



while our intelligence community agreed that Israel had the capability to make nuclear weapons, it was split on the question of whether it had already done so. Dobrynin observed that he had a "higher opinion of the US intelligence people" than this answer implied.

4. Middle East. Dobrynin asked what was expected of the Begin visit. The Secretary sketched briefly the issues of the interpretation of Resolution 242, and whether it applied to all fronts, the settlements, and how to deal with the Palestinian question. He said, in response to a question, that he did not know what position Begin would take on these issues.

In response to a question, Dobrynin said he did not have any information about the current Arafat visit to Moscow, but that he would bring in at the time of his next visit whatever information he could get.

Dobrynin asked if the Administration were willing to split up its proposal for arms to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and was given a negative reply. Dobrynin quoted Senator Jackson as saying that the Congress and the "Israeli lobby in the U.S." were split on this issue, and that he was not sure which way the Congress would vote on it.

Dobrynin expressed the opinion that Begin could get a majority from his parliament for a more flexible policy, since in his opinion it was "the best deal Israel could get now."

5. Tito visit. Dobrynin asked how the visit had gone, and was told it had been a good visit. Dobrynin observed that Tito's views had more in common with those of the Soviet Union than with those of the U.S. He noted that Tito had received "royal treatment," and said that Tito "liked these things." He said there was not now any trouble between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and he made a point of asking if Tito had raised any question about Yugoslavia's future independence, as had been mentioned in the American press so prominently. He was told that the question had not been raised, and that Tito seemed self-confident. Dobrynin observed: "nobody knows what could happen afterwards."

6. China. Dobrynin asked how the U.S. evaluated recent developments in China, and expressed agreement with the view that Teng had come out less well than might have been expected. He added that Teng was not liked because of his excessive ambition.

In response to a question, Dobrynin said he thought the treaty between China and Japan would be signed, but that it would be made clear that the anti-hegemony clause was not intended to refer to any particular country. He expressed the personal view that he didn't see why the Soviet Union should be so edgy about the anti-hegemony clause, any more than the U.S. should be.

7. Environmental Modification. Dobrynin transmitted an oral note (in Russian, with an unofficial English translation) expressing the hope that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could ratify the Convention on Environmental Modification before the US Special Session on Disarmament. (Copies attached.)

As is known, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, to the preparation of which the USSR and the US have made a substantial contribution, was opened for signature last May in Geneva. By now more than 40 states have put their signatures under this important international document whose purpose is to erect yet another barrier on the way of the arms race and to promote the preservation of the environment.

In our opinion, it is advisable now to take measures to ensure the earliest possible entry of the Convention into force. A necessary prerequisite for this would be the ratification of the Convention first of all by the USSR and the US. We believe, it would be desirable to do this prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly Special session on disarmament on May 23.

The Soviet Union is in process of the Convention ratification. At present the Council of Ministers of the USSR is considering the question of approving the Convention and its submitting for ratification. We expect that the US Government will also take necessary measures to expedite the process of ratification and to complete it, if possible, prior to the opening of the Special session.

To expedite the entry of the Convention into force, it would be advisable, in the opinion of the Soviet side, that our two Governments call upon the countries signatories to the Convention to formalize their participation in it prior to the opening of the Special session.

Besides, we would consider it useful to prompt the UN Secretary-General, in an appropriate form and on a suitable occasion, to emphasize the importance of the Convention and of its earliest entry into force.