
Department of State



COLLECT CHARGE TO

INDICATE:

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

TOSMIT EXDIS DECAPTIONED

MINISTER TOSALT 2 DELIVER GARTHOFF 8:00 AM

SUBJECT: Paper A-5, Strategic Considerations

Delegation is authorized to use following paper.

SALT Negotiating Paper (A=5)

RECOMMENDED U.S. APPROACH I.

Purpose

Our purpose in any preliminary discussion of strategic force considerations would be (1) to set forth elements of U.S. strategic thinking as a foundation for subsequent discussions, and (2) to determine as much as possible about Soviet strategic planning, the seriousness with which they consider strategic arms control, and their approach to SALT.

BRAFTED BY

ACDA/WEC: I.B.Richards

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT. 11-15-69 20927

S/S - Mr. Brown

JCS - Maj.Gen. Demler

State - Mr. Spiers Re

DOD/OSD - Mr. Tucker Re

SECRET/MXXXXEXDIS

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Declass/Release (V) in whole IN (2

FORM F5-413 VJM



#### Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**

# UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 2

#### B. Timing

Any discussion of strategic considerations would take place after our opening statement and the initial Soviet response thereto. Strategic considerations could be used in explaining and discussing illustrative Option II, or exploring Soviet attitudes on the scope of the work program for the main talks. We should avoid a lengthy discussion or debate at this stage lest we mislead the Soviets into thinking that we are not interested in coming to grips with the concrete issues associated with developing a realistic work program for the main talks.

- C. Talking Points/Which Delegation Maxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Strategic Objectives, including Arms Control
   Objectives
- a. A primary strategic objective is deterrence of an attack on the U.S. or its allies by any adversary;

DRAFTED BY

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT.

APPROVED BY

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification



### Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**

# UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 3

b. A second objective is to defend the United States if deterrence fails. and our allies against M nuclear attack. We realize that W we cannot expect to escape serious damage from a major nuclear attack. We are building an anti-ballistic missile system to (a) protect our land-based retaliatory forces,

(b) defend against the kind of nuclear attack which

~	B		-	T	-	n	BY	ï
-		_	•		-	_	-	

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT.

APPROVED BY

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State

# TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 4

U.S.S.R. countries other than the see might be able to launch in the next decade, and (c) protect against possible accidental launches.

- We would hope to achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship which would minimize any incentive to initiate nuclear war.
- We believe that agreed limitations on offensive and defensive strategic systems can be found which contribute to the maintenance of a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship and could enhance the security of both countries and of the entire world.
- e. We believe that strategic arms control can provide assurance to each side that its security will be mainreducing tained, while at the same time was the risks,

-	~		-	-	=	-	-	
U	ĸ	^	r	٠	E	u	8	٠

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES



## Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**



DISTRIBUTION

ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 57

tensions, and costs of an unrestrained strategic arms competition.

- f. We believe that there would be value in continuing U.S.-Soviet discussion of issues arising from our strategic analysiskistancy relationships.
- g. We would like to hear Soviet views on strategic objectives.
- 2. Uncertainties in Strategic Force Planning
- a. One of the features of the past relationship which may have caused both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to expand strategic armaments to present levels tuncertainty. Deployments made by one side to ensure against uncertainties may well have constituted an element in the decisions made by the other side.

DRAFTED BY

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT.

APPROVED BY

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/EXDIS

Classifica



#### Department of State

## TELEGRAM

# UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 6

┚

b. Due to the long lead-times involved in developing strategic weapons systems, decisions frequently must
be made on the basis of very limited knowledge.

Miscalculations concerning the other side's future force
levels and capabilities can result in a decision to build
additional strategic forces, which in turn may generate a
reaction and thus continued arms competition.

c. We believe that every effort should be made to reduce these uncertainties and possible miscalculations. We realize that neither side wishes to relinquish military secrets. However, within the limits set by security considerations, we believe that it is both desirable and feasible to reduce the areas of uncertainty.

#### 3. Stability

We are concerned with stability in two senses.

DRAFTED BY

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification



### Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**

INCI ASSICIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRICRITY

Page 7

We want to maintain crisis stability, by which we mean
a strategic force relationship in which neither side has
an incentive to present.
We also want to maintain a
stability in strategic force relationship under which
neither side/presents the necessity for undertaking
major new arms programs to avoid being placed at a strategic disadvantage.

a. Generally, the greater the survivability of strategic weapons systems on both sides the less the incentive for either side to strike first in a crisis situation or to undertake new arms programs in an attempt to gain a strategic advantage. Survivability is thus not only essential to deterrence and therefore to crisis stability, but also contributes to a stable # strategic relationship.

DRAFTED BY	DRAFTING DATE	TEL EXT	APPROVED BY:	
			The same of the sa	

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED



#### Department of State

# TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY Page 8

Strategic systems which have, or are periceived to have, XX a significant capability for effective attack on the other side's strategic deterrence force will erode crisis stability, since the threatened side will have an incentive to preempt in a crisis before its deterrent forces can be destroyed. Such systems may also produce instabilities since neither side is likely to accept a significant erosion of its deterrent capability and may therefore undertake new strategic arms programs. Stability in both senses can be eroded by certain changes in weapon characteristics as well as by increases in numbers of weapons. Evilone in the contract of the contra 

DRAFTED BY

<u> Peresseninguideceususus phidalograficie terrespectus consistentes de la consistencia della consistencia de la consistencia de la consistencia de la consistencia de la consistencia della consistencia della consistencia della consistencia della consistencia della consistencia de</u>

CLEARANCES:



#### Department of State

# TELEGRAM

# UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRICRITY

Page 9

- c. Another factor affecting stabillity is the capability of the deterrent forces to penetrate defenses.

  Crisis stability could be seriously eroded if one side deployed defenses which reduced the other side's retaliatory capability below the level which it would consider adequate for deterrence. Defensive deployments could also % prompt the other side to make compensating increases or improvements in its offensive forces in order to waxaataxa desired maintain a kara level of penetration capability. Clearly this factor is complicated by the problem of protecting each country from the level of attack of which waxaatax third countries are capable.
- d. In our view, long term XXX strategic stability would be enhanced, both as it affects the probability of war outbreak in a crisis and as it affects the prospects

APPROVED BY:	TEL EXT	DRAFTING DATE	DRAFTED BY
Control of the contro			

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED



#### Department of State

# **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 10

for avoiding strategic arms build-up, by frank discussion of activities which could improve or detract from stability. Arrangements for continued discussions of such subjects could be a concomitant of a strategic arms limitations agreement.

4. Relative Total Missile Throw Weights

Total missile throw weight is a measure of the ability, potential or actual, of a strategic missile force to create damage either in a first strike or in a retaliatory role. Therefore, a large difference between the total missile throw weights of two countries with might imply a large difference in strategic missile capabilities. We would like to hear Soviet views on the importance of total missile throw weight and of significant differences in total throw weights.

DRAFTED BY	DRAFTING DATE	TEL EXT.	APPROVED BY:	

CLEARANCES:





#### Department of State

# TELEGRAM

Nuclear Capabilities of Other Countries

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 11

We are engaged in bilateral discussions toward an agreement to limit only the strategic forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R; however, our strategic planning will continue

threats of other nations.

D. Issues to be Avoided in Discussions with Soviets

to take into account the potential strategic nuclear

1. Although our purpose is to explore Soviet strategic thinking on as broad a basis as possible, we must XXXX avoid any statements committing, or appearing to commit, the U.S. to any arms control proposal or position. We must not prejudge U.S. positions on issues; however, any light that XXXX our exploration might shed on these issues will assist U.S. decision-makers.

0	P		F	*	÷	0	8	٧
•	**	-			-	~	~	•

DRAFTING DATE TEL EXT

LABREDVED BY

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET/EXDIS

Classification



### Department of State

# TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY

Page 12 7

- 2. Statements which reveal specific U.S. force planning must be avoided; we must limit our statements to data contained in unclassified official documentation.
- 3. Above all, we must avoid creating the impression that we are on an intelligence "fishing" expedition.

  GP 3 END

DRAFTED BY

DRAFTING DATE

TEL EXT.

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

UNCLASSIFIED