


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

June 21, 1996

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor  
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**NOTED**



MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: JOHN R. SCHMIDT *JRS*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, June 24, 4:00 p.m.

Solana is making his second visit to the U.S. since becoming NATO Secretary General. He has been doing an outstanding job, fully vindicating our decision to support him for the post. His presence gives us the opportunity to compare notes on the IFOR mission at its half-way point and to look down the road ahead on NATO enlargement and adaptation in the aftermath of the Berlin ministerial. On the look ahead, you may want to preview some of the ideas set out in the Troika paper.

IFOR

The IFOR mission continues to progress smoothly as it consolidates its successful accomplishments of the first six months and prepares to support elections in September. You should again congratulate Solana on a successful operation and ask him what he believes will be the toughest challenges over the next three months. Regarding elections, IFOR reports that it is providing substantial support to the OSCE, including security, logistics, staff and communications. You should ask Solana what support IFOR will provide to ensure a secure environment during elections. IFOR has enhanced its patrols, particularly in the area of Pale, in an effort to inhibit Karadzic's activities and movement. You should ask Solana how the operation is progressing and review our policy regarding IFOR's role in detaining indicted war criminals. In addition, you should update Solana on our ongoing efforts to pressure Milosevic to remove Karadzic from power.

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Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 1.6, X6

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By VZ NARA, Date 9/16/2019  
2015-072-M (1.45)

NATO Enlargement

Solana has been one of our strongest supporters on NATO enlargement. Sensing early on that we would press for a NATO summit in the spring of 1997, he has been traveling through Central and Eastern Europe "predicting" that NATO would begin accession talks next year with the first group of aspiring members. This has served to reassure Poland and the others and taken the heat off of us. It has also helped to condition expectations within the Alliance that enlargement will happen according to this timetable. You should thank him for his help, which has been invaluable.

While making clear that we have yet to take a formal decision, you should tell Solana that we have the sense that the December NAC ministerial should announce the convening of a spring 1997 NATO summit to announce the beginning of accession talks with the first group of new members. December won't be the main event, but can't be a non-event, as the French might wish.

You should also suggest to Solana that the run-up to the December NAC will provide us with another opportunity to get discussions going with the Russians on building a NATO-Russia relationship. With Yeltsin newly reelected, Lebed not opposed, and Primakov appearing increasingly disposed to discuss the terms rather than the fact of enlargement, the Russians may be more receptive, particularly if we raise the issue in the context of a decision by key allies to go forward with a spring 1997 summit.

You should make clear to Solana that, in preparing for a summit, it will be equally important for the Alliance to decide what to do about those aspiring members who are not chosen. Among the ideas we are considering to address the continuing security concerns of the Baltic states (and others) are summit announcements that the first group chosen will not be the last; that the next group will be drawn from aspiring members not included in the first, and that the phase two process of intensive consultations will be institutionalized as part of PFP. We will have to think hard about how to word these decisions, to avoid forcing a moment of truth on Baltic NATO membership while also avoiding a tacit write-off of Baltic security under Russian pressure.

You might want to ask Solana for his views about the likely attitude of other allies regarding a spring 1997 summit. Although the Germans seemed most nervous about this a few months, they seem to be mollified by Primakov's changing tack and the prospect of Yeltsin's reelection. The French, however, have recently been giving out negative signals about moving in December to call for a spring 1997 summit. At last week's

Permreps Lunch, the French Ambassador baldly stated that NATO adaptation would have to come first. Our suspicion is that the French would not want to take the heat from the Poles and others for delaying enlargement and simply want to ensure maximum leverage for adaptation. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to hear what Solana thinks about this, while soliciting his continued active support.

### NATO Adaptation

Our own view is that NATO enlargement and adaptation (implementing CJTF and building an ESDI within NATO) should ideally come together at the same moment in time. We would like to see both processes finished by a spring 1997 summit so that France could use the occasion to announce it is reentering the integrated military structure under the pretext of joining the "new NATO." You should try this idea out on Solana to see if he appreciates its political beauty.

On a more practical level, the Berlin agreement on ESDI principles papered over some potentially troubling differences in approach. We agreed to the dual-hatting of appropriate personnel from within the NATO command structure to assume specifically European responsibilities, but insist that they take their orders from SACEUR and the NAC until and unless they are called on to undertake specific WEU-led missions. Even in those circumstances we would insist on continuing NATO monitoring of NATO assets. We also agreed that the WEU could make requests to NATO for generic planning on possible WEU-led missions. These, essentially, are the only roles we foresee for the WEU. The French, on the other hand, have shown disturbing signs that they favor a more extensive WEU role vis-à-vis the European defense identity, and may even seek a system whereby the WEU has automatic claim on NATO assets.

Whether these concerns are justified should emerge in the months ahead as the NATO Military Committee tackles the command structure aspects of ESDI--the dual-hatting--and NATO political military bodies address the liaison with the WEU. You should emphasize to Solana that we did not agree to an ESDI within NATO as a means of building up a separate WEU apparatus. This means that the essential WEU role vis-à-vis ESDI will be to request planning and borrow assets. While the WEU can exercise day-to-day political control over WEU-led operations involving NATO assets--with appropriate NATO oversight--it cannot exercise an intrusive function over the NATO command structure.

In making these points, you should ask Solana whether he sees problems with the French on these issues down the road and, if so, how he would propose addressing them.

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Concurrence by: Daniel Fried

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