

UNCLASSIFIED

E162

SECRET

RELEASED IN PART

~~B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D), B2~~

PAGE 01 ABU DH 03508 01 OF 02 111121Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W  
-----F6BBC9 111401Z /38

O 011210Z JUN 99 ZUI CB 8535 HW ZDK  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1418

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003508

PAGES MISSING

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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO THE NSC: CLARKE AND RIEDEL

FROM AMCONSUL DUBAI

E.O. 12958: DECL: MAY 30, 2004  
TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, SA, PK, AF, TC  
SUBJECT: U.S. REQUESTS DUBAI CLOSE ARIANA (AFGHAN) AIRLINES:  
MR DEMURS, SAYING IT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE,  
BUT LEAVES DOOR AJAR

REF: STATE 100503

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR. REASON: 1.5(D).

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2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: ON MAY 29 AMBASSADOR REQUESTED DUBAI  
CROWN PRINCE, SHAYKH MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID AL MAKTOUM (MR),  
USE HIS AUTHORITY TO HALT ALL ARIANA (AFGHAN AIRLINES)  
FLIGHTS TO AND FROM DUBAI. AMBASSADOR TOLD MR THAT THE USG  
HAD GOOD INFORMATION THAT ARIANA WAS USED BY USAMA BIN LADEN  
(UBL) AND HIS ASSOCIATES TO MOVE MEN AND EQUIPMENT FROM  
AFGHANISTAN VIA DUBAI TO VARIOUS LOCALES.

B1

USING MORE DIRECT LANGUAGE,  
AMBASSADOR TOLD MR THAT WASHINGTON WAS FAST LOSING PATIENCE  
WITH THE TALIBAN AND THEIR CONTINUED SHELTERING OF UBL FOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: APPEALS REVIEW PANEL  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X1, 25X6  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 JUN 2029  
APPEAL ACTION: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEASED  
REASON(S): B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D)  
DATE/CASE ID: 26 OCT 2011 200606069

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. HEDGBETH, DAS, A/ISS  
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E AHMAD  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(C), 1.4(D)  
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 1 JUN 2019  
DATE/CASE ID: 24 APR 2009 200606069

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'MORE THAN A YEAR, THE UAE HAD BEEN TRYING TO MODERATE TALIBAN BEHAVIOR AND PERSUADE THEM TO OUST UBL, SO FAR IN VAIN. THE USG HAD INFORMATION THAT UBL WOULD STRIKE AGAIN SOON. HALTING ARIANA OPERATIONS WOULD SEND A CLEAR MESSAGE TO THE TALIBAN THAT PROTECTING UBL HAD REAL CONSEQUENCES. IF UBL MANAGED TO HIT AMERICANS AGAIN, THE US WOULD STRIKE THE TALIBAN HARD, AND WAS CLOSE, IN ANY CASE, TO LABELING THEM A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. SUCH A DESIGNATION HAD SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THOSE DEALING WITH THEM. MBR

BI

BI

SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH HIS ADVISORS ON OUR REQUEST. END SUMMARY.

3. (S/NF) AT THE CLOSE OF VISITING CONGRESSMAN RAY LAHOOD'S COURTESY CALL ON DUBAI CROWN PRINCE SHAYKH MUHAMMAD BIN RASHID AL-MAKTOUM (MBR), THE AMBASSADOR, CONSUL GENERAL, AND

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REPRESENTATIVE LAHOOD (WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE) MET PRIVATELY WITH MBR FOR ALMOST AN HOUR TO CONVEY THE USG REQUEST (REFTEL) THAT DUBAI CLOSE DOWN ARIANA (AFGHAN AIRLINES) OPERATIONS TO AND FROM DUBAI. (NOTE: AMBASSADOR HAD RECEIVED DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS, ORALLY RELAYED FROM EMBASSY ABU DHABI, ONLY 30 MINUTES PRIOR TO THE SCHEDULED LAHOOD-MBR COURTESY CALL. ARIANA DOES NOT FLY OUT OF ABU DHABI. EACH EMIRATE CONTROLS ITS OWN CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, INDEPENDENTLY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.) MBR WAS ATTENTIVE AND ENGAGED THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD MANY PETITIONERS IN HIS OFFICE AND A LUNCH PENDING WITH PRESIDENT ZAYID AND YEMEN'S PRESIDENT ALI ABDULLAH SALIH.

4. (S/NF) AMBASSADOR TOLD MBR THAT THE USG WAS CONVINCED THAT USAMA BIN LADEN REMAINED ACTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THAT HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES WERE PLANNING TO HIT AN AMERICAN TARGET SOON. WE HAD INFORMATION THAT UBL WAS USING ARIANA TO TRANSPORT MEN AND MATERIEL FROM AFGHANISTAN VIA DUBAI TO VARIOUS DESTINATIONS. IT WAS OUR BELIEF THAT CLOSING DOWN ARIANA OPERATIONS IN THE UAE WOULD IMPEDE UBL'S PLANS. THEREFORE, THE USG WAS ASKING DUBAI TO SHUT DOWN ARIANA NOW.


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5. (S/NF) AMBASSADOR REMINDED MBR THAT THE TALIBAN HAVE HARBORED UBL, EVEN IN THE FACE OF INTERNATIONAL, UAE, AND SAUDI PRESSURE. FURTHER, THE UAE'S YEAR-PLUS EFFORT TO MODERATE TALIBAN BEHAVIOR HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL. HE WAS NOT "UNDER CONTROL." SHUTTING DOWN ARIANA AIRLINES WOULD SEND THE RIGHT MESSAGE TO THE TALIBAN: YOUR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR UBL HAS HARD CONSEQUENCES, EVEN WITH YOUR BEST FRIENDS. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPANIED UAE

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PAGE 01 ABU DH 03508 02 OF 02 130327Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W  
-----F6F2FE 130429Z /38

O 011210Z JUN 99 ZDK  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1419

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003508

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DEPT PLEASE PASS TO THE NSC: CLARKE AND RIEDEL

FROM AMCONSUL DUBAI

E.O. 12958: DECL: MAY 30, 2004

TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, SA, PK, AF, TC

SUBJECT: U.S. REQUESTS DUBAI CLOSE ARIANA (AFGHAN) AIRLINES:

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MBR DEMURS, SAYING IT WOULD BE INEFFECTIVE,  
BUT LEAVES DOOR AJAR

STATE SECURITY DIRECTOR SHAYKH HAZZA ON HIS WASHINGTON CALLS  
THE PREVIOUS WEEK. IT IS CLEAR THAT DESPITE KOSOVO, SENIOR  
U.S. OFFICIAL, FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ARE ASSIGNING THE  
HIGHEST PRIORITY TO ENDING UBL'S SAFEHAVEN. SHAYKH HAZZA

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HEARD ALL OF THIS FIRSTHAND.

6. (S/NF) ANY NEW ATTACK BY UBL ON AMERICANS OR OTHERS WOULD  
BE MET WITH A STRONG AND SWIFT RESPONSE FROM THE U.S.,  
TARGETED AT BOTH UBL AND HIS HOSTS IN AFGHANISTAN, THE  
AMBASSADOR SAID. THE MESSAGE TO THE TALIBAN NEEDS TO BE  
VERY CLEAR: KEEP UBL IN YOUR COUNTRY AT YOUR OWN PERIL.

MBR ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR HE WOULD CONFER WITH HIS SECURITY  
ADVISORS,

B1

B1

7. (S/NF) THE AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE TALIBAN DID  
NOT SCARE EASILY, BUT THEY HAD OTHER EQUITIES AT STAKE.  
THEY WANTED INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION, A SEAT AT THE U.N.,  
AND MATERIAL SUPPORT. THEY HAD NO HOPE OF OBTAINING ANY OF  
THIS IF THEY CONTINUED THEIR SUPPORT OF UBL AND EIJ LEADER  
ZAWAHIRI. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DUBAI'S  
SERVICE AND TOURIST-BASED ECONOMY WAS VULNERABLE TO  
TERRORISTS,

B1

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THE AMBASSADOR IMPLIED THAT THE REQUEST TO SHUT  
DOWN ARIANA ASIDE, THE U.S. WOULD NOT MIND ANY OTHER  
REASONABLE TACK THE UAE COULD TAKE TO PERSUADE MULLAH UMAR  
TO EXPEL UBL. BUT TIME WAS CRITICAL, UBL WOULD SOON STRIKE

B1

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AGAIN. THE MESSAGE WAS CLEAR: OUR PATIENCE IS RUNNING OUT. THE TALIBAN HAD TO HAND OVER USAMA BIN LADEN OR PAY THE PRICE FOR SHELTERING HIM. FRIENDS OF THE TALIBAN NEED TO HELP, OTHERWISE THE TALIBAN COULD BE DESIGNATED A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES.

8. (S/NF) MBR STATED AGAIN THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HIS ADVISORS.

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9. (S/NF) COMMENT: ARIANA AIRLINES OPERATES ONLY ONE WEEKLY PASSENGER FLIGHT TO AND FROM DUBAI (LEAVING DUBAI ON SUNDAY AND RETURNING ON MONDAY). ARIANA'S MAIN OPERATIONS ARE FROM SHARJAH'S AIRPORT. IN 1998, ARIANA SENT OVER 4 MILLION KILOGRAMS OF CARGO TO KANDAHAR ALONE. FROM JANUARY 1 TO MAY 31, 1999, THEY SENT 1,104,534 KILOGRAMS OF CARGO, 940,956 KG TO KANDAHAR, 36,487 TO JALALABAD, AND 122,551 TO KABUL. PASSENGER TRAFFIC AT SHARJAH, SO FAR IN 1999, IS MUCH SMALLER, HOWEVER, WITH ONLY 177 PASSENGERS LEAVING SHARJAH AND 67 COMING FROM AFGHANISTAN (ALL FROM KABUL, KANDAHAR, OR JALALABAD). WE WILL RAISE THE ISSUE WITH SHARJAH AUTHORITIES AS WELL, AT AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY.

END COMMENT.

B1

10. (U) REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH EMBASSIES RIYADH AND ISLAMABAD, NSC, AND [REDACTED] HEADQUARTERS.

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PTQ5116

PAGE 01 ABU DH 03508 02 OF 05 091745Z  
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W  
-----F5F6E6 091745Z /38

O 091624Z JUN 99 ZDK RUEHCB 3508  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1534  
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
COMUSNAVCENT  
NSC WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC  
DIA WASHINGTON DC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 ABU DHABI 003508

~~EXDIS~~

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, AND PM

LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR LEAF

NSC FOR CLARKE AND REIDEL

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ABU DH 03508 02 OF 05 091745Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/09

TAGS: PREL, MASS, PINR, GCC, TC, SA

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] GCC STANCE ON IRAN AND DISPUTED  
QISLANDS

B1


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
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PTQ5124

PAGE 01 ABU DH 03508 03 OF 05 091746Z  
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W  
-----F5F714 091746Z /38

O 091624Z JUN 99 ZDK RUEHCB 3508  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1535  
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
COMUSNAVCENT  
NSC WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
COMUSCENTAF SHAW AFB SC  
DIA WASHINGTON DC

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 ABU DHABI 003508

~~EXDIS~~

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, AND PM

LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR LEAF

NSC FOR CLARKE AND REIDEL

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ABU DH 03508 03 OF 05 091746Z  
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/09

UNCLASSIFIED

TAGS: PREL, MASS, PINR, GCC, TC, SA

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GCC STANCE ON IRAN AND DISPUTED  
QISLANDS

B1

[REDACTED]

B1

10. (S) THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT MANY  
BILATERAL DISPUTES WITHIN THE GCC HAD COME AND GONE  
(NAMING SOME OF THE MORE EGREGIOUS ONES), BUT THAT  
THE SIX STATES OUGHT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT BOTH IRAN  
AND IRAQ WANTED TO DOMINATE THE REGION AND THAT THE  
U.S. WANTED TO WORK WITH THE GCC STATES BOTH  
BILATERALLY AND COLLECTIVELY AND TO HELP DEFEND  
AGAINST THIS AND TO PREVENT AGGRESSION. HE

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
PAGE 03 ABU DH 03508 03 OF 05 091746Z  
EXPRESSED WASHINGTON'S HOPE THAT THE SAUDI AND UAE  
LEADERSHIPS WOULD DEAL WITH THEIR DIFFERENCES  
DIRECTLY AND BEHIND CLOSED DOORS BEFORE THEY BECAME  
MORE SERIOUS. HE REITERATED U.S. SUPPORT FOR A  
NEGOTIATED RESOLUTION OF THE ISLANDS ISSUE AND,  
FAILING THAT, RECOURSE TO INTERNATIONAL  
ARBITRATION. THE U.S., HE SAID, HOPED TO SEE THIS  
LATEST PROBLEM RESOLVED WITHOUT FURTHER DAMAGE TO  
THE GCC. THE UAE WAS ALREADY WORKING FOR STABILITY  
IN IMPORTANT WAYS, SUCH AS ITS SUPPORT FOR OSW AND  
ITS HUMANITARIAN EFFORT IN KOSOVO.

B1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B1



BI

12. (S) THE AMBASSADOR, REFERRING TO SHAYKH HAZZA'S RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON, UNDERLINED THE FACT THAT THE U.S. WAS ITSELF NOT ENGAGING IN A DIALOGUE WITH IRAN AND THAT ITS OFFER

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PTQ4503

PAGE 01 ABU DH 03508 04 OF 05 091602Z  
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W  
-----F5EBF2 091604Z /38

O 091624Z JUN 99 ZDK RUEHCB 3508  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1536  
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
COMUSNAVCENT  
NSC WASHINGTON DC  
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
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PAGE 02 ABU DH 03508 04 OF 05 091602Z

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/09

TAGS: PREL, MASS, PINR, GCC, TC, SA

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GCC STANCE ON IRAN AND DISPUTED ISLANDS

B1


TO TALK TO TEHRAN ABOUT THEIR DIFFERENCES WAS A PUBLIC ONE. [REDACTED]

B1


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
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
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
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PAGE 04 ABU DH 03508 04 OF 05 091602Z




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
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