## 20 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

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SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.

Colonel King was present for Item 3. Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.

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Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6.

1. Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia

Mr. McCone reported that all high-performance missions scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week, due to bad weather.

## 2. Sabotage Program, Cuba

In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special Group every two weeks. The Group agreed with this procedure. They felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate, and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.

3. Haiti - Political Action 18

The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King, in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in attempting to unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are likely to end up with a far worse situation.

Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes the necessity of taking some action. He said the Department is principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any such operation might be revealed.

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Colonel King cautioned that we will not be in a position to know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a try. Mr. McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most promising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is eventually to accomplish the defection of significant elements of the Army, the Palace Guard, etc.

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## 4. Monthly Report on North Vietnam Operations

Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past month, and those planned for the immediate future.

5. Congo - Training of Special Army Unit 98

The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in abeyance.7

6. Iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems

The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper of the 19th of June.

Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. The Group agreed that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of commitment to additional actions.7

96

7. Plans for Immediate Future

Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened.

Thomas A. Parrott

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- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone



that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commitments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.

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It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.

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