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| ntelligence Re   | port  |  |
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| CI Counterterrorist C  | enter   | 02 November 2000   |
|  |   |  |
| in Ladin's Terrori   | st Operations: Meticu   | lous and Adaptable   |
| rganization depicts a h<br>fattack at its disposal.<br>ssassinations, standofj<br>ological agents, and t | highly skilled, resilient net<br>Al-Qa`ida operatives are<br>f attacks, kidnappings, and<br>he group's extreme interp | Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa`ida work with a wide range of methods trained to conduct bombings, I attacks with crude chemical or retation of Islam sanctions the use ther targets, including civilians. |
| • The organization   | · -   | ational practices, making use of   |
| meticulous cont  |   | ed far in advance of an operation.   |
| meticulous cont<br>stelligence on terroris<br>at al-Qa`ida has refin                                     | t plotting discovered over t<br>ed its tactics to cope with t   | he millennial period also indicates<br>security crackdowns and heightened  |
| meticulous cont<br>stelligence on terroris<br>at al-Qa`ida has refin                                     | t plotting discovered over t<br>ed its tactics to cope with t   | he millennial period also indicates  |
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| Operational Doctrine Rooted in Interpretation of Islamic Law  |
| Bin Ladin's terrorist operations are grounded in his extreme interpretation of Islamic  |
| law, which sanctions attacks against a wide variety of targets worldwide.   |
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| Qa'ida's most recent fatwa—issued in February 1998 by Bin Ladin and leaders of other  |
| extremist groups under the banner of his "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews  |
| and Crusaders"—is broadly worded, stating that all Muslims have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military" worldwide. During an  |
| interview in December 1998 Bin Ladin explained that all US citizens are legitimate  |
| -targets because they pay taxes to the US Government.   |
|   |
| This interpretation broadened and superseded Bin Ladin's previous fatwa, which only authorized attacks against Western military targets on the Arabian  |
| Peninsula. Bin Ladin publicized this decree as a "Declaration of Jihad" in  |
| August 1996   |
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| US interests are Bin Ladin's primary—but not sole—target. The United States figures   |
| most prominently in Bin Ladin's public threats, and Bin Ladin has characterized the United States as "the head of the snake." Bin Ladin's   |
| fatwa authorizes attacks against Americans "and their allies," suggesting that he sees the  |
| countries of the "Jewish-Crusader alliance" (see box) as a single enemy.  |
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| This latellieunce Depart was averaged by an applied in the DCI Counterterroyiet Center. It has been coordinated   |
| This Intelligence Report was prepared by an analyst in the DCI Counterterrorist Center. It has been coordinated within CIA. Oueries and comments are welcome and may be directed                                      |
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| <sup>1</sup> Bin Ladin's fatwas carry no formal authority outside of his own organization, and many Islamic religious scholars view his justifications for terrorism as simplistic and flawed, failing to address the |
| numerous Islamic injunctions prohibiting violence against innocents—including Christians and Jews,  |
| who are traditionally tolerated as "Peoples of the Book." Instead, Bin Ladin attempts to appeal to Muslims who are not familiar with the finer points of Islamic jurisprudence but are convinced that their           |
| civilization must fend off an assault of Western military power and cultural values. (U)  |
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| intended to              | members planning attack both US an Israel and the Unitements.                            | d Israeli tourists,                    | and Bin Ladin                       | frequently                       | - · |
| attack, as "<br>December | s doctrine tolerates<br>collateral damage"<br>1998, Bin Ladin cl<br>the risk to innocent | or as targets in the                   | eir own right.<br>ligation to attac | In an interview in ck US targets |     |
|                          |  |  |                                     |                                  |     |
| target Chris             | directed extremists<br>stian religious sites   | • •                                    |                                     |                                  |     |
| tourists.                |  |  |                                     |                                  |     |
| Bin Ladin's A            | World View: Batt   | extremist "ilhad<br>siege by a conspir | movement.'.B<br>acy of foreign      |                                  |     |
|                          | goal of this allianc   |  |                                     | erritorial conquest              |     |
| and the introduction     | n of corrupting for  | eign influences.                       |                                     |                                  |     |
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| Bin Ladin and other jihadists often cite military acti  |  |  |
| against the Taliban, US support for Israel, and the ki<br>and Kosovo as recent examples of international desi   |  | 7 (2.20)   |
| Bin Ladin has endorsed a variety of actions to defend the conspiracy  | ë Islamic wor  | ld against this  |
| • Terrorist and insurgent attacks Some Sunar extre  |  |  |
| attempted to take ownersing of the word terrorism.  Muslims: To strike terror into the hearts of the enem   | ies of God? (  | 8:60) Available  |
| intelligence indicates that Bin Ladin sees the United Western powers as his organization s top targets, but extremists that target the interests of other perceived | t he also prov   | des assistance to  |
| Acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological wea   | CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR AND ADDRESS OF   | The Country of the Country of the control of the country of the co |
| acquisition of inconventional weapons a religious represent a strategic counterweight to the military spottier foreign powers.                                      |  |  |
| • Promoting Islamic unity Bin Ladin has called for Caliphate based in Afghanistan to serve as a rallying  |  |  |
| . Ligaringens en en la siese gebesche für reise. In den vert Sammensbesche in der vertreit sich in de Landschafte   | <del>e de la comencia de la come</del> ncia de la comencia del la comencia de la comencia del la comencia de la comencia dela comencia del la comencia dela comencia del la comencia del la comencia | mi luggisenilians-circle el l'elebre d   |
| Thorough Pre-Operational Planning   | :  |  |
| By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa'ida operandi emphasizing careful planning and exhaustive f  |  |  |
| Ladin saw as a prerequisite for spectacular terrorist oper<br>November 1996 interview why his organization had not  | ations. When   | asked in a   |
| response to its August fatwa, Bin Ladin replied, "If we voperations, it would have been easy to do so after the sta   | itements, but t  | he nature of the   |
| battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adve-<br>good preparation."  | rsary, which c   | bviously requires  |
| Much of the advance planning involves the preparation of  | of targeting st  | udies.   |
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|                            |                                     | The study of the         |
|                            | irobi—prepared in December 199      | 3—included detailed      |
| information                |                                     |                          |
|                            |                                     |                          |
| casi                       | ng was conducted                    | with a camera and        |
|                            | ndations for possible methods of a  |                          |
|                            | so surveilled the Embassy days bet  | fore the August bombing, |
| probably to update         | the 1993 casing report.             | ·                        |
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| Such detailed field prepar | ation may support the process of re | eview and approval of an |
| operation by al-Qa'ida's l | eadership.                          | Ì                        |
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|                            | during the n                        | nonths prior to the East |
| Africa bombings            | ,<br>1                              |                          |
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
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|    | Flexil    | ole Methods o                                   | f Attack      |               |             | •               |                  |        |
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|    |           | i`ida's bombma                                  |               |               | ed the gro  | up to conduct   | devastating a    | ttacks |
|    | using     | improvised ex                                   | plosive devic | ces (IEDs)    |             |                 |                  |        |
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|    | •         | An explosive                                    | s manuai      |               |             |                 |                  |        |
|    |           |   | -             |               |             | es for numero   |                  | _      |
|    |           | compounds, obtaining the                        |               | mufacturing   | detonator   | s, handling tip | s, and method    | s for  |
|    |           | ootaming me                                     | mgreatents.   |               |             |                 |                  |        |
|    | •         | Operatives pl                                   | otting attack | s in Jordan o | ver the m   | illennial perio | d had cached     |        |
|    |           |   |               |               |             |                 | acid, sulfuric a | icid,  |
|    |           |   |               |               |             |                 |                  |        |
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|    |           | delivery and delivery and delivery and delivery |               |               |             |                 | hicle bomb at    | acks   |
|    |           | avainsi ine ()                                  | S Empassies   | III Nairool a | na ijar es  | Salaam          |                  |        |
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|    |           | ition to bombin                                 |               | a has demon   | strated the | e capability ar | d intent to em   | ploy   |
| .[ | other i   | forms of attack                                 |               |               |             |                 |                  |        |
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| authorities antiank guided missiles into the kingdom for use against US or Saudi facilities  Assassinations and armed assaults.  Kidnappings.  Kidnappings.  Views hostage taking as a legitimate tactic under certain conditions.  Chemical and biological attacks.  that Bin Ladin's organization is interested in acquiring unconventional weapons—particularly chemical or biological agents—and possesses at least a rudimentary capability to employ them in attacks. In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these weapons a "religious duty" and noted, "How we would use them is up to us."  Too Secret | •                     |                    |               |                  | op Secret            |
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| Appendix B: Bin Ladin's Role in the Anti-US "Millenni                | al" Plots                |
| Appendix b. Din Lauin 3 Role in the Anti-05 Trimenti                 |                          |
| r m  | T                        |
| In December 1999, intelligence and law enforcement agencies in       |                          |
| uncovered separate networks preparing to conduct near-term, anti     | -US attacks.             |
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| The plotters in Jordan planned to time t                             | heir first attacks to    |
| coincide with millennial New Year's celebrations                     |                          |
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| Jordan   |                          |
| Jordanian authorities arrested members of                            |                          |
| JOI dathan authorities arested montous or                            |                          |
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| cell was planning to kill US and Israeli citizens                    |                          |
| automatic weapons at a variety of tourist-related sites, including t | he SAS Radisson          |
| Hotel in Amman   |                          |
|  | remarked that the        |
| cell's motto was, "The season is coming, and bodies will pile up i   | n sacks."                |
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|  |                          |
| al-Hijazi, began planning t  | he operation             |
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| sent casing studies for approval to Abu Zubayo                       | lah, a senior Bin Ladin  |
| lieutenant   |                          |
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| The cell accumulated a large arms cache, including severa            | tons of chemicals        |
| used to make explosives  |                          |
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|  | ol Piioci                |
|  | al-Hijazi                |
| accompanied three operatives to Afghanistan for six mont             | ns of terrorist training |
| at al-Qa'ida camps.  |                          |
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| Canada   | ·   |   |                            |                           |                 |
| The 14 Decembe   | er arrest of Algeri                             | an extremist Ah   | mad Ressam                 | at the US-Canad           | ian '           |
| The 14 December  | d preparations for                              | additional anti-  | US attacks. I              | Ressam— <u>a form</u>     | ian<br>er       |
| The 14 December  | d preparations for<br>nt who had trained        | additional anti-<br>l'at Bin Ladin's                    | US attacks. I camps in Afg | Ressam—a form<br>hanistan | er              |
| The 14 Decembe<br>border uncovered<br>Montreal residen | d preparations for<br>nt who had trained<br>was | additional anti-<br>lat Bin Ladin's<br>attempting to si | US attacks. I camps in Afg | Ressam— <u>a form</u>     | er              |
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