

PE50074-1471

RELEASE IN PART 25X1



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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

STATE 022214

ORIGIN 0005-00

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INFO OCT-91 ISO-88 /J81 P

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89109 Date 27/02/91

O 270056Z JAN 79 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NFACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 022214

[Redacted] FOR THE AMBASSADOR [Redacted]

E.O. 12865: XGDS-1 R1/26/99 (NEWSON, DAVID)

TAGS: MNUC, ENGR, TECH, PINR, RK

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM; PRESIDENT ZIA'S
RESPONSE

REF: ISLAMABAD 935

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE VIEW PRESIDENT ZIA'S RESPONSE AND OFFER TO TAKE
YOU TO VISIT FACILITIES AS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Marvin Russell,
Senior Reviewer

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BEFORE WE PROCEED FURTHER, HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE TO SHARE SOME OF OUR THINKING WITH YOU AND SOLICIT YOUR VIEWS ON THE BEST TACTICS TO FURTHER OUR OBJECTIVE.

3. FIRST, WE HAVE HIGH CONFIDENCE IN [REDACTED] THE ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING PROGRAMS WHICH IS NOW QUITE DETAILED [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] WE VERY MUCH DOUBT THAT ZIA IS UNAWARE OF THESE PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH HE MIGHT NOT BE UP-TO-DATE ON DETAILS. [REDACTED]

4. WE ARE UNCERTAIN WHY ZIA CHOSE TO MAKE SUCH A CATEGORICAL DENIAL OF YOUR ASSERTIONS. HE MAY DOUBT

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THAT WE HAVE [REDACTED] TO BACK UP THE POINTS YOU MADE. HE COULD BE ENGAGING IN SOPHISTRY, DISTINGUISHING THE ACQUISITION OF CAPACITY TO MAKE WEAPONS FROM A POSITIVE INTENTION TO DO SO. ANOTHER RELATED, HYPOTHESIS IS THAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ANTICIPATED THAT WE WOULD COME TO KNOW OF THEIR ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND ARE PREPARED TO RATIONALIZE IT AS A NORMAL PART OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A LIGHT WATER POWER REACTOR PROGRAM. IN OTHER WORDS, AN ECONOMIC RATIONALE SIMILAR TO THAT USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT. ANOTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATION MIGHT BE THAT ZIA WAS CAUGHT UNAWARE AND SHOT FROM THE HIP IN HIS REPLY TO YOU AND MAY ALREADY BE REGRETTING HIS OFFER TO SHOW YOU THE SITES.

5. ZIA HAS OFFERED TO TAKE YOU TO WHATEVER PLACES YOU SUGGEST. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, LIKE TO PUSH THE DOOR OPEN SOMEWHAT WIDER AND SEND ONE OR MORE TECHNICAL

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EXPERTS WITH YOU OR IN YOUR STEAD IF YOU THINK THAT IS POSSIBLE. AS YOU KNOW, SIMILAR GROUPS HAVE INSPECTED FACILITIES IN TAIWAN TO GOOD ACCOUNT, AND WE COULD FIELD A TEAM ON SHORT NOTICE. IDEALLY, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ACCESS TO CERTAIN FACILITIES AT CHAKLALA, SINALA, KAHUTA AND DERA GHAZI KHAN AS WELL AS THE WAH ARSENAL AND PIUSTECH. HOWEVER, WE WOULD LIKE YOUR VIEWS ON WHETHER WAH FOR EXAMPLE MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE FOR OTHER REASONS AND THUS BE LOADING TOO MUCH ON ZIA'S OFFER. WE DO NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT PAKISTAN, GIVEN A BIT OF TIME, COULD DISMANTLE THE ENRICHMENT EQUIPMENT AT CHAKLALA AND SINALA AND CLAIM OTHER USES FOR THE BUILDING COMPLEX UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN KAHUTA. NEVERTHELESS, USEFUL INTELLIGENCE CAN BE DERIVED FROM

[Redacted]

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6. WE NEED YOUR VIEWS ON THE BEST TACTICS FOR OBTAINING ZIA'S CONSENT FOR AN EXPERT TEAM TO VISIT THESE SITES AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE. IDEALLY WE WOULD LIKE TO SEND AT LEAST FOUR EXPERTS BUT COULD LIMIT NUMBER TO ONE OR TWO IF YOU BELIEVE THIS ADVISABLE. WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY PREFER AN OPEN INVITATION WITHOUT HAVING TO DIVULGE OUR HAND MUCH IN ADVANCE ON THE FACILITIES WE WISH TO VISIT.

7. A TEAM OF EXPERTS COULD ALSO BE USED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO DISCUSS WITH THEIR PAKISTANI OPPOSITE NUMBERS PAKISTAN'S PLANS FOR NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT AND THE ADVANTAGES OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD.

8. WE WILL FACE PROBLEMS SIMILAR TO THOSE OVER THE FRENCH REPROCESSING PLANT IF THE PAKISTANIS CONTEND THAT THEIR ENRICHMENT PROGRAM IS A LEGITIMATE PART OF THEIR PLANS FOR A COMPLETE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE, BUT AT LEAST WE WOULD HAVE THE PROBLEM OUT ON THE TABLE WHERE WE COULD DISCUSS IT. THE UP-TO-NOW FULLY COVERT NATURE

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OF THE ENRICHMENT EFFORT WOULD TEND TO BELIE THIS
PAKISTANI RATIONALE.

9. PLEASE REPLY NODIS/STADIS. VANCE

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