POLARIS

An examination of pertinent NSC Actions back to June 1957 does not disclose any Action indicating Council approval of increased numbers of POLARIS missiles based upon the achievement of a break through of any kind.

The Deputy Executive Secretary's notes indicate the following statements at Council meetings:

July 3, 1957: Deputy Secretary Quarles referred to the development of POLARIS as "far in the future."

December 6, 1958: Admiral Burke admitted that POLARIS was chancy at the outset. Now, however, we know that we can get a : : : : : : : : warhead for the missile. We also know that we have the re-entry problem licked. Moreover, the guidance tests have been satisfactory, and the propellant is all right. Therefore, what we have now in sight and are pretty sure of obtaining is a POLARIS missile with a 1200 mile range which can be fired from a submarine while submerged which will carry a : : : : : : : : warhead and with a CEP of four miles which can probably be reduced to two. What we must try to do in the immediate future is to get a missile with a 1500 mile range, carrying a warhead of : : : : : : : and cut the CEP two miles or less. Mr. Holaday in general confirmed Admiral Burke's figures.

August 18, 1959: Mr. Stans stated that he had recently had a two and a half hour briefing on POLARIS in which he had been informed that the eventual objective of the POLARIS program was 45 submarines, with 29 deployed at all times. With such a force, he was informed, we could destroy 232 targets, which was sufficient to destroy all of Russia. The total cost of such a program would be 7 to 8 billion dollars, and annual operating costs would be $350 million. An obvious question was suggested by this briefing — if POLARIS could do this job, why did we need other IRMs or ICBs, SAC aircraft, and overseas bases? The answer he had received when he asked this question was that that was someone else's problem.

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