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NEW DELHI FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PICKERING

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/6/2009 (OES/NET/NEP - MICHAEL
GUHIN) OR-S

TAGS: TECH, MNUC, ENRG, PK, FR

SUBJECT: (S) US-FRENCH BILATERAL ON PAKISTAN
NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

REF: STATE 27834 (NOTAL)

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY. GUHIN REVIEWED US CONCERNS ABOUT PAKISTANI
NUCLEAR PROGRAM, INCLUDING SHOPPING EFFORT FOR CENTRIFUGE
PROGRAM, US EXPORT CONTROLS, INFORMATION ON FRENCH
COMPANY, AND DESIRABILITY OF INFORMATION SHARING AND
CONTROLLING SUPPLY FOR PAKISTANI PROGRAM. HE TOLD
JACOMET OF AMBASSADOR HUMMEL'S DEMARCHE AND ZIA'S DENIAL
AND INDICATED THAT WE ARE LOOKING AT A NUMBER OF FURTHER
STEPS AND WOULD KEEP JACOMET APPRISED AS MATTERS DEVELOP.

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JACOMET AGREED TO LOOK INTO FRENCH COMPANY NAMED BY US
AND SUPPORTED CONTINUED INFORMATION SHARING IN THIS
AREA. FRENCH SIDE ALSO DESCRIBED CURRENT FRENCH EFFORTS
TO DEVELOP LIST OF IMPORTANT NUCLEAR ITEMS WHICH COULD
HELP ENRICHMENT PROGRAMS. GUHIN STRESSED SENSITIVITY
OF INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY THAT PERTAINING TO US
DEMARCHE IN ISLAMABAD. END SUMMARY

3. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR, DCM AND POL
COUNSELOR, GUHIN, POWERS, AND GALLUCCI, ACCOMPANIED

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Geoffrey Chapman, Senior
Reviewer

BY SCIENCE COUNSELOR FRIEDMAN, MET WITH JACOMET AND M. LEYGONIE (CHIEF ENGINEER, ARMAMENTS, MOD ASSIGNED TO JACOMET). GUHIN INTRODUCED SUBJECT AND PURPOSE AS IN THE HAGUE, ADDING POINT ON HUMMEL DEMARCHE AS IN SUMMARY. POWERS DESCRIBED US CONCLUSIONS REGARDING CHARACTERISTICS OF PAK CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM BASED ON PAK SHOPPING EFFORT AND PAK LEVEL OF TECHNICAL SOPHISTICATION. POWERS ALSO LISTED ITEMS THAT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO PAK CENTRIFUGE PROGRAM AND WHICH COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR PAKS TO FABRICATE INDIGENOUSLY. LEYGONIE TOOK DETAILED NOTES AND ASKED IF US COULD PROVIDE LIST IN WRITING OF ITEMS TO GUIDE FRENCH EFFORTS AT CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY AND SUPPLY. HE THEN DESCRIBED FRENCH PROGRAM TO IDENTIFY ITEMS IMPORTANT TO BOTH ENRICHMENT (DIFFUSION AND CENTRIFUGE) AND HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION, NOTING THAT THEY HAD ALREADY DONE A LIST FOR REPROCESSING AREA.

LEYGONIE NOTED THAT THEY EXPECTED LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN PREPARING LIST FOR DIFFUSION AREA BUT WOULD APPRECIATE ASSISTANCE WITH THE CENTRIFUGE LIST. IN RESPONSE TO FRENCH REQUEST, US SIDE SAID THAT IT WOULD TRY TO PROVIDE, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, A LIST OF ITEMS TO LOOK
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FOR IN CONTROL OF SUPPLY EFFORT.

4. IN RESPONSE TO US INFORMATION ON THE FRENCH COMPANY, CALORSTAT, NEITHER JACOMET NOR LEYGONIE INDICATED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF ITS ACTIVITY, BUT PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND REPORT ON RESULTS. JACOMET ASKED ABOUT THE SOURCE OF US INFORMATION AND, SPECIFICALLY, WHETHER THE US INFORMATION CAME FROM PAKISTAN. GALLUCCI RESPONDED THAT THE INFORMATION WAS BASED ON SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE.

5. GUHIN DESCRIBED RECENT US DEMARCHE IN PAKISTAN, NOTING THAT WE INFORMED ZIA THAT WE WERE AWARE OF PAK EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF ENRICHMENT AND RESEARCH INTO

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NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND THAT ZIA HAD DENIED THAT PAKISTAN WAS UNDERTAKING SUCH ACTIVITIES. GUHIN INDICATED THAT US WAS LOOKING AT A NUMBER OF FURTHER STEPS AND WOULD KEEP JACOMET APPRISED AS MATTERS DEVELOPED.

6. JACOMET ASKED IF US THOUGHT THAT PAK ENRICHMENT EFFORT INDICATED THAT PAKS WERE LESS INTERESTED IN REPROCESSING ROUTE. GUHIN REPLIED THAT WE VIEWED THESE AS PARALLEL EFFORTS, COMPLEMENTING PAK NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE PROGRAM, WHILE NOTING THE WAYS IN WHICH ENRICHMENT COULD APPEAR MORE ATTRACTIVE TO PAKS. GUHIN ALSO NOTED THAT, WHILE INFORMATION BEING RELAYED CONCERNED ENRICHMENT, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONTROL SUPPLY WHICH COULD HELP EITHER PAK ENRICHMENT OR REPROCESSING EFFORT. JACOMET THEN ASKED IF US THOUGHT PAKS COULD CARRY ENRICHMENT EFFORT TO COMPLETION. GUHIN RESPONDED THAT THIS WOULD DEPEND, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ON WHAT PAKS COULD GET IN SHOPPING EFFORT, BUT THAT INDICATIONS WERE PAKS HAD KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITY.

7. COMMENT: WE SHOULD TRY TO FOLLOW UP QUICKLY ON LIST
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AS NOTED PARA 3 ABOVE AND, IN EXCHANGE, SEEK TO OBTAIN FRENCH REPROCESSING LIST AS WELL AS RESULTS OF FURTHER EFFORTS IN THIS AREA AS NOTED. GUHIN UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED COOPERATION AND INFORMATION SHARING IN EFFORT TO STOP SUPPLY TO PAK SENSITIVE PROGRAMS. JACOMET APPRECIATED CONSULTATIONS, WAS SYMPATHETIC TO EFFORTS TO CONTROL SUPPLY, AND NOTED DESIRABILITY OF CONTINUING EXCHANGE AND CONSULTATIONS ON THESE MATTERS.
HARTMAN

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