

AUGUST 23/IV

**NATO/RUSSIA:**

***A framework for the next phase***

***The process and timetable***

The combination of Secretary Christopher's meeting in Jakarta with Primakov on July 23 and ST's earlier discussions in Moscow with Primakov and Mamedov have established the following basis for a U.S.-Russian talks in late August:

- The Russian government understands that the NAC in December will set a Summit in the first half of 1997, at which the heads of state would invite specified countries to begin accession negotiations.
- Russia understands that the U.S. is not prepared to negotiate enlargement *per se*, since that is an issue that can and will be decided solely by NATO and applicant-states.
- However, the U.S. and Russia have a shared interest in making sure that Russia participates in the elaboration of European security arrangements and acquires a role that accords with its potential influence on European and world affairs. It will be important to work out a package of understandings between NATO and Russia. The goal should be to establish for Russia a clear understanding of the security environment in which

expansion takes place, thus enabling Russia to accept measures aimed at helping some of their former client states help themselves by joining NATO and the EU.

- The U.S. and Russia will conduct confidential “one-plus-one” discussions on a “framework” for the overall structure which should emerge. This should include parameters of what each side can and can’t accept in the final arrangements between Russia and NATO (“bottom lines and red lines”).

*An important part of our job will be to make sure our red lines stick — and that the Russians’ don’t cross ours (i.e., trying to label UNACCEPTABLE Ukrainian and Baltic membership).*

- Russia understands that during the one-plus-one talks, the U.S. will consult independently and fully both with its Allies and with other states that have a direct interest in the outcome, particularly CEE applicants for NATO membership as well as the Baltics and Ukraine; there will be no U.S.-Russian “condominium” behind the backs of the Allies or anything that the CEEs can construe as a “new Yalta.”

*Simultaneously maintaining confidentiality with the Russians and transparency with the others is obviously going to be tricky — but not impossible. In a way, it’s made easier by the next point...*

- Russia reserves the right to conduct its own bilateral discussions with the Europeans.

**Primakov: "The one-plus-one will remain confidential. At the same time, each of us will talk bilaterally to the Europeans. But, I promise you that this will not be to work against what we are doing in one-plus-one."**

*In fact, the Russians, and particularly Primakov, are acutely aware of differences within the Alliance. They will be aggressive in trying to play the French and the Germans off against us. Primakov is essentially following a two-track strategy: on Track I, he will continue to look for every possible way of slowing down and if possible stopping enlargement; on Track II, he seems now prepared to get serious about the NATO-Russia dialogue we have long been pushing for. We must convince him that the only meaningful action and the only way he can advance Russia's interests are on Track II. It is in the interest of both Russia and the West that progress on Track II not be defined as Russia's price for allowing NATO expansion to go forward. From a Russian perspective, they cannot (and probably should not ever want to) endorse formally NATO enlargement, whatever concessions they may claim to have extracted. For the West, the image of Russia holding expansion hostage is unacceptable.*

*To do this, it is essential that we maintain leadership on the issue. In particular, we must counter a Franco-German desire to have official small-group negotiations with the Russians. Such a development would dilute*

*our role. It would also raise concerns among smaller allies and the applicants in Central Europe.\**

*Our goal will be to maintain the definition that we and NATO have established -- we want the most cooperative possible security relationship with Russia; we want Russia to be integrated in a new sort of European security community; we want Russia's voice to be heard in European decision-making councils; NATO enlargement and other institutional developments are designed to further this goal.*

- Following up on the Jakarta meeting, ST and Mamedov can conduct the next round of discussions, starting in late August and working through the autumn, with the objective of reporting to the Secretary and Primakov on a framework before the December NAC.
- Primakov says he will need some sort of visible evidence that the "one-plus-one" talks are underway before the U.S. elections. Specifically, he is asking for a meeting with POTUS in Washington or New York during the UNGA; it would produce some carefully co-scripted statements to establish that the process has begun in earnest.

*Primakov needs this, he and Mamedov say, because they must contend in Moscow with skeptics and opponents who*

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\* Chancellor Kohl plans to call Yeltsin on August 26, assuming Yeltsin's health permits.

*are already accusing Primakov of going soft on NATO enlargement — and who suspect the U.S. of stringing Russia along about the dialogue until we're safely past our elections, at which point enlargement will accelerate while the U.S.-Russia dialogue peters out.*

- When the one-plus-one talks yield what Primakov calls a “a point of consensus” on the framework — a general understanding, but without many details in which reside the devils — the issue will move formally to 16-plus-one: a discussion between NATO and Russia, with the objective of reaching the full package of agreements, understandings and arrangements by the time NATO expands.

*What this means exactly — inauguration of the accession talks, actual installation of new members, some step in between — remains to be worked out. The Russians appear not to have made up their own minds on this. What they're looking for is parallelism if not simultaneity.*

**Primakov: “The two processes — the development of NATO-Russia relations and the expansion of NATO — have to run in parallel; they have to unfold together. We cannot have one confined to talk while the other takes the form of concrete steps. This is imperative.”**

*At the same time, they understand there can be no restrictive or conditional linkage between the two processes: they cannot slow down enlargement by slowing down the*

*"dialogue." In fact, we may be able to keep them moving along the dialogue track by making clear to them that they'll be left in the dust if they drag their feet.\**

*Parallelism must also mean that the NATO-Russia dialogue can't get ahead of the enlargement process. A possible Primakov-POTUS session — and, of course, a possible POTUS-Yeltsin meeting in the fall — would have to be managed carefully so that it doesn't look like we and the Russians are "doing a deal" over the heads of our Allies and the CEEs.*

**Javier Solana's position, contained in a "completely private paper" that he sent ST on July 11: "Great care needs to be taken to move this important discussion forward on a confidential basis and with NATO involved. I'm prepared to work on it as much as necessary, either going to Moscow or in Brussels." Mamedov indicated he would be willing to talk directly to Solana, preferably in Brussels.**

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\* Mamedov is hoping we can set ourselves a deadline along the lines of what we've done successfully in CTB and ABM/TMD demarcation.

## ***The substance***

Primakov has agreed to an outline for Jakarta that highlights eight areas for exploration in the next phase:

### ***I: Nukes and "Infrastructure"***

- As NATO prepares to expand, the Russians are looking for agreed, predictable limits on nukes and "infrastructure" so that they can make reliable plans about their own force structure as NATO moves closer to their borders.

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**Primakov: "I have to tell you, there is one thing that will not change here — one thing that constitutes a real red line for us: if the infrastructure of NATO moves toward Russia, that will be unacceptable — it will not be accepted."**

**Mamedov dropped several dark hints that unless Russia achieves satisfaction on this point, it will break out of the CFE treaty and move tactical nukes into Western Russia.**

**The Russians have yet fully to define what they mean by infrastructure, but at least for openers, the term is troublesomely comprehensive: it includes, in addition to bases, any facilities that enhance the military wherewithal of a state, such as C<sup>3</sup>I and air-space control. Unless this is a maximalist coming-in**

position, it's probably a showstopper, since it would render the new members operationally non-members. However, Mamedov also hinted that if the nuclear problem can be dealt with adequately, the infrastructure one might be easier to manage. "We shouldn't be hostage to our own biased concepts of what is infrastructure," he said, indicating he'd been talking to Primakov on this subject ("I see movement" in Primakov's thinking, he said). "Not having nukes near our borders gives us the flexibility to think more openly and broadly on other subjects."

- For our part, we can't ....
  - 1) ... create a two-tier membership in the Alliance, with new members disadvantaged or discriminated against;
  - 2) ... tie NATO's hands on future deployments if conditions or the threat change.

*Operationally, that means that sooner rather than later we probably need to drive home the point that while we might be able to deal with nukes and stationed forces as part of the eventual understandings, there are a number of activities and facilities that cannot be on the table: e.g., the establishment of headquarters and storage sites,*



*the upgrading of airfields, and the conduct of exercises on a regular basis.*

- But perhaps we *can* agree on two mechanisms for meeting Russian concerns:

1) for nukes, additional **unilateral declarations by NATO or by new members themselves on the stationing of nukes**, *à la* the NATO study (perhaps accompanied, for appearance and reciprocity's sake, by some sort of unilateral statement on Russia's part).

**Primakov mentioned "the Norway model" as one way to deal with this issue.\***

*We must make the most of two facts: 1) having nukes on your territory has not been/is not now a requirement for full membership (only half the member-states have them); 2) the CEEs have indicated they don't want them.*

*A couple of possibilities: one would be for the CEEs themselves to state formally (though with protective hedge) that they are not requesting stationing of nukes;*

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\* No foreign troops or nukes but full membership. *We need to be extremely careful in the way we use or talk about the Norway model. Norway's — and Denmark's — policies have been an irritant in the past and have aroused concerns about Alliance solidarity. it comes dangerously close to violating the no-two-tier principle; we don't want to encourage the idea of there being "regular" members and "Norway-model" members.*

*another would be for NATO to reiterate its position that it doesn't need to put nukes there (advantage: any construct that under which the new members reject or renounce nukes could impinge on the Alliance's right to deploy nukes if security needs dictate).\** NATO's position, as reflected in the enlargement study, is based on an assessment of relevant military threats and post-war (not Cold War) political realities, and these decisions will not change with the addition of new members -three or even ten.

*The essential strategic factor is that nuclear weapons deployments are not decided on the amount of territory to defend or a new member's geographic proximity to Russia. When all U.S. ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Europe (weapons designed to move with an army), proximity became a dead issue. Aircraft carrying gravity bombs have the range to reach an array of potential targets and do not have to be forward-based to the territory of new members.*

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\* Ukraine — as recently as ST's visit to Kiev July 17 — emphasized in the strongest terms that no-nukes-closer-to-its-borders is a Ukrainian red line; the Ukrainian leaders say they have a "moral right" to make this demand, since they've given up their own nukes.

*In short, the U.S. and NATO have confidence that these gravity bombs can reach targets from where they are now deployed and this assessment is not going to change just because new territory becomes available for basing. Indeed, forward deployed aircraft would be more vulnerable. In any case, leading edge of the U.S. nuclear weapons force in defense of Europe remains submarine-launched nuclear missiles, which have the range and accuracy to hit their target and are far more survivable than air-delivered weapons. With the above explanation as background, and some fine tuning, the language of the enlargement study should provide both political cover for new members and give the Russians the assurances they are seeking.*

2) For “infrastructure,” something similar: **unilateral statements by the Alliance and individual states** — with **parallel pursuit of CFE II or CSBMs** that would address military concerns arising from enlargement; a CFE II, or CFE “modernization” agreement, that would, accommodate the military equipment of new NATO members and help address Russian concerns.

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**Mamedov: “We need to use existing arms control channels to keep your military infrastructure from expanding, while recognizing that you will retain all the rights and obligations under the Washington treaty. In SALT, we talked first about forward based**

**systems, then central systems. We should continue this method.\* The West negotiated CFE and INF and tacnukes with the Soviet Union and no one complained that it violated NATO's virginity; so there's no reason we can't continue that process between NATO and Russia, supplementing it with unilateral statements by NATO and Russia or statements others may make."**

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*CFE is not a ready-made instrument for dealing with troops or "infrastructure," since the treaty currently limits only specified equipment: tanks, APCs, etc. Nonetheless, in theory, a CFE solution may work, or at least help, because the limits would be reciprocal, and the CEEs would be part of the negotiations. However, as their part of the deal, the Russians might have to accept tighter flank limits than they just obtained in order to cap NATO in Central Europe.*

## **II: A Seat at a New Table**

- While continuing to limit their military participation with NATO to PFP and IFOR, the Russians are asking for a seat on a "political" board of directors of some kind that would

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\* If we follow precedent, it won't necessarily help. The U.S. (with the strong support of its Allies) always rejected the legitimacy of including FBS (forward-based systems) in SALT/START.

deal with the major questions of European security as a whole.

- We have two central objectives that must guide our handling of this Russian desire:

1) we want to deepen Russia's integration into European structures in ways that contribute to overall regional security;

2) we want to minimize the danger of conflict or division arising out of the decision to enlarge NATO.

To meet the first objective, we need to give Russia appropriate involvement in European security institutions, without harming the efficacy of those institutions, in the first instance NATO itself. We absolutely can't and won't...

1) let Russia into the NATO decision-making process;

2) subordinate NATO to any other organization.

It's an open question, on both our side and theirs, whether there is some kind of institutional or structural fix that suits their needs while staying on the right side of our own red lines. The Russians are looking for a body or arrangement that reflects Russia's "special role" as a major power. Among the ideas that they and others have floated, with their pros and cons:

1) **A Quint (the Quad + Russia).**

*Pro:*

- Reflects the real power arrangement in Europe;

- does not require the assent of others to establish;
- no formal powers, so doesn't undercut NATO;
- agenda flexible — issues can be added or excluded.

*Con:*

- Everybody not in it hates it;
- undercuts NATO solidarity;
- smacks of condominium to CEE;
- may create de facto Russian expectation that all major matters will be cleared by Quint before NATO action;
- unlike Quad, harder to do discreetly; the Quad is effective insofar as it operates very quietly and barely visibly — while the Russians are looking for something distinctly *visible*.

**2) A permanently institutionalized Contact Group, with a broader mandate.**

*Pro/Con:* similar to Number 1, except even more offensive to others, and formalization will lead to even greater expectation that Quint takes priority over NATO.

3) A **“European Security Council,”** an inner core of the OSCE.\* There are two versions of this.

Version A: **An ESC with real powers,** either separate or attached to the OSCE on the model of UN Security Council; it could act in an emergency, act as an executive committee on behalf of the full OSCE on a previously defined set of activities, exercise UN charter Chapter 8 authority in approving peacekeeping operations. (Possible composition: permanent members — U.S., Russia, UK, France and Germany — plus six rotating members drawing from four groups: 1) NATO, 2) CEE, 3) neutrals/Nordics, 4) NIS).

*Pro:*

- Gives Russia meaningful role;
- depending on composition (e.g. through both rotating and permanent members) would not exclude other Europeans (as in the quint);
- authority could be circumscribed to protect NATO prerogatives.

*Con:*

- weakens OSCE principle of consensus;

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\* Kozyrev was promoting this idea when he was Foreign Minister.

- creates two class states in Europe (permanent and non-permanent members of council);
- could encourage the presumption of authority over other organizations, especially for peacekeeping/peace-enforcement. In any event, Russia would certainly push for this presumption.

**Version B: OSCE Steering/Advisory**

**Committee**, as an adjunct to OSCE Presidency with no greater powers than the current presidency (could meet to form recommendations to full OSCE, other non-decision making tasks)

*Pro*: avoids most of the cons of version A; still gives Russia special “status” as permanent member.

*Con*: less attractive to Russia because no real authority.

**4) A RUSSIAN IDEA: “The Eight,” minus, perhaps Japan, which would make it “The Seven.”**

*Pro*: it has a nice ring in some Russian ears, especially after Lyon.

*Con*:

- similar to the Quint, but not as good a match with “real” power arrangement (for Canada to play a



bigger role than Dutch, Poles and Ukraine seems incongruous, especially now that Canada has withdrawn all forces from Europe);

- further complicates already confused activities surrounding the G-7/P-8 quasi-institutions.
- might draw domestic flak during the U.S. election campaign.

**5) ANOTHER ENTIRELY (AND TRULY BAD)**

**RUSSIAN IDEA: Letting the Russians attach themselves to the political structure of NATO à la the “French model,” working their way eventually into the military structure over time.**

*Pro:* Gives Russia a real seat at a real table, hence offers real integration

*Con:*

- Russia could use this device to try to jump the queue — or stop others from moving ahead;
- Could weaken political decision making at NATO, given the requirement of consensus;
- would be viewed as seriously prejudicial by other CEEs (e.g., the Balts) because Russia would have veto over subsequent new members and NATO policy.

**Solana's idea: "a NATO-Russia Standing Committee for regular, broad consultations, at different levels, in order to meet Russian interests of visibility, while retaining the 16+1 for consultation and cooperation on practical issues, such as non-practical issues: e.g., non-proliferation, nuclear safety, arms control, CNAD, economic and scientific issues."**

Mamedov hinted, during the Washington round, that if we can solve the problem of nukes and infrastructure ("the real security issues," as he called them), the Russians might be able to live without a new institutional arrangement, and that they might be able to make do instead with "16+1 and 1+1" (i.e., a dual structure that utilizes both NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia channels, along the lines of the way we've dealt with Bosnia and IFOR).

However, by the Moscow round in mid-July, both Mamedov and Primakov had hardened up, saying that it was quite important to have *both* a new structure and a better deal in existing ones.

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**Primakov: "At first glance, I like the Quint."**

**Mamedov: "My personal preference is for a combination of the Quint, because it's central to our security in terms of decision-making and central to adaptation/evolution of NATO, and a Contact Group on a permanent basis. After all, Bosnia will not be**

solved anytime soon, and other issues will need to be dealt with in that region, like Kosovo, and in the Transcaucasus. A combined Quint/CG would be more effective than the Minsk group. As for the people who aren't in the Quint or the CG, there's always the good old 16+1 to keep them happy. The guiding principle should be 'complementarity.'"

Since we don't know how important the seat-at-the-table issue will be in the end (that could depend in part on how much satisfaction they get on the security issue), we should keep exploring possible new structures, with the proviso that the Russians understand they will not have any chance whatsoever to exert "political guidance" over NATO.

*For any version, or combination of versions, to work, the Russians are going to have to get over their habit — rooted in Soviet mentality and mode of operation, and much in evidence during the CG's deliberations on Bosnia — of boycotting or threatening to boycott meetings when they don't like the agenda or the convening process.*

### **III: A Better Seat at Existing Tables**

At the end of the day, the "new" structure may turn out to be an enhancement of existing ones, along the following lines...

**1: A meaningful NATO-Russia relationship (16+1),**

which might include:

- a charter/framework agreement specifying both procedures and subject matter for consultation/joint action;
- joint military activities (NATO/Russia brigade, planning consultations for non-Article V contingencies; formally associated Russian military officers with NATO/CJTF headquarters; institutionalize IFOR arrangements;
- participation in armaments related cooperation through NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD);
- cooperation with NATO on theater missile defense.\*

**2: An enhanced role for NATO+ structures like PFP in which Russia participates directly, such as:**

- A Pan-Europe/PFP Council (subsuming, perhaps, the NACC?) with responsibility for setting the Partnership agenda and guiding its activities.

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\* Primakov raised this idea in Berlin. We should consider pushing this as an area where the Russians could be a real partner — in technological as well as political terms — in dealing with a serious threat to all of us. It could also pay dividends in the domestic political debate on enlargement which has yet to be fully joined.

- Possible political role in non-Article V actions in which Partners participate;
- Expanded partnership activities (training for peace enforcement; placement of partner officers at NATO headquarters);

**3: A strengthened role for other European institutions in which Russia is a member, notably OSCE.**

**IV: Russian Eligibility for NATO**

- As Mamedov predicted, Primakov has begun sounding us out on how we would react to Russia's formally declaring itself interested in joining NATO and asking for accession talks.

**Primakov: "I'm certain that if we raised this question, the answer would be no. The Europeans won't have it."\*** In his most recent conversation with Tom Pickering on this issue, Primakov asserted that Russia would not raise this issue.

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\* No question some Euros would object. French and German officials disagree with our position on this. They think we should stop kidding ourselves and simply say flat out, no way will Russia ever get into NATO. The British, however, have come around on this and in the end Kohl might support us.

- Our response should be consistent with what we've said since '93 — and what POTUS said to Yeltsin in September '94 in Washington:

1) **Never say never about anyone.** No PFP state, including Russia, is precluded from someday entering NATO. If Russia were to ask, there is no reason we could not usher them down the path others began this year — i.e., individual (“country-specific”) consultations about what NATO means to them.

2) The process of identifying prospective new NATO members is **self-selecting**; that is, it's up to interested countries to identify themselves; we have never indicated that we would pre-designate a PFP state as *ineligible*. By that principle, if Russia knocks on the door, we should not throw a bolt of some kind and shout through the peep-hole, “Go away! You'll never get in!” Rather, our reply should be, “Take a number and a seat in the garden.” We would then, *if they wanted*, start them down the same path of individualized consultations on NATO membership that others began this year.

That said, Russia, if it did knock, would have to understand that it would not be entering any time soon — and others would be passing it on the threshold.

Moreover, we and the Russians should both recognize that if they were to declare an interest in joining NATO — or even hold open the theoretical possibility of doing so — the

immediate reaction of others will be to suspect them of a cynical, and transparent, ploy to block expansion.

Therefore they would have to acknowledge quite publicly at the time of any such statement on their part that their own application would not in any way adversely affect the chances of other states getting in much soon, nor would it affect the pace of expansion.

***V: The Balts and the Ukrainians***

- The Russians are saying that they will not “negotiate” on the issue of Baltic and Ukrainian eventual membership in NATO. This has the distinctly ominous implication of a warning to us: “don’t even dare think about bringing in former Soviet republics.”

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**Primakov: “This is a special and emotional problem. In reality it is not acceptable to us that NATO is open to everyone. What if Chechnya were to apply? The problem for us today is that everything is going quite well [between Russia and the West]. But we are facing an issue that could disrupt or destroy everything. So we must be very, very careful.”**

**Mamedov: “We recognize that there can’t be anything on the record saying that Ukraine can never be in NATO. I understand that theoretically no one is banned. Internally, however, we would see Ukraine in NATO as a grave threat to our national security. It would be sufficient to kill START II. On others, like**

**Belarus, we just haven't thought about it enough. But in general, depending on how it's handled, NATO expansion could lead to a change our own nuclear posture, perhaps including the return of nukes to Belarus."**

- As long as they are saying "we're not going to discuss this issue," our reply should be: "Fine; we have no desire or intention to negotiate with you on what is rightly the subject only of negotiations between the Alliance and other sovereign states. Just don't think that your refusal to discuss the issue constitutes some sort of veto over the Balts and Ukrainians having the right to enter the process — and don't let your refusal appear to be pressure on them."
- If the nasty implication becomes explicit, we should slam back hard, in the same way that we have dealt in the past with assertions from Moscow of a sphere of influence or the "right" to intervene in defense of ethnic Russians.
- At the same time, we should keep telling the Russians that the Baltic States and Ukraine naturally have the same rights as other PFP states — *including Russia itself*. Thus, this point and the previous one, about Russia's eligibility for NATO, are mutually reinforcing.

*Mamedov reacted positively to an outline of our approach to Baltic security, which makes clear that the Balts are not precluded from eventual membership. He said that a similar*



*approach on Ukraine would probably be helpful.\* It is possible that confidence-building measures (in the CFE II context) could help with concerns about NATO exercises in the Baltics. We may also have to address the Kaliningrad issue which is neuralgic for the Russians and Germans.*

## **VI: Adaptation**

The new and enlarged NATO could include elements that are reassuring to Russia without diminishing NATO's effectiveness or giving Russia a say over the terms of enlargement. Useful here will be NATO's internal adaptation (including command arrangements and mission definitions) that stress NATO's role as stabilizer rather than military opponent of Russia.

NATO adaptation is part of the on-going process of moving NATO away from an organization designed to defend its members against a well-defined (i.e., Soviet) threat, toward an organization more generally designed to promote regional stability and democratic values, which benefit all European

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\* Our Baltic strategy has been blessed by principals and we've begun quietly to roll it out to the Balts, the Nordics, the CEE and the Allies. The strategy keeps open the possibility of the Balts' eventually coming in and proposes a variety of measures we (along with the EU and the Nordics) can take in the meantime to make sure that the Balts don't feel left out in the cold. We have a Ukraine strategy which, conceptually, has a similar approach but which will need to be operationalized.

states, members and non-members alike. This is apparent both in NATO's mission statement and its military arrangements.

Among those components of NATO adaptation (or what the Russians call "evolution") are the following:

- further progress à la "the New Strategic Concept" of Rome\*;
- readiness/transparency measures;
- redesigned command structures designed to promote European "visibility" and to increase flexibility to respond to non-Article 5 (e.g., peacekeeping) contingencies further reinforce the contention that "NATO is not directed at any state";
- CJTF offers an explicit opportunity for Russia to associate with NATO military structures as in Bosnia;
- adjustments to force structures designed to improve flexibility also reduce the impression of military threat to Russia.

*Further command and force structure changes will be necessary to accommodate new members. These can be designed to take into account confidence building vis à*

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\* In Rome in '91, as part of its acknowledgment that there is no longer a Soviet threat and that the new threats are regional instability and local conflict, NATO began to move away from defense along a front toward a concept based on rapid reaction and reserve force.

*vis Russia (as well as other non-members, e.g. Romania, Ukraine).*

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**Mamedov: “We can’t solve the problem just with arms-control measures or with structural and institutional innovations and fixes. We must also use the process, which is already under way, of NATO’s own evolution. Russia must plug into that; it must graft itself on it.**

**Here we must build on our experience and the momentum of our cooperation in Bosnia. I’m thinking of very mundane, down-to-earth, technical elements, like friend-or-foe identification. When our military forces exercise or conduct operations together, they identify each other as friends, not foes. That’s a big deal! Because of Bosnia, the idea is developing of ‘Russia for NATO and NATO for Russia.’ We’ve got to keep that going.**

**Perhaps, over time, even the intelligence-gathering mechanisms on the two sides will become transparent to each other, at least for certain specific purposes. One way to lick the infrastructure problem over time is to develop an increasing degree of complementarity in our infrastructures and our mentalities will follow.**

**We should seize every opportunity to dramatize that NATO really is evolving *toward* Russia —not in the sense that ‘the Americans are coming! The Americans**

are coming!," but in the sense that we're doing more stuff together.

The metaphor should be that of your spacecraft docking with ours: the docking can only take place on the new, that is, post-Cold War, parts of the structure."\* There is an important role for mil-mil and defense contacts to play here. Bill Perry, in building his personal relationship with Rodionov, should be able to show the MOD (and through them Lebed), that the constellation of adaptation, enlargement, and enhanced NATO-Russia ties will help the Russian military transform itself into a smaller but more disciplined force of which they, and all Russians, can take some pride.

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Solana would consider "the establishment of permanent liaison structures, such as Russian military liaison offices at SHAPE and the major subordinate commands; NATO military liaison office with the Russian general staff in Moscow; a Russian politico-military liaison office at NATO Headquarters; enhanced cooperation through PFP and Russian participation in CJTF

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\* Mamedov is borrowing this metaphor, quite wittingly no doubt, from the Vice President, who has used it several times to describe U.S.-Russian relations in general.

**in due course; the establishment of a NATO-information office in Moscow; increased practical cooperation in a 16 + 1 format (i.e. non-proliferation, arms control, peacekeeping, civil emergency, and scientific cooperation."**

### **VII: A Treaty?**

The idea keeps coming up of a formal agreement that would give visibility to NATO's non-adversary role.

Possibilities:

- A NATO-Russia treaty, pact or charter, with a formalized consultative mechanism\*;
- A Pan European Peace and Security Agreement to be signed contemporaneously with decision on enlargement, pledging mutual non-aggression and cooperation;
- Turning Helsinki, now a "political commitment," into a formal treaty.

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\* Sergei Rogov has suggested a) a non-aggression pact, b) a mutual cooperation agreement, c) a mutual security agreement, or d) a mutual defense treaty as a sort of sliding scale of arrangements. What we are talking about here would fall somewhere between b and c.

*The U.S. has always resisted this idea that the Russians and French have advocated.*

Solana's idea: "a political framework to be developed into a formal, but non-ratifiable document, possibly a charter."

### ***VIII: Beyond Europe***

- Mamedov and Primakov indicated that it will help if, in parallel with our NATO project, we can develop some cooperative — or at least consultative — joint ventures in other parts of the world. One candidate we've discussed is Northeast Asia (the U.S., Russia, Japan, China and the two Koreas). There is already some work going on at the academic/NGO level. While recognizing that Japan (and others) will be reserved about this idea, we should consider giving the exercise a more official cast by getting our EAP and S/P engaged with their Russian counterparts, perhaps at the DAS level.