

The View after Three Years

16.2  
*Edward C. Horman*  
12/22/76

1.

October 25, 1973, four days after returning from Santiago, I wrote to Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and described, among other things, the meeting on October 5 of Joyce Horman and myself in the American Embassy with Ambassador No. Davis, Consul Purdy and Defatt Hon.

The Ambassador said that the Embassy felt that Charles Horman probably was in hiding. He also denied knowledge of telephone calls by Chilean Military Intelligence to friends of Charles asking about his background and, in one case, stating that they were holding him. He did not admit that he was acquainted with the testimony of Charles Horman's neighbors that they had seen soldiers come to his house early on September 17 when he was not at home, return in the late afternoon and arrest him, take him into the Estadio Nacional, and return later and remove possessions from his house.

Writing to J. B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Senator Jacob K. Javits said 11/13/73, "I have received your letter of November 5 concerning the Charles Horman case and I must tell you that I find its contents to be considerably less than a satisfactory account of this tragedy and the role of our Embassy in respect thereof. As you doubtlessly have heard by now, I also found Ambassador Davis' oral account given to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 9 to be notably inadequate."

In my letter to Senator Fulbright I also said "I do not know the reason underlying the negligence, inactivity, and failure of the American Embassy. Whether it was incompetence, indifference, or something worse, I find it shocking, outrageous and perhaps obscene." Since that time abundant proof has emerged that "the reason" was horribly worse, very obscene, and deliberate.

Writing to me, to members of the Congress and to others and communicating with the press, the Department of State and other Government Agencies have denied, misstated and concealed facts which are verified in their own files and elsewhere. They have publicly stated and suggested as facts or as strong probabilities things which they privately said were implausible or untrue.

J. B. Kubitsch's letters 11/5/73 and 12/7/73, to Senator Javits, L. Holton's letter 12/6/74 to Congressman Donald Fraser on behalf of H. Kissinger, and the carefully edited "Chronology", offered confidentially to members of the Congress (and differing in substantial ways from the also edited "Resume" on which it is based) are examples of the output of the Department of State public relations mill.

Two statements in J. B. Kubisch letter 12/7/73 present two cover-up points which are typically repeated in many other letters. They are, "I also wish to emphasize that at no time has the U. S. Government attempted or been able to explain what actually happened to Charles Horman," and "It appears that Charles Horman dies some time before noon on September 18, in other words before we received the first report of his disappearance." (There is no evidence to support



this self serving statement. There is evidence to contradict it.) Another cover up is used repeatedly. Found in Kubisch letter 12/7/73 and more elaborately in L. Holton letter 12/6/74, it takes the form of a distorted, lying account of the telephone calls by Chilean Military Intelligence. Other coverups will be dealt with later.

What did the United States Government know at the time when they were professing complete ignorance of "what actually happened to Charles Horman"; indicating that they could not go beyond the Chilean assertions that they knew nothing; publicizing "Chilean" suggestions that he had been shot by leftists, etc.?

Below is material which, while not complete, seems to me to be important. It is organized under the following headings:

- I Comparison of DoS public statements and excerpts from material furnished by them under F O I A.
- II Reports of Charles Horman's arrest, trial, and murder.
- III The fading helpers.
- IV Mlgrp Vina
- V Why was it necessary for Charles Horman to disappear?
- VI Scenario.

I - Largely excerpts from selected material provided to me by Department of State.

S 181 9/18/73- 10/30	Consular memos show they were notified by at least 2 people of Charles' seizure. Refers to calls by SIM.
I 136 9/23	"The other two (Horman and Wool) have been reported missing and are assumed to be detained."
NYTimes 9/23	Carried neighbors' testimony of arrest, entry into Estadio Nacional, and story of SIM telephone calls.
I 134 9/25	Emb/DoS "Charles Edmund Horman - No new info or confirmation of detention since last report. Embassy aware of Congressional interest."
CIA46 9/26	Emb/DoS "Embassy further redoubling its efforts to find Horman"
CIA47 9/26	Emb/DoS "No new information or confirmation on detention."
CIA44 9/27	Emb/DoS "2. No further information on Charles Edmund Horman."



CIA45  
9/27      Emb/DoS "We of course continue to check all possible sources in attempt to locate him."

III58  
9/27      Emb/DoS "1. At lunhh today with Amb. Heitman(designate) I raised Teruggi and Horman cases, pointing out public relations implications of any continuance of the present situation where circumstances of their disappearance remain unexplained. I went over all the facts and reports that have come to our attention in each case."

II31  
9/27      Emb/DoS "3. Embassy redoubling its efforts to locate both Teruggi and Horman."

CIA43  
9/28      Emb/DoS "2. Charles Edmund Horman still missing... Embassy continues try check all possible sources."

CIA41  
9/28      Emb/DoS "Embassy redoubling its efforts to locate both Teruggi and Horman."

II24  
9/28      ECH/DoS My hand delivered letter asks why, instead of saying Charles Horman probably is in hiding, they don't follow line of neighbors' testimony and SIM calls.

SI84  
9/29      Urrutia file memo. "Morel (Pinochet Military Aid) indicated that it is possible that the personnel involved in the search at Mr. Horman's quarters and removal of Mr. Horman from the scene are impersonators..."

            "The Chilean Armed Forces or Carabineros did not conduct any search operation at 4126 Vicuna McKenna on 9/17/73."

II23  
9/30      ECH/DoS letter enclosing Terry Simon diary 9/17-9/22

SI85  
10/1      File memo, J.A.Anderson, D. McNally, vice-consuls. In this memo of some 900 words is described their visit to Charles Horman's house and neighborhood. Among the points which DoS has not considered worth revealing are:

Wife of the landlord, who had been away on day Charles was seized had spoken to the neighbors. "She said that the authorities had apparently come to the house on two occasions, once in the morning and again at about 1800 hours, the latter visit being the time when Horman was taken away." A woman living "in an apartment which looked right down on the Horman house" said, "At between 1600 and 1630 hours on September 17, a light blue truck had appeared in front of the house located at Vicuna McKenna 4126. The truck contained about 15 soldiers. They went into the house, carried out a man with a beard...They put him on the truck. Before departure they carried out a box which they dropped and which she saw contained papers and books and put that on the truck also, and then departed."



SI85  
10/1  
(cont.)

At about 2300 hours the same day the same truck along with two other trucks returned. This time they carried jout a lot of other things, including two large suitcases, one smaller suitcase, and a big box." "The private citizens in the area...are hesitant to talk. However the woman appeared to cooperate after we assured her that nothing would happen to her. She appeared to be honest..."

SI44  
10/3

GoC Note 15125. "Mr. Horman was detained, in the Estadio Nacional, 9/20 for curfew violation. He was liberated the following day as there were no charges against him."

III56

Davis/DoS Re-talk with Fonoff Advisor "I also pointed out that neighbors of Horman had seen him detained by persons in military uniforms, but that the military authorities continued to deny that he had ever been detained."

III55  
10/4

Emb/DoS "Regarding Horman Saenz and Carvallo assured me that GoC was doing all it could to locate this missing American."

SI92  
10/4

File memo Defatt Hon. Describes talks with various people in effort to locate Charles Horman, including Lutz, Contreras Prieto and Valenzuela. "General Valenzuela said he would like to be helpful but because of his problems he wanted all this info kept at low key and that we do not use his name."

III24  
10/5

This was the day when I arrived in Santiago and Ambassador Davis told me that the Embassy's opinion was that Charles was in hiding. On this day, however, he wired a report of the vice consuls' 10/1 memorandum to Kissinger. He added a statement regarding the landlord's (Dr. Nunez) testimony "He had talked to a young married woman who had entered a cab near 4126 Vicuna McKenna just as the truck carrying Horman and the military personnel departed. Nunez said that the cab, by chance, followed the truck from 4126 Vicuna McKenna to Calle Nuble where it turned right and proceeded directly to the Estadio Nacional. Nunez said that the witness saw the truck enter the Estadio Nacional and furthermore that the truck did not discharge passengers on its trip to the stadium. Witnesses report that the group of men which took Horman prisoner was led by either a Lieutenant or a Captain. They were not able to identify the military unit which carried out this operation."

S 199  
10/6/73

Affidavit by Mario Carvajal that his wife had been called September 18, 1973 at approximately 8.00 a.m. I translate:

"That day a person who did not give his name called, saying that he belonged to the Military Intelligence Service (SIM)...he informed her. (Isabella Rostello de Carvajal) that they were holding at SIM a North



S 199  
10/6/73  
(cont.)

American with a beard, not making mention of the name. He asked why this man had her name and telephone number.

Mrs. Carvajal answered that evidently the person referred to was a neighbor, Mr. Charles Horman, who had her number as he and his wife frequently made use of her telephone.

The person from SIM asked if she knew that the North American worked in films. Mrs. Carvajal answered affirmatively. Then he asked whether she knew that he was a leftist extremist, to which she replied that she had no knowledge of Mr. Horman's political colaration.

Finally the supposed person from SIM advised Mrs. Carvajal that the conversation was being recorded and that, if what she said was untrue, she would be in danger of death."

S 196  
10/8

(Affidavit was secured from Carvajal)  
ECH/Purdy letter requests report on Col.Hon's activities pursuant to Purdy's verification that Mario Carvajal and Frechman living in house formerly occupied by Warwick Armstrong had been called by SIM.

III54  
10/10

Davis/Willoughby. Points out discrepancies Chilean note and all indications that CH was picked up 9/17. GoC note 1512.

III 47

Refers to memo given Hon by Herrera "apparently" prepared by SIM for Foministry.

✓ CIA39  
10/15/73

Heavily omitted

S207  
10/16

File memo. Lutz suggests that Teruggi was picked up by his friends and shot, that Charles Horman was picked up by robbers or extremists.

S216  
10/19

Embassy/GoC Asks Chilean clarification of discrepancy of their note 10/3, saying Charles Horman was held in Estadio Nacional between 9/20 and 9/24 and neighbors' testimony that he was seized 9/17 and taken into Estadio.

✓ III50  
10/20/73  
6258 and  
6259

Emb/DoS Chronology

Inadequate reports of SIM calls and neighbors' testimony

✓ CIA33  
10/20/73

Emb/DoS Same Chronology

✓ III 49  
10/23

Emb/DoS Additional chronology



CIA 35  
10/23

Emb/DoS 3. "much of information which has been turned up by embassy and by Mr. Horman is based on rumor, hearsay, and perhaps, intent to deceive."

H-1  
10/19 & 20

Chronology 10/19-10/20. "Willoughby" and Amb. Fernandez discuss inaccuracies of (GoC) 10/3 note...Fonoff contemplating withdrawing note or perhaps writing new note."

"Gen. Lutz...it difficult to establish what military units, if any, responsible for Horman's death. Offered thought that if it had been military unit which killed Horman on street...commander would probably have preferred to have left scene and body rather than...having to explain circumstances action to superior officer."

III 1153  
10/23

Emb/DoS Reports receipt GoC note saying "previous note (10/3) saying Horman detained 9/20 and released following day did not correspond to actual events."

S 258  
S 260  
10/24, 25

Hand written notes of talks between Anderson(J7) and K. Marshall on cover up aspects. Difficult to read but interesting.

III 48  
10/25  
(see 1.1)

Purdy/Anderson to K. Marshall. Embassy suggestions on how Chronology should be worded - what to omit - to whom what should be shown.

S 5232  
10/25

Ambassador/Secstate. Instructions on cover up. Paragraph 3 denies receiving (S) report - see part II. The report was given to Judd Kessler who is not mentioned.

107  
10/25

ECH/Fulbright letter

I 18  
10/29

Kissinger/Embassy. Contains instructions for covering up.

I 17  
10/29

Davis/Kissinger. Confirms "factual accuracy of above."

I 113  
10/29

Letter C. A. Anderson/ECH giving text of GoC note withdrawing note of 10/3.

S 246  
11/2

File memo from Defatt Hon detailing his requests to Gen. Lutz for explanation of Teruggi and Horman cases and demand that Lutz deliver an explanation prior to 11/1/73 when Ambassador would return to U.S.

He attached unsigned, undated memo from Lutz. It seems a hastily written pack of lies.

III 47  
11/2

Emb/DoS Report of request for information on Teruggi, Horman. Usual ridiculous answers.



- I 110 Letter Kubisch/Javits. White wash of DoS position.  
11/5 Claims Charles Horman was dead when Embassy first heard of him. Offers "Chronology".
- CIA 30 Embassy/DoS Usual story of Emb request to GoC for info.  
11/5 on Teruggi and Horman. Parrots ridiculous statements of Lutz unsigned memo.
- I 106 Joyce Horman/Fulbright letter.  
11/7
- S 222 Statements by J. A. Anderson and J. M. Hall that they  
224 and Shaffer (all vice-consuls) monitored Purdy telephone  
11/12 call to ECH and that no mention was made of Chileans as Charles Horman's murderers or of place of execution. As stated in ECH diary, Purdy telephoned me at Investigaciones and then came there alone and told me that the Chileans had shot CH in the Estadio Nacional on 9/18. I repeated this to Joyce, to her Father and to others.
- I 111 Letter Javits/Kubisch, quoted on first page, expressing  
11/13 dissatisfaction with Kubisch letter 11/5 and N. Davis statement 11/9 to Foreign Relations Committee
- II 166 Secstate/Emb Voices concern regarding strong congressional and public and press interest in discrepancies of Teruggi and Horman cases and DoS fear that any Chilean response may "be pro forma at best". States "Such report would be widely condemned...as unresponsive and indicative of official 'coverup'" Gives official list of questions to be asked of Chileans.
- ch16 / III 46 Thompson tells Carvallo that unless GoC provides a substantive report, clearing up factual discrepancies, they will be condemned by Congress and others as unresponsive and covering up.  
11/14  
5594
- III 45 Thompson reports on telling "Economic Official" that  
11/15 USG ability to be helpful to Chile is affected by GoC handling of Ch, FT cases.  
5626
- II 144 Letter Karkashian/H.B. Thompson. "We have not sent out  
11/15/73 the chronology on Horman to anyone and have offered to make it available to only a few Congressmen or members of their staff on a confidential basis. So far no one has requested to see it. We have sent out the Chronology on Teruggi to several Congressmen with no restrictions on its distribution.
- S 226 Note 455 DoS/GoC. Transmits questions furnished by Secstate in II 166, 11/13.
- I 11/16 Secstate/Emb Transmits texts Javits/Kubisch 11/13, Joyce Horman/Fulbright.
- I 104 Emb/DoS Largely illegible. Answers to points raised  
11/17 by Jack Anderson Column.



- I 12      Emb/DoC Replies to points raised in Javits/Kubisch  
and Horman/Fulbright 10/25 letters. Shows that dis-  
tortions and lies originated at Emb.
- III 13      tortions and lies originated at Emb.
- III 13-2      Also replies to points raised in Joyce Horman/  
Fulbright.
- III 13-3
- I 14  
I 11  
11/18
- II 145      Secstate/Emb. Gives excerpts from NY Times article 11/19  
11/19
- III 104      Secstate/Emb. Text of Jack Anderson article.  
11/19
- III 44      "Willoughby said that if PAO could provide him with  
11/20      very informal and unofficial communication stressing  
5722      public relations effect of these (CHMFT) cases he  
would raise with Junta..." "We shall give Willoughby  
a piece of paper promptly" Thompson
- III 177      Thompson tries again.  
11/23  
6653
- CIA 28      Memo J. J. Halsema (Emb. Press contact) to (?) This is  
11/21      a pasteup of paragraphs taken from a longer document.  
"The Horman and Teruggi cases are continuing to be a  
major subject of U.S. press and Congressional attention...  
in both cases there are a number of questions about both  
men that any skilled investigator would ask...I think  
the only way to take the heat off this problem would be  
to have a factual report...Even though such a report  
might provoke initial criticism I think in the long run  
it would do much to establish the credibility of what  
is said here."
- I 10      Joyce Horman/C/A. Anderson. Asks why C.H. body is not  
11/26      being returned and whether delay is to prevent identi-  
fication.
- III 178      Thompson presses Huerta for answer to 11/15 note. Huerta  
11/27      "indicated misgivings about...results of GOC investigation.  
5825      given the degree of disorder and confusion which prevailed  
at the time these deaths are believed (sic!) to have oc-  
curred. CF statement about responsible procedure in  
number 47 - 11/2.



S 229 File memo D.N.Arzac/DCM. Reports Amb. Fernandez saying  
11/30/73 he did not know when better information on Teruggi and Horman would be forthcoming.

CIA 25 Chronology Emb/Secstate. Considerable information on  
11/30 Teruggi. Some references to Charles Horman.

III 130 Beza assures Thompson GoC "making every effort to pro-  
12/6 vide report."

S 233 File memo RS Steven/Thompson. Says Enrique Guzman  
12/6 claims he is working hard on facts of Teruggi, Horman cases, that it is "probable we never will know" just how they died. Insists that both had been deeply involved in leftist activities and perhaps shot by their own comrades of the left.

III 43 Assurances that report is being worked on.  
12/10

III 34 Kissinger to Amembassy. Poses Joyce's questions. "Is  
12/11 GOC prolonging shipment so that an autopsy could not possibly determine date of death?" "Why is it that although...never received an autopsy report, Embassy's "Preliminary report (FS 192) dated 10/30" was able to state "cause of death" was multiple bullet wounds?"

Kissinger requests copy of whatever data exists even if fails to qualify as full blown "autopsy report."

CIA 23 Emb/Secstate Thompson quotes Admiral Carvajal as very  
12/11 anxious to provide Teruggi, Horman report. Also promising if answers were not forthcoming, to furnish description of efforts. Quotes Huerta working hard to provide report.

I 5 GoC note 18557 with "Report"  
12/13

II 168 Refers to inadequacies in GOC note 18557  
1/7/74 37308

II 168 Secstate/Emb. "As Embassy is aware, Chilean note (18557)  
1/7 does not respond to or even mention various key questions and apparent discrepancies...A response to these questions, some of which are factual and should not be that difficult to answer is considered essential..."

II 156 Note 030 to GOC pointing out incompleteness of GOC  
1/22/74 note 18577 and requesting full response to USG note 455. 18557

III 174 Emb/Secstate Chilean "High level Foreign Ministry  
1/31/74 Official" said that delay in responding to U.S. questions "may have been related to some sensitivity about the series of questions which the Embassy presented about the Horman case. Nevertheless...he would raise the matter again with the Junta..."



III 40  
2/1/74

Embassy to Secstate regarding request to Foreign Minister Huerta for specific replies to questions presented earlier on Horman/Teruggi cases.

"Admiral Huerta said that at this point in time he felt sure that it would be impossible to develop further information concerning these cases..."

I 86  
2/6/74

Chilean Note 2364. "cannot provide the Embassy with any new information."

Bulk of correspondence at this period relates to efforts to have Charles Horman's body returned to the U. S.

CIA 15  
3/19/74

Emb/Secstate Chilean Naval Counterintelligence Officer approached Milgrp(Vina?) officer with what Embassy interprets as offer to return Charles Horman's body if U.S. Govt would release Tow missiles to Chile.

S 241  
3/21

Dale Shaffer (vice consul) Notice implementing first steps of sending body.

S 240  
3/21

File memo. James E. Anderson. Describes disinterment procedures with aid of Lt.Col. Rafael Gonzales, Chilean Air Force.

S 37  
7/15/74

Congressman Donald Fraser letter to H. Kissinger enclosing ELM letter 6/6/74, ECH letter 6/8/74 with questions and various statements from Milgroup Vina personnel, including 11/21/73 telegram from Admiral, Ft. Amador, CZ to Capt. Davis "C. Crater did make statement alleged quoted in newspaper.."



II Reports of Charles Horman's arrest, trial, and murder

In my letter 10/25/73 to Senator Fulbright I said, "On the same day (10/17/73) a man associated with Ford Foundation told me that a close friend of his also is a close friend of a General in the Chilean army; that the General had said that Charles had been shot to death in the Estadio Nacional on or before September 20th." I reported this immediately to Consul Purdy.

To  
Jarvis  
During December 1973, I lunched in New York with the man from Ford Foundation. He then told me that he had reported this matter to Purdy before he met me in Santiago. At that time I asked him to write an affidavit but, for several reasons, some associated with his future career, he was unwilling to do so. I agreed not to reveal his name, although it is obviously known to the DoS and to others.

W  
On the evening of 1/13/76, after a film showing in New York, a Chilean introduced himself to me, saying that he could tell me what had happened to my son. While his name is known to the DoS (who has harassed him), to Senators and to the press, I shall refer to him as W.

Sandoval?  
He was a friend of the Armstrongs who also were friends of Charles and who had been telephoned by SIM on September 13. The Armstrongs, feeling that W might be able to get information through his connections, asked him to do so. He obtained information from an Officer who was on duty in the Estadio Nacional and entirely familiar with the circumstances. He said that Charles had been interrogated in the upper part of the Estadio where Military Intelligence was stationed. He said that a dossier had been presented which spoke of Charles' participation in the march on Washington and his activity in civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements. He said that it also referred to Charles as a member of MIR. He said that Charles was sentenced to be shot.

See p 27.  
On learning this W went directly to the American Embassy and reported it to Judd Kessler. Lewis Diuguid in the Washington Post 6/20/76, referring to Kessler as "a ranking embassy official" says "the embassy official has acknowledged receipt and reporting of the information, which included the allegation that those taking the decision had a dossier on Horman including information about his anti-Vietnam and civil rights activity in the U.S."

Despite our all-out efforts to obtain information about Charles and the widespread attempts of members of the Congress and others to help us, there is not a shred of evidence that the Embassy informed their own government or queried the Chilean government about this report.

In early October, realizing that the Embassy had done nothing about his report to them, W approached Marc Dolguin of the Canadian Embassy and told him the story. Dolguin in turn told it to the man associated with Ford Foundation, who told me and Purdy.

W said that he had told the above to Mark Schneider of Senator Kennedy's staff.



Report of Charles Warren's arrest, trial, and murder

JH Diary 9/25-9/27 1973 Major Luis Contreras Prieto called on Joycek said he could obtain information about Charles by next day. Following day Mrs. Prieto called, said "Charles was alive and well but that he could not be located until they found out what charges were being held against him." Joyce reported this to Purdy following morning. He took Major's telephone number and said he would check. Later same day Purdy called Joyce and said that she had misunderstood Major's wife; that, in fact, Major had no information about Charles. Joyce called Major's wife who said that story was correct but that they had had the wrong name. (Joyce had given the Major Charles' name in writing.)

S 244 10/3/73 GoC note 15125 said Charles had been arrested 9/20 for curfew violation and released following day.

JH Diary 10/2 S 192 10/4 General Camilo Valenzuela Godoy called on Joyce, offered to help. On 10/3 he reported a Red Cross friend of his, working at Stadium, as saying Charles had been released from Stadium 9/21 and seen heading in direction of Curico.

Joyce returned to Major Prieto's home. Prieto gave her a letter of introduction to Col. Ewing, Secretary General of Junta, and said that Ewing would be able to locate the arresting group "immediately."

Following morning Joyce went to Ewing's office, presented letter, was told she could not see Ewing. She returned twice later in day and was not allowed to see him.

ECH Diary 10/18/73 Consul Purdy telephoned me at Investigaciones, saying that a probably positive fingerprint identification of Charles' body had been made. I asked him to come to Investigaciones. We talked in a hall some distance from where Joyce was being interrogated. Purdy said that Charles had been shot in the Estadio Nacional on September 18, 1973. I later telephoned Joyce's father, repeating what Purdy had said that asking him to have Charles' dental records sent to DoS. I also telephoned my brother-in-law and told him what Purdy had said.

10/19/73 About 3 p.m. Ortiz and Manesas of SIM came to our hotel and reported to me that identification was positive. I specifically asked whether Charles had been shot in the Estadio Nacional 9/18/73 and they replied affirmatively. At that moment Purdy called and said identification was positive. In reply to my question, he repeated what he had said on the previous day, that Charles had been shot in the Estadio Nacional 9/18/73. As the two men from SIM were leaving Ortiz was crying.

O-M



II Reports of Charles Horman's arrest, trial, and murder

ECH Diary 10/20/73 While we were lunching before leaving for the airport, Inspector Mario Rojas of Investigaciones was announced. He made his formal report of the identification. I repeated what I had asked Purdy and the men from SIM. He also said that Charles had been shot 9/18/73 in the Estadio Nacional. On leaving he squeezed my arm and said, in Spanish, that things like this should not happen.

S 213 10/18(?) File memo by J. E. Anderson

"A consular officer visited UN refugee center office at approximately 1600 hours. . . A UN official said that sources from the military reported that Charles had been savagely beaten and shot.

S 214 10/18/73 File memo J. E. Anderson

A Chilean, identifying himself as "Cristian" said his relative had been in Estadio and had spoken to American w<sup>h</sup> had been interrogated twice, then a rarity, and then was called again for interrogation and not seen again. Described as very intelligent, very calm.

Also said that another relative of his personally had interrogated an American who was shot.

(ECH never was told of this report)

RG  
On 6/7/76 Frank Manitzas, NBC and Jean Omang, Washington Post, interviewed Rafael Agustin Gonzales Verdugo in the Italian Embassy, Santiago, where he, his wife and his child had received asylum since 9/3/75. The interview was based on his efforts to obtain safe conduct for himself and his family out of Chile and was timed to coincide with the O A S meeting. In the course of the interview Gonzales said that he had been present in the office of General Lutz, head of Chilean Military Intelligence, about one week after the coup, when Charles Horman was brought to an adjacent room while disposition of his case was decided. Gonzales said that also present in Lutz' office were Col Barria, his second in command and another man who Gonzales took to be an American. He said that he saw Charles and that this was one reason why on 3/21/74 he was sent to vice-consul J.A. Anderson to help him if necessary to identify Charles' body. (CIA 6/18/76)

Gonzales was taped as saying "General Lutz was the Army Intelligence Director and the number two, Col. Barria was with some American. . . and they decided that this guy was supposed to disappear. So they took him away. . . But I know again about him because in 1974, in the month of February or March, Senator Javits refused to approve a plan of new spare parts if they don't give back the body of Charles Horman to his family". Later in the tape Gonzales says "they said that this guy knew too much. So he has to disappear." This statement, in various forms is repeated several times in this interview and in a subsequent interview on 6/7/76.



II Reports of Charles Horman's arrest, trial, and murder

The Consul interviewed Gonzales at least twice.

CIA 13  
6/11/76

Emb/Secstate "Statement of Rafael Gonzales on death of amcit Charles Horman . . . .3. Statement of Rafael Gonzales. . . .in the 9th floor of the Ministry of Defence was General Lutz, was an American in the next room sitting I heard that his name was Charles Horman and I heard that he knew a lot--he knew too much and he was supposed to disappear. Thats all I heard. I never saw him again until the time I went to the General Cemetery to recognize him-- and to pick him up. This was in March 1974. I went there with James Anderson of the U.S. Embassy to do that, because I could recognize him." There are repetitions of Gonzales saying that Charles Horman was shot because he knew too much and also that the army later said that he was shot in a poblacion by a "crazy" bullet.

CIA 12  
6/12/76

Emb/Secstate Repeats, in summary statements in CIA 13. "6. Common. Gonzales' statement on Horman's death adds entirely new facet to his case. Department will recall that GoC has told us officially that it had no knowledge of how Horman died, and that there was no record of his having been detained. . . However Gonzales statement raises possibility that he had been detained and then killed. 7. Gonzales statement to Consul sounds plausible but in view of his reputation we cannot assume it is accurate. . ."

NOTE: ECH - Denigration of Gonzales, found in various statements made by GoC and repeated by Emb., say that he was not employed by GoC but volunteered on several occasions and that he was not an Officer. In tape of Manitzas, Omang/Gonzales interview, Gonzales says that GoC also has said he was a deserter. He also offers evidence of his employment and having been paid a pension(PPl4,15)

S 240  
3/21/74

File memo vice consul, J.E.Anderson. Refers to Lt.Col. Rafael, Chilean Air Force.

CIA 10  
6/13

Secstate/Emb Asks embassy to try obtain release from Gonzales to show CIA 12 to Javits.

CIA 7  
6/14

Emb/Secstate. Text of note to GoC (very polite) asking them to check into Gonzalez' statement. Contains very bal comments of Chilean polcoms -largely denigration of Gonzalez-very much along line of DoS R. Fimbres said when he called me in regard to my letter to Kissinger.



II Reports of Charles Horman's arrest, trial, and murder

CIA 6  
6/14/76      Emb/Secstate. Consul interviewed Gonzalez 6/11.  
Attempts to pick holes in first statement.

CIA 6  
6/18/76      Secstate/Emb. Gives text of James Anderson memo  
3/21/74 confirming Gonzalez story of his part in turn-  
ing over body for release.

CIA 4  
6/23/76      Emb/Secstate Describes talk with Chilean polcouns  
re handling of Gonzalez case.

CIA 5  
6/21/76      Emb/Secstate Tells of Kennedy/Facsim letter.

CIA6672  
?      Emb/Secstate Text of CoC note 26 answering CIA 7.  
cf. James Anderson 3/21/74 describing Gonzalez as  
Air Force Officer.  
  
cf. Gonzalez penultimate statement re his position  
in Manizas tape.  
  
This document consists of pages 2 and 3. Page 1  
is omitted.



III The Fading Hopes

The actions of Major Luis Contreras Prieto and of General Camilo Valenzuela Godoy are described in II. Valenzuela is one of those with whom CIA negotiated to kidnap General Schneider in 1970 and may be the leader of the group which kidnapped and killed Schneider.

ECH  
Diary

10/6/73 Charles Murphy of ABC said that he could put me in touch with someone who might be able to help me. Later in the evening he telephoned me and told me to call Colonel Augusto Rojas of SIM the following morning.

10/7 I telephoned Col. Rojas who said that he would be glad to help.

10/8 Col. Rojas called. Said he would have information on the following day.

I never heard from him again.



IV MGRP VINA

- Terry Simon  
statement  
notarized  
4/11/74 Describes occurrences 9/11-9/15 and what was  
said by members of Mlgrp Vina.
- JH Diary  
9/16/73 Charles Horman's description of what he and Terry  
Simon heard from members of Mlgrp Vina.
- 11/21/73 Cable COMUSNAV Ft. Amador, CZ/ Capt. Davis.  
"Creter did meet Horman . . ." "Creter did make  
statements quoted in newspaper."
- 9/19/73 Joyce visits Consulate to report Charles' arrest.  
Vice Consul Hall asked her "Was there anything  
in the house that might have irritated the soldiers?"  
Joyce mentioned the study Charles had made of the  
Viaux Schneider case. "Hall seemed interested in  
finding out more about these pages. . . .I gave  
a detailed explanation of Charles' work. He  
specifically wanted to know about the film. . .  
about Chile."
- 9/20 Joyce and Terry went to Capt. R.E. Davis' house to  
meet Admiral Huidobro (who didn't come). Davis  
said "that the military was just protecting itself,  
that it had uncovered a plot against military  
leaders."
- 9/21 Capt. Davis sent his driver with Joyce to interview  
neighbors.  
  
Driver took Joyce to Carvajal home where she heard  
report of SIM call to them. Joyce gave this infor-  
mation to Capt. Davis shortly thereafter.
- 9/24 Capt. Davis telephoned Joyce. Asked whether Charles  
could have been involved in political activity.  
Suggested, in effect, that Joyce be prepared to  
face this possibility.
- 9/26 Ambassador Davis said to Joyce, "I understand that  
Capt. Ray Davis has been working with your problem."  
  
"I told Capt. Davis about Major Prieto's call and  
visit of the day before. Capt. Davis reacted more  
quickly than he ever had before. He said that this  
was a very important piece of information. . . He  
said we should get on it right away. He tried  
calling Prieto immediately." When line was busy  
he told his assistant to make the call right away.  
  
For Prieto's later actions see II, p. 12,  
J. Horman diary 9/25-27.
- ECH/CAAnderson This letter was shown to Don Rogers of White House  
9/28/73 staff. He ordered my requests be implemented.



IV MLGRP VINA

ech diary  
9/29

Joyce told me that Capt. Davis had called her and said that he had been placed in charge of her case.

9/30

I asked C. A. Anderson who capt. Ray Davis was. Anderson said that he was Naval Intelligence.

10/2

C.A.Anderson told me that James Anderson, vice consul, had visited 4126 Vicuna McKenna, spoken to several neighbors without obtaining information about Charles' arrest; that the Carabinero NCO School had been checked; that two of the people who had been reported as called by Military Intelligence on 9/18 had been checked without confirmation. Documents in I show this to be outright lies.

JH Diary  
10/2/73

"He (Capt. Davis) asked me if I had prepared the resume and list of Charles' friends. I explained that I had not had the time. He said that he thought it was important . . . to talk again to the lady who had seen the truck which took Charles away and had entered the Estadio Nacional. I told Capt. Davis that it seemed more important to interview neighbors to see if we could identify which military group had arrested Charles as I had already spoken with that woman at length."

NOTE: Vice Consuls J. E. Anderson and D. McNally as well as Ambassador Davis had detailed information on these matters. If Capt. Davis was "in charge", why was he suggesting duplicating reports? Presumably he knew all about what had happened and was trying to create impression of activity in search.

With such positive information about Charles' arrest and being taken to Estadio Nacional, why did Capt. Davis want names of Charles' friends?

ECH Diary  
10/5

Capt. Ray Davis did not attend meeting in Amb. Davis office, in spite of announcements that he was in charge of the case.

His name never again was mentioned in connection with the case. He did telephone me twice and invited Joyce and me to dinner. He mentioned no reason other than social for these invitations. I refused them.

S 258  
10/24/73

Conversation memo- K. Marshall/C.A.Anderson. "I talked him (ECH) out of idea of Capt. Davis in Intelligence.

NOTE: F. Manitzas told ECH that Navy's biography of Davis says he has been in Naval Intelligence for years in Caribbean, Brazil, etc.



IV NLGRP VINA

S 37  
7/15/74

Letter Congressman Fraser/Kissinger "Why did Col. P.J. Ryan of NLgrp vina remove the registration cards of Charles Horman from the Hotel Miramar?"

Letter  
8/10/74

Col. P.J. Ryan/F. Purdy "I did not remove them, nor did I ever see them."

Manitzas  
article

p. 38. "Ryan denied that he took the cards. But the U.S. Embassy official . . . was clear: 'I don't know why in the hell he took them or what he did with them but Colonel Ryan took the registration cards.'"

S 37  
7/15/74

Letter Congressman Fraser/Kissinger. "Why did Col. Ryan bring to the hotel a woman who he said was the mother of a Chilean woman who stayed at the hotel with Charles Horman?"

Letter  
8/10/74

Col. P. J. Ryan/F. Purdy. ". . . I am willing to swear I brought no one to the Hotel who purported to be the mother of Terry Simon, or any one else's mother."

Manitzas  
article

"The desk clerk and the hotel manager . . . said. . . Colonel Patrick Ryan. . . came by with a woman who he said was the mother of the girl -- the girl who had stayed with Horman."



V Why was it necessary for Charles Horman to disappear?

1. He knew too much.

- a - The things he heard and saw at Vina del Mar strongly indicating U. S. involvement in the coup.
- b - Details of the Schneider case.

2. They probably suspected that he might have known things which have been revealed since or which still remain unrevealed.

- A - U. S. deliberate destabilization of Chilean economy.
- b - Long term interference in Chilean elections.
- c - CIA and multinational efforts, other than Schneider case, activities to block Allende inauguration.
- d - CIA plans for action in case of coup, such as providing "arrest lists", etc.
- e - CIA part in funding strikes, aiding rightist paramilitary groups, etc.
- f - ????

3. They knew that he was an investigative reporter who had written articles and made documentaries.

4. They knew that he had been active in the civil rights movement and in opposition to the Vietnam war.

5. They knew that he was of the group who conducted F I N.

We sent him clippings from N. Y. Times, Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, which were bases for small news service to Government supporting press. Many of the letters containing these clippings arrived pen. ECH diary 10/16/73". . . two men from Military Intelligence . . . arrived. They spent 1½ hours asking questions of Joyce. As they were leaving, Ortiz asked what she knew about F I N."

6. This was a very critical time for Kissinger and Nixon.

Nixon was under heavy fire because of Watergate. Kissinger was examined by the Senate regarding confirmation as Secretary of State shortly after the coup. American investors in Chile were counting on financial benefits from the coup.

A revelation of what part the U.S. Government had played and of what had led to the murder of two American citizens would have been disastrous for Kissinger, Nixon and the investors.

from  
church  
report

M-Ortiz



VI Scenario

Charles Horman and Terry Simon were caught in Vina del Mar by the coup. At the Hotel they met Creter of the U. S. Navy who talked freely and indiscreetly about participation of the U.S. Government in the coup. His remark "we came to do a job and we did it" was later confirmed by Captain R. E. Davis, Commander of Mlgrp Vina, and a member of Naval Intelligence. Captain Davis had been an Intelligence agent for some time and probably was active in Brazil and in the Caribbean theater.

Creter's indiscretions were overheard by a woman who accompanied him and she interrupted the conversation. Later she probably described the incident to Lt.Col.Patrick J. Ryan,USMC second in command of Mlgrp Vina. Col. Ryan reported the matter to Captain Davis, either by telephone to Santiago or personally when Captain Davis came to Vina later in the week.

info from "W" Captain Davis drove Charles Horman and Terry Simon to Santiago September 15. Alerted by Col. Ryan's report on Charles Horman's talk with Creter, he checked with CIA and was given the information which later were presented as a dossier at Charles Horman's interrogation (see p. 11). Arrangements were made to have Charles Horman arrested and turned over to SIM. A detachment of soldiers was sent to his house on the morning of September 17 but found the house empty. They returned late in the afternoon, made the arrest, taking him off in the truck alone, seized some books, etc. Late the same night three trucks returned and carried off more things.

They did not take him to a Comisaria, as was done with the Garret-Schesches, Frank Teruggi, David Hathaway and others, they took him directl.y into the Estadio Nacional (see p. 3-S185, p.4 III 24 et al.) Charles Horman was not checked into the Estadio in the usual way (described in David Hathaway's statement). He was taken directly to the upper level and interrogated by S I M. The dossier mentioned above described his activities in the U. S. in the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements, his participation in F I N in Chile. He was condemned to be shot but the interrogators were unwilling to carry this out on their own authority. They therefore sent him and their files to the office of General Lutz, Director of Army Intelligence, in the Ministry of Defense building. Recognition of the gravity of murdering an American citizen who had been arrested under circumstances where there might have been witnesses (as there were) is evidenced by the fact that Charles Horman's file was reviewed by General Lutz, by Col. Barria, his second in command, and by an American intelligence agent. They decided that Charles Horman "knew too much" and confirmed the sentence of shooting him. This was done, most probably about September 20.



VI Scenario

Although the Embassy knew no later than September 13 of Charles Horman's arrest and that S I M had telephoned two of his friends, and although their files show that they obtained a great deal of solid information, they made no cogent efforts to bring the Junta to book. Steps they might have taken if they had really wanted to resolve the matter can readily be visualized.

It is obvious that efforts were being made to conceal the truth. The cover up continued. First the Department said that they knew absolutely nothing; that Charles Horman's name was not on the list of prisoners issued by the Junta, that they had approached the Junta at the highest levels and had been told that they knew nothing. On 9/27 they started telling me that their best opinion was that Charles was in hiding. They did not refer in any way to the important evidence of the neighbors who witnessed the arrest and introduction into the Estadio or to the telephone calls by S I M. After Don Rogers of the White House Staff told them to implement the requests of my letter 9/28, they announced that they were putting Captain Davis in charge of the case. When I arrived in Santiago 10/5 Captain Davis was not present at my meeting with the Ambassador and was never again mentioned as having anything to do with the case.

By the end of September Kissinger had been confirmed as Secstate and the Junta government had been recognized by the Senate, and one crisis had been weathered. To cast doubt on the witnessed fact that Charles had been seized on 9/17, the Junta issued on 10/3 their note 15125, saying that he had been arrested 9/20 and released the following day. For the first time the Embassy began the process of building a file of mild suggestions to the Junta that their statements did not coincide with what seemed to be facts. This continued for some three months. It never interfered with successful efforts to funnel money to Chile and never was reflected in their statements to members of the Congress or to us. These statements hewed to the line of denials of any knowledge of what had occurred and suggestions that Charles had been seized by leftists and shot by them in the streets.

Major Contreras Prieto, General Camilo Valenzuela and Colonel Augusto Rojas, all able to learn what had occurred and all professing themselves as willing to help, backed away at once after initial investigations.

October 15, when Joyce and I visited Major Contreras Prieto and he arranged for an "investigation" by S I M, followed by my being told, on October 17, by the man at Ford Foundation about Charles' execution by the Chileans, followed by my talk the same day with Asst. Foreign Minister Enrique Bernstein (who arranged another "investigation" by Investigaciones) led to conclusion by the Department of State that I was not



VI Scenario

going to stop trying to learn the truth and that there was a real danger ~~that~~ of strong Congressional and public demands for the truth.

On 10/18, 10/19 Consul Purdy and representatives of two Chilean departments acknowledged that they had "discovered" Charles' body and said that he had been shot in the Estadio Nacional. This accomplished several purposes. Joyce and I returned to New York the following day. Most important, it tried to establish Charles' death as having occurred 9/18. Later this was changed to "early" on 9/18 and was the basis for the statement that the Embassy could not have helped Charles because he already was dead when they heard he had been arrested.

It did, of course, seem to leave the Chileans with the onus <sup>and</sup> of murder. However, this was handled by denying the 10/18, 10/19 statements to me, ~~statements~~ that Charles had been shot in the streets, and suggestions that this probably had been done by leftists. <sup>claiming</sup>

Considering the knowledge in the possession of the Embassy, it is apparent that their only purpose in "assisting" me while I was in Santiago was to learn whatever I might discover, to misdirect me, and to avert the possibility that I might lose my temper and give interviews to the press.

I have not gone into the matter of the "discovery" of and efforts to have Charles' body returned to this country. The files show that shortly after arriving in Santiago I asked for a definitive check of Charles' fingerprints with all those in the morgue. On being told that this had been done with negative result I requested a re-check and received the same answer. When the admission was made that they had been in possession of the body since 9/18, I was told that the prints had been "misfiled". There is much in the file regarding obtaining permission to have the body returned. The two reasons for not doing so were to make it impossible to find evidence of any torture and to avoid public uproar in the U. S.



VII *Refused to answer 1/21/77* *N 21*  
Hearing before the Subcommittee to investigate problems connected  
with refugees and escapees - 9/28/73 Sen. Edward Kennedy, Chairman

Testimony of Adam and Patricia Garrett Schess

- P. 21 A Schesses names were entered in special book for foreigners.  
They were detained 9/14 although Report shows 9/11.
- P. 22 B "We understand that the American Embassy was notified  
almost immediately after our detention, that our friends  
and Representatives in Congress mounted a substantial  
campaign in behalf of our release, and that the American  
C Embassy, in particular Consul Frederick Purdy, worked overtime  
on our case."

Testimony of Jack B. Kubisch-Asst Secstate for Interamerican Affairs.

- P. 24 Kennedy presses Kubisch on whether DoS tried to bring out  
and enforce agreements on preservation of Human Rights.
- P. 25 Kubisch". .we instructed Ambassador Davis, our Ambassador in  
Chile, at his very first opportunity to meet with the Chilean  
Government and bring to their attention our long held views  
on human rights. And he has done so, Mr. Chairman".
- Kubisch. "Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few comments on  
that and would like to go into greater detail in executive  
session if you wish." DoS recognized Junta Government 9/24.  
"Ambassador Davis had his meeting with the Chilean Government  
officials on Wednesday, September 26."
- Kennedy. "The coup was on September 11."
- Kubisch. "The coup was held on Tuesday, the 11th, and he had  
his meeting on Wednesday the 26th. He has had several meetings,  
I would rather not go into details of whom he met with or  
what he said because of the safety and well-being of Americans  
there. . . and I do not believe it would be proper to disclose  
privileged conversations between individuals of two  
governments. . . We were encouraged by the replies we got  
and I will go into it in more depth in executive session."
- P. 26 Kennedy. "You certainly can reveal to us in open session what  
kind of assurances you received. . . I cannot understand how  
that could possibly be classified."
- Kubisch. "I think the touch point concerns the Chilean  
Government officials giving any assurances or undertakings  
to American Government officials about matters they consider  
to be exclusively of internal jurisdiction. Let me go a little  
further with that. I think I can deal with the question ---"
- Kennedy. "About how Americans are treated? Do they think that  
is strictly an internal matter---"
- Kubisch. "No. No. I am really referring to how the Chileans  
are treated and how third country nationals, non-Americans are  
treated."
- Kennedy. "Do I draw the conclusion therefore, that the assurances  
that the Department received were received after recognition  
and that they in no way played a part in the decision by the  
administration to go ahead and recognize Chile?"
- Kubisch. "The assurances?"



VII *Edward Kennedy 9/28/73* 25  
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Kennedy. "Do I draw the conclusion therefore, that the assurances that the Department received were received after recognition and that they in no way played a part in the decision by the administration to go ahead and recognize Chile?"

Kubisch. "The assurances?"



P.26 Kennedy "Yes. It seems to me you went ahead and recognized them and then you received assurances ~~####~~ afterward. . . I would feel that the assurances and conversations would have been more meaningful if you had them first, and then went ahead and recognized them. But I gather, from the time sequence, this was not the case."

D

Kubisch. "I understand your point, Mr. Chairman."

Sen. Fong. "Do you know whether our citizens were treated properly?"

P.27 Kubisch. "There are still three Americans about which some question remains. . . two have still not yet been accounted for. Their welfare and whereabouts are not known. We do not know whether they are detained or where they are, . . ."

E

Cf this deliberate lie with P.2, "The View after Three Years".

E.C.H.

Why isn't this actionable?

They admit putting no pressure on Chile before recognition while knowing what happened to Charles and Frank.



VII  
Hearing before the Subcommittee to investigate problems connected with refugees and escapees. 7/23/74

P. 74 Questions submitted to H.W. Schlaudemann 8/1/74

A "(6) There is a century-old law, the Act of July 27, 1868 (22 USC 1732) which is still in effect and which is still cited in regulatory material and guidelines to United States Consular Officers.

B This law states "Whenever it has been made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the right of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to the Congress."

Is the Department satisfied that this law was fully complied with in regard to the deaths of Frank Teruggi, jr. and Charles Horman? "

P. 77 Responses to above transmitted by Linwood Holton on behalf of Schlaudemann.

"(6) While the Act of July 27, 1868 is indeed still in force, it was not relevant to the actual circumstances of the Horman or Teruggi cases. Only in the Teruggi case was it clear that the individual had been detained, and according to the Chilean Government he was released the following day. Our Embassy did not learn of his detention until later. At the time when these two young men were reported to our Embassy as missing, they were among hundreds of Americans whose concerned friends and relatives in Chile and the United States had asked us to trace. As in all other cases, we pursued every available avenue to locate them, including direct inquiries to Chilean authorities, both military and civilian. As it turned out, both were already dead by the time the first word had reached our Embassy that they were missing or detained."



VI Hearings of 9/28/73

- A Is "special book for foreigners" required by Chilean, treaty, or International law? Why wasn't Charles name entered?
- B Why wasn't the American Embassy notified about Charles by the Chileans?
- C Why didn't the American Embassy display the same zeal in running down the evidence in their hands about Charles' seizure?
- D The Embassy had substantive evidence prior to September 24 (date of recognition of Junta Government by DoS) that Charles had been arrested 9/17; was taken into Estadio Nacional; was held by Military Intelligence. Why didn't they pursue the evidence and use the threat of non-recognition against the Junta?
- CF S-181, I-136 of 9/23/73 "The other two (Horman and Wool) have been reported missing and are assumed to be detained", N.Y. Times Article 9/23/73.
- E Again, they had substantive evidence that Charles had been detained and that he had been held in Estadio Nacional by Military Intelligence.

VII Hearings of 7/23/74

- A Are there other laws, American, Chilean, treaty, or international which apply?
- B Wasn't the evidence available to the Embassy suitable notice that Charles had been deprived of his liberty?
- C Why didn't the Embassy forthwith demand the reasons for depriving him of his liberty?
- D Why wasn't the threat of non recognition (as well as the other obvious threats which were available) used?
- E On 9/18/73 the Embassy had evidence that Charles had been arrested. The law was relevant.
- F Offering the word of the Chilean Government as evidence is ridiculous when considered in the light of the many lies they have told.
- G How many of the "hundreds of Americans" were reported to have been arrested and held by Military Intelligence in the Estadio Nacional?
- H Only the Department of State and Government of Chile, both of whom have demonstrably and repeatedly lied, say that Charles was already dead when the Embassy first learned that he had been detained. Other, more credible evidence is that he was murdered about September 20th. The Department of State selected September 18 (later changed to "early September 18") when they recognized that evidence of their knowledge of Charles' arrest was available to the public,

on September 18



VII

29  
P. 26  
27

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Those defending the claim that the U.S. Government was not involved in the overthrow of the democratically elected Allende government of Chile usually quote the following excerpt from the Covert Action report of the Senate Select Committee which was chaired by Senator Church., "There is no hard evidence of direct U.S. assistance to the coup, . . .".

This is one statement in a massive context of well documented evidence in the same report of U.S. Government moves to block Allende's election, prevent his confirmation and inauguration, and, after his inauguration, to destroy his government. Intense economic pressures were organized to carry out President Nixon's instructions which were summarized by Richard Helms as "Make the economy scream" (p.180) At the same time Nixon "instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile." (p.170) Pre-inauguration moves culminated in the CIA seeking out, financing and arming those who would kidnap the Army Chief and thereby, hopefully, provoke military take over of the government. While this resulted in the murder of General Schneider, the military did not move. This failure bore out the conclusion of the 40 Committee, "there would probably be no military action unless economic pressures could be brought to bear on Chile". (p.172) U.S. economic aid to Chile, which had been 80.8 million dollars in 1969 were dropped in progressive years to only 3.8 millions in 1973. (p. 181) Export Import bank accommodations and foreign financial transactions were blocked, spare parts were withheld (p. 180, 182). Among the decisive destabilizing actions against the Chilean economy were the huge truckers' strikes. Speaking of these, the Report says "they could not have been maintained on the basis of union funds. . . . It is clear that anti-government strikers were actively supported by private sector groups which received CIA funds." (p. 173)

From 1970 to 1973 "Chilean officers who were aware that the United States once had sought a coup to prevent Allende from becoming President must have been sensitive to indications of support for a coup". (p.184) "During 1970-73, the Station (CIA) collected operational intelligence necessary in the event of a coup- arrest lists, key civilian installations and personnel that needed protection, key government installations which need to be taken over, and government contingency plans which would be used in case of a military uprising". (p.185) "The intelligence network continued to report during 1972 and 1973 on coup plotting activities. During 1972 the Station continued to monitor the group which might mount a successful coup. . . By January 1972 the Station . . . was in contact through an intermediate with its leader". (p. 185-6)

"The CIA's information gathering efforts with regard to the Chilean military included activity which went beyond the mere collection of information. More generally, those efforts must be viewed in the context of United States opposition, overt and covert, to the Allende government". (p.186)

The Report contains a great deal more on this subject.



Another insight to U.S. involvement is the case of Charles Horman who was shot by the Junta Government about ten days after the coup. In early June 1976, Col. Rafael Agustin Gonzalez Verdugo, retired intelligence officer, living with his wife and child in asylum in the Italian Embassy in Santiago, was interviewed by Frank Manitzas of NBC and Jean Omang of The Washington Post. He told of his being present in September 1973 in the Defense Ministry office of General Augusto Lutz. Others present were General Lutz, Commander of Chilean Military Intelligence, Col. Barria, vice Commander and an American, who decided that Charles Horman, who was in an adjoining room, was to be shot "because he knew too much". (see transcripts Manitzas/Omang interviews with Gonzalez, Department of State cables describing Consul's interviews with Gonzalez).

Charles Horman was shot "because he knew too much". What did he know? The Department of State still publicly maintains that nothing is known of what happened. However their cables and other records, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, show clearly that Chilean soldiers came looking for him early September 17, 1973, returned later, arrested him and took him into the Estadio Nacional and, late in the evening returned a third time to remove his possessions. The Department's records also include an affidavit from a friend of Charles Horman stating that his wife was telephoned by Chilean Military Intelligence early on September 13 and told that they were holding Charles Horman.

*DiNGUID* - The Washington Post of June 20, 1976 says that an official of the American Embassy acknowledged receiving, approximately September 29, 1973, a report of Charles Horman's interrogation in the Estadio Nacional, of the presentation of a dossier describing his activities in the United States against the Vietnam war and in support of Civil Rights activities, and his execution by gunfire. This never was revealed or acted by the Department of State. Members of Charles Horman's family were left in doubt about his fate. At the time when the Department of State knew exactly what had happened, the family were told that he probably was in hiding. His father was allowed to go to Santiago on a search which the Department knew was hopeless.

*Kessler*

Requests for data under the Freedom of Information Act have in some cases been denied, although there could be no justification for this on the grounds of "national security". In some cases government agencies have denied possession of pertinent documents when simple logic indicated that this is not so.

What reason is there for such an elaborate cover up? Why have untruths been uttered, verbally and in writing, in spite of the risk that they might be exposed, as many of them have? It seems apparent that Charles Horman must have known something whose exposure would endanger people who were culpable of something.

Was it what Charles Horman and a friend of his who were trapped by the coup in Vina del Mar learned from indiscrete talk and actions of members of Ilgor Vina, the chief American contact with the Chilean Navy, regarding American involvement in the coup?

Was Charles Horman suspected of having stumbled across some of the facts on American involvement which since have been revealed?

Was he suspected of having learned facts which still are being hidden?

None of the well informed people of the Department of State or of Ilgor Vina have been questioned under oath about the planning and cover up of Charles Horman's death.