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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

JCSM-406-67
20 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Future Use of Ryukyuan Bases (U)

1. [redacted] The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned about possible future changes in the character of US control in the Ryukyus which could impact adversely on national security.

2. [redacted] The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that:

a. Reversion of the Ryukyus to the Japanese Government would weaken the US strategic posture and our military position in the Far East.

b. Because of the growing aggressiveness of Communist China and unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia, it would be premature to draw up a timetable for returning the Ryukyus to Japanese control.

c. In view of the complete interdependence of the military and civil communities, unilateral US control of Ryukyuan administration is of prime importance for as long as we maintain major bases there. Under Japanese control political limitations could be imposed upon the use of our Okinawa-based forces, equipment, materiel, and other resources.

d. Japanese reluctance to share proportionately in Free World defense in the Pacific strengthens the case for continued US jurisdiction over Okinawa.

3. [redacted] In view of increasing pressures by the Japanese Government for reversion of the Ryukyus, possible alternatives (Appendix hereto) to existing unrestricted US use of Ryukyuan bases have been examined. It is concluded that:

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a. For reasons of military security, it is important that the United States retain its present administrative control over the Ryukyus. Erosion of such control is not supportable from a military point of view since it would impact adversely on the US posture in the Pacific.

b. Unrestricted access and freedom of action in the use of our military bases in the Ryukyus is essential if US security interests in the Far East are to be protected through the foreseeable future.

c. Should political developments require a lessening of the current level of administrative control, the following factors should be considered in the formulation of future US actions:

(1) The least disruptive alternative of those examined would be an orderly transfer of civil administration to Japan in return for a special base rights agreement which provides for the military requirements essentially as set forth in Annex B. However, such an arrangement would be vulnerable to future changes in policy by subsequent Japanese governments.

(2) Transfer of administrative authority to Japan under the context of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 with Japan would seriously reduce US military capabilities in the Far East because of the resulting highly restrictive conditions governing our operations. US interests would best be served by separate negotiation on the future of the Ryukyuan bases.

(3) The establishment of an enclave-type base structure in Okinawa, or one of the other Ryukyu Islands, does not appear practicable and should not be considered as an acceptable alternative unless it is the only method of retaining unrestricted control and freedom of action over our military bases in the Ryukyus. The United States has over the years provided common support utilities (water, electricity, telecommunications, transportation nets, POL pipelines, airports, harbor installations, etc.) for its bases and the civil community. The establishment of independent base support facilities would be made necessary by an enclave policy. The relocation effort and legal actions associated with development of separate utilities and facilities would be extremely expensive and complex. In any instance, further feasibility and cost studies by the military services would be required and the cost implications fully understood by the Japanese before a decision is made. Full understanding of these problems

as well as recognition of the fact that the United States would expect exclusive enclave rights and reimbursement from the Japanese for relocation costs could persuade Japan to give preference to other alternatives.

(4) Relocation of US bases elsewhere in the western Pacific within the mid-term period would seriously undermine US military capabilities because of such factors as host government political restrictions and the greatly increased operating ranges involved. More significantly, it would result in the abandonment of approximately $1 billion in assets, with negligible salvage value, and require in excess of $600 million for the construction of alternate facilities. However, examination of alternate base sites in the western Pacific should continue in the event of the contingency occurring that prescribes relocation elsewhere of some or all of the US Ryukyuan facilities.

d. In recent years, the Government of Japan has endeavored to increase its knowledge and understanding of security questions, including the use of US bases in the Ryukyus. This maturing attitude on the part of Japan's leaders, together with the problems involved in establishing a true enclave, should make it possible for the United States to press for continued exclusive control of the Ryukyus as a legitimate political cost of US defense commitments to Japan. The US Government should continue to emphasize to the Government of Japan that Japan's security is in large part dependent on the maintenance of a substantial US military posture in the Ryukyus. The Government of Japan, for its part, should continue its efforts to bridge diverse attitudes among the Japanese people concerning basic security issues and should seek to create popular support for the thesis that Japan's security, together with that of the rest of the free nations in east Asia, is largely dependent on credible US military presence in the Pacific. Such presence, in turn, is dependent on continued unrestricted US control of its bases and operations in the Ryukyus.

e. While unrestricted US control over the Ryukyus is critical for the foreseeable future, the political pressures we now face and may anticipate in coming years point to the urgency of having the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under US sovereignty. Also important is the requirement to retain US control over and freedom of action in the Bonin-Volcano Islands.

4. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the conclusions above, as amplified in the Appendix, be approved as the Department of Defense policy position for guidance by US officials in future discussions and actions concerning the Ryukyus.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments

[redacted]

APPENDIX

DISCUSSION

1. (U) Legal Basis for US Tenure. The legal basis for continued US tenure in the Ryukyus is found in Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which grants to the United States full jurisdiction over the Ryukyus - specifically, "any and all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction" over this archipelago. After being signed at San Francisco on 8 September 1951, the treaty was approved by the US Senate, entering into force on 28 April 1952.

2. (U) US Policy Regarding Tenure. Review of successive US expressions of policy regarding the duration of US tenure of the Ryukyus reveals the following:

a. Since conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan in 1951, each President has publicly reaffirmed Japan's residual sovereignty over the Ryukyus and stated that the present status of this area will continue for as long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.

b. In the budget for FY 1962, President Kennedy specified that the "United States will continue responsibility for administration of the Ryukyus, as long as conditions of threat and tension in the Far East require the maintenance of military bases in these islands." This same statement has been repeated in every budget since then. These statements equate the tenure of our jurisdiction over this area with the requirement for maintaining our bases there.

c. In a public statement released by the White House on 19 March 1962, President Kennedy said: "I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland, and look forward to the day when the security interests of the Free World will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty."*

* Statement by the President of the United States, 19 March 1962, on signing amendment to Executive Order 10713

[redacted]

d. In the joint communique released at Washington on 13 January 1965, at the conclusion of discussions between President Johnson and Japanese Prime Minister Sato, the President reaffirmed President Kennedy's promise to revert the Ryukyus to Japan, ". . . when the security interests of the Free World in the Far East will permit the realization of this desire."

3. [redacted] Relevant Political Considerations. On 13 September 1966, the Senior Interdepartmental Group approved a report prepared by the Interdepartmental Regional Group, East Asia, Ryukyus Working Group (Our Ryukyus Bases), which stated that "The US military base complex in the Ryukyus is vital at the present time to US security interests in the Far East and World-Wide and to the effective prosecution of the military effort in Vietnam." The report concluded in part that:

a. Pressures for the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan are rising in both Japan and the Ryukyus.

b. A crisis resulting in unmanageable demand for reversion is not presently likely. However, pressures for change in the character of US administration toward greater local autonomy and a larger Japanese role are strong.

c. Current trends in Japan and the Ryukyus point toward the probability of a major Japanese initiative for the return of administrative control of the Ryukyus to Japan, possibly between now and 1970, in connection with the expected Japanese review of the US-Japan Treaty* of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Confrontation would result if the United States should object to turning the administration of the Ryukyus over to Japan when they actually request it.

* The Treaty, as it stands, will be subject to termination on one year's notice by either side after 1970.

d. By the 1970 period, the Japanese may be prepared to negotiate a special base rights agreement which would include and permit the maximum possible freedom of operational action essential for US security needs, thus permitting retention of our effective US base complex in the area for an extended period after reversion.

4. (S) The report referred to in paragraph 3, above, recommends that:

a. Actions be taken to counter pressures in both Japan and the Ryukyus for reversion and to maintain constantly a sense of forward motion.

b. We should emphasize to the Japanese the importance of maintaining operational capability of the Ryukyus bases and keeping reversionist pressures within manageable proportion.

c. Pressures for reversion should be periodically assessed.

d. The "Ryukyus Working Group" should undertake further study of the "feasibility and implications of a transfer to Japan of administrative authority over the Ryukyus." This study is currently in progress.

5. (S) The above referenced report concluded that pressures for reversion were rising in both Japan and the Ryukyus but remained manageable. This conclusion remains currently valid, but subsequent developments* in both Japan and the Ryukyus point to an increase of pressure for reversion and make an analysis of the possible effects of reversion all the more timely.

6. (S) Within the past year, the Government of Japan has initiated exploratory talks concerning the military utility of all islands administered by the United States under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace, with the expectation of restoring

*CIA Weekly Summary No. 269, dated 5 May 1967

Japanese authority over these areas (the Ryukyu, Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus Islands). Currently, there are indications that the Bonin-Volcano Islands are receiving higher priority in the Japanese Foreign Office than in past years. Clearly, however, reversionary pressures in the Ryukyus will continue regardless of the future status of the Bonin-Volcano Islands. The latter should be considered as a separate strategic entity and not be made a part of any Ryukyus reversion negotiations. Their retention under US control would salvage a measure of US military flexibility, should satisfactory base rights in the Ryukyus and Japan fail to endure.

7. [redacted] Current Military Functions Performed in the Ryukyus

a. Okinawa has been developed into an extensive complex of military installations which cumulatively constitute an operational and support base of major dimensions not duplicated elsewhere in the Far East. US facilities currently on Okinawa are valued at about $1 billion, excluding capital goods and supply stockage. Approximately 74,000 acres of land are used directly by US military forces. There are approximately 44,000 US military personnel based on Okinawa, 3,000 American employees, 28,000 American dependents, and over 53,000 indigenous employees of US forces, contractors, and American personnel, making a total of about 128,000 persons directly connected with our presence there. US expenditures in the Ryukyus in FY 1966 amounted to $239.5 million, more than half of the Ryukyus gross national product.

b. Essentially, the bases on Okinawa serve a four-fold purpose in helping to maintain the security of the western Pacific area. First, they provide a close-in staging area

and operational base, permitting the maintenance of ground and air forces in readiness for a swift reaction in an arc stretching from Northeast to Southeast Asia. Second, they provide a centrally located logistical base which has a major mission in support of land, air,and naval forces operating in the western Pacific. Third, Okinawa is the hub of an extensive communications network in the region. Fourth, the US bases, by providing visible, credible evidence of deterrent power, make an important over-all contribution to Free World security strength in the general area.

c. Okinawa is less than 1,000 miles from Taiwan, Korea, most of Japan, the Philippines, and the important areas of mainland China and, consequently, occupies a highly important strategic location. The relationship of Okinawa to our strategic posture and defense concepts for the Pacific is such that serious restriction of our freedom of action would require a fundamental examination and reorientation of our national strategy and the entire Pacific posture.

d. A complete listing of military units and activities is attached at Annex A. Military and civilian strengths are reflected, as well as the operation and maintenance budget and mission of each unit or activity.

8. [redacted] Military Functions Programmed for the Ryukyus or To Be Performed in a post-Vietnam Environment

a. The Ryukyus will continue to be extremely important as a deterrent to CHICOM aggression and to the conduct of major contingency actions conducted by US military forces in the Far East. Okinawa, the most significant island, will continue to serve in the post-Vietnam environment as the

principal offshore operational and logistical supply base for US military contingency operations in Northeast and Southeast Asia. CINCPAC contingency plans are based on the present and anticipated US defense requirements and commitments. The US Navy forces transiting between Japan, the Philippines, and South China Sea area will continue to use Okinawa for logistic support. Okinawa serves as the central location for surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence activities in the Far East. US military units can be quickly deployed to threatened areas and supported from the Ryukyus base complex. Exclusive US jurisdiction over the Ryukyus permits storage of nuclear weapons and conventional munitions for support of CINCPAC's contingency and general war plans. The geographical location of the Ryukyus and the absence of restrictions have allowed installation of NIKE and HAWK missile nuclear delivery systems. Ryukyuan bases serve as prestrike and poststrike support of SIOP forces. Air refueling forces based on Okinawa extend the range, delivery capability, and operational flexibility of US strike aircraft. The Ryukyus, by virtue of their strategic location, provide communications essential to CINCPAC operations.

b. In the event of a termination or suspension of hostilities and accelerated withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam, the magnitude of effort in withdrawing US forces would require the use of the Ryukyus as a staging terminal to facilitate expeditious turnaround of shipping and to preclude the probable loss of millions of dollars in high-value equipment.

c. The Vietnam conflict has required a drawdown on US military resources in the Ryukyus. Units so affected, in

[redacted]

addition to other units programmed for the Ryukyus, are tentatively projected by the Services to be redeployed to Okinawa at the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam. US forces relocated to Okinawa would be available for rapid redeployment to South Vietnam should hostilities reopen. These military activities to be based on Okinawa would include:

(1) Army

(a) Headquarters, US Army, Ryukyu Islands, and supporting units.

(b) Headquarters, IX Corps, with attached Special Forces Group and PYSOPS Group, Civil Affairs Group, and missile battalion.

(c) One airborne brigade.

(d) One logistical command.

(e) One air defense brigade.

(2) Navy

(a) One patrol squadron.

(b) One US naval air facility and other naval support activities.

(c) The Master Plan for Naval Facilities envisages a Navy facility at Ora Wan in support of fleet operations.

(3) Marine Corps

(a) A Marine division/wing, reinforced, less one air group, which will be stationed at Iwakuni.

(b) A significant construction project in the Ryukyus pending is Kushi Wan airfield. Contingent upon the approval of the Secretary of Defense, Kushi Wan airfield will provide for the basing for two

fighter/attack Marine aircraft groups in the post-Vietnam period.

(4) Air Force

(a) Tactical fighter wing (3 squadrons: F-105, converting to A-7).

(b) Strategic refueling squadron (rotational) (KC-135).

(c) Tactical reconnaissance squadron (RF-4C).

(d) Tactical missile group (CGM 13-B).

(e) Tactical fighter squadron (rotational) (F-111 in FY 71/72).

(f) Air commando wing (2 squadrons: AC-47, A-1, C-47, C-123, A-37, U-10).

(g) Tactical air support squadron (OV-10).

(h) Tactical air support squadron (CH-3E).

(i) Tactical electronic warfare squadron (EB-66C/D).

(j) Tactical fighter squadron (rotational) (F-4E).

(k) Tactical airlift wing (3 squadrons: C-130).

9. [redacted] Positions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Reversion of Administrative Control of the Ryukyus to Japan

a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff through the years have steadfastly maintained that the United States must have unrestricted military use of Okinawa. The most recent statement of this position, in December 1965* concluded:

(1) Reversion of the Ryukyus to Japanese control would degrade the US strategic posture and seriously impair the US military position in the Far East. Exclusive US jurisdiction over the Ryukyus will continue indefinitely to be essential to US and Free World security interests.

*JCS 2180/204-1

(3) Unilateral US control of Ryukyuan administrative procedures is essential for as long as we maintain major bases there, to prevent the direct imposition of political limitations by another country upon the utilization of our Okinawa-based forces, equipment, materiel, and other resources.

(4) The United States should continue to eliminate those restrictions on the private freedoms of the Ryukyuan people which are not essential to the maintenance of the security of US military installations or of the Ryukyus themselves.

(5) The United States should continue to provide economic aid, based on the capability of the Ryukyuan economy to utilize such aid efficiently. Increased Japanese economic aid and technical assistance should be welcomed and encouraged. However, the United States should continue to exercise basic control over the Government of Japan's participation in the economic assistance program for the Ryukyus, within the context of the present US-Japanese agreement on this subject.

b. From a military viewpoint there is no justification for a retreat from the above position. Nevertheless in the light of recent security consultative meetings between the United States and the Government of Japan, various alternatives to unrestricted US use of our Ryukyuan bases are examined below in order to determine which alternative would least disrupt and degrade over-all military operations from the Ryukyus.

[redacted]

10. [redacted] Consideration of Alternatives

a. A review of the various proposals which have been advanced over the years reveals that there are at least four alternatives to unrestricted US use of the Ryukyu Islands. These alternatives are:

(1) Continued US operation of bases under special base rights agreement.

(2) Continued US operation of bases within the context of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 with Japan, extended to cover US military bases in the Ryukyus.

(3) Establishment of an enclave-type base structure on Okinawa or possibly on one of the other islands in the Ryukyus under exclusive US jurisdiction.

(4) Relocation of US bases elsewhere in the western Pacific where military operations would be less bound by political restrictions.

b. Consideration of other possible alternatives suggests that a feasible addition to the above might be a "partial or functional reversion" whereby certain functions such as education, law and order, or civil service would gradually revert to Japanese control. Partial or functional transfer of administrative authority appears to be a technique of transferring authority rather than a separate and distinct alternative. This is particularly true when it is recognized that the transfer of responsibility for one function would only whet the appetites of the Japanese and Ryukyuans and increase the pressure for complete reversion.

c. An analysis of the alternatives to unrestricted US use of our Ryukyuan bases involves an assessment of the degree of impairment both of the effectiveness of the bases and of our

over-all defense posture which would result from the adoption of the alternatives available. In making this assessment, the following guidelines were used:

(1) US national objectives and policy for the Far East will remain essentially unchanged within the foreseeable future insofar as it affects our security interests and military posture.

(2) The continuation at least through the mid-term of a cooperative and moderate government in Japan was assumed. The effectiveness of the Ryukyuan bases, whether under US or Japanese administration, largely depends on the acquiescence and cooperation of both the Ryukyuans and the Government of Japan.

(3) Bases in the Philippines, Taiwan, Guam, Hawaii, the Bonin-Volcano islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) were considered in determining the feasibility and effects of relocating bases.

[redacted]

c. Alternative 1. Transfer of administrative authority to Japan under special base rights agreement.

(1) With this alternative, the impact on US military functions would depend upon the nature of the arrangements agreed to. Retention by the United States of maximum freedom of operations would depend upon the assurance that any agreement will remain in force and be honored over the long term. Such assurance, no matter how strong at the beginning, nevertheless would be vulnerable to unfavorable changes in the outlook and leadership of the Japanese people.

(2) Should the United States remain in complete control of areas and bases, and access thereto, the erosion of

the effectiveness of US military bases might be small. A conservative government would presumably remain moderate in its approach, and, although it would undoubtedly press for increased control of areas and government functions, it is believed that, so far as US military forces are concerned, it would tend to maintain the status quo.

[redacted]

(4) The transfer of administrative control of the Ryukyus to Japan under "special arrangements" may not assure continued unrestricted operating rights, particularly if the Government of Japan leadership changes to a party committed to abolition of the agreements. However, properly drafted, base rights unlimited by self-imposed restrictions could set the stage for an orderly transfer of administrative control to Japan with minimum impact on US security interests.

(5) Conditions in Annex B hereto represent minimum military requirements with respect to our base rights in the Ryukyus, as expressed by CINCPAC.

e. Alternative 2. Transfer administrative authority to Japan under current US-Japan security arrangements.

(1) Return of the Ryukyus to Japanese administrative control under existing treaty arrangements would place these islands under the US-Japan Security Treaty. Therefore, pursuant to Article 6 of the treaty, all facilities and areas of the US land, air, and naval forces in the Ryukyus, as well as the status of these forces, would be governed by the provisions of the US-Japan Agreement. Further, the use of such facilities and areas

in the Ryukyus would be subject to the restrictive supplemental classified understandings, presently in force, which were agreed upon by the two countries upon negotiation of the Security Treaty.

(2) One of the most significant strategic consequences of reversion would be the imposition of potential restrictions on the United States resulting from the requirement to consult with the Government of Japan prior to:

(a) Initiating military combat operations from the Ryukyus;

(b) Making major changes in the deployment of US armed forces stationed there;

(c) Moving and using a significant portion of theater-reserve stocks in this important forward storage area; or

[redacted]

With regard to the first two of these limitations, it seems probable that the only exception to the prior-consultation requirement would be with respect to operations or deployments undertaken in connection with our immediate response to the resumption of hostilities in Korea or in the actual defense of the Ryukyus and Japan. Government of Japan authorization would have to be sought for deployments undertaken in response to emergencies elsewhere. [redacted]

(3) The United States would also be confronted with adverse consequences of reversion in a number of ways.

the cumulative effect of which could be to endanger and possibly disrupt certain essential military missions.

(a) The United States could lose:

1. Freedom of action for forces assigned or staging through the regi...

2. Control of the air space and unrestricted control over air defense operations.

(b) Additional pressures for commercial use of Naha Air Base and other airfields in the Ryukyus can be expected, which would complicate the security problem and exceed the fields' capacities.

(c) Japanese control over commercial port facilities could result in impaired military usage. (Naha is the only major commercial port in Okinawa.)

(d) Military transportation outside military bases would be subject to Japanese control and interference.

(e) Emergency operational requirements for POL products could be jeopardized if the pipelines to the bases were under Japanese control.

(f) Japan would probably insist on some control over radio frequencies and monitor telephone trunklines between military bases.

(g) The United States could expect restrictions on troop movements, maneuvers, and the use of firing ranges.

(h) Public safety and security operations would be hindered as a result of restrictions on our regulatory controls in specific areas, such as surveillance of criminals, control of firearms and explosives, and prevention of black-marketing of ammunition and narcotics.

(i) Local communists are credited with a limited clandestine harassment capability, primarily against off-base targets such as POL pipelines, storage areas, water distribution systems, and electrical power installations. The fact that such acts presently have no more than a nuisance value and that subversive elements on Okinawa do not have the capability to engage in widespread sabotage or guerrilla warfare is largely due to the availability of US security elements to aid Ryukyuan police in off-base areas.

(j) The United States could expect to lose our unrestricted right of investigating security matters of US interest outside military bases.

(k) Freedom of movement of diplomatic personnel and cultural and commercial exchanges would facilitate the conduct of subversive and espionage activities.

(l) The United States would be faced with complex and time-consuming procedures for the acquisition of military lands for emergency purposes and would possibly lose control over the 24,000 acres of former Japanese public lands used by the United States, currently without compensation.

(m) The approximately 50,000 Ryukyuans employed directly by US agencies would no longer be under our direct control. There would be danger of the unrestricted intrusion of Japanese labor federations (of both right and left), with the consequent likelihood of legally sanctioned demonstrations, strikes, and other slow-down activities - which are now illegal.

f. Alternative 3. Establishment of an enclave-type base structure on Okinawa, or possibly another island in the Ryukyus, under exclusive US jurisdiction.

(1) Some 15 years ago, when the decision was made by the United States, based on strategic interests, to develop a military base on Okinawa, "on a long-term basis," the construction of these military facilities was merged with the progressive rehabilitation of the civilian economy. The complex of military installations on Okinawa was thoroughly integrated with the civilian community, in a geographic sense, and both communities were made to share in the common use of all essential supporting facilities. As a consequence, there is now common dependence of both the local civilian community and the US military upon Okinawa's limited essential utilities - such as electric power, water supply, telecommunications, POL pipelines, airports, and harbor installations.

(2) Early in 1959, at the request of the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense assigned to the Department of the Army the task of conducting a study to determine the feasibility of concentrating US military installations on Okinawa into a "single area." The Department of the Army referred the requirement to CINCPAC, who passed the action to CINCPACREP RYUKYUS.

(3) The study was completed on 29 May 1959 and concluded that "the price that must be paid in increased vulnerability, popular animosity and dollars for the formation of such an enclave is utterly unacceptable." The study was concurred in by all concerned, and CINCPAC was informed by the Department of the Army that the President had agreed that the consolidation of military installations on Okinawa was neither feasible nor desirable.

(4) It is recognized that an enclave concept does not necessarily depend upon the concentration of all facilities into a "single area." However, the difficulties uncovered in the Single Area Installation Study are so substantial that further consideration of this alternative should be

held in abeyance unless the Japanese strongly support such a concept. In this instance, a thorough feasibility study should be conducted before committing the United States.

(5) On 24 February 1967, the High Commissioner, Ryukyu Islands, recommended that an engineering study be made of other large islands in the Ryukyu chain for alternate sites for selected facilities now located or planned to be located on Okinawa. CINCPAC, in commenting on the above recommendation, indicated his opposition to the plan on the grounds that:

(a) Overt activity which might suggest that the United States is considering the development of additional or alternative bases in outlying Ryukyu Islands would stimulate reversionist pressures.

(b) Pressures which dictate a search for base sites alternative to those in the Ryukyus point to the necessity of giving increased attention to Guam and possibly other islands in the Mariana group.

(c) CINCPAC further stated that future base development in areas which are likely to remain under US control is much preferred to the investment of capital for permanent-type facilities in the Ryukyus which are destined for ultimate reversion to Japanese sovereignty.

(d) This concept merits consideration only if a truly exclusive enclave status could be obtained and if the Japanese would reimburse the United States for the costs to relocate within the enclave. A true enclave status should provide for the desired US special base and operating rights and free the Japanese from political association with subsequent US actions. It is also possible that costing factors would be so prohibitive that they would tend to persuade Japan to accept the special base rights agreement.

g. Alternative 4. Relocation of US bases elsewhere in the western Pacific.

(1) Present US military strategy in the Pacific is based upon retention of complete US jurisdiction and operating rights in the Ryukyus. Withdrawal of forces from Okinawa could eliminate use of certain offensive and defensive weapons in the western Pacific. Relocation of Ryukyuan-based US fighter-bombers to Guam would reduce their capability to strike Soviet, Communist China, and Korean targets. [redacted] The increased distances resulting from relocating conventional units would correspondingly increase reaction time and, under varying conditions, require additional sealift and airlift and refueling and staging bases. The communications essential to the command and control of US forces will also be affected.

(2) These forces would be relocated to Korea, Taiwan, or the Philippines to avoid the adverse results of the loss of the Ryukyus bases. However, political restrictions, either currently in effect or possible in the future, in these countries might make such an alternative infeasible or undesirable.

(3) Under the UN Trusteeship Agreement of 1947, the United States may establish bases and station military forces

in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. However, location of combat or support units in that area would be limited by available real estate and civilian labor forces. More important, five years after NSAM 145* was promulgated, the political status of the Trust Territory remains unresolved. Urgent action is required to enable the Trust Territory to come under US sovereignty.

(4) Together with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Bonin-Volcano Islands occupy a highly strategic position in the defense of the Western Pacific. However, relocation of military units to the Bonin, Volcano Islands would be even more limited by available land and labor resources. Moreover positive measures are required to insure long-range US control over these islands before this area can be considered, even as a partial alternative to the Ryukyus.

(5) A more detailed evaluation of degradation of these various military functions and the cost associated with relocating US forces and supporting facilities is reflected in the following discussion of Service considerations:

(a) Army Functions. As indicated previously, Okinawa plays a primary role as an offshore base for support of operations in Southeast Asia and in Northeast Asia. Should the Army forces located on Okinawa be relocated elsewhere, facilities comparable to those on Okinawa would be required.

1. One alternative would be to move the US Army complex from Okinawa to Guam (or even Hawaii). However, the cost incident to such a transfer of supplies

* NASM 145, New Policy for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islnds, directed action to bring the TTPI into permanent association with the United States.

and facilities plus the loss in response time for deployment of forces make such an alternative most undesirable, particularly in light of the current and foreseeable threat. Further, logistic support could not be provided from these possible alternative locations with even approximately the same degree of effectiveness as is possible from the Ryukyus.

2. Recent studies concerning relocation of US Army logistical support activities examined the requirements for offshore support of US forces engaged in the South Vietnam conflict. The study group considered areas which offered potential base sites, acquisition of base rights, and the development, cost, and time required for new construction. The study concluded that the Philippines could serve as an adequate replacement for Okinawa and that a new logistical base complex could be constructed in the Philippines in two or three years for approximately $180,500,000, assuming acceptable agreements with the Philippine Government could be negotiated.

(b) Naval Functions. There are no suitable alternative locations for the Marine Corps units in the western Pacific which have the potential to match the facilities and response times provided by Okinawa. Alternate locations such as Guam, the TTPI, and the Philippines may be considered, but such locations would reduce the quick-reaction capability and effectiveness of the Marine Corps forces in meeting emergency and contingency operations requirements. As for Navy antisubmarine warfare

air units, in the event of limited or general war, certain patrol areas would be out of the range of land based patrol aircraft if bases in Japan and the Ryukyus were not available. Also, base loading or political restraints on the arming of aircraft could become critical factors in maintaining effective land based patrol operations from Taiwan or the Philippines.

(c) Air Force Functions

1. Air units and bases on Okinawa constitute a major source of military forces and support available in the western Pacific to meet a wide range of emergency and contingency requirements. The forces (air defense, tactical, strategic, reconnaissance, airlift, and missile) in the Ryukyus are considerable in number. Any relocation of these forces would seriously upset the area-wide geographical balance and degrade the strategic and tactical advantages afforded by the current force posture in the Ryukyus. [redacted] In addition, concentration of forces on a reduced number of locations would degrade flexibility, result in limited dispersal, and seriously increase the vulnerability of US air units and possibly exceed capacities of logistic support facilities.

2. In the event complete transfer of SAC supporting facilities becomes a necessity, the degree

of degradation of SAC units operating in the western Pacific would be dependent on the geographical area in which SAC forces are relocated. Movement from Okinawa of the operating bases for SAC KC-135 air refueling aircraft will have an appreciable over-all degradation when measured in terms of mainland China contingency strikes. In terms of operational suitability, particularly as a base for US air units, Southeast Asia basing offers advantages for counter-strikes against Southern Asia targets. If adequate air defense can be provided at Ching Chuan Kang, Taiwan, KC-135 aircraft could be positioned at this location to provide pre-poststrike refueling support of SAC and tactical air strike forces. Improvement of the existing airfield at Ching Chuan Kang would perhaps require the least funds for construction, but it would also be the least desirable in terms of vulnerability to attack by Communist China. The geographical location of Iwo Jima for forward basing of KC-135 support is considered the minimum acceptable for

[redacted]

However, the geographical location is unsatisfactory for supporting strikes against North China.

2. Airlift forces currently operating from the Ryukyus expend their major effort in support of Southeast Asia airlift requirements. Any relocation of airlift operation and support facilities from

the Ryukyus to locations farther from Pacific contingency areas or from PACOM personnel centers and supply depots would result in increased airlift fleet requirements in a direct proportion to the increased distance involved. MAC operations depend upon the airlift support requirements of the using commands. Under consultative agreements, such as exist under the current US and Japan Security Treaty, MAC could continue to operate a logistical airlift support system for the Ryukyus. However, special weapons flights may have to be routed to or through bases outside the Ryukyus complex.



2. The loss of the DOD communications relay capability on Okinawa would require a complete reconfiguration of the US strategic communications in PACOM.

(c) Military Assistance Program. Ryukyuan-based units and activities provide support to MAP organizations in Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and the Philippines. Essentially, this support consists of logistic and maintenance backup and the provision of on-the-job training for MAP supported personnel. Such support is transferable to US bases other than the Ryukyus with an indeterminate increase in turn-around time as well as labor and transporation costs.

(6) Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps activities on Okinawa are designed to be mutually supporting. Most contingency plans for which Okinawan-based units would be employed (both offensive and defensive) require the employment of combined arms teams in order to accomplish the mission. Land, sea, and air forces, together with the support activities, are largely interdependent. Decentralization of major functions to various alternative locations would destroy the integrity and effectiveness of remaining

forces or activities. In all probability, there are miscellaneous units and/or activities based in the Ryukyus which could be redeployed to alternate locations without a serious impact on US military capabilities in the area. However, such recommendations would involve re-evaluation of strategic concepts and supporting force structures which is considered beyond the purview of this study.

(7) While the Philippines, Taiwan, the Bonin-Volcano Islands, Guam, Hawaii, and the TTPI were considered as alternate locations, the following factors, not fully developed in other portions of the study, must be considered:

(a) A highly proficient indigenous labor force of over 50,000 personnel is currently available in the Ryukyus at competitive wage rates. This force includes personnel trained in such fields as maintenance and operation of sophisticated equipment to include communications and ADP equipment. At locations other than the Philippines, and possibly Taiwan, necessary civilian employees would probably have to be imported as well as trained. In the Philippines, physical security would be a major problem, and, in Taiwan, installations would be more vulnerable to CHICOM attack.

(b) In order to move any of the Ryukyuan base complex to either the Philippines or Taiwan, a base rights agreement would have to be negotiated. There is no assurance that the United States could obtain more favorable, or even as favorable, arrangements with these

countries as with Japan. Additionally, there is no assurance that such arrangements would endure.

(c) To transfer all functions to the next best location would result in vacating facilities with a value of approximately one billion dollars, which are probably not recoverable, with only 20.7 million dollars in salvage value, and the expenditure of an estimated additional 604 million dollars to provide minimum mission essential alternate facilities.* This does not include costs of moving personnel, supplies, and equipment to the alternate location or the associated costs in providing an adequate labor force at the new location.

h. Partial or Functional Transfer of Administrative Authority to Japan

(1) This concept envisages the gradual return to Japan of the responsibility for selected functions such as education, social security, public health, and other aspects of civil administration.

(2) The primary objection to this concept is that the transfer of the responsibility for the administrative control over selected functions would generate pressure for additional concessions, for there is no doubt that complete reversion is the end objective. This could very well result in an extended period of strife, work stoppages, and other forms of civil disobedience designed to force the United States to accept full reversion. There is also the distinct danger of arriving at full reversion without the protection of an adequate base rights agreement.

* Attachment to Enclosure to CINCPAC letter 3121 Ser 000534, 16 December 1966; on file in Joint Secretariat.

(3) Should we decide to transfer administrative authority to the Japanese by the adoption of alternative 1, 2, or 3, above, it would be impractical to turn over simultaneously all functions. Instead, a time table for the orderly transfer of functions should be developed through US-Government of Japan discussions.

CONCLUSIONS

11. [redacted] For reasons of military security, it is critical that the United States retain its present administrative control over the Ryukyus. Any erosion of such control over the Ryukyus would impact adversely on the US posture in the Pacific and is not supportable from a military viewpoint.

12. [redacted] Unrestricted access and freedom of action in the use of our military bases in the Ryukyus is essential if US security interests in the Far East are to be protected through the foreseeable future.

13. [redacted] Should it become evident that efforts on the part of the United States to retain complete administrative control of the Ryukyus are resulting in intolerable political liabilities, to include an untenable base position in either Japan or the Ryukyus, the following considerations should govern future US actions:

a. The least disruptive alternative of those examined would be an orderly transfer of civil administration to Japan in return for a special base rights agreement which provides for the military requirements essentially as set forth in Annex B. However, such an arrangement would be vulnerable to unfavorable changes in the outlook and leadership of the Japanese people.

b. Transfer of administrative authority to Japan under the context of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of

1960 with Japan would seriously reduce US military capabilities in the Far East because of the resulting highly restrictive conditions governing our operations. US interests would best be served by separate negotiation on the future of the Ryukyuan bases.

c. The establishment of an enclave-type base structure in Okinawa, or one of the other Ryukyu Islands, does not appear feasible and should not be considered as an acceptable alternative unless it is the only method of retaining unrestricted control and freedom of action over our military bases in the Ryukyus. In this event, it merits consideration for discussion with the Japanese if exclusive enclave rights can be obtained and if, in the ensuing transfer, the Japanese would reimburse the United States for the relocation costs. In any instance, further feasibility and cost studies by the military services would be required before a decision is made.

d. Relocation of US bases elsewhere in the western Pacific within the mid-term period would seriously undermine US military capabilities because of such factors as host government political restrictions and the greatly increased operating ranges involved. More significantly, it would result in the abandonment of approximately $1 billion in assets, with negligible salvage value, and require in excess of $600 million for the construction of alternate facilities. However, examination of alternate base sites in the western Pacific should continue in the event of the contingency occurring that prescribes relocation elsewhere of some or all of the US Ryukyuan facilities.

14. [redacted] In recent years the Government of Japan has endeavored to increase its knowledge and understanding of security questions, including the use of US bases in the Ryukyus. This maturing

attitude on the part of Japan's leaders should make it possible for the United States to press for continued exclusive control of the Ryukyus as a legitimate political cost of US defense commitments to Japan. The US Government should continue to emphasize to the Government of Japan that Japan's security is in large part dependent on the maintenance of a substantial US military posture in the Ryukyus. The Government of Japan, for its part, should continue its efforts to bridge diverse attitudes among the Japanese people concerning basic security issues and seek to create popular support for the thesis that Japan's security, together with that of the rest of the free nations in East Asia, is largely dependent on credible US military presence in the Pacific. Such presence, in turn, is dependent on continued unrestricted US control of its bases and operations in the Ryukyus.

15. While unrestricted US control over the Ryukyus is critical for the foreseeable future, the political pressures we now face and may anticipate in coming years point to the urgency of having the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands under US sovereignty. Also important is the requirement to retain US control over and freedom of action in the Bonin-Volcano Islands.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES CURRENTLY LOCATED IN THE RYUKYUS

| UNIT | STRENGTH Mil | STRENGTH Civ | BUDGET | MISSION |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Army | | | | |
| Headquarters, US Army Forces, Ryukyus | 394 | 126 | $ 1,639,000 | Supports Headquarters Army Forces, Ryukyus, with personnel management, personnel services, and other administrative-type functions. |
| 2nd Logistical Command | 3,540 | 4,061 | $48,487,000 | Supports cold and limited war defense of Taiwan, Penghus, Korea, mainland Southeast Asia and military activity to stabilize the situation in the Republic of Vietnam and Laos; conducts counterinsurgency support; operates offshore logistic base to provide wholesale support of all classes of supplies (less medical); and maintains US Army elements stationed in the western Pacific. Missions under limited and general war essentially the same. |
| Fort Buckner | 2,057 | 6,051 | $35,000,000 | Provides heavy equipment installation support to all organizations located on Okinawa and support of other areas in the western Pacific. |
| USA Medical Center | 1,014 | 418 | $ 3,633,000 | Provides medical support for the Ryukyus; medical evacuation, and medical support for Southeast Asia to include AID and MAP. |
| 30th Artillery Brigade | 2,923 | 30 | $ 4,173,000 | Air Defense of Okinawa and all actions on air defense matters. |
| 1st Missile Battalion (LG) of 57th Artillery | 624 | | $ 225,000 | Provides for the sector defense of site HANZA; deploys units in PACOM as directed; prepares to conduct nuclear and CBR operations, as directed. |
| 1st Special Forces Group | 1,097 | 3 | $ 995,000 | Provides cold and limited war counterinsurgency and contingency plans and actions; provides military advisor throughout Southeast Asia. |
| 97th Civil Affairs Group | 85 | | $ 80,000 | Provides Civil Affairs support to the 1st Special Forces Group. |
| 999th Signal Co. | 232 | | $ 225,000 | Provides communications support to the 1st Special Forces Group. |
| 7th Psychological Group | 276 | 78 | $ 2,048,000 | Supports PSYOP offensive operations directed toward North Korea and throu out Southeast Asia; provides advisory personnel and conducts extensive pu lication and reproduction of all types of PSYOP material including leafle and magazines. |
| b. Navy | | | | |
| Commander, Fleet Activities, Ryukyus | 79 | | $ 108,000 | Provides limited logistical support for all nonaviation naval activities and fleet activities in the Ryukyus Islands. |
| Naval Air Facility, Naha | 569 | | $ 2,010,680 | Maintains and operates facilities and provides services and material to s port operations of aviation activities and units as designated by the CNO |
| Patrol Squadron | 423 | | $ 1,020,288 | "Market Time" operations, ASW surface surveillance, and air patrols in direct support of the Seventh Fleet efforts in Vietnam and waters contiguous thereto. |
| VC-5, Naha | 160 | | $ 103,547 | Provides targets and target services, as required, in supporting Seventh Fleet. |
| Naval Operations Support Group, WESTPAC Detachment | 92 | | $ 28,000 | Special warfare advisor to Commander Seventh Fleet. Function is concerne with counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare, tactical cover and deception, psychological warfare, restricted water warfare, and other clandestine activities. |
| Naval Security Group, Hanza | 500 | | $ 191,800 | Performs Naval Security Group functions as directed by the CNO. |
| Naval Communication Station, Okinawa | 254 | (additional personnel programmed) | $ 500,000 | Maintains and operates communications facilities and provides communications services and material for Navy and Marine Corps activities. |
| Headquarters, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific (Forward) | 39 | | $ 26,800 | Monitors all aspects of logistic support rendered III Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF); supervises and coordinates the operations of the WESTPAC Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC), replacement system, including transient facilities; supervises and coordinates the scheduling and execution of all intratheater airlift and sealift for movement of FMFPAC units, personnel, and supplies within WESTPAC. |
| 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) | 8,623 | | $ 8,505,419 | a. Serves as a task element available for operation in support of CINCPAC contingency plans. Conducts amphibious and other training exercises, including exercises with SEATO and other allies.<br>b. MAB retains its alert posture for contingency operations; provides a Special Landing Force (SLF) continuously afloat which is available fo independent or supporting operations in the Republic of Vietnam or elsewhere (currently, two such SLFs are afloat and provide rotational base for units in the Republic of Vietnam).<br>c. In general war, the 9th MAB would form an integral part of III MAF an would conduct operations in support of CINCPAC's concept of maintaini a military capability as far forward as possible in the western Pacif. |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3rd Force Service Regiment (FSR), Camp Sukiran | 3,225 | | $ 3,721,946 | Supports WESTPAC-based tactical elements including combat operations in Vietnam by providing the essential offshore supply and maintenance suppor for Marine Corps forces in Vietnam.<br>REMARKS: The budget shown for the 3rd FSR is for the organic account onl The 3rd FSR gross obligations to support Marine Corps units in Republic of Vietnam including ROKMC, will be $75,308,000 during FY 1967. |
| Headquarters, Camp Butler | 503 | | $ 7,585,820 | Provides support to the 9th MAB and Marine Corps forces in Vietnam, maintains a transit facility and baggage center for personnel assigned duty i Vietnam. Performs maintenance, construction, and related functions for a Marine Camps on Okinawa. |
| Marine Corps Air Facility, Futema | 240 | | $ 1,032,970 | Provides support to the 9th MAB and Marine Corps forces in Vietnam; provi normal air station support for the helicopter and refueler-transport sqs. |
| Marine Barracks, Naha | 53 | | (Funded by Hq, MC, approx budget $5,000) | Performs security duties for fleet activities in the Ryukyus |
| Sub-Unit 2, Hq and Service Battalion, FMFPAC | 555 | | (Included in Camp Butler budget) | Provides support to the 9th MAB and Marine Corps forces in Vietnam; proc ses all replacement and casuals to and from Vietnam.<br>REMARKS: The average daily replacement, casual, and transient Marine Co strength on Okinawa is approximately 1,400. |
| Naval Mobile Construction Battalion | 762 | | $ 600,000 | Provides construction support to Naval, Marine Corps, and other forces as directed.<br>REMARKS: Unit recently deployed to Vietnam but will be reconstituted in August, 1967. |
| c. Air Force | | | | |
| Kadena Air Base 313th Air Div | 5,462 | 2,228 | 1/ | Exercises command and control of Ryukyus-based offensive and defensive a and support units committed to general war and contingency operations. |
| 18th Tactical Fighter Wing | 227 | | 1/ | Provides forces on continuous TDY to Southeast Asia, maintains and opera jet engine field maintenance facility and accomplishes modification and pair of F-101/F-105 aircraft; provides supply support for all Southeast Asia-based KC-135 tanker aircraft and supply support to six bases in Sou east Asia. |
| 15th Tactical Recon Sq | 227 | | 1/ | Provides forces and replacement aircraft to Southeast Asia. |
| 498th Tactical Missile Group | 655 | | 1/ | [redacted] |
| 400 Munitions Maintenance Squadron | 363 | 75 | 1/ | |
| 403rd MAC Air Support Squadron | 595 | 179 | $ 3,236 | Provides intertheater airlift (supports approximately 740 sorties/month airlifting over 50,000 passengers/month). |
| Detachment 432, 1156th Tech Opns Sq | 13 | | 1/ | Electromagnetic surveillance. |
| Detachment 5, 6003rd Support Sq | 25 | 40 | 1/ | Monitors USAF Management Engineering Programs related to manpower for Ryukyus-based USAF units. |
| Detachment 43, 1005th Special Investigation Group | 27 | 6 | 1/ | Provides counterintelligence and investigation service. |
| 1962nd Communications Group | 622 | 31 | $ 142,004 | Provides fixed ground telecommunications, air traffic control, and navi tion aid services in support of air force units and other US Government agencies at Kadena. Also responsible for International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) function. |
| Air Force Logistics Command Detachment | | 8 | | Provides manufacturers' technical representation and services for vario USAF weapon systems. |
| 20th Weather Sq | 65 | 5 | 1/ | Provides meteorological services in support of US forces operating on a through Kadena Air Base; develops and disseminates meteorological obser tions in support of Air Weather Service worldwide observing network. |
| Detachment 1, 6927th Security Gp | 74 | | $ 74,529 | Transmission monitoring security unit. |
| 1030th USAF Auditor General Group | 5 | 1 | 1/ | Performs audit missions and prepares reports concerning need, acquisiti and custody of funds and property under jurisdiction of Air Force. |
| Detachment 1, 374th Troop Carrier Wing | 7 | | 1/ | Performs liaison function at Kadena Air Base for Naha Air Base, 37th Tr Carrier Wing. |
| Detachment 911, 3751st Field Tng | 42 | | 1/ | Provides refresher ground training for aircrews and other formal traini courses to produce and maintain maintenance skills relative to USAF wea systems. |

| UNIT | STRENGTH Mil | STRENGTH Civ | BUDGET | MISSIONS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Detachment 911, 3424th Field Interceptor Squadron | 12 | | 1/ | Conducts formal training courses to maintain crew and maintenance readin on the CGM 13B (MACE) missile. |
| Detachment 3, 7651st Aero Chart Sq | 6 | | $ 799 | Stores, maintains, and distributes navigation and planning charts, air t get material, flight information publications, and related items for PAC SAC, and other authorized USAF and US military units operating in the Ry |
| Detachment 3, 901st Aero Medical Evacuation | 12 | | 1/ | Manages airlift of medical patients for all military services in the Ryu |
| Detachment 2, 2875th GEEIA Sq | 47 | | $ 2,400 | Provides engineering for and installation of ground electronics communic tions equipment and systems in the Ryukyus. |
| 4252nd Strategic Wing | 1,138 | 6 | $ 325,638 | Maintains and operates air refueling KC-135 tanker aircraft in direct su of B-52 strike missions in South Vietnam; supports directed B-52 strikes contingency plans against Southeast Asia/Asian targets; provides for re covery and follow-on B-52 [redacted] |
| Detachment 6, PACAF Air Rescue Center | 19 | | 1/ | Provides local base rescue helicopter support including crash rescue and fire fighting coverage for tactical fighter aircraft. Secondary mission search, rescue, and medical evacuation support of military and civilian personnel in the Ryukyus. |
| Detachment 12, 4440th Air Delivery Group | 4 | | 1/ | Exercises operational control of transiting aircraft within the Ryukyus |
| Detachment 4, 1st Med Service Wing | 16 | | 1/ | Provides squadron medical elements which support tactical units at forw operating bases. |
| 6002nd Standardization Evaluation Gp | 58 | 18 | 1/ | Standardizes operating procedures and evaluates performance of aircrews, weapons controllers, munitions loading crews, and missile launch crews. [redacted] instruction for PACAF fighter bomber crews. Collects and disseminates PACAF weapon systems tactics a techniques. |
| 11th Air Postal Sq | 29 | 2 | 1/ | Provides system for transmission of mail, financial service, pouch and delivery of "hi-value" spares for weapon support systems; serves Ryukyu Philippines, and Taiwan. |
| Naha Air Base | | | | |
| 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing | 2,174 | 1,238 | 2/ | Provides active air defense of Ryukyuan bases as well as scheduled depl ments of interceptor aircraft, aircrews, and maintenance personnel for mentation and training of allied forces in the Philippines, Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Currently supporting Southeas Asia conflict with interceptor controllers and conducting intercept con troller training. |
| Detachment 14, 30th Weather Sq | 21 | 3 | 2/ | Provides meteorological services in support of US forces operating on a through Naha Air Base; develops and disseminates meteorological observa tions in support of Air Weather Service worldwide observing network. |
| Detachment 2, 5th Communications Squadron | 12 | | 2/ | Provides fixed and mobile tactical communications in support of airlift operations. |
| 7th Aerial Port Sq | 129 | 25 | 2/ | Provides air terminal and aerial delivery service. |
| Detachment 2, 11th Air Postal Sq | 18 | 3 | 2/ | Maintains postal system for transmission of mail, financial service, po and delivery of "hi-value" spares for weapons support systems. |
| 33rd Air Rescue Service | 111 | | $ 108,846 | To search, locate, and recover personnel and aerospace hardware in the Ryukyus area. |
| Detachment 4301 1005th Special Investigation | 6 | 1 | 2/ | Provides counterintelligence and investigative service. |
| 374th Troop Carrier Wing | 25,126 | 12 | 2/ | Provides airlift from Okinawa to Southeast Asia (monthly airlift of app mately 3,000 passengers and 4,000 tons of cargo). |
| 1038th USAF Auditor General Group | 4 | 1 | 2/ | Performs audit mission and reports findings to Air Force management con ing need, acquisition, and custody of funds and property under jurisdic of the Air Force. |
| 2152nd Communications Squadron | 196 | 17 | $ 38,800 | Provides fixed ground telecommunications, air traffic control, and navi tional aids services in support of Air Force and other US Government agencies at Naha Air Base. |
| Detachment 901, 3751st Field Training Squadron | 16 | | 2/ | Provides refresher ground training for aircrews and other formal traini courses to produce and maintain maintenance skills relative to C-130A a F-102 aircraft. |

1/ Kadena Air Base O&M Budget: $19,298,300. Existing Air Force accounting and budget system not designed to provide a breakd of O&M dollars at lower than major organizational levels. Except for O&M budget support specifically allocated for the ten ants by parent command, all unit O&M funds are included in the O&M budget for Kadena Air Base.

2/ Naha Air Base O&M Budget: $9,127,900. Existing Air Force accounting and budget system not designed to provide a breakdown O&M dollars at lower than major organizational levels. Except for O&M budget support specifically allocated for the tenant parent command, all unit O&M funds are included in the O&M budget for Naha Air Base.

[redacted]

ANNEX B

CINCPAC RECOMMENDATIONS

MINIMUM MILITARY REQUIREMENTS US SHOULD INSIST UPON RE: OKINAWA BASES IN EVENT ADMINISTRATION OF OKINAWA REVERTS TO JAPAN

1. [redacted] General

a. Title to such bases as the United States now utilizes or later acquires for use will be retained by the United States. This proviso is similar to that provided by a proposed amendment to the Philippines Independence Act of 1934. However, it was not passed. Similar language was contained in the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Though the language of the act would cover bases, relevant reports indicate that was not the intention of Congress.* There is, therefore, precedent, albeit somewhat weak, for insisting upon such a guarantee.

b. The United States must be permitted to expand existing bases, exchange existing bases for other bases, acquire additional bases, or relinquish rights to bases, as any military exigency may require.

2. [redacted] Description of Rights

a. It must be agreed that the United States shall have rights and authority within bases which are necessary for use, operation, and defense thereof and all rights within limits of land, territorial waters, and air space of Ryukyus which are necessary to provide access to or control of military bases.

b. Such rights should include, but not be limited to, the authority:

(1) To construct (including dredging), operate, maintain, utilize, occupy, and control the bases.

* US in World Affairs 1945-47, footnote, page 309

(2) To improve and deepen the harbors, channels, entrances, and anchorages, and to construct or maintain necessary roads and bridges affording access to the bases.

(3) To control (including the right to prohibit) insofar as may be required for the efficient operation and safety of the bases, anchorages, moorings, landings, take-offs, movements, and operation of ships, aircraft, and other vehicles on water, in the air, or on land comprising or in the vicinity of the bases.

(4) The right to acquire such rights of way, and to construct thereon, as may be required, communications facilities, including underground cables, pipelines, and roads or railroads.

(5) To construct, install, maintain, and employ on any base any type of facilities, weapons, substance, device, vessel, or vehicle on or under the ground, in the air, or on or under the water that may be required or appropriate, including meteorological systems, aerial and water navigation lights, radio and radar apparatus, and electronic devices, of any desired power, type of emission, and frequency.

(6) To deploy, redeploy, and/or employ freely from any base, any type of military unit or organization without consultation, notification, or approval.

c. The exercise of the above rights should not be unreasonable or, unless required by military necessity, determined by the United States, so as to interfere with the necessary rights of navigation, aviation, communication, or land travel within the Ryukyus.

3. Shipping and Navigation

a. It should be agreed that US vessels, and the military forces of the United States, military aircraft, and Government-owned vehicles shall be accorded free access to and movement

[redacted]

between ports and US bases throughout the Ryukyus, including territorial waters, by land, air, and sea.

b. Lights and other aids to navigation of vessels and aircraft placed or established in the bases and adjacent territorial waters or in the vicinity of US bases shall conform to the system designated by the United States.

4. [redacted] Exemptions From Customs and Other Duties. No import, excise, consumption, or other tax, duty, or import should be charged on materiel, equipment, supplies, or goods, including food stores and clothing, for use in construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the bases, consigned to, or destined for, US personnel.

5. [redacted] Maneuver and Other Areas. The United States should have the right to use land and coastal sea areas of appropriate size and location for periodic maneuvers, for additional staging areas, bombing and gunnery ranges, and for such intermediate airfields as may be required for safe and efficient air operations.

6. [redacted] Use of Public Services. It should be agreed that the United States may employ and use for US military forces any and all public utilities, other services and facilities, airfields, ports, harbors, roads, highways, railroads, bridges, viaducts, canals, lakes, rivers, and streams in the Ryukyus under conditions deemed necessary by the US authorities.

7. [redacted] Health Measures Outside Bases. It should be agreed that the United States may construct wells, water catchment areas, or dams to insure an ample supply of water for all base operations and personnel. The United States should also have the right as may be necessary to improve health and sanitation in areas contiguous to the base, including the right to enter, in coordination with Ryukyuan authorities, and inspect any privately owned property.

8. [redacted] Surveys. The United States should have the right to make topographic, hydrographic, and coast and geodetic surveys and aerial photographs in any part of the Ryukyus and adjacent waters.

9. [redacted] Cemeteries and Historical Sites. The United States should have the right to retain and maintain such US military cemeteries and such sites of historical significance to the United States as may be deemed appropriate. All rights and authority in relation to bases granted the United States should be applicable, as appropriate, to the cemeteries and sites mentioned above.

10. [redacted] Immigration. The United States shall have the right to bring into the Ryukyus, together with their families, members of the US military forces, US nationals, and personnel of other nationalities, employed by or under a contract with the United States, in connection with the construction, maintenance, or operation of the bases.

11. [redacted] Tax Exemption

a. No member of the US Armed Forces or other US national serving in the Ryukyus in connection with the bases and residing in the Ryukyus by reason only of such service, or his dependents, should be liable to pay income tax in the Ryukyus.

b. No person as referred to above should be liable to pay the government or local authorities of the Ryukyus any poll or residence tax, or any import or export tax, or any other tax on personal property imported for his own use.

c. No US national or US corporation should be liable to pay income tax in the Ryukyus on any profits derived under a contract made with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, and defense of the bases, or any tax in the nature of a license in respect of any service or work for the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, and defense of the bases.

[redacted]

12. [redacted] Jurisdiction

a. It should be agreed that the United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by members of the US Armed Forces including their families or US nationals and their families employed in the construction, maintenance, operation, and defense of the bases whether or not the offense was committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty.

b. The United States should also have the right to exercise jurisdiction over any offense committed by any person within the base.

13. [redacted] Arrest and Service of Process. No arrest should be permitted and no process, civil or criminal, should be permitted to be served within any base except with the permission of the commanding officer of such base.

14. [redacted] Security Legislation. Administrators or Government of the Ryukyus, as appropriate, should agree to take such steps as may be agreed to be necessary with a view to the enactment of legislation to insure the adequate security and protection of the US bases, equipment, and other property and the operations of the United States, and the punishment of persons who may contravene such legislation. Appropriate authorities of the Ryukyus should consult with US authorities in order to insure that laws and negotiations of the Ryukyus in relation to such matters are in conformity with those of the United States.

15. [redacted] Postal Facilities. The United States should have the right to establish and maintain US post offices in the bases for the exclusive use of the US Armed Forces and civilian personnel who are nationals of the United States and employed in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of the bases, and the families of such persons, for domestic use between US post offices in the bases and between such post offices and other

US post offices. The United States should have the right to regulate and control within the bases all communications within, to, and from such bases.

16. Removal of Improvements

a. It should be agreed that the United States shall have the right to remove or dispose of any or all improvements, equipment, or facilities located at or on any base. No export tax should be charged on any material or equipment so removed from the Ryukyus.

b. All buildings and structures which are erected by the United States shall be the property of the United States and may be removed by it. The United States should not be obligated to turn over the bases to the Ryukyus or the Government of Japan as the case may be at the expiration of the agreement or the earlier relinquishment of any bases in the condition in which they were at the time of their occupation.

17. Sales and Services Within the Bases. The United States should have the right to establish on bases, free of all licenses, fees, sales, excise or other taxes, or imposts, Government agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries and post exchanges, messes, and social clubs, for the exclusive use of the US military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their families. The merchandise or services sold or dispersed by such agencies should be free of all taxes, duties, and inspection by the Ryukyuan authorities.

18. Commercial Concerns. It should be agreed that the United States shall have the right to grant to any commercial concerns such rights to the use of any base or facility retained or acquired by the United States as may be deemed appropriate.

19. Condemnation or Expropriation

a. Whenever it is necessary to acquire by condemnation or expropriation proceedings, real property belonging to any

persons, associations, or corporations in order to carry out the purposes of the agreement, the appropriate Government of the Ryukyus authorities will institute condemnation or expropriation proceedings.

b. Prior to the completion of such condemnation or expropriation proceedings, in cases of military necessity, the United States should have the right to take possession of such property required for military purposes.

20. Mineral Resources. All minerals (including oil) and antiquities and all rights relating thereto and to treasure trove, under, upon, or connected with the land and water comprised in the bases or otherwise used or occupied by the United States, should be reserved to the Government of the United States. The United States should be able to exercise the right to quarry rock and gravel necessary for construction work in the bases.

21. Grant of Bases to a Third Power

a. Government of Ryukyus and/or Government of Japan as appropriate should agree not to grant, without prior US consent, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases, to any third power.

b. The United States should be able to, without consent of Ryukyuan or Japanese authorities, extend privileges for use of any part of any base to any third power the United States deems appropriate.

22. Definition of Bases. At the time of negotiation of any base agreement, bases and other additional areas as may be required for military purposes should be named.

23. This Appendix attempts to set forth the minimum rights the United States should seek in negotiating an agreement for bases in the Ryukyus necessary to meet our military requirements. While the requirements listed herein may, on examination, seem

immoderate, they are in fact based upon the original lease agreement for our Philippine bases. The outcome of those negotiations have been described as "...the United States undoubtedly getting its way." On the other hand, President Roxas reported to the Philippine Congress at the time that the United States had been neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.* It is true that the international climate has changed markedly since 1947. Irrespective of change, the US military must take the strongest possible stand when it comes to the matter of base rights. Too often, in such negotiations, there has been less concern about the residuals left to the US military than to the intangibles supposedly obtained in understanding and friendship.

* The US in World Affairs 1945-47, Council on Foreign Relations, PP309-310