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MINUTES
OF
MEETING
OF
JANUARY 30, 1964

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 10:00	Chairman's Time
2.	10:00 - 11:00	Acting Director of Central Intelligence Lt. General Marshall Carter
3.	11:00 - 11:30	Executive Session
4.	11:30 - 12:30	Director, National Reconnaissance Office Under Secretary Brockway McMillan, USAF
5.	12:30 - 1:45	Executive Session
6.	1:45 - 2:30	Lunch--White House Mess
7.	2:30 - 4:00	Consideration of Report to the President
8.	4:00 - 5:00	Meeting with the President
9.	5:00 - End of Day	Executive Session and Discussion of Future Board Business.

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER JENKINS

Following up on the recent conversation which you had with Mr. Clark Clifford, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, there are listed below the names of the personnel of the Board who are scheduled to meet with the President on January 30 at 4:00 PM.

Mr. Clark Clifford	- Washington, D. C.
Dr. William O. Baker	- Murray Hill, N. J.
Lt. Gen. James D. Little	- Redondo Beach, Calif.
Mr. Gordon Gray	- Washington, D. C.
Dr. Edwin H. Land	- Cambridge, Mass.
Dr. William L. Langer	- Cambridge, Mass.
Mr. Robert D. Murphy	- New York, N. Y.
Mr. Frank Pace, Jr.	- New York, N. Y.
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne	- Washington, D. C.

Copies of this memorandum are being provided to Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell and Mr. Pierre Salinger for their information.

J. Patrick Coyne
Executive Secretary

cc: Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell
Mr. Pierre Salinger

Attached memoranda (Tabs A through H) were used by the Chairman as the basis for an oral briefing on the Origin of the Board at the PFIAB meeting with President Johnson on January 30, 1964.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Origin of the Board: From 1946 to 1954 a variety of ad hoc groups were constituted at the Presidential level to review selected aspects of the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

In 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recommended a permanent bi-partisan "Watch Dog Committee" (to be composed of members of both Houses of Congress and of public-spirited citizens) to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies and effectiveness of the foreign intelligence activities of the several Government agencies concerned, reporting thereon both to the Congress and the President. President Eisenhower rejected this proposal.

In February 1956, as a tactic to forestall creation of a Watch Dog Committee, President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order (Tab A) establishing his own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, to maintain a continuing, independent review of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities. President Eisenhower's Board functioned continuously from February 1956 to January 1961. (The membership of the Eisenhower Board is listed under Tab B.)

In January 1961, President Kennedy decided that there was a continuing need for a Presidential advisory board on foreign intelligence, but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members. In the interim he requested that the Executive Secretary of the prior Board remain in office and that he continue to review and report to the President on the conduct of our foreign intelligence effort.

Mission of the Board: On May 4, 1961 following the disaster suffered by the U.S. at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President, by Executive Order No. 10938 (Tab C), established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Order directs the Board (a) to conduct a continuing, independent review and assessment of all functions of the departments and agencies having responsibilities in "the foreign intelligence and related fields" and (b) to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of these activities, which are required in the interest of foreign policy, national defense and security. The phrase "related fields" pertains to highly sensitive covert operations relating to political action, propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, escape and evasion, subversion against hostile states or groups and support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. These covert operations are to be conducted in such manner that, if uncovered, the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim responsibility for them.

Membership of the Board: President Kennedy's Executive Order provides that "members of the Board shall be appointed from among qualified persons outside the Government..." All appointments to

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the Board have been made on that basis. (The Board's membership is listed under Tab D.) The Board was chaired initially by Dr. James Killian, Jr. In April 1963 when Dr. Killian resigned, President Kennedy appointed Mr. Clark Clifford as Chairman. In appointing Mr. Clifford, the President directed that the Board "continue to perform the highly important function of maintaining an independent review and assessment of the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the departments and agencies having responsibilities in this field." (Tab E)

Coincident with Mr. Clifford's appointment, the President made a public announcement emphasizing that he would "continue to look to the Board for non-partisan, objective appraisals of the activities of our intelligence agencies in order to assure their efficient management and maximum effectiveness." (Tab F)

Review Procedures of the Board: The Board maintains its continuing, independent review and assessment of U.S. foreign intelligence activities and covert action operations through the following means:

(1) Panels (composed of designated Board Members and the Executive Secretary) which are responsible for keeping the full Board informed with respect to significant actions, problems, gaps, overlaps, and deficiencies in specified areas of the overall foreign intelligence effort.

(2) On-the-scene reviews, both in the U.S. and abroad, of intelligence-related activities. These reviews (made by designated Members and/or the Executive Secretary) encompass pertinent activities of the CIA, the Departments of State and Defense, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the National Security Agency and the Service Cryptologic Agencies. Such reviews have been made at the Seat of Government, elsewhere in the Continental U.S., in Latin America, Scandinavia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East.

(3) Review of periodic progress reports and special reports, submitted to the Board by the military and civilian intelligence agencies.

(4) Review of major intelligence publications, produced on a daily, weekly, monthly, or "spot" basis by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and by the U.S. intelligence community collectively. These publications include current intelligence reports and appraisals of significant day-to-day developments, National Intelligence Estimates, Special Intelligence Estimates, and the intelligence results of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions.

(5) Briefings on selected intelligence topics from agency heads and other officials associated with the several U.S. intelligence agencies.

(6) Discussions, as appropriate, with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the President's Special

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Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Heads of the several intelligence agencies.

(7) Frequent meetings of the full Board.

Meetings of the Board: (From May 1961 through November 1963, President Kennedy's Board held 25 separate meetings covering a total of 39 days. These meetings included sessions with the President, which provided opportunities for discussion of topics of major significance. (President Eisenhower's Board held 18 meetings covering a total of 39 days during its five-year tenure.)

Recommendations of the Board: During the past 2½ years the Board submitted to the President a total of 170 recommendations, summarized under Tab G. (During its five year tenure the Eisenhower Board made 42 recommendations; these are summarized under Tab H.) A large percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's Board involved activities internal to the Department of Defense; a lesser proportion involved activities internal to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of them related to activities of joint interest to two or more member agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170 recommendations, the President approved 125, disapproved 2, and temporarily deferred final action on the remainder. Of the 125 approved recommendations, implementing actions on 85 have been substantially completed. The remaining Presidentially-approved recommendations deal with substantive intelligence matters warranting continued Board attention and, possibly, the submission of further Board recommendations to the President.

Intelligence Areas of Major Concern: These include:

- (1) The ever-increasing cost, size and complexity of the overall intelligence effort. This fiscal year the effort will cost \$3.7 billion. Its personnel strength is in excess of 149,000. (Of this number, over 131,000 are in the Department of Defense and 17,000 in CIA.) The effort is diffused throughout a number of Government agencies including the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Service Cryptologic Agencies; the Unified, Specified and Component Commands; and the Central Intelligence Agency.
- (2) The acquisition on a priority basis of crucially-needed intelligence on the long-range missile capability of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
- (3) The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection of photographic and signals intelligence through surveillance satellites, manned aircraft and drones (e.g. CORONA, LANYARD, GAMBIT, ARGON, U-2, OXCART, TAGBOARD).
- (4) The Signals Intelligence Program for the interception and analysis of the governmental and military communications of foreign governments, and of electronics emanations associated with their missile and space vehicle activities.

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(5) The handling and analysis of intelligence information (received in massive amounts) as the basis for (a) the preparation of appraisals of current intelligence indicators and early warning data for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) the formulation of longer-range national intelligence estimates for use in the policy-making process.

(6) The U. S. clandestine espionage effort for the collection of vitally-needed intelligence concerning the plans, actions and capabilities of the Sino-Soviet bloc in areas significantly affecting our national defense and security.

(7) The safeguarding of sensitive U.S. information (including intelligence and intelligence sources and techniques) by means of (a) positive counterespionage penetration of Soviet bloc intelligence operations targeted against our Government on a world-wide basis, (b) the security screening and security supervision of personnel engaged in sensitive U.S. Government activities, and (c) physical security measures for the protection of sensitive U.S. material, installations and operations.

(8) The covert operations conducted by the CIA in political action, propaganda and related fields with the objective of influencing the complexion and orientation of selected foreign governments.

(9) The budgeting and management, particularly in the Department of Defense, of the complex programs which make up our total foreign intelligence effort. (Over 85% of our foreign intelligence dollar expenditures falls within the management and control responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.)

(10) The coordination and guidance of all significant aspects of our entire foreign intelligence effort as a means of achieving maximum effectiveness in meeting critical intelligence needs of our Government.

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
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
May 1961 - - - - November 22, 1963

Board Reports of July 2, July 18,
October 4, and October 17, 1961.

Rec. #1:

The Board made a series of 17 recommendations calling for (1) a redefinition of the role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and (2) a reorganization and redirection of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These recommendations were submitted on the basis of a Board study requested by the President in anticipation of the appointment of a new DCI which subsequently took place on November 29, 1961. The Board recommended as follows:

- (1) That the President designate the DCI as the Government's chief intelligence officer having primary responsibility for lending coordination and guidance to the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort.
- (2) That the DCI consider establishing a small staff to assist him in providing coordination and guidance to the intelligence effort.
- (3) That the DCI, although retaining over-all responsibility for the CIA, be directed by the President to assign to the Deputy DCI the day-to-day operational direction of the CIA.
- (4) That the DCI be housed in the Executive Office of the President, in order to emphasize his role as chief intelligence officer of the United States.
- (5) That the DCI consider taking with him to the Executive Office those CIA personnel engaged in the preparation of national intelligence estimates and evaluations.



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- (6) That the DCI participate with the Bureau of the Budget in its review of the intelligence budgets of the various U. S. intelligence agencies.
- (7) That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing the preparation of national intelligence estimates by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the President and other White House officials as required.
- (8) That the DCI serve as Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and represent the President on intelligence policy matters at the national level.
- (9) That CIA (1) place increasing emphasis on the acquisition of "hard" intelligence, and (2) decrease the excessive emphasis being placed upon covert action programs.
- (10) That CIA devise means for identifying and eliminating covert action programs of low potential.
- (11) That CIA consider the feasibility of transferring clandestine operations and covert operations from CIA to some other agency.
- (12) That, if feasible, the headquarters administration of all or portions of clandestine activities be relocated to points outside of Washington (e.g., to New York City, and other appropriate points).
- (13) That deeper cover be achieved for all clandestine activities and covert actions.
- (14) That efforts be made to reduce the visibility of our foreign intelligence activities through (1) action by the DCI to reduce to a minimum the appearances of CIA officials before Congressional Committees, and (2) action by officials of all intelligence agencies to refrain from public statements concerning substantive intelligence matters.

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- (15) That improvements be achieved in the quality of CIA personnel.
- (16) That consideration be given to a possible change in the name of the CIA.
- (17) That there be realignments in the organization and staffing of the CIA, with a view to increasing its effectiveness.

Rec. #2: That positive action on the new leadership of CIA be taken as soon as possible.

Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #3: That the Department of State and the CIA conduct a study of the number of CIA representatives serving overseas under official State Department cover, with a view to an orderly reduction of such cover positions in appropriate instances.

Rec. #4: That the U. S. Intelligence Board create the means for assessing and reporting early warning indications of developing "cold war" crisis situations in any part of the world (such early warning to be handled separately from "hot war" indications dealt with in the National Indications Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee).

Rec. #5: That there be a strengthening of the capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) in the acquiring and processing of Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence, through the following means: (1) new legislation authorizing the Department of Defense to summarily deny or revoke the employment at NSA of any person unless such employment is found to be consistent with national security interests; (2) new legislation exempting the NSA from statutes and regulations governing employment in the U. S. civil service, as required to enable NSA to accomplish its sensitive and vital mission; (3) a requirement for full management and budgetary control of NSA by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (4) central supervision by NSA of all

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collection and processing of Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) done by military intelligence elements within the Department of Defense; (5) a realistic re-examination of the system followed by the U. S. Intelligence Board in levying intelligence collection requirements upon the NSA; and (6) support by the Defense Department to meet such vital needs of NSA as ship-borne intercept stations, and equipment for intercept coverage of submarines and critical land areas, in order to meet national as distinct from purely military requirements.

Rec. #6: That the President support the Secretary of Defense in a reorganization of Defense Department intelligence activities through the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency.

Rec. #7: (This recommendation, on the subject of possibly changing the name of the CIA, is dealt with in the summary of Rec. #1 (16), above).

Rec. #8: That the President oppose: (1) the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence; and (2) Congressional investigations of the CIA.

Rec. #9: That every effort be made to protect the President against public identification with specific U. S. projects and programs involving (1) clandestine espionage activities, and (2) covert political, propaganda, psychological, paramilitary and related activities.

Rec. #10: That the President lend his influence in persuading Congress to reduce its demands for testimony by officials of the CIA.

Rec. #11: That the Departments of State and Defense, and the CIA, be requested to report semiannually on the status of their respective actions to implement the 43 recommendations made on December 15, 1961, by the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

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Rec. #12:

That the President lend his prestige (in the period of transition involving the selection of a new DCI, and related matters) to support and enhance the morale of the intelligence community, and to restore public confidence in the CIA, by: (1) a Presidential statement commending the work of those serving in our intelligence agencies; and (2) an indication by the President of appreciation for the long, distinguished and pioneering work of Allen Dulles in the foreign intelligence field.

Board Report of July 18, 1961

Rec. #13:

That CIA review its plans for occupancy of the newly-completed CIA Headquarters Building at Langley, and consider the feasibility of housing at some other place the administration of CIA's clandestine activities.

Rec. #14:

That the mechanism of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group be employed in such a manner as to ensure: (1) political control of all covert actions (including paramilitary operations whether or not assigned to the Department of Defense); with an opportunity for the Department of State to bring suggestions and judgments to bear on covert action operations in the planning and execution stages; (2) the submission for resolution by the President of matters involving disagreement by any member of the Special Group with respect to a proposed covert action operation; and (3) a current review and evaluation by the Special Group of all covert action authorizations then in effect, in order that the Department of State might be fully informed of all such authorizations.

Board Report of October 4, 1961

Rec. #15:

That the U. S. Intelligence Board make a thorough assessment with a view to improving the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence concerning scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet bloc.

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Rec. #16:

That, because the need for intelligence on Soviet nuclear and missile capabilities is more urgent than the current need for geodetic and mapping information, urgent action be taken as follows: (1) the scheduling of as many additional CORONA shots as possible in the coming months, with postponement of ARGON shots, if necessary; (2) the THOR-CORONA system to be relied upon as the photographic reconnaissance "work horse" while other systems are in the developmental stage; (3) a sufficient number of CORONA systems be made available to meet basic needs, either by ordering long lead-time items beyond the present CORONA system, or by ordering additional CORONA systems until advanced systems are improved; and (4) steps be taken to ensure launch pad availability to permit future CORONA flights for quasi-tactical objectives.

(Subsequently, based on information obtained in the course of its continuing review of the National Reconnaissance Program, the Board submitted to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a report dated July 5, 1963, in which the Board:

(1) noted a significant series of failures which had occurred in photographic reconnaissance satellite missions, because of malfunctions of booster and other systems; and (2) suggested that the President's office appropriately re-emphasize the urgent need for achieving and maintaining a dependable and continuing photographic reconnaissance satellite capability -- lest our Government be denied vitally-needed intelligence essential to our intelligence-estimating and policy-formulating processes relative to the Sino-Soviet bloc.)

Rec. #17:

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group re-evaluate and make recommendations to the President on the desirability and feasibility of conducting (under special security safeguards) U-2 photographic reconnaissance missions over selected areas of the China mainland.

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Rec. #18:

That the DCI, as Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board, explore the feasibility of expediting the operational readiness date (April 1963) of the new National Photographic Interpretation Center at the Naval Weapons Plant.

Rec. #19:

That (1) the Defense Department report on the feasibility and status of two technical projects initiated by the U. S. Air Force to eliminate delays in the transmission of critical Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence data to Strategic Air Command Headquarters; and (2) the Department of Defense comment on the adequacy of interim remedial measures which the Board had proposed as a tentative means of reducing delays in the transmission of such intelligence data to SAC headquarters.

Rec. #20:

That preparatory to a Board review of the security of U. S. classified intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods, the DCI submit a detailed report on the implementation of the following: (1) Section 102-d-3 of the National Security Act of 1947 which provides that the DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; and (2) Section 3 of National Security Council Directive No. 1 which prescribes methods by which the DCI, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods, from unauthorized disclosure.

Rec. #21:

That at the earliest possible date action be taken on the Board's previous recommendations for a redefinition of the role of the DCI and for an improved organization of CIA activities. (See Rec. #1, above.)

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Board Report of October 17, 1961

Rec. #22:

The Board re-emphasized to the President its conviction as to the importance of outlining to the newly-chosen DCI the objectives of previous Board recommendations concerning the coordinating role of the DCI. (See Rec. #1.)

Rec. #23-a:

With respect to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Board proposed that it review, with the Defense Department and the CIA, the contemplated organizational structure of the NRO for purposes of clarifying its responsibilities and increasing its effectiveness in the coordinated management and operation of all satellite and overhead reconnaissance projects.

Board Report of June 26, 1962

Rec. #23-b:

With further reference to the National Reconnaissance Office, the Board noted that the NRO agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI was not adequate to support an efficient NRO organization; and the Board recommended further study to achieve a better documentary basis for the NRO with particular reference to National Security Council directives possibly in conflict with the NRO plan then existing.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #23-c:

With further reference to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) the Board recommended that a recently-completed draft of a new NRC agreement be adopted by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, and that in the implementation of the NRO plan there be: (1) a clear channel of guidance and authorization from the policy decisions of the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the DCI; (2) a clear and effective connection between the advance technology and planning of the National Reconnaissance Program and the development of plans for reconnaissance capabilities for the Department of Defense and the military services; (3) plans for improved continuity of management of the NRO, particularly

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with respect to the availability of career specialists heavily engaged in meeting schedules for new satellites, aircraft and other reconnaissance instruments; (4) action to ensure that Department of Defense directives which guide the National Reconnaissance Program are consistent with pertinent directives from higher authority, such as National Security Council Intelligence Directives; and (5) within the Defense Department a clarification of present and planned relationships as between the NRO, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

Board Report of October 17, 1961

Rec. #24:

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review the paramilitary operations being carried out by the CIA in Laos (and elsewhere) to determine whether those operations, given their present scale, are properly assigned to the CIA.

Rec. #25:

(Not a recommendation -- this was a report to the President on the progress achieved by the Defense Department in performance of its share of the responsibility for the efficiency of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network for the quick transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data from overseas posts to headquarters in Washington.)

Board Report of January 11, 1962

Rec. #26:

Based on a review of advance intelligence concerning the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup incidents, the Board recommended that: (1) a sense of urgency be imparted at field and headquarters levels of U. S. intelligence agencies, with a view to ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are of potential significance to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States; (2) without imposing undue delay on the transmission of raw intelligence to Washington,

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State Department officials at overseas posts prepare periodic appraisals of developing crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consideration at Washington in the preparation of intelligence analyses and estimates;

(3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board, and its subsidiaries such as the Watch Committee, ensure that intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of view which may develop in the intelligence estimative process; and

(4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested to review arrangements and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA's intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are furnished to the DCI for information and for use in preparing intelligence estimates.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #27:

Based on an on-the-scene review (made by representatives of the Board) of U. S. intelligence activities in Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Israel, the Board recommended as follows:

- (1) That U. S. Ambassadors be given an opportunity to comment on the drafts of proposed National Intelligence Estimates prepared in Washington with respect to foreign countries to which the Ambassadors are assigned.
- (2) That Political Sections and Ambassadors at U. S. Embassies be given an opportunity to comment on all political intelligence at the time it is being sent to headquarters, except when this would unduly delay the reporting process.
- (3) That U. S. Ambassadors be made aware of the capability and security of emergency clandestine radio stations installed in selected U. S. Embassies.

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- (4) That U. S. intelligence personnel be assigned to overseas posts where best use can be made of their language abilities.
- (5) That when intelligence information is reported that later proves erroneous, appropriate corrective notification be given to recipients of the erroneous reports.
- (6) That the DCI and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensure the validity of intelligence collection requirements levied upon the CIA for support of the military in wartime.
- (7) That the Defense Department review the Attache Systems of the three Military Services to determine the advisability of establishing a single Military Attache System.
- (8) That the Defense Department ensure adequate foreign language training of Military Attaches prior to their assignment to overseas posts.
- (9) That the Defense Department staff Military Attache posts on the basis of specific intelligence needs and on the basis of linguistic and other specialized talents.
- (10) That the Defense Department, for intelligence-related purposes, ensure efficient allocation of aircraft to Military Attaches at overseas posts.
- (11) That the Defense Department equip field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network with capability for rapid communication of critical messages among major and subordinate military commands in the field.
- (12) That the DCI review NSC 5412/2 and related National Security Council Intelligence Directives, and recommend any necessary revisions to ensure adequate guidance to U. S. Ambassadors and CIA Station Chiefs overseas, with regard to (1) covert actions directed at targets within foreign countries, and (2) covert actions directed against third country targets.

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- (13) That the Signals Intelligence Panel of the President's Board, in the course of its review of National Security Agency operations, determine whether significant intelligence gathered by NSA intercept stations in the field is being furnished to U. S. intelligence agency consumers (and to field consumers) in timely fashion.
- (14) That the U. S. Intelligence Board review (1) the adequacy of criteria used for the selection of a particular Military Cryptologic Service or the CIA for Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence intercept operations in a given country; and (2) the grounds for selecting targets for such operations in a given foreign country.
- (15) That improvements be made in the communications of the U. S. Embassy in Cairo, particularly under emergency circumstances which would not permit use of commercial communications channels.
- (16) That the Defense Department consider changing the Army Attache station in Lebanon from a "hardship" to a "regular" post, to permit longer tours of duty and continuity of experience.
- (17) That the DCI and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army, improve the coordination of clandestine espionage activities conducted by the Army and the CIA in Iran (as called for in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5).
- (18) That the National Security Agency make an on-the-scene technical review of CIA's covert Communications/Electronics Intelligence collection effort in Behshahr, Iran, to ensure maximum technical use of this strategically-positioned activity against Soviet missile and satellite operations.

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- (19) That the National Security Agency take steps in Iran to ensure that: (1) the U. S. Embassy is furnished significant intelligence developed by the U. S. Army Security Agency intercept detachment which is housed on the Embassy grounds, and (2) the National Security Agency provides to the Teheran CIA Station Chief any data developed by the Army Security Agency detachment concerning (a) communications of the Iranian security and intelligence forces, and (b) illicit Soviet agent communications networks targeted against Iran from Odessa.
- (20) That the State Department and CIA review the situation in Iran with a view to: (1) improving the coordination of U. S. intelligence activities in that country; (2) agreeing on procedures for the handling by the U. S. Embassy of political intelligence developed by the CIA in Iran; and (3) maintaining an appropriate proportion between the numbers of Foreign Service Officers and CIA representatives assigned to the Political Section of the Embassy in Iran.
- (21) That the DCI ensure that: (1) in Cyprus increasing emphasis is placed on covert operations, particularly in the trade union and newspaper fields; and (2) the CIA Stations in Greece and Turkey provide support to the covert action operations of the CIA Station in Cyprus.
- (22) That the DCI ensure that the CIA Station Chief in Cyprus keeps the U. S. Ambassador informed of the nature of a clandestine intelligence program in which the CIA Station Chief is engaged with the Cypriot Minister of the Interior.
- (23) That the DCI ensure that the U. S. Ambassador in Athens is adequately informed about the substantive nature of the special relationship between the CIA Station Chief and the ruling and policy-making officials of the Greek Government.
- (24) That the DCI reassign CIA personnel who are in excess of the requirements of the CIA Station in Athens.

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- (25) That the DCI consider furnishing the U. S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv with details of CIA-Israeli intelligence undertakings involving Africa.
- (26) That the DCI consider the proposal (made to Board representatives by the Israeli Intelligence and Security Service) calling for (1) extended CIA-Israeli coordination of intelligence activities in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere; and (2) a cooperative mechanism for the review, discussion and assessment of intelligence problems relating to the Middle East and peripheral countries.
- (27) That the Air Force consider the assignment to Tel Aviv of an Air Force Attache having jet fighter experience, because of the intelligence significance of jet aircraft operating in this area of the Middle East.
- (28) That officials making up the Special NSC 5412/2 Group: (1) examine the Turkish government's request for access to operational and early warning data of the NSA-Service Cryptologic intercept sites in Turkey; (2) consider assigning to the U. S. Ambassador in Turkey the responsibility for negotiating the Turkish request; and (3) assure coordination of the efforts of the many U. S. elements in and out of Turkey which are working on various aspects of the strategically-placed U. S. Signals Intelligence activity in Turkey.
- (29) That the National Security Agency take steps to ensure that: (1) the U. S. Army Security Agency Detachments at Ankara pass significant intelligence to the U. S. Ambassador, the Embassy Political Section, the CIA Station Chief, and to CIA headquarters in Washington; and (2) improvement is made in the communications capabilities of selected intercept sites in Turkey, including the Tropospheric Scatter System.

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(30) That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review the desirability and feasibility of C-130 aircraft reconnaissance flights over Iran from Turkish bases, with a view to covering Soviet missile tests and related activities.

Rec. #28:

That highest priority be placed on the acquisition of crucially-needed intelligence on the Soviet ICBM capability, with special and intensive efforts to advance the photographic reconnaissance capabilities of the OXCART and GAMBIT projects even earlier than now programmed.

Rec. #29:

That, with regard to CORONA, OXCART and other advanced intelligence collection projects: (1) prompt and stringent measures be taken, within the intelligence community and with outside contractors, to keep to the absolute, practicable minimum the number of persons cleared for access to information concerning such sensitive projects, and (2) there be periodic security indoctrinations of all persons cleared for access to such information, including knowledge of the special photographic capabilities involved.

Rec. #30-a:

That there be brought to the urgent attention of the Secretary of State the intelligence aspects of the U. S. space satellite program, for consideration in connection with a United Nations requirement for the registration by member nations of all satellite launchings.

Board Report of May 16, 1962

Rec. #30-b:

Subsequently, in a May 16, 1962 letter to the President, the Board: (1) pointed out the intelligence implications to the United States of international discussions of agreements to provide information on U. S. satellite launchings to the United Nations and its Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; (2) urged that U. S. control of the development of space capabilities for national defense and intelligence purposes not be foreclosed, diminished or compromised; and (3) noted that the United States, unlike the USSR, would lose a

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crucially-needed intelligence capability if international agreements prohibiting military uses of outer space should preclude continued use of our Government's highly effective reconnaissance satellite intelligence activities. Accordingly, the Board recommended that: (1) the United States formulate a clear position on the relationship of our reconnaissance satellite intelligence programs to international discussion of peaceful uses of outer space; (2) the President review and approve the position to be taken by the United States on this subject; (3) U. S. representatives involved in UN, Geneva and other discussions be appropriately briefed on the sensitive U. S. intelligence collection program involved; and (4) differing points of view among U. S. Government officials on this subject be resolved as soon as possible.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #31:

That there be a re-examination of the status of the DCI, to determine whether his relative position and salary are in keeping with the newly-defined role and responsibility of the DCI for coordinating and guiding the U. S. foreign intelligence effort, as provided in the President's January 16, 1962 memorandum to the DCI.

Rec. #32:

That the DCI, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, review the functions of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee and National Indications Center, to determine their effectiveness in carrying out their mission of providing early warning.

Board Report of June 26, 1962

Rec. #33:

That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group ensure that: (1) adequate cover stories are approved and ready for release by responsible parties, if required, with respect to the U-2, OXCART and satellite reconnaissance programs; (2) adequate

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procedures are in readiness for making such releases; and (3) that U-2 and OXCART pilots are instructed as to appropriate action to be taken in case of mission failures.

Rec. #34:

Based on further continued studies of ways and means to strengthen the national Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence effort, under authoritative control and management of the National Security Agency, the Board recommended: (1) strong control and management by NSA over these intelligence activities; (2) concentration by NSA on intelligence objectives of greatest national importance, in response to U. S. Intelligence Board guidance which must be refined; (3) NSA supervision of all Signals Intelligence collection and processing, so that national needs will be met without undue cost and effort; (4) the completion of long-pending plans for improved collection and processing of Electronics Intelligence; (5) increased Department of Defense leadership now that responsibility for NSA activities has been assigned to an Assistant Secretary of Defense; and (6) within NSA itself, the exercise of strong leadership competent to meet national intelligence needs rising beyond specific military intelligence interests.

Rec. #35:

That the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA jointly: (1) make an operational analysis of present and potential use of audiosurveillance as an intelligence collection technique; (2) work up a plan for developing audiosurveillance devices to meet operational clandestine intelligence requirements; (3) estimate the costs and results of a major research and development effort to produce practicable audio systems for use in clandestine collection and counterintelligence activities; and (4) on the counter-audio side, install secure rooms (electronically and acoustically shielded) in sensitive U. S. posts overseas.

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Rec. #36:

That the U. S. Intelligence Board evaluate the intelligence potential of the "Big Dish" moon-reflector project; and that thereafter the Secretary of Defense reach an early decision as to the future of this project.

Board Report of August 1, 1962

Rec. 37:

Based on a review of intelligence disclosures in a New York Times article by Hanson Baldwin, the Board recommended that: (1) the President emphasize to Government officials his concern about such disclosures and his intention in this case to identify and take action against the source of Government leaks to the newspaper writer; (2) the President take drastic action against the offender if identified by the FBI, or against the heads of offices from which the leak emanated; (3) the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA require their personnel to make memoranda of record on talks with the press, and to clear such contacts in advance with departmental Public Relations Officers; (4) those responsible for protecting intelligence data and techniques identify selected areas of sensitive data requiring special handling; (5) ways be sought to reduce the number of persons involved in preparing highly sensitive intelligence estimates; (6) the DCI and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency be provided with the investigative capability to run down leaks of sensitive intelligence data; (7) a confidential policy be established within the Executive Branch as to the degree of disclosure of intelligence data to be made to Congressional Committees; (8) a re-study be made of possible proposals for legislation to protect official secrets; and (9) a review be made of Government policy and procedures with a view to declassifying non-sensitive information and thereby strengthening programs for the safeguarding of sensitive data.

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Board Report of October 5, 1962
(Based on an on-the-scene review by Board representatives of U. S. foreign intelligence and related activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East)

- Rec. #38: That the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency strengthen the intelligence elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Unified Commands (drawing on resources of the military intelligence services in the process.)
- Rec. #39: That the flow of intelligence guidance from the Defense Intelligence Agency to Unified/Specified and component commands be oriented toward a controlled, integrated effort on the part of the numerous U. S. military intelligence organizations overseas (e.g., in South Vietnam, Thailand and Japan), in order to make the most effective use of their substantial resources.
- Rec. #40: That the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Special Security Offices (SSO) Communications System for transmitting sensitive information with a view to: (1) consolidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific military commands and Washington civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Commands in the field and command (as distinguished from Service) elements in Washington.
- Rec. #41: That the National Security Agency accelerate spectrum searches in Thailand in order that the U. S. Intelligence Board may give guidance to the U. S. Ambassador in negotiating a permanent U. S. intercept site in Thailand (which is a most favorable location for U. S. Signals Intelligence operations against targets in the Soviet bloc, North Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Tibet and Communist China.)
- Rec. #42: That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group consider authorizing selective, airborne defoliation operations against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

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Board Report of October 19, 1962

Rec. #43:

Based on an on-the-scene review of U. S. intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East, the Board made the following subsidiary recommendations:

- (1) That the National Security Agency review the Office of the NSA Pacific Representative with a view to clarifying its mission, and its relationship to the Pacific Command structure and to other NSA personnel deployed in the Pacific area.
- (2) That the Defense Department consider staggering the rotation schedules of U. S. Army Intelligence Advisers to the South Vietnam Government, and that such advisers be given more extensive training in the French and Vietnamese languages.
- (3) That the DCI and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency emphasize efforts of U. S. civilian and military intelligence elements in South Vietnam to improve the capabilities of South Vietnamese intelligence and security services.
- (4) That the DCI and the Defense Intelligence Agency in their respective areas of responsibility ensure adequate and timely lateral exchange of intelligence reporting of the various U. S. intelligence units in South Vietnam (particularly the intelligence elements of the Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam, the U. S. Military Attaches in Saigon and the CIA Station, Saigon).
- (5) That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting with the three U. S. Military Intelligence Services, consider the advisability of (1) extending from two to three years the tours of Service Attaches in Thailand; and (2) provide Thai language training for Military Attaches selected for future assignment to Thailand.
- (6) That the Defense Intelligence Agency arrange for U. S. Air Force photo interpretation personnel on Taiwan and at Yokota, Japan, to receive all reports produced by the Chinat Air Force Photo Interpretation Center concerning U-2 and other reconnaissance flights over the China Mainland.

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- (7) That the Defense Intelligence Agency in consultation with Army Intelligence: (1) assess the organization, management and effectiveness of clandestine espionage operations conducted in the Pacific area by Army's 500th Intelligence Corps Group; and (2) assure early coordination with appropriate CIA Station Chiefs of the few Army Intelligence clandestine operations not yet coordinated.
- (8) That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting with U. S. military intelligence agencies, assure that (under guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Unified Commands) maximum use is made of the substantial intelligence potential of U. S. Military Assistance Groups deployed in foreign countries.
- (9) That the Defense Intelligence Agency make maximum intelligence use of Service Attaches in foreign countries, particularly where intelligence is also being produced by U. S. Military Assistance Groups and other U. S. military organizations.
- (10) That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting with the National Security Agency and U. S. military intelligence agencies, reduce the time required for security clearances of personnel assigned to sensitive U. S. installations overseas.

Rec. #44:

The Board also made the following additional recommendations based on its Southeast Asia and Far East review:

- (1) That the State Department explore with the U. S. Intelligence Board the practicability of a mechanism to furnish U. S. Ambassadors in Southeast Asia with current, regional intelligence evaluations (of a political, economic and military nature) concerning the Southeast Asia area -- as proposed by the U. S. Ambassador to Thailand.
- (2) That the State Department review the manning table of the Political Section of the U. S. Embassy at Bangkok, to determine whether an additional officer should be assigned (as recommended by the Chief of the Political Section of the Embassy).

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- (3) That the CIA renew efforts to convince the Thai Government of the need for an effective central intelligence organization in the Government of Thailand (the State Department to decide whether the U. S. Ambassador should make specific overtures to Marshal Sarit in this regard).

Rec. #45:

That the CIA explore the feasibility of intensifying covert actions against the sizeable and effective influence of Communists among Japanese intellectuals, educators and students.

Board Report of December 28, 1962

Rec. #46:

Based on its review of intelligence coverage, assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the months preceding October 22, 1962, the Board submitted to the President an interim report containing the following recommendations:

- (1) That the U. S. Government: (1) maintain an aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate intelligence information to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontations in Cuba; and (2) resist any tendency toward a let-down in intelligence coverage of Cuba in the wake of U. S. intelligence successes through U. S. military aircraft reconnaissance of Cuba.
- (2) That the United States make intensified, hard-hitting efforts to obtain significant intelligence on Cuba through clandestine espionage operations, including efforts by U. S. intelligence agencies to lay the groundwork for "deep cover" espionage operations in Latin American and other foreign countries (without dependence on official State Department cover which would not be available in the event of a break in diplomatic relations).
- (3) That (1) high-level and low-level reconnaissance of Cuba be continued as a means of acquiring photographic and Signals Intelligence concerning Soviet military installations, forces, weapons,

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and highly-sophisticated communications equipment in Cuba; (2) planning be made for substitute intelligence techniques in the event that our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba is denied us by Soviet air defense systems on the island; and (3) that the United States launch a clandestine agent program to provide on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an adjunct to our aerial reconnaissance photographic coverage of Cuba.

(4) That, as an adjunct to Signals Intelligence coverage of Cuba: (1) a major clandestine agent effort be directed toward obtaining vitally-needed Signals Intelligence from Soviet encoding machines through the use of clandestine intercept equipment carried by on-the-ground U. S. espionage agents in Cuba; and (2) plans be readied for commando-type or covert actions to pre-empt Soviet communications equipments in the event of internal revolt or invasion of Cuba.

(5) That in instances where exceptional intelligence collection techniques are suggested to meet priority U. S. intelligence objectives, but are opposed because of political or other risks involved, the issues be submitted for resolution at the Presidential level.

Rec. #47:

That, in view of Soviet camouflage of missile installations in Cuba, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office assign high priority to experiments to determine the effectiveness of short and long-range photography of concealed ground targets, including the use of new sensing and illuminating methods.

Board Report of January 19, 1963

Rec. #48:

That, with regard to the Secretary of Defense/DCI plan for surfacing military versions of OXCART, intelligence considerations require that: (1) no statements or programs should be undertaken which would result in public (and Soviet) knowledge of OXCART or military versions thereof; (2) although leaks concerning OXCART will eventually occur, such leaks should be avoided as long as possible

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in order to postpone Soviet development of countermeasures against OXCART; and (3) instead of an OXCART cover story to the effect that a new U. S. interceptor aircraft is being produced, the cover story should be that a variety of U. S. military aircraft are being developed. (In making these recommendations the Board confined itself to the intelligence-related aspects of the subject, noting the Board's awareness that the problem involved military and Congressional considerations (the B-70 issue, for example) apart from intelligence concerns.)

Board Report of February 4, 1963

As a follow-up to the Board's interim Cuba report and recommendations of December 28, 1962, the Board forwarded to the President on February 4, 1963, the results of the Board's assessment of the performance of the U. S. intelligence community in its coverage and reporting of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during 1962.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #49:

On March 8, 1963, the Board submitted to the President its final report on Cuba (taking into account views and comments which had been received from the Director of Central Intelligence concerning intelligence aspects of the Cuba experience). The Board made a number of specific recommendations for strengthening U. S. intelligence coverage of Cuba, and for increasing the capabilities of the total foreign intelligence program of our Government, as follows:

- (1) That U. S. intelligence planning include attention to possible Soviet intention to create and maintain in Cuba a Soviet base for communications surveillance and military command-and-control in the Western Hemisphere (with unprecedented opportunity to use electronic and other means to obtain intelligence on U. S. military and space capabilities).

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- (2) That U. S. intelligence agencies make it a major goal to discover the terms of Soviet/Cuban agreements and the programs to carry out such agreements.
- (3) That intensified efforts be made for substantial improvement in U. S. clandestine espionage coverage of Cuba -- because human-resource espionage operations continue to be important in spite of noteworthy results obtained by the United States in using scientific and technical intelligence techniques against Cuba.
- (4) That (1) there be a resumption of efforts to develop a long-focal-length camera for use in U-2 coverage of Cuba, using color and stereo photographic methods; (2) that there be a re-appraisal of the decision to suspend low-level photographic reconnaissance aircraft missions over Cuba; and (3) that a vigorous clandestine agent program be instituted with a view to obtaining on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential supplement to aerial photographic reconnaissance of the island.
- (5) That the current, intensive aerial surveillance of Cuba be accompanied by priority planning for adequate substitutes in the event that our aerial reconnaissance program is cut off by the advanced Soviet air defenses being installed in Cuba.
- (6) That, as recommended earlier, a major clandestine agent effort be mounted against Cuba, with a view to intercepting emanations from sophisticated Soviet code machines through the use of intercept equipment capable of concealment on an agent's person.
- (7) That, as previously proposed, the President be asked to resolve the issue when exceptional intelligence techniques are opposed at lesser levels because of the element of risk.

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- (8) That (1) U. S. intelligence officials be less reluctant to propose to higher authority the use of extraordinary means (such as the U-2) to acquire vital intelligence not otherwise obtainable; and (2) that there be a mechanism whereby policy officials will be informed of operational delays or other factors which call for top-level authorization of new or revised intelligence missions.
- (9) That, in order to meet intelligence needs in simultaneous emergencies, pre-arranged plans be made for: (1) the rapid reassignment of personnel, equipment and other intelligence resources; (2) the designation of various processing centers for the handling of photographic intelligence; (3) the processing and communication of vital intelligence to major users in Government; and (4) planning for such related intelligence activities to meet the extra burden if two or more crises should occur concurrently.
- (10) That, in the event that emergency situations should arise requiring restrictions on the normal publication and distribution of intelligence data, the U. S. intelligence community should monitor the application of such restrictions to ensure that (1) they are carried through, and (2) they are not applied in such a way as to deny critical intelligence to policy-making and command officials who need such intelligence data.
- (11) That concerted efforts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism for the integrated assessment (and cumulative periodic appraisals) of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making and command officials; and (2) conduct intensified research concerning automatic data processing techniques to facilitate the review and assessment of the great volume of material dealt with in the United States intelligence community.
- (12) That there be a re-examination of present methods of arriving at national intelligence estimates, with a view to ensuring that (1) all indicators

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and other available intelligence information are considered; (2) the views of intelligence community members are fully taken into account; (3) recognition is given to the possibility of widely-varying interpretations of a given body of evidence; (4) consideration is given to the advisability of preparing two or more estimates when evidence is susceptible of more than one interpretation -- even though under current practice dissents are noted in footnotes to estimates; and (5) that every precaution be taken to avoid adherence to isolated opinions or preconceived notions.

- (13) That the effectiveness of the National Reconnaissance Office be strengthened through specific measures separately summarized in Rec. #23.

Rec. #50:

That there be a reorganization and reorientation of the CIA's scientific and technological activities in the intelligence field. Specifically the Board recommended: (1) a research and development effort located outside the intelligence community but coupled with development and engineering conducted within CIA and other intelligence agencies; (2) an administrative arrangement in CIA to bring science and technology into contact with major intelligence programs and projects of the CIA; (3) the vesting of scientific and technological intelligence responsibilities in a top-level official of the CIA; (4) the formation in CIA of special research and development groups concerned with natural sciences and behavioral research in studies of such matters as camouflage and concealment; and (5) actions within the Defense Department to emphasize research on advanced sensing, photographic and other systems, and advanced research in the Signals Intelligence field over the next ten years.

Board Proposal of July 11, 1963

Rec. #51:

That the Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board give continued attention to and report periodically on measures taken by the U. S. intelligence agencies

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to strengthen our Government's counterintelligence posture. (Here the Board reiterated its previous endorsement of a recommendation that: "The Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on the important area of counterintelligence and the security of overseas personnel, and assign responsibility for periodic reports thereon to the United States Intelligence Board.")

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- 28 -

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

No. 1 3 26 a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: January 30, 1964, Meeting of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in regular meeting at 9:00 a.m. on January 30, 1964, at the Board's offices, Room 297 Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford and Board members Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Pace, and Land (Dr. Baker was unavoidably detained in New Jersey and joined the meeting later in the morning); and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford gave Board members a fill-in on the brief talk he had with President Johnson a few days after the President took office on November 22. Chairman Clifford had taken the occasion to relate to the President some of the highlights of the function performed by the Board for President Kennedy, and the composition of the Board. Although President Johnson gave no indication that he had previously known of the work of the Board, he expressed appreciation for the effort which the Board had made on behalf of President Kennedy. The President said that he was comforted to know that this group of outstanding citizens is giving attention to the important subject of intelligence, and he asked Mr. Clifford to inform the Board members that he wished them to continue with this important task.

Chairman Clifford referred to the one-hour meeting which the Board would have with the President later in the day. Mr. Clifford spoke of the heavy work schedule which the President has undertaken and the many demanding matters to which the

CORONA/OXCART/TAGBOARD/GAMBIT

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Page 38

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President is giving personal attention. Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion that prior to succeeding to office President Johnson has probably had few occasions on which to obtain more than brief glimpses of intelligence problems. With that assumption in mind, Mr. Clifford thought that the Board's major purpose at today's meeting with the President should be one of education with respect to the foreign intelligence effort and the Board's role in it. Mr. Clifford proposed that he begin with a background statement to the President concerning the circumstances under which President Kennedy established the Board (the Bay of Pigs incident), and its responsibilities and method of performing its assigned functions. Then, in order that the President might become better acquainted with the Board membership and some of the more significant intelligence areas reviewed by the Board, Mr. Clifford said he would like to call on various members to speak briefly about those areas. Particularly, the Chairman asked that Dr. Land be prepared to inform the President about the National Reconnaissance Program; that General Doolittle be ready to discuss the U-2 OXCART, and TAGBOARD programs; Dr. Baker the Signals Intelligence Program; and Mr. Gray the Dunlap espionage case. (The Board agreed with Mr. Coyne's proposal that in the Board's reporting on the Dunlap case there be only an oral statement to the President, but nothing in writing, with respect to the closely-held and highly sensitive source about which the Board has been informed. In this connection, the Chairman said that in the course of a recent conversation with former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, the latter seemed unaware of the sensitive source.)

Dr. Land suggested that during the Board meeting with the President the point be made that the Board's principal function is to determine what the foreign intelligence program should be and to recommend how to achieve it.

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Mr. Pace thought that it would also be well to indicate to the President the value of the role played by McGeorge Bundy in the staffing of Board subject matters for the President, and mention should also be made of the Board's use of Panels in its review of intelligence matters. Dr. Langer thought that brief remarks from selected Board members concerning intelligence subjects, coming within their special Panel assignments, would be more appropriate and helpful to the President than for all Board members to be called upon. Mr. Clifford thanked the members for these suggestions and said that he would be guided accordingly in making his presentation to the President.

Chairman Clifford then made reference to the recently-discovered Soviet espionage case involving Army Sergeant Howell, a case which Mr. Clifford thought might prove to be more damaging than the Dunlap case, and one which dramatizes the recommendations which the Board has formulated in its report to the President on the basis of the Dunlap matter. Mr. Clifford recalled that when he recently discussed the Dunlap case with former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, the latter said that if any progress is made by the Government in the area of counterintelligence, the impetus will have to come from the Board, and remedial action cannot be left up to the Defense Department. The Chairman asked Mr. Coyne to be prepared to brief the Board on the Howell case later on in the meeting.

Next, Chairman Clifford directed attention of the members to the list of topics which he had asked the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, to cover at today's meeting -- Mr. Clifford noting that because the DCI is out of the country he had designated his Deputy, General Carter, to cover these matters with the Board.

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Page 30

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Chairman Clifford then turned to the January 13, 1964, letter which he had received from the DCI, volunteering information concerning the events which had led to the recent CIA release of information on the estimate of the Soviet economy, with resulting critical editorial reaction in the United States press. Mr. Clifford asked that Board members study the DCI's letter as the basis for later discussion. Mr. Clifford said that he had found the letter to be curiously defensive, and he expressed concern over the danger inherent in what appeared to be an almost obsessive interest on the part of the DCI in regard to the CIA's "image". The Chairman also observed that according to newspaper accounts the DCI was at that moment in Europe visiting several heads of state, presumably on intelligence and other matters. Mr. Murphy recalled that previously the Board had urged closer relations between the President and the DCI on intelligence matters and he wondered if the DCI's current trip abroad is an indication that this close relationship exists between the DCI and President Johnson. Mr. Clifford said that it could only be speculated that sometimes a new President is susceptible to suggestions offered by experienced Presidential advisers, and in this instance the President may possibly have received a suggestion from the DCI that the European trip be made and perhaps the President acquiesced in reliance upon the DCI's judgment.

Mr. Clifford left the Board meeting to take a telephone call from Secretary of Defense McNamara. Upon his return to the meeting Mr. Clifford said that the Secretary of Defense had called to emphasize the importance which he placed on the NRO problem which would be related to the Board later in the day by NRO Director McMillan; and Secretary McNamara had indicated that he personally was disturbed about the competition and back-knifing which had become evident in the NRO program. Mr. Clifford noted that General Carter

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of CIA was about to join the Board meeting, and that it would be well for the Board to defer bringing up the NRO subject at this time. In this connection, Mr. Clifford stated that he had recently been visited by NRO Director McMillan who had expressed his views as to the NRO problem and would repeat them to the Board when he joined the meeting later in the day.

At 10:20 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by the Deputy DCI, General Carter (substituting for Mr. McCone). General Carter was accompanied by Mr. Knocke (who was introduced as substituting for Mr. Kirkpatrick who was in the Far East), and by Mr. Fitzgerald (referred to by General Carter as the CIA's expert on Cuba).

Mr. Clifford thanked the CIA officials for their attendance. He pointed out that today the Board was having its first meeting with President Johnson, therefore the Board would appreciate being brought up to date; would like to hear from General Carter on the topics which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's note to Mr. McCone; and would be glad to hear from General Carter on any matters which he might also wish to cover.

General Carter said that Mr. McCone's absence from the country prevented his meeting with the Board, but that he would endeavor to cover for Mr. McCone the various matters in which the Board had expressed an interest as set forth in Mr. Clifford's note to Mr. McCone dated January 16, 1964.

Turning first to the subject of Cuba, General Carter said that all sabotage efforts have been stood down; that the President and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have some serious doubts about our policy toward Cuba; and that the question had been raised as to whether it is not hypocritical for the United States Government to talk peace while at the same time "waging war" against Cuba. General Carter added that when Mr. Bundy gets back from leave and when Mr. McCone returns from abroad the following Saturday,

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- 5 -

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there will be a meeting to discuss a new policy toward Cuba.

In answer to an inquiry from Dr. Land, General Carter said that Mr. Bundy has no deputy to act in his absence; that the DCI briefs the President on intelligence matters and Mr. Bundy briefs him on foreign policy matters; and that the White House staff has not seemed to have settled into any new mechanism since November 22. General Carter said that the President gets the CIA daily intelligence check list which is handed to the President by one or another member of the White House staff, not necessarily the same one each time. Also, CIA has added a weekly check list review, and it is understood that the President reads them. Mr. McCone sees the President at least twice a week and attends all policy meetings except on occasions when the DCI has to be absent, in which case General Carter attends in his stead.

General Doolittle asked whether there has also been a stand-down in clandestine intelligence collection efforts with respect to Cuba, and General Carter answered in the negative. Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the volatility of the Cuban people is a factor, and over the long run the capability of CIA to infiltrate intelligence agents into Cuba is affected by the morale of the Cuban people which in turn is affected by the success of sabotage acts directed against Cuba.

In answer to a question from Chairman Clifford, Mr. Fitzgerald said that no hard facts had been obtained concerning the purpose and subject matter of Castro's recent talks with Khrushchev in Moscow, although the Panama and Cuban economic situations may have been discussed -- Mr. Fitzgerald agreeing with Murphy that this is all speculation on CIA's part.

General Carter said that our Government's economic denial program against Cuba is also falling by the wayside, as reflected by the actions of Britain and Spain in trading with Cuba. There is a view, General Carter

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added, that it is difficult for our Government to equate its policy of wheat sales to Russia with a policy of economic denial against Cuba; however the President has said that he wants to push the economic denial program. Mr. Fitzgerald remarked in this connection that the volatility of the Cuban people transmits itself to Washington.

Mr. Murphy then asked if someone could say what is going on in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the most important development is the series of "victories" which Castro has enjoyed: Castro found at year's end that there was an unanticipated hard currency balance of \$100 million from the sugar crop, thus giving Castro a basis for obtaining extensions of credits for such transactions as the purchase of British buses; the French are about to extend Castro credits over a 5-year period; in Panama, although Castro didn't provoke the anti-U. S. incidents he gets credit for it; and Castro also gets credit for the Zanzibar coup even though he did not instigate that incident, either. So, Mr. Fitzgerald noted, "Castro is stronger and his arm is longer".

Dr. Langer asked if CIA is getting intelligence agents into Cuba, and information out. Mr. Fitzgerald exhibited a chart depicting the deployment of agents in Cuba, pointing out that there was a concentration of agents in the Havana area. He said, however, that the figures were off because CIA had sloughed off the poor agents, and because two agent nets had been lost in the Havana area (although a key agent from each net had been successfully pulled out). Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has 64 singleton agents; 83 agents legally resident in Cuba; and 55 "black subagents" in one net.

In reply to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that about 1200 Latin American and African nationals a year are receiving training in Cuba and are returning to their respective countries.

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Mr. Pace asked what are the priority intelligence objectives which are assigned for coverage by CIA agents sent into Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that the agents are targeted against the strategic military situation. In answer to a query about the question of the use of Cuban caves, Mr. Fitzgerald said that this question had been pretty well resolved but CIA is keeping at it.

General Carter stated that CIA presently estimates there are from 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba who are operating the SAM sites and providing military training to Cubans, plus about 4,000 non-military Soviet personnel. He added that by April the Cubans will probably be ready to take over the air defense systems if the Soviets choose to turn them over to the Cubans. Mr. Fitzgerald added that a flash had been received this morning of the first evidence of a Chinese pilot taking part in air operations in Cuba (this from a COMINT source).

Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether CIA had succeeded in planting agents in Castro's immediate entourage. Mr. Fitzgerald said that this is another priority intelligence objective being pursued by CIA, including the objective of obtaining intelligence on the inter-relationship of factions within the Castro regime; on the extent of Cuban counter-insurgency programs (in which Cuba has a good capability); and on the Soviet bloc training of Cubans in counterintelligence activities (Cuba has a fairly wide intelligence system with "plenty in the United States").

Mr. Fitzgerald departed the meeting at this point, upon conclusion of the discussion of the subject of Cuba.

General Carter next turned to the Panama situation. He noted that CIA has regularly reported on the subject of Communist activities in Panama since 1956. General Carter stated that there is no evidence that Communists

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Page 44

NW 88132

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instigated the recent incidents in Panama, although the Communists were quick to exploit the situation once it arose. CIA succeeded in photographing 13 Castro-ites who were engaged in fomenting the incident after it started. Of a total of 45 Communist Castro-ites involved, 13 had been trained in Cuba, and they distributed leaflets and disseminated propaganda over the radio. CIA also learned that one Thelma King personally led a mob of Panamanians in the streets. Dr. Langer wondered if Panamanians and the world at large are aware that radio stations in Panama were in the hands of the Communists. General Carter replied that one could not say that precisely, but it can be said that 30 minutes after the incident began there were inflammatory broadcasts on the air. As for the sniper activity, General Carter said that one sniper had been identified as a known Communist.

With regard to Vietnam, General Carter said that the bloodless coup which began yesterday afternoon was accomplished by a group of young generals who are pro-American and anti-neutralist. General Khanh is the leader. General Khin, 3rd Corps Commander, will be chief of staff. The coup group had been plugging for more counter-insurgency effort against the Viet Cong, and the new leaders will take stronger action. General Khanh has said that he will look to U. S. Ambassador Lodge for guidance on political matters in the immediate Saigon area.

General Carter said that CIA had received advance information from General Khanh that he was worried about French moves with respect to Vietnam. (In answer to Mr. Coyne's question as to whether CIA had been back of yesterday's coup, General Carter replied that it is well known that the CIA does not instigate coups.) Mr. Murphy, noting the conspiratorial

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

- 9 -

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Page 45

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aspects involving France in the Vietnam situation, asked whether CIA had received advance intelligence from French sources concerning involvement of the French Government in Vietnam. General Carter said that none had been received, despite good CIA penetrations in Paris. Mr. Murphy found it difficult to understand why there had been no hard intelligence on this matter, particularly when there had been public statements by the French concerning France's neutralist objectives in Southeast Asia. General Carter said that there had been no evidence of a covert French ^{effort} against the Vietnam regime. ✓

Chairman Clifford asked whether there had been an improvement in the Vietnam situation following the previous coup which overthrew the Diem regime. General Carter said that social reforms have been made but their timing and acceleration have been disappointing. He thought it too early to say whether the new regime will have the will and ability to intensify the fight against the Viet Cong. General Khanh has indicated to Ambassador Lodge a desire to retain General Minh in the new government. General Khanh also said that he saw no malfeasance on the part of the generals in the Minh regime although they were known to have cooperated with French intelligence in the past.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, General Carter said there was no evidence that the murders of Diem and Nhu in the previous coup were motivating factors in the recent coup. General Carter answered Dr. Langer's question by saying that there is no hard evidence of an increased flow of supplies, arms and men into North Vietnam. (from Communist China). ✓

Turning to the next item which had been indicated as of interest to the Board, General Carter referred to the question as to the desirability to separate the coordinating function of the DCI from the post of head of the CIA. Chairman Clifford interposed the comment that from its inception this Board had been concerned with achieving greater coordination and control over the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort, the Board still urges it,

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cases whether involving U. S. military personnel or civilians; and another recommendation dealing with the criteria for selection of the heads of sensitive agencies such as the NSA. The Chairman stated that these proposed recommendations would be taken up at the next Board meeting. *1/15/50*

Chairman Clifford directed Board members' attention to the report and recommendations which had been completed by the Board Panel on Signals Intelligence. There was agreement with Mr. Clifford's suggestion that the report and its recommendations be forwarded to Mr. Bundy for consideration and action with the agencies involved, rather than presenting this complex subject to the President today.

Mr. Clifford mentioned to the Board the recently copyrighted newspaper article by former President Truman who took the CIA to task for engaging in activities which were not within the function of CIA as originally created. Mr. Clifford reminded the Board that while Mr. Truman was President the CIA was authorized and directed to engage in covert actions (e.g. in Italy) which had much to do with stemming the Communist tide in post-World War II in Europe.

Chairman Clifford brought up another matter, which he felt could become more serious, namely, the aggressive campaign being waged by CIA to improve its "public image". Mr. Clifford asked that the Board members think about this subject, which would be placed on the agenda of the next Board meeting. At that time the Board should hear from the DCI regarding this matter, and consider it in the light of previous Board recommendations that the DCI and other CIA officials refrain from making public speeches, with a view to reducing the visibility of intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford said that he had learned that one of the subjects which the DCI is now *1/15*
1/13

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discussing in the course of his visit with heads of state overseas is the advisability of their countries engaging in economic reprisals against Cuba. Dr. Baker confirmed this, stating that today he had learned that CIA is taking specific covert steps to influence cessations of trade with Cuba, particularly in the case of Spain. Mr. Clifford could only speculate that the DCI had suggested that the fostering of economic reprisals is properly a task for the CIA, and the President may have agreed in the absence of any other advice or consultation. Mr. Clifford thought that the DCI's meetings with heads of state is the course least likely to succeed in CIA's efforts to contradict its growing image as becoming a policy-making organization in the Government. Mr. Clifford repeated that the Board should hear from the DCI on this at its next meeting and consider making a recommendation to the President. W3

At 4:00 p.m., until 5:30 p.m., the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House (a pertinent memorandum on the meeting is filed elsewhere in the Board's records).

When the Board members returned to the Board's offices, Chairman Clifford remained at the White House at the President's request to confer on other matters of a non-intelligence nature.

April 2 and 3, 1964, were selected as the dates of the next meeting of the Board, a two-day session.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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February 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting with the President, January 30, 1964

At 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 1964, the Board members and the writer met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The meeting terminated at 5:30 p.m. The highlights of this meeting follow.

At the outset, Mr. Clifford made reference to his meeting with the President in early December reporting that immediately following the meeting he conveyed to the Board personnel the President's desires that the Board continue to perform its mission and that each Board member continue to serve with this advisory body. Mr. Clifford then went on to state that he considered the Board to be an extraordinary group composed of individuals whose diverse backgrounds and experience were of inestimable value in carrying out the mission of the Board. By way of example he cited tremendous contributions made in the fields of communication, signals intelligence and missiles systems by Dr. William O. Baker, the Head of Research at Bell Laboratories. He next mentioned the outstanding military career of Jimmy Doolittle, noting that he has served three Presidents in reviewing various aspects of intelligence and noting also the ramified contributions which he has made to the overhead intelligence reconnaissance program. He next mentioned Mr. Gordon Gray noting that he had earlier served as Secretary of

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the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Mobilization and Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs. He noted, too, that with Coyne on behalf of the Board, Mr. Gray has made on-the-scene reviews of intelligence activities in practically every country in the Near East, Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East. The Chairman next mentioned Dr. Land, his Presidency of Polaroid and his outstanding contributions to photographic reconnaissance techniques having special application to intelligence. He next mentioned Dr. William Langer, his distinguished academic career and his long association with the intelligence estimating process. He next mentioned Mr. Robert Murphy and his decades of service as a career diplomat, roving ambassador and Under Secretary of State. He next mentioned Mr. Frank Pace, noting that his experience as Director of the Budget Bureau and as Secretary of the Army, as well as his experience as President of General Dynamics, especially equips him to keep abreast of management and organization problems in the intelligence community and of the intelligence budgeting process. Finally Mr. Clifford mentioned Mr. Coyne, the Executive Secretary of the Board, as a Presidential appointee and member of the White House staff who has had some 24 years of experience in the intelligence field, first as Assistant Director of the FBI and in more recent years with the staff of the National Security Council and of the President. He observed that prior to President Johnson's assuming office, Coyne had served Presidents Truman,

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Eisenhower and Kennedy in various intelligence capacities.

Mr. Clifford then went into some detail with respect to the history of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and predecessor organizations of the Board. He pointed out that following the close of World War II, a variety of ad hoc groups were formed at the Presidential level to review selected aspects of the Government's foreign intelligence effort. Studies were made from time to time, recommendations were submitted, and then in most cases the particular study group disbanded with little or no follow-up action on its recommendations. Mr. Clifford noted that in 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch recommended the creation of a permanent, bipartisan "Watch Dog Committee" (to be made up of House and Senate members and private citizens) to make periodic surveys of the foreign intelligence activities of our Government agencies, and to report to the Congress and to the President. President Eisenhower opposed the idea of a Congressional Watch Dog Committee on Intelligence (as did President Kennedy after he took office). Mr. Clifford went on to state that in February 1956, President Eisenhower formed his own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, made up of private citizens, responsible for reviewing on his behalf all foreign intelligence activities of the United States; that President Eisenhower looked on the Consultants group not only as a means of obtaining independent appraisals and advice concerning our foreign intelligence effort, but also as a

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tactic to forestall the creation of a "Watch Dog Committee" in the Congress. The Board of Consultants served for some five years until the members submitted their resignations at the close of President Eisenhower's term of office.

Mr. Clifford then pointed out that in January 1961 President Kennedy decided that there was a continuing need for a Presidential Advisory Board on foreign intelligence, but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members; that on May 4, 1961, following the disaster experienced by the Central Intelligence Agency at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President issued an Executive Order establishing this Board. (Mr. Clifford noted that at that time and on several subsequent occasions, President Kennedy remarked to him that he could not stand another intelligence failure like the Bay of Pigs fiasco; that as President he must have the assurance of adequate intelligence on which to make important decisions; and that he would depend heavily on this Board to continually monitor the activities of all of the intelligence agencies, providing him with independent, objective assessments and recommendations concerning those activities.) Mr. Clifford stated that President Kennedy had informed him that CIA had provided him with "bad" information on Cuba and that this had resulted in "bad" decisions. Based on this experience President Kennedy had emphasized to Mr. Clifford that he was activating the Board to perform a continuing mission for the President; that the Board was to

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have three functions (1) investigation (2) recommendation and (3) follow-up.

Mr. Clifford noted that Dr. Killian served as Chairman of the Board until April 1963; that he resigned at that time because of reverses in his health; and thereupon Mr. Clifford was moved up from member to Chairman.

Mr. Clifford then proceeded to describe in some detail the work, meetings, review procedures, reporting procedures and general modus operandi of the Board. He noted that from May 1961 until the time of President Kennedy's death, the Board held 25 separate meetings covering a total of 40 days. He emphasized that the intelligence community is made up of a great many departments and agencies and that efforts to coordinate and control them have thus far barely gotten off the ground. Some progress has been made but much more remains to be accomplished.

Mr. Clifford then went on to discuss in some detail the Panels and Task Forces of the Board citing a few examples.

The Chairman next went into some detail with respect to the recommendations which the Board made to President Kennedy noting that during the past 2½ years the Board submitted to the President a total of 170 recommendations. A large percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's Board involved activities internal to the Department of Defense; a lesser proportion involved activities internal to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of them related to activities of joint interest to two or more

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member agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170 recommendations, the President approved 125, disapproved 2, and temporarily deferred final action on the remainder. Of the 125 approved recommendations, implementing actions on 85 have been substantially completed. The remaining Presidentially-approved recommendations deal with substantive intelligence matters warranting continued Board attention and, possibly, the submission of further Board recommendations to the President.

Next Mr. Clifford cited several examples of intelligence areas of major and continuing concern to the Board. These included the following:

1. The vast size and cost of the over-all intelligence effort which involves some 149,000 individuals, 131,000 of whom are in Defense and 17,000 of whom are in CIA. Mr. Clifford reported that the effort this year will cost slightly less than four billion dollars.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program (at this point Mr. Clifford asked Dr. Land to brief the President for three or four minutes, which he did, on the highlights of the satellite reconnaissance programs.) In the course of the briefing Dr. Land exhibited to the President examples of the recent Gambit photography taken over Montana.

3. The U-2, Oxcart, Tagboard programs. At this point, pursuant to Mr. Clifford's request, General Doolittle briefed the President for several minutes on the highlights of these three programs.

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4. The Signals Intelligence Program. Here, Dr. Baker, at the request of Mr. Clifford, briefed the President on the highlights of the Signals Intelligence effort and on the major contribution which is made to the over-all intelligence effort by elements of the COMINT-ELINT community.

5. The Counterintelligence Program. At this point Mr. Clifford advised the President that, following a serious espionage penetration at the National Security Agency, President Kennedy requested the Board to make a thorough examination of the entire situation. Happily Mr. Gray was able to free himself in order to devote full time, along with Mr. Coyne, to such a study. Mr. Clifford requested Mr. Gray to brief the President on the highlights of the Dunlap case which he did. Thereafter Mr. Gray mentioned briefly the highlights of the Howell penetration. Following the Gray briefing Mr. Clifford presented to the President the report on the Dunlap case which had been prepared by the Board, noting that it was dated as of November 22, 1963. (The President retained the report and later sent it to Mr. Bundy's office for appropriate staffing and it is now in the process of being staffed by us.)

In the course of the Board's discussion with the President, the following major points were made:

With respect to the recent developments in Panama, the President was not happy with the way in which CIA acquitted itself. The President indicated that after the fact "they told us they had been reporting disturbing

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developments in Panama for months on end and that perhaps this was so" but from the President's vantage point there was no specific information pinpointing developments until after difficulties had occurred.

In the case of the coup which had occurred in South Vietnam on the night preceeding our meeting with the President, he said that he "received no intelligence at all on that development." In fact it appeared to the President that General Khanh had advised our intelligence people of a suspected coup which would be attempted by someone else in Saigon for the purpose of "pulling us off the track."

Next the President inquired as to the Board's view on a request that he had recently received from the Pentagon. Reading from a communication which he had before him, it appeared that the President was being informed by the Pentagon that a proposal had been made to reduce the military membership on the U. S. Intelligence Board by dropping from the USIB the Directors of G-2, A-2 and ONI, retaining on USIB the DCI, the Deputy Director of CIA, DIA, NSA, State, AEC and FBI. Mr. Clifford observed that in our bureaucracy no one having representation on a committee likes to be removed therefrom but that it was his personal view that USIB would probably function as well if not better with reduced membership. The President indicated that the Chiefs of Staff did not agree. They were, in fact, asking the President to permit their respective G-2's to continue as regular members of USIB. Mr. Clifford advised that he and the other Board members did not agree that this was necessary, particularly now

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
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that military intelligence activities are being centralized in the Defense Intelligence Agency along the lines earlier recommended to the President by the Board. President Johnson expressed appreciation for the Board's views on this matter indicating that it would be helpful to him in responding to the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Turning to another matter, the President asked whether the Board believes that Congress is being provided with enough information on our intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford responded in the affirmative then brought up the fact that there are increasing pressures for the establishment of a Congressional Watch Dog Committee on intelligence. Mr. Clifford emphasized to the President the view of the Board that the creation of such a Watch Dog Committee would be dilatorius to the national security and national interests because it would be most difficult to keep our secrets secret under such a committee.

The meeting with the President terminated with an expression on the President's part of deep appreciation to the Board for the continuing patriotic and substantive contribution which it is making to the national security in important areas involving foreign intelligence.

(At the suggestion of the President the discussion of Board business was momentarily suspended in order to let the Press take pictures of the President in session with his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.)



J. Patrick Coyne

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 16, 1964

Dear John:

The next meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is scheduled to be held on January 30, 1964, and in line with established practice it would be very much appreciated if you would meet with us on the morning of that day, preferably from 10:00 to 11:00 a.m.

At the time of your meeting with us, it would be helpful if you would be prepared to discuss the subjects outlined in the attachment.

Sincerely,

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

Attachment

Mr. John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Langley, Virginia

*General Corder will
attend meeting in Mr.
McCone's absence from
the country.*

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjects Suggested by Board Members for Discussion by the Director of Central Intelligence at the Board Meeting of January 30, 1964

1. Cuba

(Status and effectiveness of clandestine collection and covert action programs; numbers and missions of Soviet personnel in Cuba; Castro's involvement in counter-insurgency and subversive programs in Latin America and other countries.)

2. South Vietnam

(Prospects for permanency of present regime; adequacy of coordination and effectiveness of indigenous intelligence organizations.)

3. Panama

(Availability of pre-crisis intelligence indicators and timeliness of current reporting thereon; extent of Castro influence.)

4. Separation of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency

(Views as to desirability and feasibility.)

5. U. S. Counterintelligence Posture

(Assessment of damage to U. S. intelligence sources and operations resulting from Dunlap and Howell cases. Status of CIA studies on protection of intelligence, intelligence sources and methods.)

6. Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence

(The DCI's appraisal of effect such a Committee arrangement would have on the effectiveness and security of foreign intelligence and related activities.)

7. CIA Estimate on Economy of USSR

(The DCI's comments on substance of the estimate and significance of its public release by CIA.)

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

16 January 1964

Dear Clark:

As you probably know, I am leaving for Europe on Saturday and hence will miss an opportunity to visit with you in the immediate future. However I wish you to know the background of the press incident which unfortunately has been "blown up" and hence the theme of a great number of editorials.

Therefore I am attaching a memorandum prepared for my file to review the series of events which led up to the release of information on the Soviet economy with CIA attribution. Also attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Stennis and my reply. Finally, there is a copy of the directive which I am issuing today in order to prevent an inadvertent recurrence of the situation.

Frankly I am surprised at the publicity and furthermore I cannot be overly critical of the attribution because of the long history of CIA's releases on Soviet economy. We have for 10 years been issuing volumes on this subject in unclassified form carrying the Central Intelligence Agency name and these are in universities, libraries, and in the hands of virtually all economists and newspapermen interested in the subject. Furthermore, Allen Dulles has testified in open hearing and on the record on this subject. It was a favorite topic for speeches by Allen, General Cabell and Bob Amory in the days when CIA officials were making speeches. Hence the denial of the privilege of attribution would have, in my opinion, not been respected by anyone in the press.

Two additional points which might have something to do with this -- first, we recently lost Col. Grogan, who has handled press relations for CIA for years, because of retirement after a heart attack. His replacement, a capable officer in the field of public relations was in the process of getting acquainted with the press and hence was not as sensitive to the tricky problem of press relationship as a more experienced press officer might have been. Secondly,

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
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Page 61

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I have known for some time, as I told you, that there are people in this Government, most particularly in the State Department, who enjoy harassing CIA in the press. I think, although I cannot prove it, that they have not been inclined to pass up this opportunity.

Sincerely,


John A. McCone
Director

Attachments as stated

The Honorable Clark Clifford
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, D. C.

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UNITED STATES SENATE

January 13, 1964

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Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Recently I read an article stating that the CIA had held a press conference during which the Soviet economy was discussed.

My impression is that the holding of press conferences is a distinct departure from CIA's past practice. I would appreciate it if you would advise me of the significance of this occurrence and whether it represents a change of policy which will be a precedent for the future.

Sincerely,

/S/

John Stennis
United States Senator

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P.B. #1695

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

14 January 1964

The Honorable John Stennis
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Stennis:

This is in reply to your letter of January 13th. As I told you when I saw you at my meeting with your Committee on Friday afternoon, the press report of a "CIA press conference" was something of an over-statement of fact, although circumstances were such that I can understand the reason for the statement.

What happened was that several reporters received unclassified information on the Soviet economy from us and one of them featured the CIA attribution. This brought an avalanche of requests from other reporters who felt that one had been favored with some "inside information." Therefore our people prepared a brief memorandum of just what had been told and invited the inquirers to come out and pick it up. All who inquired were asked to come at a particular hour. The fact that they were met and talked to by a CIA officer during the course of distribution of the memorandum gave rise to the report that it had been a "CIA press conference," which, I think, overstates what happened.

I have been concerned over the fact that the CIA attribution has been given such wide-spread publicity and frankly don't understand why because in this area, namely Soviet economics, CIA has been a recognized authority and has for the past 10 years issued volumes of unclassified reports of one sort or another which have been distributed to libraries and universities. Moreover, the subject was a favorite subject of my predecessor who looked upon it as one area which he could treat freely and publicly in open forum. You may recall there was an open hearing by the Joint Economic Committee on 13 November 1959 at which the Director of Central Intelligence testified.

P.B. #1695

In view of all this, I cannot criticize the authorized attribution.

The above background of CIA interest in, and continued study of, the Soviet economy is so well known to the press that a request for non-attribution would most certainly not have been respected. Nevertheless I have restated our rules so that no such circumstance will again occur without my consent and approval; and this, I assure you, would be given only after consultation with all interested parties.

I have tried to answer your questions by the above explanations but I assure you that there is no change of policy which will be a precedent for the future.

Sincerely,

JS/

John A. McCone
Director

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13 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Recent CIA Publicity

Two recent developments within CIA should be noted:

a. Following the briefings of the NSC and Congressional leadership, I proposed that CIA findings on Soviet economy be released to the public in the United States and Europe in order to (1) influence curtailment of long-range credits and (2) influence a number of uncommitted leaders of nations in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. This plan was discussed and agreed with the President, Secretaries Rusk, Harriman, Alexis Johnson and others. My proposed plan per Memoranda and Notes of Conversation was to handle the subject through cut-outs, on an unattributable basis, and largely through the foreign press on a carefully timed schedule to avoid the impact of "sudden propaganda". DDP organized to implement this program. Additionally, information was to be furnished (presumably on an unattributable basis) to Stewart Alsop (SATURDAY EVENING POST) and Charles Murphy (FORTUNE) who were said to be studying the subject.

b. I have felt, and expressed myself to the late President Kennedy, to President Johnson, to Secretary Rusk and others, that the DCI and CIA image must be changed. Its basic and primary responsibilities by law are to assemble all intelligence, analyze, evaluate, estimate and report such intelligence for the benefit of policy makers. This function has been submerged and CIA has been consistently referred to as a "cloak and dagger" outfit whose activities involve (almost exclusively) operations designed to overthrow governments, assassinate Heads of State, involve itself in political affairs of foreign states, and none of these activities are either controlled or coordinated with the White House or the State Department. This is

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entirely wrong, both with respect to the activity and the coordination and control, and I wish to attempt to change this image. (NOTE: Hundreds of editorials, and dozens of speeches on the Hill have dealt with this thesis in one form or another, and there has been no rebuttal at any time to my knowledge).

No authorization was given by me for the briefing of press or other columnists (other than Alsop and Murphy) or for attribution or for statements or references to CIA's unique capabilities in Soviet economy or the purpose of the releases.

What has happened is that the two stated purposes "merged" and journalists, including TIME, NEWSWEEK, HERALD TRIBUNE, Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale of the NEW YORK TIMES were briefed during late December and early January.

In the case of Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale, permission was given to attribute the information to CIA by DD/I and PR and apparently additional information on the depth of CIA's work in studying Soviet economy was discussed.

As a result the CIA role, the attribution and the fact that it had finally "spoken out" was of far greater significance than the facts. When the NEW YORK TIMES featured this side of the story in a front-page article, there was a clamour for like information for others and, as a result, CIA invited inquiring press men to come down and receive identical information which was then prepared in a written memorandum. The memorandum was discussed with them and this was interpreted to be a "formal press conference" which is only partially true.

In defense of DDI and PR's activities, it is to be noted that CIA has for 10 years issued unclassified publications on the Soviet economy and the method used in analyzing it. Mr. Allen Dulles used this subject as a favorite topic for his speeches, which were numerous - in fact, Mr. Elder, my assistant, states he has written at least 12 speeches on this subject for Mr. Dulles. However the timing and manner of release has given special notice by the press in this instance.

Attribution to President Johnson for authority to do all of the above is completely wrong, except to the extent that President Johnson knew of, and agreed to, a. and b. above which were entirely separate courses. It was not anticipated that they "merge" as they have.

The consequences are as follows:

1. The White House, and more particularly the State Department, are rightfully disturbed because they do not know the effect this publicity might have on their responsibilities.
2. CIA's methodology and findings have been questioned because a vast amount of information upon which our conclusions are based was not disclosed (and much of it cannot be disclosed), and hence the legitimacy of our conclusions is doubted by some experts and in the public mind.
3. Congressional leaders (Senators Russell, Saltonstall, Stennis, Chairmen Vinson and Cannon) are rightfully disturbed and have so expressed themselves.
4. All of this will be used to emphasize the need for a "Watchdog Committee" and legislation on this is more probable now than at any time in the past.
5. A carefully planned DDP operation for covert release of information, and developed at my direction, has been destroyed. The purpose of DCI's trip to brief Heads of State in Britain, France, West Germany and Italy has been impaired if not destroyed.
6. Activities have been contrary to my specific written and oral orders and warnings of DDCI at staff meetings when the subject was discussed.

As a result it is my intention to issue instructions for the conduct of all public relations activities in the future, their careful coordination at the level of the White House and the State Department, and until these orders are issued I wish absolutely no contact whatsoever, no comments, no discussions with the press except with my personal authorization.

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