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Bob:

Is a study going forward as to how long it would take the Paks to finish the reprocessing plant on their own?

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*Yes. See Attached*

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

January 20, 1978

SUBJECT: A Study of Pakistan's Capability to Produce  
Indigenous Nuclear Explosive Devices

A meeting was held on January 17, chaired by PAB Country Director Coon, with representatives of the Special Projects Office, Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory. A list of those attending is appended. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss a possible study by Lawrence-Livermore of Pakistan's capacity to produce indigenously fissile material for nuclear explosive devices. In order to help the Lawrence-Livermore specialists, we worked out certain parameters for the study. In response to our request, they indicated that they would try to provide their initial thoughts by mid-March.

The working assumptions for the study include the following:

-- Pakistan is strongly motivated to acquire nuclear explosive capability to counter the perceived Indian threat.

-- Pakistan will not be able to acquire from abroad equipment specifically identified with reprocessing. However, Pakistan will be able to import chemical materials and equipment which are not solely identified with reprocessing and which are commercially available. Pakistan already possesses most of the blue prints for the French reprocessing plant, but probably not detailed designs of key sensitive equipment.

-- Pakistan's objective is to produce two or three explosive devices useable in underground tests. The study will not address the question of delivery capability.

-- Facilities designed and constructed in this effort of Pakistan will not need to have any commercial or economic uses.

-- The operation will be covert.

-- Design and construction will not be constrained by financial considerations within reasonable limits. (The study will however, consider the financial implications.)

*N.B. Coon has now broadened to include covert, in view of recent developments*

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-- The Pakistani approach will be "quick and dirty". In other words, they will be prepared to take risks in terms of health and safety standards.

-- The study will take into account the possibility that China may be willing to provide some assistance, both in design and materials.

Basically, the study will attempt to determine if it is feasible at all for Pakistan to "go it alone" and if so, in what time frame. The study will examine at least two possible routes: (1) the use of KANUPP spent fuel and (2) the construction of a covert production reactor as a fuel source.

In addition to its obvious policy implications, the study could be useful in terms of pinpointing intelligence indicators for future collection efforts.

Copies to: List of Attendees from State  
T/D: Dr. Nye  
S/AS: Mr. Kelly ✓  
NEA: Mr. Dubs

Drafted by: NEA/PAB: JAC *[Signature]*: so  
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List of Attendees

Murray Cavanaugh, Special Projects Office, Lawrence  
Livermore Laboratory

Kathleen Amiri, Special Projects Office, Lawrence  
Livermore Laboratory

OES/NET, Dixon Hoyle

PM/NPP, Alan Locke

INR/RNA, George Griffin  
Karen Longeteig

INR/STA, Jeff Siegel  
Joseph Hayes

NEA/PAB, Jane A. Coon

*N.B.  
I was invited  
but had other  
work  
RA  
SIAS*