (#193-SCS file).
- Joyce Horman quoted in Chilean newspaper article (#211-SCS file).
- 3. Diuguid article, Washington Post, June 20, 1976; Steven Volk (Anderson memo of October 1, 1973 -#186-SCS file); Marvine Howe article, New York Times, November 5, 1973 (Cong. Rec. November 27, 1973, p. 521141).
- Steven Volk (Anderson memo of October 1, 1973);
 Diuguid article.
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- 5.
- 6. Marvine Howe article, op. cit.
- 7. Joyce Horman in "Chile: Under Military Rule;"
 Diuguid article, op. cit.
- Professor Richard Fagen, letter to Senator Fulbright, October 8, 1973.
- 9. Howe article, op. cit.
- 10. Diuguid article, op. cit.
- 11. Lister to Shlaudeman memo, April 12, 1974.
- 12. Terry Simon article Senior Scholastic, December 6, 1973 (part of #237-SCS file).
- Lieutenant Colonel P. J. Ryan, USMC, memo November 16, 1973 (part of #237-SCS file).
- 14. Captain Ray Davis, USN, memo summarizing MILGP contacts with Horman, October 1973.
- Simon article, op. cit.




- 16. Joyce Horman, "Chile: Under Military Rule," op. cit.
- 17. IBID
- 18. Joyce Horman, op. cit.
- 19. Simon article, op. cit.
- 20. Joyce Horman, op. cit.
- 31. Anderson/McNally memo, October 18, 1973 (#185-SCS file).
- 22. Santiago 5668 of November 18, 1973.
- 23. Carvajal statement (#199-SCS file).
- 24. Santiago 5668 of November 18, 1973.
- 25. Embassy's November 30, 1973 summary re Horman.
- 26. Santiago 5668 of November 18, 1973.
- 27. Embassy's November 30, 1973 summary re Horman.
- 28. Santiago 4859 of October 5, 1973.
- 29. Embassy's November 30, 1973 summary re Horman
- 30. Anderson memo, October 18, 1973 (#214-SCS file).
- 31. Judd Kessler, memo, July 19, 1976.
- 32. Kessler letter to Purdy, July 1976.
- 33. Fimbres letter to Poppser, August 4, 1976.
- 34. Santiago 5088 of October 18, 1973.
- 35. Santiago 5128 of October 19, 1973.
- Colonel W. M. Hon, memo, October 16, 1973 (#207-SCS file).
- 37. IBID.





- Attachment to Colonel Hon memo, November 2, 1973 (#246-SCS file).
- R. S. Stevens memo to Charge Thompson, December 6, 1973 (#233-SCS file).
- 40. FonMin note #18557 of December 13, 1973.
- 41. FonMin note #2364 of February 6, 1974.
- 42. Santiago 5272 of October 27, 1973; Santiago 66 of January 4, 1974.
- 43. Santiago 1325 of March 18, 1974.
- 44. Santiago 1453 of March 22, 1974.
- 45. Anderson memo, March 21, 1974.
- 46. Santiago 0713 of January 28, 1976.
- 47. Santiago 2941 of April 2, 1976.
- 48. Santiago 2813 of March 21, 1976.
- 49. Santiago 1738 of March 5, 1976.
- 50. Santiago 5296 of June 3, 1976.
- 51. Santiago 1738 of March 5, 1976.
- 52. Santiago 3719 of April 23, 1976.
- 53. Transcript of press interview of June 7, 1976.
- 54. Transcript of press interview of June 8, 1976.
- 55. Santiago 5663 of June 11, 1976, as amended by enclosure to ADCM Stourts letter of August 3, 1976, to ARA/BC Mr. Fimbres.
- 56. Santagio 5736 of June 14, 1976.
- 57. Santiago 5677 of June 11, 1976.
- 58. Santiago 6112 of June 23, 1976.
- 59. Santiago 6111 of June 23, 1976.



- 60. Diuguid article, Washington Post, June 20, 1976.
- 61. Santiago 5745 of June 14, 1976; Embassy note number 173 of June 14, 1976; Santiago 6159 of June 24, 1976.
- Santiago 6472 of July 2, 1976; FonMin note number 26 of July 2, 1976; Santiago 6562 of July 7, 1976.
- Santiago 6870 of July 14,1976; Embassy note number 63. 219 of July 13, 1976.
- 64. State 184455 of July 26, 1976.
- 65. Santiago 7077 of July 21, 1976; FonMin note number 31 of July 13, 1976.
- 66. Santiago 7386 of July 29, 1976.
- 67. Santiago 2941 of April 2, 1976.
- 68. Santiago 6159 of June 24, 1976.
- 69. Santiago 6562 of July 7, 1976.
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- Transcript of press interview, June 7 and 8, 1976.
- 72. IBID.
- Santiago 5663 of June'll, 1976, as amended by enclosure to ADCM Stout's letter of August 3, 1976 to ARA/BC -Mr. Fimbres.
- Santiago 6111 of June 23, 1976.
- 75. Transcript of press interview, June 7 and 8, 1976
- 76. Anderson memo of March 21, 1974.
- 77. Deptel 161734 of June 29, 1976.

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- Santiago 6870 of July 14, 1976. 80.
- 81. Santiago 7386 of July 29, 1976.
- Santiago 6159 of June 24, 1976. 82.
- 83. Santiago 6562 of July 7, 1976.
- 84. Ibid.
- 85. Gonzalez-Pinochet letter of April 26, 1976.
- Santiago 6562 of July 7, 1976. 86.
- 87. Transcript of press interview, June 7 and 8, 1976.

- 89. Memo, ARA-LA/BC W. Lowenthal to ARA/BC -R.V. Fimbres, July 8, 1976.
- Captain Ray E. Davis, USN, memo, September 1973 (SCS - Embassy file).
- 91. Santiago 5663 of June 11, 1976.
- David Hathaway, memo of telephone interview, undated (SCS - Embassy file).
- Joseph Francis Doherty, statement, November 16, 1973 (SCS - Embassy file).
- David Hathaway, letter, January 23, 1974, to Department (Charles Anderson - SCS).
- 95. Steven Volk, letter, January 9, 1974, to Senator Gale McGee.
- INR/DDC Mr. Gardner, memo, July 23, 1976, to 96. ARA/BC - Mr. Fimbres.
- INR J.J. Hitchcock to ARA F. Smith, phone, 97. November 1976.
- FBI Report of Frank Teruggi, December 14, 1972. FBI Report on Andrew S. Berman, October 25, 1972.
- Santiago 5663 of June 11, 1976.