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Portion redacted by DIA per 10 USC 424. Refer to NGA for review. No other DIA objection to declassification subject to the results of NGA review and the results of concurrent CIA review. JDC 29 Aug 13



Defense Intelligence Brief

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT DATE: 13-May-2014

Nuclear Weapons in the Non-Russian Republics and Baltic States (U)


~~(S//NF//AWN)~~ If nuclear weapons are ultimately consolidated in Russia, tactical nuclear warheads are likely to be the first weapons removed from the other republics, but strategic weapons probably will remain for some time.

Nuclear Weapons Outside the Russian Republic

~~(S//NF//AWN)~~ The USSR has most of its nuclear stockpile in the Russian Republic, along with all facilities to develop, manufacture, and assemble nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is currently

believed to have some 7,800 nuclear weapons — about 25 percent of its stockpile — in the non-Russian republics and Baltic states. Of these, about 2,400 weapons are on land- or sea-based strategic missiles. The remaining 5,400, consisting of both strategic and tactical

Distribution of Nuclear Warheads in the Non-Russian Republics and Baltic States (U)



^aIncludes Baltic states.




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~~(S//NF//WR)~~ Aleksandrova National Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Site, Ukraine. Six large depots — national stockpile sites — are located in the non-Russian republics. Each is capable of storing hundreds of nuclear weapons. The non-Russian republics and Baltic states also contain 80 direct-support facilities, which generally store fewer than 100 nuclear weapons apiece.

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~~(S/NF/WH)~~ Mozyr SS-25 Nuclear Weapons Storage Site, Byelorussia. Storage bunkers are designed to deter forced entry. They are protected by multiple fences and, in many cases, sensor systems. Company-sized units protect direct-support sites like this one, while battalion-sized units guard the larger national stockpile sites.

NGA 1.4(c)


OSD 3.3(b)(1)

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~~(S/NF/WH)~~ Soviet SS-25 ICBM. Two divisions of road-mobile SS-25s are located in Byelorussia.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//WH//INTEL~~



nuclear warheads and bombs, are spread among 86 storage sites in the non-Russian republics and Baltic states.

Withdrawal Status

~~(S/NF/WH)~~ DIA believes that by mid-1990, in response to ethnic unrest in the southern Caucasus, the USSR withdrew all nuclear weapons from Azerbaijan and Armenia, and some, but probably not all, weapons from Georgia. [REDACTED] indicate one storage site in Estonia was recently deactivated. This is the first confirmed step toward eliminating nuclear weapons from the newly independent Baltic states. Despite central government claims to the contrary, however, no conclusive evidence supports the complete removal of weapons from these states. The largest concentrations of nuclear weapons outside the Russian Republic are in Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan. Currently, DIA has no indications that a major withdrawal of nuclear weapons from these or other non-Russian republics has begun. [REDACTED]

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withdrawn. If this space is not adequate or if operational requirements dictate immediate access to weapons, the central government may be forced to use nonstandard facilities for temporary storage.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Since the late-August coup attempt, leaders both at the national level and in the republics have made conflicting public statements about the ultimate status of nuclear weapons. The issue is still being debated. The central government probably would withdraw nuclear weapons if:

A Nuclear Security Risk?

- It perceives that weapons outside the Russian Republic are at risk of unauthorized seizure.
- It fails to reach an agreement with the republics on deployment and control of the weapons.
- It reaches an agreement with the republics for transferring weapons to Russia.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ Unauthorized seizure of nuclear weapons from a storage or missile-launch site in the non-Russian republics would be very difficult without help from a large, organized armed force or from disloyal elements within a site. The USSR's effective protection measures include robust physical security, strict compartmentation of information about nuclear weapons, and personnel reliability programs.

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ If weapons are ultimately consolidated in Russia, tactical nuclear warheads are likely to be the first weapons removed from the other republics, but strategic weapons probably will remain for some time. The 22 national stockpile sites already in the Russian Republic probably have enough capacity to store most, if not all, weapons that might be

~~(S/NF/WN)~~ If the central government ultimately withdraws all nuclear weapons to the Russian Republic, the risk of an unauthorized seizure would be greatest during transfer operations outside the storage sites. However, the military will take every precaution to ensure that the weapons are moved safely. It will have to coordinate hundreds of short- and long-distance transfers at a time when conditions are unsettled. Such a large, complex logistics and security operation will require careful planning and at least several months to accomplish.

(U) Questions and comments may be addressed to [redacted] Directorate For Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DST981-2512, Commerical 202-373-2712, AUTOVON 243-2712). This Brief contains information as of 1 October 1991.

OSD
5 U.S.C § 552 (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 424

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Date: 23 MAR 2016 Authority: EO 13526
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Declassify in Part: X
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