

CHAIRMAN OF THE VERKHOVNA RADA OF UKRAINE

To President of Ukraine

L. M. Kravchuk [handwritten]

TO PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE

L. D. KUCHMA

Dear Leonid Danylovych!

I am sending You proposals of people's deputy of Ukraine Tolubko V.B. regarding nuclear weapons, space, and navy.

Please review.

Respectfully,

[signature]

I. Plushch

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SPACE, NAVY:

DECISIONS CANNOT BE DELAYED

The ratification of the START-1 treaty should be considered together with all other military issues in order to guarantee the national security of Ukraine in the military domain.

I am referring to the problems of nuclear weapons, space, and the Black Sea Fleet.

Combat capabilities of the future Armed Forces will be defined by strategic nuclear deterrence forces, military-space forces, high-precision weapons, and weapons based on novel physical principles. It is these forces that will define the structure, quantitative and qualitative composition of the Armed Forces.

When considering the issues of military building, we must be guided by considerations of national defense, minimization of costs, deployment of modern armaments, real military and political circumstances, and readiness for mutual compromises. At present, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are still unwieldy, with imperfect command and control system, poorly equipped, and, to some degree, disoriented by the lack of clearly defined and slow-moving reforms, constant personnel changes, and acute social security issues for the servicemen. The prolonged period of transition is taking a toll on the army. In these circumstances,

what should be the foundation of Ukraine's national security in the military domain? It is widely accepted and confirmed by years of experience that nuclear weapons are the most effective means of deterrence and guarantee national security. History has played out so that Ukraine is today a state with an immense (third in the world in terms of military might!) nuclear arsenal. In the interest of national security, there is no alternative but to preserve nuclear weapons as part of our Armed Forces. There are two ways for us to use this military might. In the first scenario, a decision is adopted to create our own nuclear industry. This will eventually allow Ukraine to become completely independent in the realm of nuclear weapons and supply its own army with the necessary nuclear munitions. However, the implementation of such a scenario requires significant investment of money and time.

The second scenario is based on the outlined principles of national security as well as the conclusion of bilateral agreements with the Russian Federation, based on equal and mutual interests. We are talking about the joint operation and use of the Ukrainian nuclear weapons. In this scenario, strategic nuclear arms remain under the Ukrainian administrative control and the troops are staffed with our citizens. The combat use, should it become necessary, would be planned and executed under the control of both states. In my view, this scenario guarantees us, for the duration of the agreement, security and military immunity. Ukraine would be immune from encroachments, should it happen to displease any one of the founders of the "new world order." Both Russia and the United States, first of all, would be actively counteracting not just the breakout of a nuclear war, but also the development of local conflicts on our territory involving conventional military means, and also provocations of internal conflicts in Ukraine. Why? Russia will be forced to protect the territory of Ukraine because even the 46 out of 176 Ukrainian missiles, in terms of their nuclear might, are almost equivalent to half of American land-based missiles. On the other hand, America will not be able to do to us, what was done to Grenada, Yugoslavia, and Iraq because it will be unacceptable to use military methods, starting or supporting aggression against the state, whose territory has strategic missiles that could, perhaps, be aimed at it. Wars evade powerful states, Margaret Thatcher once asserted. In this case, she was absolutely right.

Given the interconnectedness of Ukraine's nuclear weapons and its national security, I will share my vision regarding the ratification of the START-1 Treaty. I cannot refrain from another quote, this time by the French prime minister. He stated that France "...approves of the proposals...for nuclear disarmament. We will proceed in this direction, but after the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia are comparable to those of France." So why are we not framing the question in a similar way?

What power are we trying to appease, to whose pressure are we yielding when we declare ourselves a non-nuclear state? I cannot answer these questions, but I consider as advisable the following course of action in relation to the ratification of START-1. At present, Ukraine has no legal obligation before the international community with regard to nuclear weapons.

There are two possible options for the parliament regarding the decision about

Ukraine's nuclear missiles. Before making any one of them, Ukraine must declare itself a nuclear state on the basis of the [1983 Vienna Convention](#), which determines that all components of nuclear weapons on the territory of any state are its full or shared property.^[1]

First scenario. Ukraine ratifies START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol, but with the following conditions:

1. Ukraine delays the accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 until the middle of 1995, when the international conference and facts on the ground determine its future.

2. It concludes, in accordance with START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol, a memorandum by all four nuclear states of the CIS on limits and restrictions.

3. It ratifies the [Minsk agreement](#) on the status of strategic nuclear forces, removing the President's amendment ("in accordance with economic and technical capabilities of Ukraine") to Article 10, which sets the 1994 deadline for the elimination of nuclear stockpiles in Ukraine.

4. Ukraine concludes a bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation regarding the full scope of military-technical and military-economic issues.

Second scenario. Ukraine does not ratify START-1 and bases its decision on the future of the nuclear missile weapons on further bilateral and multilateral agreements. In this case, we independently determine the necessary number of launch vehicles and the nuclear-armed missiles that will be located on Ukraine's territory.

When adopting any of the two decisions in the interest of our national security, the most probable and preferred partner for Ukraine in brokering an agreement on the nuclear missile forces is Russia. Such an agreement would allow Ukraine to remain under the cover of nuclear missile forces as weapons of deterrence from external aggression.

Under these conditions, the security provided by the nuclear weapons would allow us to substantially reduce and reform the national Armed Forces, acquire the necessary means and time for the development and reequip the army with new, modern types of weapons, including high-precision weaponry and weapons based on advanced physics. Such weapons, if deployed against government and military command facilities, plants, and nuclear and chemical industry, could be equal to nuclear weapons in terms of their combat effectiveness. Armed with military means capable of replacing nuclear weapons, we would have the basis for considering, in the future, the option to renouncing nuclear weapons, without unilaterally declaring ourselves a non-nuclear state. The same time would allow us, if an appropriate decision is taken, to create our own nuclear industry.

To support the argument in favor of the abovementioned scenario, a few words should be stated regarding the economics of nuclear weapons, an issue which is

being intentionally silenced or distorted.

According to deputy Defense Minister of Russia A. Kokoshyn, "Missile forces, from the point of view of their maintenance, are the cheapest kind of military forces. They are capable of solving 60-100% of strategic tasks, while requiring only 5-6% of the entire defense budget." It is difficult not to agree with this, considering that in the past year Ukraine's expenses on the maintenance of nuclear missile forces amounted to 3.9% of the defense budget, and this year they accounted for 1.1%. In addition, it should be noted that we are talking about expenses for maintaining 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, even though, based on the abovementioned considerations, it is enough for us to limit our nuclear arsenal to 46 missiles of the newest class that are basically produced by the Ukrainian plants. We can eliminate the remaining 130 missiles, demonstrating thus an act of goodwill unprecedented in history. Moreover, if the missiles, fuel, and re-entry vehicles are handled wisely, it would be possible to receive substantial economic benefits. The silos that remain after the elimination of missiles and the entire existing infrastructure can be used to deploy non-nuclear high-precision weapons systems.

Furthermore, all issues of nuclear missile forces should be tied to the conclusion of an agreement with Russia, whereby the latter would commit to acquire from Dnipropetrovsk the missiles that were due to be supplied to the strategic missile forces in the former Soviet Union. This, undoubtedly, would provide Ukraine with a sizeable economic benefit.

The second issue that I am considering is that of space. The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrated that effective use of high-precision weapons requires space-based systems of various applications and advanced computer technologies. We should have understood this long ago and raised the question of the division of space-based systems with the same persistence and harshness, with which Russia is raising the issue the division of the Black Sea Fleet. Today, in the context of principles of national security of Ukraine, this issue is one of the most important and relevant.

At present, the orbital space group consisting of some two hundred spacecraft, has passed under the Russian jurisdiction, although Ukraine has legal rights to 16.7% of this group.

Based on the principles of mutual compromise, in exchange for concessions by Ukraine in the field of nuclear missile forces and the solution of the Black Sea Fleet issue, Ukraine has the right to demand the division of the spacecraft, inclusion of Ukraine's military-space units into the common space control system with the subsequent creation (with Russian help) of a national flight control center.

Ukraine has at its disposal everything that would permit it to preserve the status of a space nation. Ukraine has a huge space-industrial manufacturing and technological complex. It includes a powerful scientific complex and a well-established system of personnel training. It also includes space control nodes in the vicinity of Dunayevtsi, Yevpatoria, and Simferopol, which received trillions [of rubles] in investment and can yield results.

Space is the sphere of activity that currently produces super-profits for space-firing nations. According to international data, every dollar invested in space research produces 20 dollars in profit. This profit is produced by the use of communications channels for state, commercial, and banking structures, use of databases and databanks of highly developed countries. For instance, space-based communication systems produce billions of dollars in profit annually (every minute of a call with the United States costs 5 dollars, with Europe - 3 dollars).

Similar estimates are produced when using space technologies in civilian industries on Earth to solve environmental problems, study natural resources, meteorology, and navigation.

Today, others receive this profit, while Ukraine could have been doing the same. In other words, space activity of a state is a testament to the high level of scientific and technical progress. At the same time, space is a way to ensure high combat effectiveness of most military technologies, including high-precision weapons.

Thus, the need to have our own national orbital space group of dual-use application - civilian and military - is obvious. The operation and control of space systems, in the interests of national economy and defense, must be carried out by the defense ministry, which possess the necessary technical means and trained specialists. The dual-use space systems also allow to minimize defense expenses and strengthen Ukraine's national security.

And now about the problems of the Black Sea Fleet.

In the former Soviet Union, the Black Sea Fleet performed primarily supportive, not strategic tasks, as a backing for the Mediterranean naval group. Ukraine's fleet, having no free access to the world ocean, can similarly carry out limited combat assignments only within the boundaries of the Black Sea aquatorium.

Most of the ships in the combat group of the Black Sea Fleet have by now served out their allotted lifespan.

From the economic perspective, the Black Sea Fleet is costly for the people of Ukraine to maintain. At the same time, the contribution of the fleet to the state's defense capacity is insignificant in comparison to resources spent on it.

We must admit that Russia's fleet will not leave Crimea, and we will not be able to drive it out by force since this would lead to war. Stationing the fleets of both states on one naval base introduces potential for conflicts. That is why it is advisable to lease the base to Russia for a reasonable period of time. Ukraine should retain a fleet sufficient for the defense of its shores and deploy it at other bases.

The lease of the naval base to Russia must be linked to a lease by Ukraine of the Russian cosmodromes and testing ranges for space vehicles and space-missile technology, cooperation between Ukraine and Russia in the field of missile and space technology, supply of energy resource and timber from Russia to Ukraine, as well as placement of procurement orders for Russia's naval forces at the Ukrainian shipyards.

There is no time to waste! The issues of military and technical policies must be decided without delay. The fact is that Ukraine's defense industry, without state procurement orders and without prospects for development, is on the brink of collapse. The defense industry consists of specialists of the highest qualification and the most modern production facilities. If the defense industry is destroyed, we lose world-class scientific and technological accomplishments, as well as opportunity to create, in the future, the required weapons systems at a minimal cost.

Thus, nuclear weapons could ensure 10-15 years of immunity for Ukraine. Meanwhile, we create high-precision weapons, a space group with its own control centers, and build a small-sized mobile army, equipped with modern, highly effective means of warfare. In the meantime, the state will have the opportunity to determine its relationship to a nuclear program.

It is necessary to remember that the future of defense is being laid down today, and we should think about it right now. Otherwise, it will be too late!

PEOPLE'S DEPUTY OF UKRAINE

[signature]

V. TOLUBKO

[\[1\]](#) Here, 'shared' means one apportioned to successor states in respective shares (ed.).