



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 29, 1996

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
~~NOT FOR THE SYSTEM~~

**NATO-Russia: A Framework for the Next Phase**

A key element of a comprehensive approach to European security issues is the NATO-Russia relationship. Our discussions will be taking place in a U.S.-Russia dialogue, which has now been endorsed by our closest allies. We will be conducting this dialogue in the broadest possible framework, since our agenda with Moscow encompasses European security writ large, not simply NATO enlargement.

Defining the Issues

In discussions with senior U.S. officials, Russian Foreign Minister Primakov has outlined his agenda for the next phase of European security discussions. Primakov's -- and Russia's -- strategy includes two basic elements:

- continued efforts with our NATO allies to delay -- or even prevent -- NATO enlargement; and
- simultaneously establishing the Russian-NATO dialogue that we have long sought (i.e. "Track Two").

Within this second element, the Russians are seeking -- via eight "areas for exploration" -- to (a) prevent the movement of NATO "infrastructure" (especially nuclear weapons) onto the territory of new allies; (b) draw red lines around certain countries (e.g. the Baltics and Ukraine) to prevent their ever being considered for NATO membership; and (c) establish some sort of binding mechanism for Russia to influence NATO and European decision-making.

It is in the interest of both Russia and the West that this agenda not be defined as Russia's price for allowing NATO expansion to go forward. From a Russian perspective, they cannot (and probably should not ever want to) endorse formally NATO enlargement, whatever concessions they may claim to have extracted. For the West, the image of Russia holding expansion hostage is unacceptable.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

Thus, our first goal will be to maintain the definition that we and NATO have established so far -- we want the most cooperative possible security relationship with Russia; we want Russia to be integrated in a new sort of European security community; we want Russia's voice to be heard in European decision-making councils; NATO expansion and other institutional developments are designed to further this goal.

Establishing this definition will be the first goal of the U.S.-Russia that are about to begin. Our closest allies have endorsed this method of handling the NATO-Russia dialogue. We have already established a solid foundation for this effort. We will remind the Russians of the key elements of this foundation:

- the Clinton-Yeltsin understandings of September 1994;
- decisions taken at the December 1994 Budapest Summit to strengthen the OSCE;
- the U.S.-Russian Joint Statement on European Security of May 1995;
- the May 1995 "Beyond PfP" agreement between NATO and Russia (which establishes a special 16+1 relationship);
- the draft "Political Framework" document which NATO tabled in September 1995 in an effort to move the relationship forward and give it more substance;
- the NATO/Russian agreement on IFOR command and control; and
- the results of the May 1996 CFE review conference (including plans for further adaptation of the CFE Treaty).

Using these elements as a basis, our goal will be to find the widest possible consensus with the Russians on the outlines of new security structures in Europe. We will seek concrete cooperation in as many areas as possible.

Specific NATO issues can be supplemented with a joint project for the December 1996 OSCE Lisbon Summit and the ongoing security model exercise; with detailed consultations on ongoing issues in Bosnia; and with the greatest possible cooperation on CFE.

A first step will be to define a joint work program which encompasses the above issues. Core issues and political understandings will be handled between Deputy Secretary Talbott and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov. But a number of other consultations will also begin, with the goal of defining the broad program for the next twelve months.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

### Defining the Solutions

The next step will be to define the solutions. This does not mean that we need a specific answer for every issue the Russians (or others) may have raised. Some answers will emerge from the discussions themselves. Others will depend on our success in related areas.

What we will seek to do is set forth the broad outlines of our joint strategy. We need to define up front the basic goals we intend to achieve and then work to fill in the blanks of the areas Primakov outlined as ripe for "exploration" in the next phase of U.S.-Russian discussions.

### A Possible Method

In addressing Primakov's eight proposed areas of discussion, we will follow a method used before with considerable success. In this case, it will include:

- a first presentation of basic U.S. and NATO goals. The key word should be **adaptation**. We intend to adapt NATO, the OSCE and our security partnerships to new realities. The Berlin meeting defined a new NATO. The 1997 summit will continue in that spirit. Enlargement will be only one aspect of that adaptation. Many Russian concerns will be taken up by other aspects of adaptation, including NATO's continuing offer of a special relationship with Russia.
- a sketch of the content of adaptation -- a new European visibility; new command structure; strengthening of PFP; new roles and missions, etc. We should offer the greatest possible transparency to avoid surprises on either side.
- organization of topics. On the basis of this adaptation, we should organize areas which need work. NATO subject matter is now well defined. Two other important areas are OSCE and the security model and consultative arrangements. The consultative point should probably be decided only after most of the other subjects are near agreement.
- mobilization of resources. As noted above, the core discussions should be supplemented by more detailed discussions on issues such as PFP, OSCE and arms control. This will make it possible to add substances to the broader understandings.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

DRAFTED:EUR:JCKornblum  
07/23/96; SERPMP 11812