	THE WHITE HOUSE	RELEASE IN
• •	WASHINGTON	DECLASSIFIE
MEMORANDUM OF CO	, NVERSATION	
SUBJECT:	Second Expanded Bilateral S President Boris Yeltsin of	
PARTICIPANTS:	The President Warren Christopher, Secreta Thomas Pickering, U.S. Amba Mack McLarty, Chief of Staf David Gergen, Counselor to Anthony Lake, Assistant to National Security Affairs Leon Fuerth, Assistant to t for National Security Aff Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secr (Designate) Frank Wisner, Under Secreta Policy Dr. Lynn Davis, Under Secre International Security Af	ssador to Russia f the President the President f he Vice Preside airs etary of State ry of Defense f tary of State f
· /	LTG Michael Ryan, Assistant Joint Chiefs of Staff Rose Gottemoeller, Director Ukraine and Eurasia Affai (Notetaker) Dmitry Zarechnak, Interpret	to the Chairma for Russia, rs, NSC Staff er
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DATE, TIME	January 14, 1994, 9:35 - 11 St. Catherine's Hall, The K	

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<u>President Yeltsin</u>: From the medicinal point of view, all of it was beneficial. (U)

<u>The President</u>: In no area have the results of our cooperation and partnership been more dramatic than in the area of arms control and nonproliferation. (U)

Successful agreement on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) underpins the broad scope of future space cooperation, including our Space Station partnership. The United States supports full Russian membership in the MTCR. We have gone a long way toward the mutual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from Belarus and Kazakhstan. Where Ukraine is concerned, the agreement we celebrated today shows how far we've come in the past year. And our cooperation on safe and secure dismantlement has advanced to include a broad scope of cooperation, including defense conversion. You asked me yesterday to commit to allocating ten percent of Nunn-Lugar funds directly to research facilities and I have promised to do so. (C)

I am also very pleased that we are signing today the contract for the purchase of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Russia. You and I have been wanting to do this since Vancouver. The contract is worth at least \$12 billion to Russia over the 20-year life of the contract. This is a very positive initiative. (U)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: [Nodding.] Yes. (U)

<u>The President</u>: Let me take a few minutes to talk about the momentum of arms control -- how to keep going to resolve old business and begin new. We must proceed as rapidly as possible to implement START I. The Ukraine agreement signed today will help us to do that. I think we should also look forward to the ratification of START II. We should discuss how we will press ahead with START II -- how you intend to press ahead with the new parliament. (U)

Now let's talk about the old business of biological weapons, which we have discussed before. I understand that you have made a personal commitment to end the offensive biological weapons program that you inherited from the Soviet Union when you became President of Russia. (U)

[Yeltsin nods.]

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Our people believe that there is still illegal work going on -our specialists have handed your side a report summarizing our concerns. I look forward to continuing to work with you to resolve this problem. (C)

[Yeltsin shakes his head vigorously and continues to shake his head, pointing to Minister of Defense Grachev, who also shakes his head.].

President Yeltsin: There is no illegal work. (U)

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<u>The President</u>: I am glad we have accelerated progress on chemical weapon issues. The U.S. and Russia have the largest CW stockpiles and we should lead the way on early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States is seeking Senate ratification by July -- we hope the Russian parliament will, too. (C)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: We have ratified the Chemical Weapons of Convention. We are not producing any new weapons. (C)

[Minister of Defense Grachev, in a quiet aside to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, says that Russia has <u>not</u> ratified the CWC and that he will tell the U.S. side Russian plans in that regard.]

<u>The President</u>: We have asked you to ratify by July. If you have already ratified, then we have to do a Bilateral Destruction Agreement that is consistent with the CWC. That's our next job. (C)

Now, on fissile materials: we already have broad agreement on the potential for progress. We appreciate the support you have given for a multilateral convention banning production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. I welcome your willingness to place materials under international safeguards. I think we should plan bilateral expert talks on this subject. I also want to welcome the Chernomyrdin-Gore working groups on shutting down plutonium production reactors and on nuclear material control and accounting. These are big issues for us, too, and we look forward to working with you on them. (U)


On the question of regional security threats --, it is important work closely on issues affecting North Korea, the Middle East, Iraq and South Asia. We have done a lot since Vancouver on replacing COCOM with a regime in which Russia would be an original member. We have a joint statement in that regard. It confirms Russia's readiness to end arms trade with Iran, Libya, Iraq and North Korea. (U)

President Yeltsin: [Interrupting:] Iran, Libya, Iraq, North
Korea? (U)

The President: Yes. We think the advantages of membership in this COCOM follow-on regime far outweigh the profits from arms sales to these countries. Last night we had a short discussion of the Iran issue. You reminded me that the submarine sale was made under the USSR, before you became President of Russia. Our State Department believes that your sales have been more extensive. I want to do a few more issues, then give the floor to Dr. Lynn Davis, who knows the facts on Iran. (C)

Regarding the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, we will need to work closely to secure the agreement of those countries still straddling the fence to the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. (U)

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I've also been very glad to hear that we have been able to work together on a Comprehensive Test Ban. I appreciate that you've continued the testing moratorium despite the recent Chinese test. I hope we can continue our bilateral cooperation on CTB issues as well as coordinate our positions among the P-5, anticipating the formal opening of CTB negotiations later this month. (U)

I'd like to mention a few more issues. As you know, we are proceeding with a welcome first step in strategic disengagement, joint detargeting. Now we have to move to fuller strategic disengagement. Our experts will be meeting later this month to discuss joint measures such as notifying strategic forces exercises. These measures help lend credibility to what we are both trying to achieve to lessen tensions. (C)

The last issue I'd like to discuss has to do with the ABM Treaty. I'm pleased with the progress we've made in technical talks on the recent U.S. proposals to multilateralize the ABM Treaty and create a demarcation between "theater" and "strategic" missile defenses. (C)

<u>Minister Grachev</u>: [Interrupting:] Strategic and non-strategic. (U)

<u>The President</u>: Yes. As you know, we take the ABM Treaty very seriously. We intend to work with you to make sure that this treaty regime continues intact. In that regard, I have a suggestion I would like to put to you on the ABM site at Skrunda, Latvia. (C)

President Yeltsin: Skrunda? (U)

The President: Yes, the ABM radar at Skrunda. I understand you need a reasonable time to withdraw from that site. That is truly understandable, but I wanted to raise with you the possibility of splitting the difference in your negotiations with Latvia over the withdrawal. Because of the other issues we have to address in Estonia, if we deal well with this issue in Latvia it would really help to send a good signal about our partnership and Russia's leadership role in Europe. It would have a positive impact on our Partnership for Peace discussions all across Europe. As I understand the present state of the negotiations, Russia is asking for five years of continued presence at the radar site and two years to withdraw, while Latvia is asking for three years of presence and one year to withdraw. I would suggest that you split the difference. If you are willing, I will do everything I can to secure Latvia's agreement to a fouryear, eighteen-month split. (C)

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Now I would like to turn to Dr. Davis so that she can go over the facts on the Iran arms sales to clear the air. (U)

<u>Dr. Davis</u>: Russia is now Iran's major arms supplier, the only country sending modern weapons to Iran. These deliveries amounted to \$600 million this year and included advanced fighter aircraft and tanks as well as the missiles to be delivered by

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these sophisticated aircraft. I have shared these details with some of your staff. The COCOM regime will end in the next month, to be replaced with a new export control regime that would have Russia as one of its original members. With that membership will come the benefits of high-technology trade in arms. In that context, I hope you will make it possible to end the sale of arms to Iran, one of the most serious threats facing you and us. (C)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: We have a full plate of issues -- of course, they are no less relevant for us than they are for you. We will begin with some issues to be discussed by the Minister of Defense, then I will discuss other issues. (U)


<u>Minister Grachev</u>: Taking into account the fact that we have quite a few issues to touch on, I would like to begin with biological weapons. We understand your anxiety, but I would like to inform you that in the context of the 1992 Trilateral Statement, your and UK experts visited two facilities after September 1992 and one in St. Petersburg before September 1992. We have agreed on a further schedule of visits and working group meetings. In response to your lingering concerns, we are prepared to organize visits of your experts to any other facility and also information exchanges to deal with any uncertainty. But these activities can only take place on a reciprocal basis. We work from that principle with you; we must insist on reciprocity. We also want to work with you on an international verification mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. (C)

On chemical weapons, we have encountered problems with implementation. This is an economic matter. (C)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: [Interrupting:] But we will not produce, just destroy. (U)

Minister Grachev: With the resolution of three major tasks, we will be able to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention. The first is conversion of production facilities, the second is financing of destruction and the third is preparing facilities for the physical process of elimination. We need to resolve these tasks in the fastest possible time in order to ease ratification of the convention. It is very important for there to be some economic benefits. We have to be able to demonstrate, that value is being extracted from chemical weapons plants through conversion. In order to be able to sell the convention to our Parliament, we will have to be able to show that we are getting value for the facilities. (C)

On the fissile material cutoff, we do not see a problem with concluding this on a bilateral basis. This is indicated by the way in which you stopped production of weapons grade plutonium. I would like to inform you that we will cease to operate plutonium production reactors by the year 2000. We believe it would serve our mutual interests if production of fissionable materials would be halted not only by the nuclear powers but also by the nuclear threshold states. We are not opposed to multilateral negotiations in this regard. (U)



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Where nuclear testing is concerned, the position of Russia in known. Boris Nikolayevich (Yeltsin) has expressed it. We are ready to go further, that is, to proceed to multilateral negotiations with the participation of the nuclear powers, but involving as large a number of countries as possible -- those that are on the threshold. We want to ensure that nuclear tests by all countries are halted and that effective verification of this occurs by national technical means. (U)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: Thank you. I would like to dwell on several other issues. First, our partnership relationship. It will be important to develop global stability on the basis of a new system of international relations involving an active U.S.-Russian partnership. That formula could be laid out in a joint document defining various aspects of our partnership. Second, on detargeting, I suggest that we set up a delegation to proceed with bilateral discussion of an agreement on detargeting. Third, on the ABM Treaty: I am prepared to respond positively to your proposal on Latvia, to proceed with a four-year, eighteen-month formula, but at the same time I request that you make a statement on the rights of the Russia-speaking population in Latvia. (C)

Now, on neutron-beam weapons: I understand that you are conducting laboratory tests of neutron beam weapons. We should either agree to develop these weapons together, or perhaps you could tell us that you are <u>not</u> developing them. (C)


We are for START III. Our newly elected Parliament will ratify START II and we are ready to do the next step with you. We must level the balance among the various branches of the strategic forces -- submarines and missiles, silo-based, mobile and advanced types. We are engaged in a pace of warhead destruction that is 1000 per month. We will continue along this front, as we agreed with you. (C)

On testing -- we are for a Comprehensive Test Ban. We are glad that the moratorium is continuing but need a greater step. If you and I decide then the other nuclear powers will join in this wise move. (C)

We support your initiative on the nonproliferation of missile technology and are glad to adhere to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Although we had preliminary discussions with Iran, in March 1993 we denied Iran delivery of heavy water reactors. I agree with Ms. Davis that we have agreement about the supply of weapons to Iran. However, it is difficult for us to revoke the contract because we would pay penalties amounting to \$4.3 billion. Of course, we understand your view and will do our best to lessen the volume of deliveries. (C)

On biological and chemical weapons, as the Minister of Defense told you, everything you said is so. We have agreed with you on CW destruction and your assistance, amounting to \$30 million. (C)

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I would in conclusion agree with you about regional problems --Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The time has come for us to proceed to propose an initiative to reshape world institutions such as the United Nations and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as other institutions that work in the old way. They do not stand up to current requirements. This is a very good time to come up with a common position on this, because it is the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations. It is possible to move a very serious way. I would also like to ask you to recognize the Commonwealth of Independent States as a world institution and part of the international world structure. (C)

<u>The President</u>: First, I want to say how much I appreciate your openness and the straightforward manner in which you are discussing these matters. If we are going to be friends and partners, we have to talk as we are today. I welcome General Grachev's statement on the BW visits. We will follow up on that. Second, with regard to the question of neutron beam research, we are <u>not</u> developing a weapon. Let us get our experts together to compare notes and recommend steps to address your concerns. I do not want you to be concerned about this. We will follow up with whatever steps are necessary to alleviate your concerns. (C)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: And then in one and the same stroke we would resolve the problem of external intelligence. (C)

<u>The President</u>: Yes. With regard to your interest in the Global Protection System: we have been doing a total review of our defense policy, one aspect of which is what should be the followup to the Strategic Defense Initiative. We have now finished that review, so our experts should meet and discuss what to do next with the Global Protection System program. (C)

On START III, I think it would be appropriate to assign a group of experts to discuss this issue, but I am concerned that we not go too far before we ratify START II and implement START I and II. It would be useful to develop a framework for discussion of START III, but I don't want to get so far ahead that people are concerned that our words are outrunning our deeds. (C).

President Yeltsin: [Nods.]

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<u>The President</u>: On Latvia, I understand that you are not prepared to respond to our suggestion. On the rights of the Russians there, I understand that the CSCE has sent a special team to Latvia to look into the minority rights issue. Perhaps we should let that team complete their work and then return to the idea. [Responding to comment that Yeltsin <u>had</u> responded favorably to timeframe suggestion:] Good, let us pursue this approach now and as part of it I will make a statement on the rights of Russian minorities. We will contact the Latvians immediately. (C)

<u>Mr. Lobov</u>: What about recognizing the CIS? (U)

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<u>The President</u>: [To Yeltsin:] Since you and I have never discussed reform of the United Nations, I don't know what to say about it --but I do think it's worth looking at. Let's get our Foreign Ministers together to discuss it. (C)

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<u>President Yeltsin</u>: Yes, let's get our Foreign Ministers together. (U)

<u>The President</u>: For my last point, I wanted to mention the positive sign of partnership that I take from our discussions of Skrunda, neutron weapons, START III and GPS. We need an active Russian-American partnership, but we have to be careful how we characterize that relationship to the rest of the world. The whole reason the United States did the Partnership for Peace was so that two powerful partners like Russia and the United States would not get together and divide Europe again. If we lead in the proper way, we have a chance to help create if not a united Europe, then an integrated Europe -- not divided for the first time in its history. People are concerned at how America is characterizing its role. We have to be careful how others look at us -- so people don't think we're dividing Europe. We have a remarkable partnership, but we have to be careful how we characterize it so that people don't think that we are carving up their countries and predetermining their futures. (C)

<u>President Yeltsin</u>: [Nodding.] All right, we should go to our press conference. Since it was to start at 10:45, it's already underway. [Time: 11:15.] (U)

<u>The President</u>: Good, then we don't have to answer many, questions. (U)

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-- End of Conversation --

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