The purpose of this meeting is to engage the PRC in the Pakistan nuclear problem and obtain its endorsement for both our diplomatic and Congressional strategy.

We face two distinct but inter-related problems: 1) how do we best prevent Pakistan from acquiring nuclear capability, and 2) how do we deal with the problem of the Symington Amendment which could require us in the not too distant future to terminate aid and further complicate our position in the turbulent Persian Gulf region?

Those attending the PRC will have received the attached paper entitled "Pakistan Nuclear Program: Policy and Legal Implications for the United States". There is no agenda.

I. Introductory Remarks

You may wish to open the meeting by briefly describing Pakistan's nuclear program and its implications for US policy.

Talking Points

-- We face a critical dilemma in our relations with Pakistan, which could have serious ramifications throughout the region.
-- Pakistan is moving rapidly and secretly toward the construction of facilities which could give it nuclear explosive capability perhaps within two to four years.

-- It is obtaining some equipment necessary for the enrichment plant from abroad. Although our analysis is not conclusive, current indications suggest that a serious question is raised with regard to the Symington Amendment which could require us to cut off aid to Pakistan. Although not legally affected, military sales under these circumstances would be extremely difficult.

-- Given the situation in Iran, a near rupture in our relations with Pakistan would further add to regional instability and could pose serious political problems for us.

-- Our European allies and regional moderates want us to move toward a more supportive relationship with Pakistan at this critical time and would be deeply disturbed by American withdrawal of support of Pakistan. This concern could certainly be echoed by domestic observers of our policy in the region.

-- Pakistan might seek compensating assistance from other oil rich Arab countries and acquiesce in some accommodation with the Soviet Union.

-- A cut off of aid would confirm India's suspicions of Pakistan's nuclear intentions, and increase domestic pressure in India for resumption of a nuclear explosive program.

II. Proposed Strategy

Background

We do not believe US leverage alone is sufficient to turn the Pakistanis around. Given the probable short time fuse on the Symington Amendment, we need urgently to seek the diplomatic support of others who have influence is Islamabad. We are not certain that our proposed multi-pronged strategy will work, but believe we must make every effort to turn Pakistan around.
Desired PRC Action

Endorsement of our strategy of bringing diplomatic pressure to bear on Pakistan.

Talking Points

-- China is Pakistan's most influential friend. We recommend a strong approach to Teng Hsiao-Ping pointing out the danger that Pakistan's nuclear program will provoke India nuclear weapons development and that our support of Pakistan depends on turning Pakistan off.

-- We propose to approach the Saudis who also have considerable influence in Islamabad, urging them to weigh in.

-- We propose to suggest to Ambassador Dobrynin the desirability of a Russian demarche to Pakistan. The USSR shares our non-proliferation concerns and presumably would not wish to see a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent. We recognize that Pakistan might well consider that the Soviets were in collusion with India, which could produce a negative reaction. However, Pakistan is currently very sensitive to the extension of Soviet influence through Afghanistan and we believe on balance that Soviet pressure would have a strong desirable impact.

-- Until now, we have kept separate our nuclear problems with India and Pakistan. Fundamentally, however, the two are linked and we risk in the near term the generation of domestic pressure in India which could force the Desai government to resume an explosives program. We believe that Desai himself is genuinely opposed to such an Indian program and might be susceptible to a very quiet overture on the Pakistan problem. If he were prepared to accept the joint declaration on non-use of nuclear weapons, it might give President Zia an essential rationale for reversing his present course.

-- We propose to seek the political support of our major western allies in a coordinated approach to Pakistan.
-- We plan to work actively with other suppliers on ways to inhibit sensitive exports to Pakistan and we will need the cooperation of the intelligence community to utilize sensitive information in this effort.

-- Finally, we recommend that President Zia be invited to Washington as soon as the dust has settled from the Bhutto case. We would stress our willingness to be supportive of Pakistan but make it clear that constructive ties with the US require assurances that Pakistan will forgo its nuclear weapons program.

III. Congressional Aspects

Background

We believe that key members of the Congress will wish us to be helpful in managing the Pakistan problem if they receive a candid explanation of the situation, taking into account overall US security interests in the region and the fact that we have a coherent strategy to deal with the Pakistanis proliferation threat within a reasonable time frame. We plan to explore the possibility of a relatively minor change in the law would provide us with somewhat greater flexibility or at least more time than the Symington Amendment is likely to give us.

Desired PRC Action

Endorsement of our proposal.

Talking Point

-- We kept key members of Congress informed while the French reprocessing drama was played out. They were concerned but consistently supportive of our efforts. We plan to brief key members on a highly confidential basis about the current problems and explore with them the possibility of changing the law to give us somewhat greater flexibility and time.
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
POLICY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

I. Nuclear Weapons Related Activity in Pakistan

Pakistan is working actively on two ways to produce fissile material for a nuclear explosive device -- reprocessing spent fuel to produce plutonium and enriching natural uranium to produce highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The Pakistanis are building a facility near Islamabad capable of small-scale reprocessing. (This installation is quite distinct from the much larger, so-called French reprocessing plant, which we very much doubt could be finished in less than 8 years since cessation of French cooperation.) The smaller facility could produce enough plutonium for an explosive device in 2-4 years, but would not be capable of supporting a weapons program. Reprocessing is also complicated by safeguards commitments to the IAEA and Canada.

Pakistan is also pressing ahead with a secret gas centrifuge program intended to yield significant quantities of HEU. This program is technically more difficult, but Pakistan could produce enough HEU for a nuclear device in 4-5 years, and would then have the capacity to support a small nuclear weapons program.

In addition, Pakistan has a very secret nuclear weapons design group working on the necessary detonation package.

II. Legal Implications

Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act proscribe certain economic or military assistance to a country which, after August 1977, receives from abroad enrichment or reprocessing "equipment, materials, or technology". Some of the equipment necessary to Pakistan's enrichment program has been obtained from abroad or is on order. While our analysis is not conclusive, current indications on types of equipment involved and the timing of imports suggest that a serious question is raised with respect to the pertinent amendment. (Section 669 known as the Symington Amendment.)

There is a waiver provision in the amendment which requires that the President determine that the termination of our assistance would have a serious adverse affect on vital US interests and that he has received reliable assurances that the country
in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. If it is decided to pursue the steps leading to a waiver, we could not delay application of the termination requirement in the amendment beyond the minimum time to arrange for a waiver. (See Tab 1 for a more detailed legal analysis.)

III. Policy Implications:

We clearly have a shorter time fuse on the Pakistan nuclear problem than we had anticipated, both in terms of preventing Pakistan from developing nuclear capability and in terms of the legal problem. The legal analysis suggests that we may find in the fairly near future that we are required to cut off aid to Pakistan and if it is decided to pursue the steps leading to a waiver, we will have only a limited period in which to obtain reliable assurances from the Pakistanis. We have not determined what would constitute "reliable assurances", but our overall objective would remain termination of Pakistan's sensitive nuclear activities.

If we have to cut off aid, we believe it would be extremely difficult to obtain Congressional acquiescence for significant military cash sales to Pakistan. Such a disruption of our relations, could have unpredictable consequences both internally in Pakistan and in the region. Among other things, Pakistan could seek compensating assistance from Libya or other oil-rich Arab countries on the grounds that the Muslim world needs a nuclear deterrent to Israel. Given Pakistan's acute anxiety about potential Afghan subversion, a withdrawal of U.S. support could lead Islamabad more actively to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Our European allies, as well as our friends in the region, hope we will move toward a more supportive relationship with Pakistan in the context of the critical situation in the Persian Gulf. The regional moderates, in particular, would be deeply disturbed by a withdrawal of American support for Pakistan, and this concern would certainly be echoed by domestic observers of American policy -- including many in Congress. Our position would be rendered more difficult by the fact that our knowledge of Pakistani activities is derived from extremely sensitive intelligence primarily of third-country origin, which we presumably could not use publicly.

There could also be serious repercussions in India, most immediately by undercutting our efforts to resolve the Indian safeguards question. A cut off of aid would confirm publicly
GOI suspicions about Pakistan's nuclear intentions -- suspicions based on rather good Indian intelligence on the Pakistan enrichment program. There would be growing domestic pressure in India for resumption of work on an explosives program, perhaps leading to weaponization and development of delivery capability. A nuclear arms race on the subcontinent could have a profound effect on our overall non-proliferation policy.

IV. Proposed Strategy

We conclude that it is essential to move on a very urgent basis to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan to terminate its nuclear explosive program, including construction of sensitive facilities.

A. Steps Already Taken

We have already taken the following steps to counter Pakistan's nuclear ambitions.

-- We and the British have alerted 11 supplier countries to Pakistan's intentions and urged them to restrict exports of items related to reprocessing and enrichment.

-- We have alerted the IAEA on the need for very careful inspection of all safeguarded Pakistani nuclear facilities.

-- Ambassador Smith raised our concerns in a general way with his Soviet counterpart at IAEA in November.

-- Ambassador Hummel warned the Pakistanis when we resumed aid in October of the consequences of continued activity in the nuclear field. We have reiterated this warning and have instructed Ambassador Hummel to put the GOP on notice that we are aware of their activity and that it will jeopardize our ability to assist Pakistan.

B. Further Steps Proposed:

In our judgment, U.S. leverage alone is not sufficient to deter the Pakistanis. We had hoped to have time to rebuild our ties with Pakistan, including significant sales of military equipment, in order to increase the perceived cost of their proceeding on a nuclear course. At the present juncture, a cut-off of aid in fact risks enhancing Pakistan's sense of isolation and insecurity which are the primary motivating
factors prompting their search for a nuclear deterrent. However, we believe we must now move quickly to maximize the influence we can bring to bear by seeking the diplomatic support of others who have influence in Islamabad. The timing and coordination of our efforts will be important.

1. **China:** The PRC is Pakistan's most influential friend. We recommend a very strong approach to Teng Hsiao-Ping pointing out the danger that Pakistan's nuclear program will provoke Indian development of nuclear weapons and delivery capability. We should also stress that continued U.S. ability to continue support for Pakistan depends on Pakistan's foregoing its nuclear weapons program.

2. **Saudi Arabia:** The Saudis also have very considerable leverage in Islamabad. In the context of our shared concerns over regional stability, we propose to clearly point out to the Saudis the disastrous consequences for US/Pakistani relations if Pakistan pursues a nuclear weapons option and to urge the Saudis to press the Pakistanis.

3. **USSR:** We have raised the issue of Pakistan's nuclear intentions with the Soviet Union in the context of our common non-proliferation concerns. In a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, you may wish to suggest the desirability of a Russian demarche in Islamabad, pointing to the destabilizing impact on the region of a nuclear-armed Pakistan. (We assume the Russians would have little sympathy for our Symington Amendment problem.) Given current Pakistani efforts to seek limited accommodation with Moscow, a Russian demarche could have considerable impact.

4. **India:** Up until now in our discussions with India on safeguards, we have not linked that issue to the problem of Pakistan. We now know that India is concerned about the Pakistani enrichment program. Morarji Desai's principled stand against nuclear explosive testing will rapidly become untenable in domestic political terms if Pakistan approaches the nuclear threshold. We suggest that a high level, but low profile emissary, armed with a Presidential letter, discuss the problem with Desai and suggest the need for Indo-Pak agreement in the form of a joint declaration on non-development and non-use of nuclear weapons—a proposal made by the Pakistanis last year. A joint declaration could provide Zia with some rationale permitting him to reverse his present course and terminate the enrichment and reprocessing programs.

5. **Other Suppliers:**

We are developing a list of key identifiable components of the enrichment facility, which we will circulate to other
suppliers and discuss with them the best means of controlling exports to Pakistan. This effort could slow significantly Pakistan's enrichment program. (The degree to which we can effectively obstruct Pakistan's efforts to obtain equipment abroad will depend in large part on the extent to which we can share U.S. and third-country intelligence with these suppliers.)

6. Western Allies:

We should discuss quite frankly, initially with the British and subsequently with the French and Germans, our problem with the Symington Amendment, its implications for our role in the region, and the need for early action to turn the Pakistanis around. We should recognize, however, that the French, for example, believe they have made a major contribution already by ceasing cooperation on the reprocessing plant and they look forward to recouping some of their losses through increased military sales. We doubt that these countries would be prepared to make a common front with U.S. by threatening to cut off economic assistance to Pakistan; a number would argue that this would only isolate Pakistan and give further impetus to its weapons program. However, we should seek their political support in coordinated approaches to Pakistan.

7. U.S.: Ultimately, if a waiver is contemplated, we will need to confront the Pakistanis with the choice between providing reliable assurances that they will not continue with their nuclear explosives program or facing the consequences of a cut-off of aid, probably including significant military supply. We would like to delay this confrontation until some influence has been brought to bear from other quarters as suggested above. We would recommend that President Zia be invited to Washington as soon as the dust has settled from the Bhutto case. We would propose to discuss with Zia Pakistan's important role in the region and our desire to be supportive economically and with military sales, at the same time making clear that the maintenance of constructive ties with the U.S. will require that Pakistan forego its nuclear explosives program.

Pakistan Reaction: We are under no illusion that it will be easy to turn Pakistan around. The GOP appears to be heavily committed to the nuclear explosive program, presumably on the grounds that a nuclear deterrent to India would be cheaper and more effective than conventional forces. We believe that a very small group of senior military and civilian policy makers are aware of and responsible for the current program. Having observed international reaction to the Indian nuclear test in 1974, they may assume and be willing to risk a sharp, short-lived international reaction, in the expectation that they would benefit in the longer run by increased security vis-a-vis India and a much enhanced status in the Muslim world.
On the other hand, Pakistani leaders have long been susceptible to outside pressures and are particularly sensitive to China and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the current nuclear explosive program is entirely covert and thus not an emotional issue in domestic politics, as was the French reprocessing plant. This situation could change if elections are held next fall and a civilian government replaces the present regime. At present President Zia is in charge but he must depend on the continuing support of his senior military commanders and could not alone make a decision on the nuclear program. His position could be further weakened if he commutes Bhutto's sentence since the military leadership generally would like to see the Bhutto problem solved once and for all.

Thus, we are unable to predict with any assurance that our proposed multi-pronged strategy will work, but in view of the consequences, we must make every effort to turn off Pakistan's nuclear explosive program.

V. Congressional Aspects

Before we resumed aid and military sales in October, Mr. Newsom, Ambassador Hummel and Dr. Nye consulted with Senator Glenn, Congressman Zablocki and a handful of key Members and staffers with an interest in non-proliferation. We told them that the French were not proceeding with the reprocessing plant contract, but we quite frankly said that Pakistan is continuing to explore indigenous ways to acquire nuclear explosive capability. Senator Glenn and his colleagues did not object to our proposal to resume normal relations with Pakistan and did not demur when Nye explained that we would try to deal with these other Pakistani efforts in the time gained by the French decision.

We believe Senator Glenn and other key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee (e.g., Senators Church and Percy and Congressmen Zablocki, Bingham and Findley) will wish to be helpful if given a candid explanation of the situation, the overall U.S. security interests in the region, and the steps we intend to take to get Pakistan to stop its enrichment efforts.

We believe that key members will concede that broader U.S. security interests in the region are not served by an across-the-board cutoff now of AID and military relations with Pakistan, but Glenn and others will not be willing to sacrifice non-proliferation goals to vaguer foreign policy objectives. We will thus need to assure them that the priority we attach to our non-proliferation objectives with respect to Pakistan has not been diminished by the changed geo-political picture in the region.
Members of Congress will not agree to go along with anything that appears to be ignoring the provisions of the law. We suggest therefore that we explore with key members the possibility of a relatively minor change in the law, which would provide us with somewhat greater flexibility or at least more time. In seeking this type of change, we would promise to provide Congress periodic reports on our efforts to change Pakistan policy. It will be essential to present these legislative changes as designed to enhance our non-proliferation objectives and that we are proceeding energetically with a coherent strategy within a reasonable time frame to turn Pakistan around.
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Legal Analysis

Sections 669 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, known as the Symington and Glenn Amendments, respectively, prohibit the furnishing of certain economic or military assistance to a country which, after August 4, 1977, delivers to or receives from another country enrichment or reprocessing "equipment, materials, or technology."

Section 669 (concerning enrichment) provides that the President may waive the aid cut-off: 1) if he certifies to the Congress that such action would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests and 2) that he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so. (Section 670 concerning reprocessing is not currently at issue, given a lack of adequate evidence that reprocessing equipment, material or technology has been transferred or received by Pakistan since August 4, 1977.)

In applying Section 669 (Tab 2) to the current situation in Pakistan, there are two considerations: whether the transfer or receipt has taken place after August 4, 1977; and whether the nature of the equipment, materials, or technology transferred or received falls under the definition of the amendment.

With regard to the timing issue, available information suggests that a significant quantity of items for the Pakistani enrichment plant has been exported to and received by Pakistan since August 4, 1977 from a variety of Western European suppliers. An intelligence estimate of which items have been sent or received after that date is attached at Tab 3. However, the presently available information on the timing of all the transfers is not complete.

With regard to the nature of the equipment transferred, we will have to make a judgment whether it is "nuclear enrichment equipment" within the meaning of Section 669. There is no precise definition of the phrase in the Symington amendment. Accordingly, in making such a judgment we will have to look to standards that are internationally accepted, as well as to any applicable guidance in other United States law.
The Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines define enrichment equipment as equipment "especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium," which is further clarified to include "each of the major items of equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation process," including gas centrifuge assemblies, corrosion-resistant to UF6. A separate section of the guidelines defines as a "major critical component" (a sensitive part) of an enrichment facility as "gas centrifuge assemblies, corrosion-resistant to UF-6" and further specifies that for facilities for which no major critical component is described, the transfer "in the aggregate [of] a significant fraction of the items essential to the construction and operation of the facility," should be deemed a transfer of the facility. Under the Non-Proliferation Act, nuclear "equipment" includes both facilities and components that are licensed by the NRC in view of their significance for explosive purposes. (We understand that some of the particular items transferred to or received by Pakistan would be subject to licensing by Commerce, rather than the NRC, but may be subject to special interagency review procedures because of their potential non-proliferation significance.) Further, some of these items are classified and could not be legally exported from the United States.

Current indications concerning both the timing of the transfers and the nature of the equipment transferred suggest that a serious question is raised under the Symington Amendment. In this regard, Section 669 was initially designed to prevent international transfers of essentially completed facilities (the FRG-Brazil, French-Pakistan deals were clearly in mind) and did not seek to prevent indigenous development of these types of facilities. The definitions which have been followed in implementing the law have been geared to the limited range of equipment and components which are subject to the export controls under the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines and the later enacted United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Pakistan appears to have imported items which are not necessarily within these guidelines.

It could be argued, therefore, that the plant, or at least its post-August 1977 component, is basically indigenous and thus beyond the ambit of this law. Such
an interpretation, however, seems narrower than either the terms or the purpose of the Statute. Even if none of the imported items is itself "nuclear enrichment equipment", it is clear nevertheless that the items are being imported for use in combination in the same facility and in a way that is only consistent with the construction of gas centrifuge for enrichment. Most if not all of the critical items in the plant have been or are being imported to Pakistan. It is because of these circumstances that there is a serious question regarding Section 669.

If, after further study of the evidence (and, perhaps, the receipt of additional evidence), it is decided that the Symington Amendment is applicable because of Pakistan's imports since August 1977, you could recommend a waiver to the President. In order to waive termination, the President would have to determine that: 1) "the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests" and 2) "he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so." Obviously, reaching this determination and obtaining these assurances would take some time. However, we could not delay application of the termination requirement in Section 669 beyond the minimum time necessary to arrange for a waiver.
Sec. 609. Nuclear Enrichment Transfers.—(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), no funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or the Arms Export Control Act may be used for the purpose of providing economic assistance, providing military or security supporting assistance or grant military education and training, or extending military credits or making guarantees, to any country which, on or after the date of enactment of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977, delivers nuclear enrichment equipment, materials, or technology to any other country, unless before such delivery—

(1) the supplying country and receiving country have reached agreement to place all such equipment, materials, or technology, upon delivery, under multilateral auspices and management when available; and

(2) the recipient country has entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to place all such equipment, materials, technology, and all nuclear fuel and facilities in such country under the safeguards system of such Agency.

(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the President may furnish assistance which would otherwise be prohibited under such subsection if he determines and certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that—

(A) the termination of such assistance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests; and

(B) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in doing so.

Such certification shall set forth the reasons supporting such determination in each particular case.

(2) Any joint resolution which would terminate or restrict assistance described in subsection (a) with respect to a country to which the prohibition in such subsection applies shall, if introduced within thirty days after the transmittal of a certification under paragraph (1) of this subsection with respect to such country, be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601 (b) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
INTELLIGENCE RELEVANT TO THE TIMING OF PAKISTANI IMPORTS OF ITEMS FOR USE IN THEIR GAS CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM

1. Items reportedly sent or received after August 1977:
   -- 200 stator bellows (in transit as of 1/19/79)
   -- 40 stator bellows (October 1978)
   -- 100 m. aluminium tubes (probably to be used as rotors) Nov. 1978

   (Also membranes, helium leak detector, nylon bars, elbows, negatives for centrifugal bearing etching.)

2. Items which may have been sent after August 1977:
   -- centrifuge rotor drives reportedly "are supplied" by a Swiss company
   -- connector bellows "have been imported from" a number of supplier countries
   -- 32 inverters supplied by UK sometime after 1976 Pakistani order
   -- FRG firm reportedly "is supplier" of inverters, vacuum valves and K90 computers

3. A number of other items used in gas centrifuge assemblies were ordered with unknown delivery dates. Pakistan reportedly has stocks of the following items, all of which were received from foreign suppliers at some unknown time:
   -- 809 stator assemblies
   -- 2,000 bearing cups
   -- 4,016 bearing shafts
   -- 8,262 stator bellows
   -- 308 top baffles

4. An eight machine cascade is reportedly operating; a 64 machine cascade is planned for June 1979, and a 1,000 machine cascade for sometime in 1980.

January 1979

SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: P - Under Secretary Newsom
T - Under Secretary Benson

FROM: NEA - Harold H. Saunders
OES - Thomas R. Pickering

SUBJECT: Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Policy and Legal Implications for the United States

You recently asked us to reexamine the status of Pakistan's nuclear programs and the policy implications for US/Pakistan relations. We have also reviewed steps already taken to deflect the Pakistanis from efforts to acquire nuclear explosive capability.

Pakistan is moving rapidly and secretly toward the construction of facilities which will give it nuclear explosive capability perhaps within two to four years. Some of the equipment necessary to these efforts has been obtained from abroad or is on order. Current indications suggest that a serious question is raised under the Symington Amendment which prohibits furnishing aid to a country that receives nuclear enrichment equipment after August 1977. We all agree that our objective is to persuade Pakistan to terminate its enrichment and reprocessing program. All also agree that termination of aid under the Symington Amendment would further complicate our position in the turbulent Persian Gulf region and would not contribute to achievement of our non-proliferation objectives.

The actions recommended in the memorandum will take time to implement.
We propose to explain the problem and our plan of action to key members of the relevant Senate and House committees in the context of seeking legislative changes which would assist us in carrying out our non-proliferation objectives.

In parallel with the above, we would also propose to do the following-on an urgent basis:

-- Continue direct U.S. approaches to the Pakistanis, including an invitation to President Zia when the dust has settled on the Bhutto case, to visit Washington with a view to using that visit for a direct Presidential demarche on the nuclear problem.

-- Use the Dung-Xiaoping visit to try to enlist China's help in turning off Pakistan's nuclear program.

-- Approach the Saudi Government to weigh in with Pakistan.

-- Suggest to Ambassador Dobrynin the desirability of a Russian demarche in Islamabad.

-- The delivery of a Presidential letter to Desai, suggesting an Indo/Pakistani agreement in the form of a joint declaration of non-development and non-nuclear weapons.

-- Development and circulation to other nuclear suppliers a list of key components with a view to obtaining cooperation of these suppliers to prevent export of such components to Pakistan.

Attached is a paper that covers this subject in more detail. We apologize for its length.

Recommendation:
That you approve the above action plan.

Approve _______  Disapprove _______
We propose to explain the problem and our plan of action to key members of the relevant Senate and House committees in the context of seeking legislative changes which would assist us in carrying out our non-proliferation objectives.

In parallel with the above, we would also propose to do the following on an urgent basis:

-- Continue direct U.S. approaches to the Pakistanis, including an invitation to President Zia when the dust has settled on the Bhutto case, to visit Washington with a view to using that visit for a direct Presidential demarche on the nuclear problem.

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Recommendation:
That you approve the above action plan.

Approve ________  Disapprove ________
Clearances:

L - Mr. Bettauer
H - Mr. Flaten
OES - Mr. Nosenzo
S/AS - Mr. Kelley
INR - Mr. Gallucci
PM - Mr. Humphreys
ACDA - Mr. Van Doren