The attached note is DI52’s response to an action placed at the meeting of the Far East CIG held on 13 September 1978.

29 Sept 78
DIS(CS)

PAKISTAN: NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTENTIONS

Reference paragraph 6 of R J Alston's note to P H Moberly FCO.D152 would make the following comments:

1. We have no reason to modify our technical assessment of Pakistan's nuclear development capability. (GC)

2. The technical assumptions on which we base our assessment include the following:

(a) A 4-5 year period is required for completion from sanctioning given the availability of adequate workshop machinery and expertise. (About 2 years of which would be taken up by building and endurance testing a few hundred centrifuges).

(b) Separative work capacity of each centrifuge set at 1kg SW/year.

(c) Assuming a plant of 10,000 centrifuges 50kg of highly enriched uranium could be produced per year.

(d) A supply of uranium hexafluoride of some 10 tonnes/year will be needed for this plant. (S)

3. In our view sanctioning of this project must have occurred by late 76/early 77. (S)

4. New information indicating that in late 1977 Pakistan representatives were looking for machine tool equipment costing about £250,000. This equipment could be used for centrifuge manufacture. (S UK EYES A)

5. This latter information suggests that the main cascades will be manufactured in Pakistan when workshops are suitably equipped (possibly early 1979) and that an operational date for a cascade of 10,000 centrifuges may be 1983-84. In making this assessment we have taken an optimistic view of the technical competence of their craftsmen (S UK EYES A).

6. The Pakistanis have a pilot scale plant for uranium ore processing capable, we assess, of producing some 250kg of U₃O₈ concentrate per annum. We are also aware of their plans to build a plant of some 20 tonnes/yr capacity. We have no further information on the status of this proposal. (S)

7. A small plant for producing some 10 tonnes of uranium hexafluoride will be required, we have no knowledge of plans for construction of such a facility or attempts to purchase uranium hexafluoride abroad. This aspect is at present a significant gap in our information. (S)

8. Notwithstanding the later date of 1983-4 in paragraph 5 above, it would seem unwise to assume that the Pakistanis cannot acquire sufficient fissile material for a single device by 1981 at the earliest. Our knowledge of their activities is still very sketchy and much remains unknown. We would agree, however, that the probability of their acquiring a weapons capability so soon is low. (S)

cc. DDSTI
G. E. Clark, Cabinet Office
(contd overleaf)