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Authority NND 958100  
By EE NARA Date 4/25/87

WEDNESDAY, 11:00 A.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY

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(With Attachment) *Hofg*

G/PM

November 8, 1966

*7/11/78*

*11/8/66*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

THRU : S/S

FROM : G/PM - Jeffrey C. Kitchen *ck*

SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Five Year Force Structure  
Memorandum on Strategic Forces  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. Attached is our analysis of Secretary McNamara's Five Year Force Structure Memorandum to the President on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces.

2. Because of the complexity of this subject and the number of issues raised, we are proposing that we devote the entire hour on Wednesday for discussion of this memorandum.

3. The complexity of the subject also accounts for the length of our analysis. For your convenience we have divided the analysis into three parts. At Tab A is a brief summary of the DOD memorandum, Tab B contains a more detailed analysis. To gain an adequate perception of the issues, it would be highly desirable if you could find the time to read Tab B. Tab C contains a discussion of the major questions which we believe are raised by the memorandum, and which we would propose be the focus of our meeting with you.

4. Our Thursday meeting will be devoted to discussing the several other DOD memoranda which deal with other than strategic nuclear force problems. I will shortly be sending to you similar background material on these other memoranda.

5. You should note that with the exception of one memorandum on Military Assistance, Secretary McNamara's memoranda have not been transmitted to you formally as yet. We expect that they will be in the next few days. (Our analysis is based upon material informally made available to our staff by

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
Secretary McNamara's staff.) Our meetings on Wednesday and Thursday are for the purpose of exchanging views on the substance of the memoranda as well as to consider how and to what extent you wish to provide comments to Secretary McNamara in anticipation of his request for your views.

Attachments  
As stated.

cc: U - Mr. Katzenbach  
M - Mr. Rostow

*Swiss*  
*L.S.*  
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Tab A

(21) Presidential Memorandum on Strategic  
Offensive and Defensive Forces


Precis

I. The Threat

The Soviets are developing a secure, second-strike deterrent force. Two new ICBM systems are being introduced this year in the Soviet force. The smaller of these two systems, which appears to be primarily a counter-city weapon, (SS-11) is being deployed at a rapid rate in hardened dispersed silos. DOD now estimates the Soviets will have 660 to 1000 land-based missiles by 1971. Last year DOD estimated 500 to 800 in 1970. Most of the Soviet inventory will be hardened and dispersed. Soviet missiles will not have the accuracy of US missiles in the early 1970's, but they will have more missiles capable of carrying large payloads. On the defensive side there is strong evidence of a Soviet ABM deployment in the Moscow area expected to be operational in 1967 or 1968. A second system near Leningrad and extending across the European USSR may be intended either for ballistic missile defense or bomber defense. The Soviets also are modernizing their interceptor force to cope with high-performance aircraft

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
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and air-to-surface missiles, but they still lack a very low altitude capability against bombers (i.e., under 1000 ft). The estimates of the CPR threat are essentially unchanged from last year, i.e., no ICBM before mid-70's. (These estimates were made prior to the latest Chinese nuclear test.)

II. US Strategic Offensive Forces

Major improvements are planned in the US missile force even though <sup>no</sup> major changes are proposed in the basic force structure (i.e., numbers of missiles and bombers). By 1968 we will reach a force of 1054 land-based ICBMs, and 656 submarine-launched missiles; this force is planned at the same levels through 1972. The strategic bomber force will decline from about 600 to 450 by 1972 as previously planned. However, significant qualitative improvements are to be introduced between now and the early 1970's. The larger payload POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III will replace 500 of the present POLARIS missiles and 400 MINUTEMAN I respectively. MIRVs (independently targetted multiple warheads) will be installed in the MINUTEMAN III and POSEIDON missiles. This will increase the number of warheads in the missile force from the present (1966) level of 1400

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to over 4000 by 1972 without increasing the number of launchers. Each of these warheads will be independently targetable, and all US missile warheads will have greatly increased accuracy. This will improve US capability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses, and increased missile accuracies also will improve US counterforce capabilities. Also FB-111 bombers will be introduced in the force by 1971 to replace the older B-52 types.


### III. US Damage Limiting Program

Deployment of NIKE X and related damage limiting measures is again deferred. In the case of China it is concluded that our estimate of the Chinese threat does not warrant a deployment decision now. In the case of the Soviet Union the uncertainty of their response to an ABM coupled with the "substantial cost and relative ineffectiveness" of ABM deployments leads the Secretary to disapprove the JCS recommendation to deploy NIKE X.

On the other hand, there are three important findings with respect to damage limiting programs which differ from findings of prior years.

--a) An effective ABM defense against the Chinese ballistic missile threat to 1980 might cost about \$3 billion.

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
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Last year such a defense was estimated to cost \$8 to \$10 billion.

b) This year defenses of \$10 billion and \$20 billion with considerable damage limiting potential against certain Soviet attacks are described. In prior years the cost of similar defenses against the Soviet Union were estimated at \$20 to \$30 billion. These differences in cost result both from new assessments of our own ABM capabilities and from consideration of ABM effectiveness against less than full-scale surprise attacks on cities.

c) The cost to the Soviets to maintain their second-strike capability against both improvements in US missile accuracy and ABM is estimated to be about equal to the cost to the US of ABM. Previous estimates put the cost to us of an ABM at 2 to 10 times as much as the cost to the Soviets to overcome it.

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Tab B

(21) Presidential Memorandum on Strategic  
Offensive and Defensive Forces

I. The ThreatA. Soviet Offensive Capabilities

The Soviet strategic missile force is growing more rapidly than previously estimated, and new missiles are being deployed in dispersed hardened silos so that the emerging force will have the characteristics of a secure second-strike deterrent force. Pertinent figures are summarized in the following table:


Estimated Soviet Strategic Missile Forces <sup>a/</sup>

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>Estimate one year ago for 1970</u>
ICBMs			
Soft Launchers	142-146	10- 100	40-150
Hard Launchers	168-218	630- 900	460-650
Mobile	0	20- 0	0
Total	<u>310-364</u>	<u>660-1000</u>	<u>500-800</u>
MR/IRBMs	709	546-715	600-720
SLBMs-Launchers	121-136	127-244	120-220

a/ This is a DOD estimate based on the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP). ICBM figures were revised upward by DOD to reflect later intelligence than that reflected in NIPP. The recently published NIE 11-8-66 has similar, but slightly higher ICBM estimates.

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Two new missiles of the storable liquid-fueled type will begin to become operational this year. The large SS-9 missile has a payload estimated at 9000 to 12,500 pounds. Thus, it could carry a single-large warhead (10-25 Mt.\*), or, in the future, might carry half a dozen 2-3 Mt. warheads. The smaller SS-11 with a 1000 to 2000 pound payload apparently is designed as a survivable counter-city weapon. Like the SS-9, it is being installed in hardened (about 300 psi\*) and dispersed launch sites. The SS-9 may have a CEP\* of 0.5 nautical miles initially and the SS-11 about 1 n.m.\* Both missiles could have markedly better CEPs by the early 1970's.

The rate of deployment of the SS-11 has recently increased to a level about 20% above previous maximum estimates. It is this trend which leads DOD to conclude that the Soviets could have as many as 1000 land-based ICBMs by 1971. About two-thirds of these would be SS-11s. An alternative possibility is a somewhat smaller force with a higher percentage of larger more sophisticated weapons including an advanced version of the SS-9 and a

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\* Mt. = 1,000,000 tons of TNT equivalent  
CEP = Circular error probable - a measure of missile accuracy.  
n.m. = nautical miles  
psi = pounds per square inch - a measure of resistance to blast pressure.

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
new solid fuel ICBM. There is also evidence that the Soviets are developing a low trajectory ICBM or a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) which could attack the US from the south or other "unorthodox" threat corridors. Both of these systems would complicate the problem of ABM defense and would reduce or even eliminate warning from our present BMEWS system.

There is as yet no evidence of sophisticated ICBM re-entry systems such as MIRVs or penetration aids of the type which are now in advanced development in the US. Neither is there any evidence of the technology required for highly accurate missiles. However, these are the sort of sophisticated technical developments which are difficult to detect well in advance, and it is certainly within Soviet technical capabilities to develop such systems by the mid-1970's. DOD estimates that detection of such developments might not occur until three years before significant deployment, or 1 to 2 years before initial deployment.

#### B. Soviet Defensive Nuclear Capabilities

There are two relatively large-scale Soviet defensive nuclear programs apparently underway. These are:

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(1) a long-range anti-ICBM system in the Moscow area (although this system could cover a considerable area of the Western Soviet Union, it is estimated that because of the limited numbers of missiles and radars being deployed, it is intended to protect the immediate Moscow area only). This system is expected to be operational in 1967 or 1968. It is probably not very sophisticated by comparison with our NIKE X, but it apparently does employ an exo-atmospheric interceptor which would have a very large lethal radius (5 to 50 miles) at high altitudes. The state of Soviet technical development on a warhead for such a missile is quite uncertain although it appears that some tests were conducted prior to the test ban treaty. Therefore, the precise effectiveness of this system is difficult to predict.

(2) a system near Leningrad and extending across the European USSR intended for either ballistic missile defense, long-range surface-to-air bomber defense or some combination of the two. As a part of the Intelligence Community assessment, State and CIA concluded that the deployments suggest that this is probably primarily an anti-bomber system. However, reflecting the DOD view,

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the memorandum to the President concludes that "Soviet defense priorities, as we assess them, suggest a probable emphasis on ABM." Here, as with the Moscow system, technical capabilities are quite uncertain.


C. The CPR Nuclear Threat

It is estimated in the DOD memorandum that the earliest operational Chinese ICBM is not likely to appear until the mid-1970's. (Recent intelligence data suggests the possibility of a CPR ICBM in the early 1970's.) DOD estimates that the Chinese probably would first deploy an MRBM perhaps as early as 1967. (Their recent operational test with a nuclear warhead tends to confirm this estimate.) Although the CPR has one "G" class ballistic missile submarine and could have missiles available for this submarine in 1967-1969, DOD believes the system would not pose a credible threat to the US because of its vulnerability to our ASW and its limited operational range.

II. US Strategic Forces

US strategic forces are planned to accomplish two missions: assured destruction and damage limiting. The objective of the assured destruction mission is to have the clear and unmistakable ability to inflict unacceptable

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damage on the Soviet Union and the CPR even after a surprise attack on our strategic forces. The goal of damage limiting is to reduce by both offensive and defensive means the damage an enemy can inflict on the US and its allies should deterrence fail.


At present the planning of our assured destruction force is heavily influenced by uncertainties with respect to developments in the Soviet Union, in particular:

(1) How effective and how extensive will be the Soviet ABM deployment, and

(2) How soon will the Soviets develop greater accuracy and multiple warheads for their ICBMs? Because both of these uncertainties affect the capability of our assured destruction mission and because that mission is fundamental to deterrence, these uncertainties have caused us to hedge heavily in planning the future structure of our own strategic forces. At present the design of our forces is being influenced primarily by Soviet ABM deployment, but options to counter Soviet MIRVs also are being developed. (See below.)

Our present and planned damage limiting capability, though it can reduce casualties, cannot prevent massive

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destruction to the US in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Even a much larger damage limiting program could not provide high confidence of preventing major damage in such a war, but it might reduce damage significantly in certain scenarios.

### III. The Assured Destruction Problem

#### A. Changes in the Force


The US is undertaking major improvements in its missile forces while holding the number of missiles constant. The planned changes in the missile force are reflected in the following table:

#### Present and Planned (1968-72 program) US Strategic Missile Forces

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1971-72</u>
<u>Land Based</u>		
Titan	54	45
Minuteman I	800	0
Minuteman II	80	600
Minuteman III	0	400
Total	934	1045
<u>Sea Based</u>		
Polaris	512	160
Poseidon	0	496
Total	512	656
Total number of warheads	1446	4060 (1967 program was 2130)
Total megatons		1710* (1967 program was 1600)

\*Excludes bomber weapon totaling 2970 Mt.

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


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The capability of the force is being improved in several ways. First, the MINUTEMAN II and III will have a greater payload (1500 pounds) than MINUTEMAN I, (1000 pounds) and POSEIDON will have a significantly greater payload than POLARIS (3000 pounds vs. 1100 pounds). Second, new warheads will give greater yield in relation to weight. Third, a new warhead, the Mark 17, is being developed for MINUTEMAN II and POSEIDON. It will have accuracies (CEP) of 1/4 n.m. or less and a yield of 1.5 Mt. This will give a single weapon a kill probability of 85% against a hard (300 psi) target. It would require 2 or 3 of our present warheads to achieve the same result. Finally, both the POSEIDON and MINUTEMAN III systems are to be equipped with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles). These MIRVs also will be highly accurate and will improve our capabilities in several ways. A single MINUTEMAN III can carry three MK-12 MIRVs each with a yield of 170 kt. and POSEIDON up to 14 MK-3 MIRVs, each warhead having a yield of about 40 to 70 kt. These can be used to saturate an ABM defense or to attack independent soft targets. If a greater counterforce capability is desired the MK-17 can, in the future, be deployed as a

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
MIRV on the POSEIDON (three per missile). Each MK-17 warhead will have a high kill probability (approximately 85%) against hard targets because of the yield and accuracy of MK-17.

As a result of introducing MIRVs the number of warheads now planned for 1972 will be almost three times that in today's missile force (4000 as compared to 1400). The total number of megatons in the missile force will remain about the same as the new multiple warheads will be smaller than present ones. In addition, all missile systems are to be equipped with decoys capable of penetrating both area and local ballistic missile defenses.

B. Capability of the Force Against the Most Likely Threat

Against what is estimated by DOD to be the most likely Soviet threat in 1972, the presently programmed US force could survive a well-coordinated surprise attack even if the Soviets used all their available strategic offensive forces against our missiles and airfields. It is estimated that some 2340 US missile-delivered weapons and 830 bomber-delivered weapons would survive such an attack and would be capable of delivering 2280 megatons on the Soviet

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
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Union. Even if the Soviets deployed a more extensive ballistic missile defense than now seems to be emerging the US missile force alone (without bombers) could inflict more than 34% fatalities on the Soviet Union in a second strike. Furthermore, the planned force could execute limited nuclear attacks on China while still maintaining an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union.

C. Capability of the Programmed Force Against Higher than Expected Threats

The memorandum also examines three threats in the early 1970's that are "higher than expected". It is against these threats that the planned US strategic force for 1972 is designed. The first is a very extensive Soviet ABM program which costs them the equivalent of \$25 billion over a five-year period. The second threat is the development of 150 SS-9s each with six highly accurate MIRVs costing about \$5 billion. The third threat is a combination of the first two. If they chose the latter response, the Soviets would have to increase the portion of their defense budget devoted to strategic forces by about 40%; (this would mean either a major reallocation within or a net increase to the defense budget). Even

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
if the Soviets undertook such a program the programmed US missile and bomber force could inflict 35% fatalities on the Soviets in a second strike. Furthermore, the resulting Soviet force would not be a good second-strike force unless they devoted still further resources to protection of their missiles against the increasing accuracy of our missiles.

D. Further Hedges Against Extreme Soviet Threats

Although the memorandum concludes that the presently planned force will provide an adequate assured destruction capability even against unlikely Soviet threats in the early 1970's there are under study additional measures which might be taken to modify our missile force should the combined Soviet MIRV and large-scale ABM capability threaten our assured destruction capability in the mid to late 1970's. (It is not clear from the memorandum what developments would require our resort to these measures.) These additional measures, which are under study, include:

- (1) construction of additional submarines armed with

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POSEIDON missiles (only 31 of the 41 currently planned boats are capable of being and now are planned to be converted to POSEIDON),

(2) development of advanced ICBMs with increased payloads. These missiles could carry additional MIRVs, (they might require active missile defense for protection),

(3) NIKE X defense of the present MINUTEMAN silos. This is considered only as an interim measure if an early Soviet MIRV threat emerges, and


(4) ballistic missile ships. This scheme would be similar to the surface vessel scheme explored for the MLF and would utilize POSEIDON missiles on merchant vessels.

All of the above schemes would be costly (ranging from \$1 billion to several billion over the next 5 years). Defense Secretary McNamara concludes that, while they should be studied, there is no need to commit ourselves at the present time to any of these programs.

E. - Bombers

While the planned bomber force for 1971 remains unchanged from that proposed last year for 1970 (255 B-52s and 210 FB-111s), it is proposed that the percentage

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of the force on alert be reduced from 53% to 43%. This reduction in the alert rate means that somewhat fewer bomber weapons would survive a Soviet surprise attack (1150 megatons as compared to 1340 mt. in the present program); but Secretary McNamara concludes that this is acceptable given the marginal contribution of the force to deterrence and planned improvements in the missile force. The lower alert rate will help to extend the life of the B-52s beyond 1975 (as a result of being flown less).

#### IV. Damage Limiting


##### A. General Conclusions

The general conclusions reached with respect to damage limiting programs are the same as those reached last year. These are:

(1) that there is as yet no need to develop a damage limiting program against the CPR threat inasmuch as the Chinese Communists are unlikely to have any ICBMs before the mid-1970's and

(2) given the "substantial cost and relative <sup>in</sup>effectiveness" of damage limiting postures against the Soviet Union, NIKE X deployment, and related damage limiting measures are not approved. (As was the case last year, the JCS recommended deployment of NIKE X and advanced

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anti-bomber defenses.)


On the other hand, there are some significant new findings from the past year's studies of damage limiting measures:

(1) An area defense could be effective against the CPR threat through 1980 and might cost as little as \$3 billion. (Last year it was estimated that a defense against the CPR would cost \$8 to \$10 billion requiring not only an area defense but also local defense of 25 cities.)

(2) A significant damage limiting capability against many possible Soviet threats might be achieved for approximately \$10 to \$20 billion if the Soviets do not respond to such a defense deployment. Previous estimates had ranged from \$20 to \$40 billion. The new estimates are based on two major factors. First is the assumption in the calculations that greater attrition will be exacted by the NIKE X long-range exo-atmospheric warhead. Second is the inclusion of a broader range of attack scenarios including Soviet counterforce attacks.

(3) If the US were to deploy a \$10 billion or \$20 billion damage limiting program (this includes civil defense and bomber defense as well as ABM) the Soviets could respond in several ways with differing financial

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implications for them; but some responses could cost them as much as an ABM program costs us. Previous studies estimated that the cost to the offense to overcome a defense was only a fraction of the cost of the defense, but the ratios have been changing over the years. Five years ago some estimates were 100 to 1 in favor of the offense. Only a year ago DOD estimated that the ratios still favored the offense by 2 to 4 to 1. Explicit recognition of the effects of the improved accuracy of our missiles on Soviet planning combined with the effect of ABM have resulted in the current findings that at least under certain conditions in which the Soviet response involves sophisticated and survivable offensive weapons, it may be as costly for them as the defense is for us.

B. Evaluation of Damage Limiting Postures


This year's memorandum evaluates three US damage limiting postures against three types of Soviet attacks.<sup>1/</sup>

The three US postures evaluated are:

- (1) The currently approved program extended to 1976,

<sup>1/</sup> It should be noted that, by contrast with previous analysis, the Soviet attacks exclude cruise missiles. Also excluded is the cost to the US of an advanced surface-to-air missile which could provide a local defense against cruise missiles and advanced bombers.

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(2) a \$10 billion damage limiting program including \$8 billion for NIKE X (area defense plus local defense of 25 cities) and

(3) a \$20 billion program including \$17½ billion for NIKE X (area defense and local defense of 52 cities).  
The three Soviet attacks are:-


(1) a combined military-urban attack (there are two variations, one concentrating on urban targets and one on military targets),

(2) a military attack with the attack on cities withheld and

(3) a Soviet second strike following a US pre-emptive strike.

1) With the current US damage limiting program extended to 1976 fatalities would range from 20% to 45% of the US population in a Soviet first strike. The lower end of the range depicts results if the Soviets first strike is counterforce with the urban attack withheld. In this circumstance a US counterforce strike would contribute to limiting damage. The higher figures are characteristic of results if the Soviets first strike places

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
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the bulk of their attack on cities. Finally, if the US were to strike first, assuming a Soviet response with its surviving force against our cities, our fatalities are estimated at 24% of the population.

2) With a \$10 billion damage limiting program US fatalities would range from 5% to 34% in a Soviet first strike, and 6% to 13% in a US first strike. A \$20 billion program would improve the results in Soviet urban attacks (reducing maximum fatalities from 34% to 22%) but would not significantly affect the calculations in cases where the Soviets strike military targets. The above figures would hold only if there were no attempt by the Soviets to offset the US damage limiting program.

3) If, as seems likely, the Soviets responded to a US damage limiting program they would have to take two factors into account if their objective is to maintain a second-strike capability. Not only would they have to increase their missile force and/or add penetration aids to overcome the US defenses, they would also have to expend additional sums to protect their force against the improving counterforce capability of the US missile force. If the Soviets did indeed choose to maintain a

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
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second strike capability they would require approximately an expenditure equivalent to our own, to counter either the \$10 billion or \$20 billion US damage limiting program. This would reinstate their previous second-strike capability but their first-strike capability would be somewhat less than before the installation of the US defenses. (This is because a large portion of their additional expenditure would go for missile protection rather than payload.)

Although the cost of matching a US ABM certainly is manageable for the Soviets, they might choose not to fully offset an ABM or choose a less costly response than reinstatement of their secure second-strike capability, e.g., which emphasized soft missiles. This would result in a less stable posture. With unprotected missiles they might feel greater pressures to pre-empt in a crisis. However, the current Soviet force development suggests that they place rather high priority on achieving and maintaining a second-strike capability.

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
Questions Raised by the Strategic Forces Memorandum

A. Introduction

The DOD memorandum paints a picture of a changing strategic balance. While many of these trends have been emerging for several years, the present memorandum poses certain questions more sharply than ever before. Among the most important are the following:

1. How does the emerging strategic balance affect deterrence of a nuclear attack?
2. How is the emerging strategic balance likely to affect Soviet policies and actions?
3. How does mutual deterrence affect our nuclear guarantee to allies in NATO?
4. What reactions can we expect in Europe to the growing realization that deterrence is mutual?
5. What effect will the changing strategic balance have on the prospects for arms control?
6. Can the US influence the future Soviet posture? If so, how, and in what directions do we want to influence it?
7. How are China's policies likely to be affected

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by their perceptions of the changing strategic balance?

8. What should we say publicly about the changes in the Soviet threat and in our own posture?


9. Is it now in the US interest to begin a new damage limiting program, including ABM; or should we try to obtain an ABM freeze?

10. What further efforts should the US make to consult with our allies about ABM?

B. The Effect on Deterrence of a Nuclear Attack

There are many uncertainties about how the Soviet threat will develop. However, we have hedged in planning our future strategic forces so that the assured destruction objective appears to be secure even against rather unlikely developments in the threat. It seems highly unlikely, now or in the foreseeable future, that the Soviets would be tempted to initiate a deliberate nuclear attack on the US, as they could not have confidence of escaping unacceptable damage to their society. Even in crises we would expect they would exercise extreme caution to avoid a nuclear engagement.

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


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On the other hand, the Soviets also have an increasingly formidable deterrent, and this does have implications for us that will be explored below. Both major powers now can wreak great damage on the other, even after absorbing a first strike. Thus relative damage to the enemy has less and less significance. (It may be worth noting that even now the Soviets capacity to inflict fatalities on the US may exceed our capacity to inflict such damage on the Soviet Union, because of their larger missiles and our more concentrated population.) The increasing accuracy of our missiles will, by the early 1970's, begin to reduce the Soviet second-strike capability, and may force them to develop new means of protecting their missile force, such as mobility or active defense. In sum, we are no more likely to cancel out their deterrent than they are to invalidate ours. One implication seems clear. We have been cautious in the past in direct confrontations with the Soviets -- and rightly so. Are we not likely to be even more cautious in the future? Will this, in turn, invite more aggressive Soviet behavior?

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C. The Effect on Soviet Policies and Actions.

It is possible that Soviet policies will become more aggressive once they have achieved an even larger and better protected strategic force. Threats and probes (e.g., as in Berlin) or political maneuvering backed by the authority of their nuclear deterrent (e.g., efforts to destroy allied confidence in US commitments) might be tempting. While this is a possibility it should be recognized that such a policy still would entail great risks. Aside from the fact that there are many other factors that influence Soviet policy besides the size and character of their missile force, they are likely to be uncertain about their strategic capabilities. Existing US capability to strike the USSR, and further advances already planned, should limit Soviet behavior. We think that the Soviets do understand the dangers of nuclear war quite clearly so that caution with respect to the use of threats is likely to continue.

On the other hand, they are likely to try to exploit a Soviet image of increased strength and nuclear parity with the US for political and propaganda purposes with the

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
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objective of enhancing their image as a major power equal to the US, and reducing the confidence of our allies in US commitments to their defense. There are a variety of ways in which the Soviets could do this and they may feel less constrained in challenging the US in areas that they may consider less vital to our interests and in using non-military means. In these circumstances, the possibility of miscalculation is always present.

D. Effects on Our Nuclear Guarantees to Allies in NATO.

When we extended our nuclear guarantee to NATO, we, in effect, agreed to a strategy based on the use of nuclear weapons -- first use if necessary -- to prevent NATO territory from being overrun. In our Berlin strategy we accepted resort to initiating nuclear attacks if necessary to persevere against the clearly superior Soviet conventional forces. At the time these commitments were made the US had marked superiority in both strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry. The extension of the protection of our deterrent to European allies was based primarily upon this superiority, on the recognition by the Soviets that we considered NATO and Berlin vital to US interests, and the resulting belief by

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
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the Soviets that threats to our interests in Europe might logically be met with nuclear force if necessary.

For the past decade, our effective superiority in both tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry has been dwindling. While we continue to maintain numerical superiority, it is questionable that this has much meaning strategically so long as both sides can inflict very substantial damage on each other both in a tactical or strategic exchange.

Deterrence of Soviet aggression against NATO has a different character today than it did ten, or even five, years ago, in that it depends on a variety of factors, not just the nuclear umbrella. First, the Soviets are deterred by a desire to avoid aggressive actions which would reawaken a sense of threat and solidify the alliance. Second, they are deterred from low levels of aggression for limited objectives by a significant NATO conventional force. Third, they are deterred from large-scale conventional and/or tactical nuclear attack by NATO's large and well-advertised tactical nuclear capabilities and by

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
the risk of escalation. While they may doubt that we would risk an attack on the US in order to defend Europe, they cannot be certain of this, particularly in view of our existing commitments and their knowledge that we continue to consider our relationship to Europe to be vital to US interests.

However, if Soviet actions continue to be constrained, does not the existence of a growing Soviet deterrent impose greater constraints on US policy and actions in Europe? Is our Berlin strategy, which could force the initiation of a US nuclear attack, as valid today as it was when formulated in 1962? Will we be less willing to reaffirm our nuclear commitments to Europe in the unequivocal terms we have in the past? Even if we do, will such reaffirmation be less persuasive to our allies and to the Soviets given the knowledge that the US would accept griev~~o~~us damage as the cost of invoking our nuclear guarantees? How will our political relationships with NATO allies be affected?

E. Possible Reactions in Europe.

Doubts have already been voiced in Europe as to the

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
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credibility of our nuclear guarantee, and these are likely to increase as the growing capability of the Soviet force becomes more widely recognized. Already it is increasingly clear to our allies that US interests will not necessarily be served by early use of nuclear weapons. While it is by no means certain that in the event of an attack our allies would want to use nuclear weapons promptly, they will want to keep clear the existence of this capability given the heavy emphasis they place on nuclear deterrence.

Several reactions are possible. First, there is likely to be a concern among our allies with the US ability to cover with its externally based forces Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs threatening Europe. The growth of the Soviet ICBM force and the potential growth of their ABM system suggest the need to allocate more US missiles to the task of exhausting the defenses and to covering the ICBM threat to the US. While in the short run this will not have any significant effect on our ability to continue to cover Soviet missiles threatening Europe, it could have an important effect in the long run. Views in DOD differ on this point and we will need to have a clearer picture from them on the future nature of this

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
problem so that we can discuss it intelligently with our allies. However, we question whether any answer we can give will fully reassure our allies.

Second, there could be greater pressure for a larger European role in nuclear strategy and planning to assure that plans are formulated so that the probability that the US deterrent would be invoked promptly would be enhanced.

Third, there could be, in time, greater pressures for allied control of nuclear forces to insure that plans would be carried out in accordance with the desires of the whole alliance. The pressures for such control would stem from a desire for a finger on the trigger and on the safety catch as well!

Fourth, there may be increasing pressures from our allies for arms control agreements that might dampen the arms race between the great powers. Finally, there could be growing pressure for accommodation with the East. Growing uncertainty about the US nuclear guarantees also would open new opportunities for DeGaulle to stress the theme of US unreliability, and to press for greater European "independence" from the US.

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
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F. Effects on Arms Control.

On the one hand, with rapidly growing strategic capabilities on both sides, many will perceive a more urgent need to find new ways to stabilize the arms race. In this connection our growing inventory of warheads, resulting from the MIRV program, may appear to be quite destabilizing. On the other hand, it is difficult, on the basis of past experience, to place high confidence in arms control prospects. The tendency is to try to improve one's own competitive position; to out-think and out-produce the adversary. In this country we can expect continuing pressures from Congress and from those responsible for our military security to respond to the projected Soviet posture, and to hedge against future uncertainties by producing an even larger and more sophisticated strategic force.

It is difficult to predict how Soviet perception of the strategic balance is likely to affect their views on arms control. In the short run, while they were in the midst of their current build-up, it would seem unlikely

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that they would be amenable to a missile or ABM freeze.

In the longer run there are two possibilities:

a. If they realize it is impossible for them to gain a strategic advantage and very costly to try, they may try to stabilize arms competition.


b. On the other hand, if they feel we have thwarted their objective of achieving a secure second-strike force, they may try even harder to obtain such a force and be even less responsive to arms control proposals.

It is possible that the prospects for a non-proliferation treaty could be impaired as the knowledge of growing US and Soviet strategic capabilities spreads -- as it is virtually certain to do. Those non-nuclear states, such as India, that have considered great power disarmament steps an important condition to their acceptance of a non-proliferation treaty may be less inclined to accept a treaty if they believe US-Soviet arms competition is accelerating. However, this is unlikely to be a major factor in national decisions to acquire a nuclear capability.

G. The Prospects for US Influence on the Future Soviet Force Posture.

One possible way to influence Soviet forces is by

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
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succeeding in arms control measures. The present US proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles probably has little promise of acceptance. An ABM freeze also appears to have little prospect of acceptance, but some believe it may be worth a try. (This is considered further in Section J. below.)

We may also be able to influence the Soviet strategic posture by the ways in which we design our posture, but Soviet responses to our actions are uncertain. For example, DOD argues that as US missile accuracies increase, the Soviets will be forced to expend even more of their resources to protect their missile force if they want to maintain a second-strike capability. This would, they argue, result in a more stable Soviet posture for two reasons. First, a better protected force is less likely to be used preemptively or in a spasm-type response. Second, the more resources the Soviets are forced to spend on protecting their force, the smaller that force is likely to be. But if the Soviets take protective measures against an improved US counterforce we may be compelled to try to overcome these measures by new measures of our own as we

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
are in fact doing today and thus the cycle could be a continuing one.

In short, while we have argued in the past that we want to stabilize the strategic race by forcing the Soviets to provide more protection for their force and thus improve their second-strike capability, paradoxically we are also taking steps to deny them such a capability. This poses the not unfamiliar dilemma: So long as nuclear deterrence remains fundamental to our strategy and foreign policy, US security interests require continuing increases in our own strategic capabilities to match not only present threats but even very unlikely future threats. The exercise of self-imposed restraints that might stabilize arms competition continues to be risky and so arms competition continues in new forms. Is there a way to break out of this dilemma without incurring unacceptable risks to US security?

H. Effects on China's Policies.

China's policies are likely to be little affected by the US strategic force programs. They are almost certain to continue their efforts to build a nuclear force, and to project an image of growing strength. Their hostility

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
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to the US and the Soviets is almost certain to continue, and they can be expected to accuse both countries of further increasing the nuclear arms race. This will provide them further justification for their own nuclear program. But we believe they also will continue to use their military power with caution, and as even more sophisticated US and Soviet capabilities appear, they may begin to realize the limitations of their own strategic forces. However, at the present time both prudence and intelligence evidence would dictate that we assume that the CPR will try to deploy an ICBM at the earliest possible date. This, in turn, raises the question of a US ABM deployment (See J. below).

I. What We Should Say Publicly.

At present there is not much awareness of the changing strategic balance in this country or abroad, but awareness is sure to increase in the coming months. Our estimate of growing Soviet capabilities will become available to our allies, and will almost certainly become public in general terms. Similarly our own efforts to improve our strategic forces will eventually become more widely known. On the

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
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one hand, we will want to reassure our own public and our allies that we are taking steps to counter Soviet capabilities. To do this we will to some extent make public the improvements we are making in our strategic forces. But in doing so we may raise concerns here and abroad that we are stimulating arms competition, particularly by our deployment of MIRVs; and we may also stimulate further Soviet responses. A carefully prepared public affairs program dealing with the implications of the new strategic balance would appear to be most important. What themes should such a program emphasize? How much information on our own plans can we and should we release?

J. Damage Limiting and ABM.

Last year Congress voted funds -- not requested by DOD -- to initiate procurement of components for the NIKE X. The JCS have for the past two years recommended the deployment of ABM and related damage limiting measures. Secretary McNamara proposes in his memorandum to defer this decision for yet another year. However, it is possible that his views on ABM are changing. He recently has asked that his

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
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staff prepare a White Paper on ABM summarizing the pros and cons of ABM deployment. It is not yet clear to what purpose this paper will be put. It seems most likely that it is intended to justify the present position on deferring deployment but it also could foreshadow a decision for deployment in the not too distant future.

The recent Chinese demonstration of a missile capability could generate further pressures for initiating an ABM deployment against China. It is also likely that as more information on the Soviet progress in ABM leaks out, pressures in Congress for a US ABM deployment will grow. However, in his present memorandum Secretary McNamara sees no need to begin deployment against China because even an initial CPR ICBM capability is some years in the future; and he feels that ABM deployment against the Soviets is not justified in view of the uncertainty of Soviet reactions, the high cost and the limited damage limiting capabilities we could expect to achieve.

Meanwhile, there have also been suggestions that we approach the Soviets with a proposal to freeze ABM deployment.

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
It is argued that even if the chances of Soviet acceptance are slim, we should make one more effort before they become committed to a larger ABM program since we have little to lose by such an effort.

The pros and cons of ABM deployment are extremely complex. However, they might be summarized as follows:

Pro. An ABM program offers the prospect of saving many millions of American lives should a nuclear war occur. While we do not believe such a war is likely it seems only prudent to insure against such a contingency now that the prospects of such a defense seem more promising. We are uncertain about the capabilities of the Soviet ABM at present, and even less certain about its future capabilities. We should not give them the chance, however remote, of achieving a technological breakthrough in defense that we would not match. Such a breakthrough might have important psychological and strategic implications.

Although the Soviets might respond to our ABM deployment, and cancel out the effects of our ABM, this is by no means certain. The financial resources and technical effort required by them to do so would not be insignificant,

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
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and it is not clear that their response would be fully effective. Even if they do respond and their response is effective, the resulting strategic equation would be more complex; the uncertainties for both sides would grow and thus could enhance deterrence, rather than, as some contend, decrease it.

There seems no prospect, even with large-scale ABM deployments on both sides, that a first strike would appear an attractive option to either party; there could still be no confidence of preventing unacceptable damage. Thus deterrence would persist. At the same time an effective defense would greatly reduce the risks of a major exchange resulting from an accidental launch or an Nth country attack.

Even if we do not deploy against the USSR, we should at least consider beginning to deploy a defense against China which could be very effective until at least 1980 at modest cost. While it seems unlikely that China will have an ICBM before the mid-1970's, it is possible they could have one earlier. Recent intelligence suggests they may. Even a very limited Chinese ICBM deployment would permit the Chinese to exercise some leverage over US policy and actions. Therefore, we should not defer any longer a

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
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decision to deploy.

The prospects of a freeze agreement on ABM are slim. The Soviets have consistently held that an ABM was strictly defensive, and that they could not deny such protection to their population. They are now deploying an ABM themselves and continue a large R&D effort in ABM so that restraint on our part is no longer likely to impose restraint on the Soviets. They have shown no interest in previous informal British suggestions for an ABM moratorium. If we did make such a proposal it might generate pressures abroad for a freeze, which would make it more difficult for us to deploy ABM in the future, even if the Soviets rejected a freeze. Furthermore, an ABM freeze would not deal with the growing Soviet missile threat.

Finally, it can be argued that in the long run a more stable posture might be created if there were a better balance between offensive and defensive forces on both sides. If both major powers could be induced to concentrate more of their resources on defensive rather than offensive systems this might reduce the pressures to create even

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
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more destructive offensive forces, and even make possible a new strategic balance based on more traditional defensive concepts rather than the mutual terror of deterrence.

Con. It is impossible to measure the potential effectiveness of ABMs against the Soviets. One reason (although not the only reason) is that the Soviets have the economic capacity and technical capability to offset a US deployment. Against the background of their present effort to achieve a credible deterrent, it is unrealistic to suppose they would not react in ways designed to maintain the effectiveness of their deterrent forces. We could, in short, spend billions of dollars and, after years of effort, find ourselves as vulnerable as we are today. But dollar costs are not the only costs. Political tensions between the US and Soviets could increase as uncertainty increased. Thus, from the Soviet standpoint, the US ABMs plus the improved accuracy of US counterforce missiles could raise serious questions about US intentions. We might well view changes in their forces the same way. If one or the other achieved extensive ABM deployment, concern would increase that a first strike might be more attractive. Meanwhile, our European allies

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
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would see themselves caught in the middle of an ever-expanding arms race which not only afforded them little or no protection, but also stood in the way of progress toward better political relations with the Soviets. There would be no prospect for further steps in arms control, and that fact would affect views not only in Europe but elsewhere. Confronted with the prospect of an ever-expanding arms race between the US and Soviets, some countries might find less reason to refrain from acquiring nuclear arms themselves.

We cannot predict with certainty that all of these adverse consequences would flow from a US-Soviet ABM race, but these risks are present. Since the gains from deployment would at best be questionable for both sides, and since political and psychological risks would be large, an argument clearly can be advanced to support an effort to freeze ABM deployment. Given Soviet attitudes toward defense, such an effort might well fail. However, the effort to achieve a freeze would be useful; even if it failed, our allies and others would consider that the effort had been made in their interest as well as our own. With respect to the ChiCom threat, a freeze would mean that we would depend on

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
deterrence or on a disarming strike if necessary. ABM deployment against the ChiComs could not be divorced from the Soviet reactions suggested above and would raise additional questions vis-a-vis our allies and others in Asia. Although it is thought that ABMs could be effective against the ChiComs, the view here is that our relationship with the Soviets is of higher priority.

These issues have been debated at great length now for several years in this country, and the debate is beginning to extend abroad. There is merit to both sets of arguments. While we do not expect that these issues can be resolved easily we do feel that decisions on both an ABM freeze and ABM deployment are closing in. Whatever decision is made will have important foreign policy implications, and the State Department should be prepared to play a major role in this decision.

K. Further Consultation with Our Allies about ABM.

While a decision to deploy ABM has been deferred, we cannot and should not foreclose the possibility of future deployment if it is in the US interest. We have recently held discussions with the British and Canadians on the

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political and strategic implications of an ABM program. In these discussions we stressed that the US Government had made no decision to deploy ABM but did not preclude a future decision to deploy. We attempted to make clear that we were exploring in some detail the complex political and strategic issues related to ABM deployment and were considering the effects on our allies.

We can expect further interest from these two countries and others in discussing this important subject with us. It has been proposed that ABM be one of the major topics considered by the NATO Special Committee of Defense Ministers if agreement is reached to establish this Committee on a permanent basis. While the papers prepared for the UK talks are intended to serve as a vehicle for discussion with other allies, we will need to be prepared for more detailed discussions at a later date. Interagency planning for such discussions should be undertaken soon. In particular, we will need to give careful consideration to the pros and cons of overseas deployment of ABM should there be a decision to deploy such a system in the US.

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