TO: Chief of Naval Operations
   Vice Chief of Naval Operations

Via: DCNO (Plans and Policy)

DATE: 1 February 1957

SUBJECT: Railroad; running of

Ref: (a) Op-09 Second Memorandum Endorsement, ser 0002B02,
     31 Jan 1957, subject: Guided missile sites in the
     Middle East
(b) Op-06 ser 00038P06, 25 Jan 1957, same subject

1. I believe that the dim view of reference (b) expressed by the
   Vice Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a) is not wholly
   warranted, and may be due to some misunderstanding of the intent of
   reference (b). Without any desire to initiate an exchange of
   memoranda which could last all winter, I am nevertheless impelled
   to submit this one in order to set the record straight.

2. It is not the intent of my memorandum to recommend that the
   sea-borne IRBM capability be superimposed on the SAC capability,
   but that it supplant it in substantial measure. The whole idea
   is to free this retaliatory capability from fixed shore bases in
   the United States and in Allied territory, thereby removing a
   major threat to our allies and to the continental United States
   resulting from the mere presence of SAC bases and missile bases
   in these locations. I am in agreement with the thought implicit
   in paragraph 2 of reference (a) that the retaliatory capability
   of the United States, expressed in weight of bombs, is more than
   adequate now.

3. I am still of the opinion that if we had a substantial number
   of IRBM submarines deployed as a matter of routine around the
   Eurasian periphery, we would have a retaliatory capability which
   would be difficult if not impossible for the Soviets to neutralize—
   certainly more difficult to neutralize than our existing capability
   which relies upon fixed bases at locations which we must presume
   are known to the enemy.

4. This is not a matter of "casting envious eyes on the SAC side
   of the fence." The Navy does not need the IRBM; the IRBM needs
   the Navy. When this capability materializes, I think the United
   States would be better advised to channel funds and manpower in
   this direction rather than to more B-52s, more airfields, more
   tankers, and more overseas bases in somebody else's front yard,
   thereby increasing the number of No. 1 priority Soviet targets in
   the United States and Allied territory.

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Op-06