JOINT PLANNING FROM A SERVICE VIEWPOINT

delivered by

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to the

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on

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FOR THE PAST TWO MONTHS YOUR CONSIDERATION OF "FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY" HAS BEEN LIKE A FRENCH CHEF PREPARING THE "SPECIALITE DE LA MAISON." YOU HAVE SHOPPED THE MARKETS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND SELECTED FEDERAL AGENCIES; YOU HAVE CHOSEN THE REQUIRED INGREDIENTS WITH GREAT CARE AND JUDGMENT. YOU HAVE USED THE MIXING BOWL OF OSD AND THE JOINT STAFF, BEATEN LIGHTLY WITH THE BUDGET AND FLAVORED WITH SERVICE DOCTRINES, ROLES AND MISSIONS. AT THIS POINT I CAN'T ADVISE YOU WHETHER TO BROIL, BAKE, FRY, OR PERHAPS FREEZE YOUR CONCOCTION. I CAN, HOWEVER, TELL YOU A LITTLE ABOUT THE VARIOUS KINDS OF TEMPERATURE THAT YOUR SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO SURVIVE IN THE EVERY YEAR WORLD OF MILITARY PLANNING.

I WILL REVIEW BRIEFLY THE JOINT PROGRAM FOR PLANNING TO ESTABLISH A POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR A SOMewhat detailed and illustrative look at a joint planning problem and finally I will conclude with some more or less random and personal observations that seem pertinent.

THE JOINT PROGRAM
THE JOINT PROGRAM FOR PLANNING, IN THE ORDER OF DISCUSSION COMPRIS ES A CHART 0 ON JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (JL RSE), A JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (JSOP) AND A JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN (JSCP) GENERALLY PRODUCED EACH YEAR FOR THE TIME PERIODS INDICATED.

FIRST THE JOINT LONG RANGE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE - THE JL RSE - CHART 0 OFF CHART I ON

THIS ESTIMATE COVERS A FOUR-YEAR PERIOD BEGINNING EIGHT YEARS IN THE FUTURE. ITS PURPOSE IS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR FUTURE MILITARY POLICIES, PLANS AND PROGRAMS, AND FUTURE REVIEW OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES. IT CONTAINS AN APPRAISAL OF THE WORLD SITUATION, AN EVALUATION OF TRENDS WHICH COULD INFLUENCE MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL COURSE OF ACTION; AND FORECASTS THE NATURE OF POSSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, INCLUDING THE WEAPONS AND TECHNIQUES LIKELY TO BE EMPLOYED. BASED ON THESE APPRAISALS, THE ESTIMATE LISTS POSSIBLE U. S. COURSES OF MILITARY ACTION IN TERMS OF STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND MILITARY POSTURES REQUIRED FOR U. S. SECURITY DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION. SINCE I AM NOT GOING TO DISCUSS THE JL RSE IN DETAIL TODAY, BEFORE WE LEAVE IT, WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT
SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS AN ESTIMATE ONLY AND THE JCS
USUALLY PUT IT TO BED QUIETLY WITH A "NOTED." I WANT TO
STATE FRANKLY THAT THE AIR FORCE DOES NOT CONSIDER THE
CURRENT EMPHASIS, THOUGHT, AND ATTENTION GIVEN THIS LONG
RANGE EFFORT TO BE EITHER ADEQUATE OR MEANINGFUL. WE HAVE,
AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A MORE CONSIDERED AND USEFUL
LONG-RANGE PLANNING DOCUMENT. PARTICULARLY IS THIS
IMPORTANT WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE URGENCY OF CONCEPTUAL AND
STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR OUR LONG LEAD R&D PROGRAM. TOO
OFTEN THE JLRSE APPEARS TO RUBBER-STAMP (OR TO BE A MERE
EXTENSION OF) THE INTERMEDIATE PLAN -- THE OBJECTIVES PLAN --
APPEARING ON THIS CHART.

CHART 1 OFF

CHART 2 ON

THE NEXT PLAN PRODUCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANNING
PROGRAM IS THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN. WE CALL
THIS PLAN "JSOP," AND IT IS IDENTIFIED BY THE MID-TIME
PERIOD COVERED. THUS, THE JSOP JUST APPROVED BY THE JOINT
chiefs of STAFF IN NOVEMBER IS JSOP-66. THIS PLAN COVERS
A 36-MONTH PERIOD BEGINNING FOUR YEARS IN THE FUTURE. THE
PURPOSE OF THIS PLAN IS TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE ANNUAL
SERVICE BUDGETS, MOBILIZATION PLANNING, AND STRATEGIC
STOCKPILING... THIS GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED BY A TRANSLATION
OF NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES INTO MILITARY OBJECTIVES
AND STRATEGY. THE CRITICAL INGREDIENT IS EMBODIED IN THE
MILITARY FORCE OBJECTIVES -- OR "FORCE TAPS" -- ESTABLISHED
FOR AN ASSUMED D-DAY
FOR AN ASSUMED D-DAY OF A GENERAL WAR BEGINNING FOUR YEARS IN THE FUTURE, THE FORCE OBJECTIVES AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SERVICE BUDGET REQUESTS. AS THE TITLE OF THE PLAN INDICATES, THIS IS AN OBJECTIVES PLAN, AND IT SETS A DEFINITE PATTERN FOR THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF OUR MILITARY FORCES FOR THE YEARS PRIOR TO THE ASSUMED D-DAY, AS WELL AS FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME THEREAFTER.

CHART 2 OFF

CHART 3 ON

THIS CHART DEPICTS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN AND SERVICE BUDGETS.

ACCORDING TO THE PROGRAM, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF HAVE ESSENTIALLY APPROVED A JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN WHICH ASSUMES A D-DAY OF 1 JULY 1985. THE FORCE OBJECTIVES WILL BE FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HIS APPROVAL. THE SECRETARY WILL ESTABLISH PROGRAM GUIDANCE AND BUDGETARY GUIDELINES -- SUCH AS MANPOWER CEILINGS, FISCAL RESTRICTIONS OR MATERIAL PROGRAMMING LIMITATIONS -- AND FORWARD THEM TO THE SERVICES FOR USE DURING BUDGET PREPARATION.

THE SERVICES THEN DEVELOP THEIR INDIVIDUAL BUDGET REQUESTS WHICH ARE FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET FOR REVIEW. THE RESULTS OF THESE REVIEWS PRODUCE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET REQUEST WHICH IS PRESENTED AS A PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL BUDGET MESSAGE TO THE...
BUDGET MESSAGE TO THE NEW CONGRESS. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TRANSPoses THE BUDGET REQUEST INTO DOLLAR APPROPRIATIONS BY 1 JULY 1962. THESE FUNDS ARE THEN OBLIGATED AND SPENT SO AS TO ACHIEVE BY 1 JULY 1965 THE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH IN THE PLAN.

CHART 3 OFF

CHART 4 ON

THIS IS THE LAST PLAN REQUIRED BY THE JOINT PROGRAM -- THE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN. IT IS THE JOINT PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF PRESENTLY AVAILABLE U. S. MILITARY FORCES DURING THE CONTINUATION OF THE COLD WAR, A LIMITED WAR, OR A GENERAL WAR.

IT IS PREPARED OR REVISED ANNUALLY, AND ASSUMES THAT A GENERAL WAR COULD BREAK OUT AT ANY TIME DURING THE PERIOD THE PLAN IS IN EFFECT. THE PLAN TRANSLATES OUR NATIONAL POLICIES INTO MILITARY OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND TASKS. IT SETS FORTH THE DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. MILITARY FORCES, BOTH THOSE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE AS WELL AS THOSE WHICH CAN BE MOBILIZED BEFORE OR AFTER D-DAY. THIS IS THE JOINT FIGHTING PLAN. BASED UPON THIS PLAN, EACH MILITARY SERVICE, AS WELL AS EACH UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMAND, DRAWS UP CURRENT CAPABILITIES PLANS AND EMERGENCY WAR PLANS.

THIS PLAN HAS 13 DETAILED ANNEXES, AND IS THE COMPLETE CURRENT WAR PLAN ON WHICH ALL OF THE CINC'S WAR PLANS ARE APPROVED. THE NEW PLAN FOR NEXT JULY -- JSCP-62 -- WAS FINALLY APPROVED LAST MONTH AND WILL GIVE THE CINC'S ABOUT 6 MONTHS LEAD TIME FOR DEVELOPING THEIR FY 62 WAR PLANS.

CHART 4 OFF
OF THE THREE BASIC JOINT PLANS, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND THE ONE INVOLVING MOST SERVICE DISAGREEMENTS IS THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN — OR JSOP — TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THAT PLAN FURTHER. THIS IS THE ONE WHICH SHAPES THE STRUCTURE AND BUDGET OF THE MILITARY SERVICES. ALL OF THE MILITARY SERVICES HAVE DEVELOPED (UNILATERAL) REQUIREMENTS WHICH, TAKEN TOGETHER, ADD UP TO AN IMPRESSIVE DEFENSE BUDGET. (BY IMPRESSIVE I MEAN UNATTAINABLE.) THERE ARE MANY FACTORS WHICH RESULT IN THIS INITIAL UNREALISTICALLY HIGH BUDGET. FIRST, WE ARE IN A TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN CURRENT WEAPON SYSTEMS AND RADICALLY NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS FOR THE FUTURE. WE ARE FACED WITH THE REQUIREMENT TO MODERNIZE CURRENT FORCES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR IN-BEING STRENGTH WITH WHICH TO FIGHT ANY KIND OF WAR THAT MIGHT ARISE, AND AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE FACED WITH THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND BUY NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF EVER INCREASING COST IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE COMPARABILITY WITH OUR ENEMY. THESE MAY EVENTUALLY REPLACE, TO A LARGE DEGREE, THOSE NOT IN USE BY THE SERVICES, BUT IN THE MEANTIME — WE ARE FORCED TO PROVIDE, TO SOME DEGREE, A DUAL FORCE STRUCTURE — ONE THAT IS PROVEN, AND ONE WHICH, IN THE FUTURE, WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE BUT, AT THE PRESENT DOES NOT GIVE US ADEQUATELY RELIABLE WEAPONS. THE MIX OR BALANCE IS A CRITICAL QUESTION OF JUDGMENT IN THIS ERA OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY.

ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH
ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH GREATLY INCREASES THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MILITARY FORCES IS THE INDEPINIT NATURE OF THE CONTINGENCIES WHICH WE MUST BE PREPARED TO MEET AND THE VARIETY OF CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIC COURSES UNILATERALLY DEVELOPED AND SUPPORTED.

THESE FACTORS RESULT IN EXTREMELY LARGE INITIAL MILITARY DEMANDS FOR THE TAXPAYER'S DOLLAR. IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, AN ARBITRARY CEILING ON THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS INEVITABLE, AND MANY OF THE STATED SERVICE REQUIREMENTS WILL NOT BE MET. EACH SERVICE, THEREFORE TENDS TO EMPHASIZE THOSE CONCEPTS, STRATEGIC COURSES AND CONTINGENCIES WHICH ENHANCE ITS CHANCES FOR SECURING THE GREATEST PROPORTION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES. THIS DIFFERENCE IN EMPHASIS COLORS THE VIEWPOINT OF EACH SERVICE ON EVERY ELEMENT WHICH ENTERS INTO THE PLAN, AND IT IS IN THIS UNILATERAL FRAME OF REFERENCE THAT THE SERVICES APPROACH THE JSOP PLANNING PROBLEM.

AT THIS POINT, AND BEFORE GOING FURTHER INTO THE PLANNING PROCESS ITSELF, I THINK YOU SHOULD TAKE A QUICK LOOK AT THE BACKGROUND AND THE MAJOR CHANGES THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE JOINT PLANNING STRUCTURE OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS.

PRIOR TO THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958, THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE, MADE UP OF THE PLANNERS FROM EACH SERVICE AND CHAIRMED BY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS OF THE JOINT STAFF DRAFTED JOINT PLANS. THIS COMMITTEE WAS ASSISTED IN THE JOB BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP.
STRATEGIC PLANS GROUP OF THE JOINT STAFF AND ORGANIZED IN MANY THREE-MAN PLANNING TEAMS. THE COMMITTEE NORMALLY MET TWICE WEEKLY AND CONSIDERED JOINT PLANS AND OTHER AGENDA ITEMS. MUCH OF THE GIVE AND TAKE, THE NEGOTIATION, IN JOINT PLANNING WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THIS COMMITTEE.

THIS COMMITTEE AND OTHERS LIKE IT, HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED AS ONE RESULT OF THE REORGANIZATION ACT.

THE NEW ORGANIZATION REVEALS THE FOLLOWING PLANS STRUCTURE IN THE JCS.

CHART 5 ON

YOU SEE THAT THE JOINT STAFF IS NOW CONVENTIONAL IN NATURE WITH THE FORMER GROUPS AND TEAMS REPLACED BY THE J-SECTIONS.

SOME OF THE OLD PLANNING FUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE NEW J-3 SECTIONS, BUT MOST, AS YOU WOULD EXPECT, HAVE GONE TO THE J-5 SECTION.

CHART 5 OFF

THIS CHART INDICATES THE AIR FORCE -- JCS PLANNING RELATIONSHIP.

CHART 6 ON

AS YOU CAN SEE, THERE IS A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP AT ALL LEVELS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS. THE "ACTION OFFICER" ON BOTH SIDES IS A KEY ELEMENT IN THE SUCCESS OF THE SYSTEM.

THESE OFFICERS, INCIDENTALLY, ARE COMPARABLE IN RANK, EXPERIENCE, AND BACKGROUND TO YOU HERE IN THE WAR COLLEGE -- ABOUT EQUALLY DIVIDED, COLONELS AND SENIOR LT. COLONELS.

SERVICE CO-ORDINATES, BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL, ARE DEVELOPED AT THE ACTION OFFICER LEVEL. THE SERVICE PLANNER, THROUGH HIS STATED CONCURRENCE
THROUGH HIS STATED CONCURRENCE OR NONCONCURRENCE WITH PLANS UNDER CONSIDERATION IN THE JOINT STAFF, LARGELY DETERMINES THE WORKLOAD FOR THE OPERATIONS DEPUTIES AND THE JCS, WITH EACH LEVEL TRYING TO REACH AGREED VIEWS.

THE BASIC THEORY BEHIND JOINT PLANNING IS TO APPLY THE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF ALL THE MILITARY SERVICES IN ORDER TO COME OUT WITH THE BEST POSSIBLE MILITARY ANSWER IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. FROM A REALISTIC STANDPOINT I AM SURE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU THAT THE RESULTS ACHIEVED ARE Seldom THOSE CLEAR, SPARKLING GEMS OF MILITARY JUDGMENT AND WISDOM WHICH IS THE GOAL OF THE PLANNING PROCESS.

CHART 6 OFF

CASE IN POINT -- YOU ARE WATCHING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN FOR FY '66.

IT IS NOW FEBRUARY 1960.


As IT IS NORMALLY CALLED, OF THE JSOP FOR FY '66. THIS DRAFT, LARGELY BASED UPON A
LARGELY BASED UPON A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FOR
THAT TIME PERIOD, INCLUDES STRATEGIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES,
A STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, AND A STRATEGIC CONCEPT.

THIS DRAFT IS THEN SENT TO OTHER JOINT STAFF AGENCIES
AND TO THE ACTION OFFICERS OF EACH SERVICE FOR INFORMAL
COMMENT. THE STRATEGIC MILITARY OBJECTIVES ARE CHECKED TO
DETERMINE IF THEY REFLECT ADEQUATELY THE MILITARY ASPECTS
OF NATIONAL POLICY AS INTERPRETED BY THE SERVICE OF THE
ACTION OFFICER REVIEWING THE PAPER. IN CONSIDERING THE
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, IT IS IMMEDIATELY APPARENT WHICH
CONCEPT THE JOINT STAFF HAS ADOPTED. THE INFLUENCE OR
LACK THEREOF OF EACH SERVICE MEMBER OF THE BASIC WAR PLANS
BRANCH IS CLEARLY NOTICABLE.

IN COMMENTING INFORMALLY ON THE "FLIMSY" AND LATER ON
THE SECOND DRAFT OR BUFF, EACH SERVICE ATTEMPTS TO INJECT
INTO THE APPRAISAL THOSE FACTORS WHICH WILL HIGHLIGHT THE
NEED FOR ITS PARTICULAR FORCES TO DEEP-CONTINGENCIES OF
ITS OWN PRIMARY CONCERN.

EXAMPLE — OVERSIMPLIFIED BUT WITH SOME BASIS IN FACT —
WE'LL SAY THAT THE ARMY FAVORS AN APPRAISAL WHICH EMPHASIZES
THE POSSIBILITY THAT DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION,
A CONDITION OF MUTUAL NUCLEAR "STALEMATE" WILL PREVAIL.
THE ARMY BELIEVES THAT A GENERAL WAR IS MUCH LESS LIKELY
THAN LIMITED WAR, AND THAT THE SOVIET ARMY WILL CONTINUE TO
BE THE TRADITIONAL AND DECISIVE ELEMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING A
CONTINENTAL STRATEGY.

THE NAVY FAVORS
THE NAVY FAVORS THAT PORTION OF THE APPRAISAL WHICH
INDICATES THAT THE USSR WILL CONTINUE ITS NAVAL CONSTRUCTION
PROGRAM, THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BEGINNING TO CONSIDER THAT
CONTROL OF THE SEA IS VITAL TO SUCCESS IN WAR, AND THAT THE
SOVIET NAVAL PROGRAM CAN CONSTITUTE A DIRECT THREAT TO THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. IN PARTICULAR, THE NAVY
ENDORSSES THE ESTIMATE THAT LIMITED WAR WILL BECOME THE MORE
PROBABLE FORM OF MILITARY AGGRESSION, BECAUSE IN LIMITED
WAR ALL OF THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS HAVE A ROLE AND, THE NAVY
AND THE MARINES MAY BE CALLED ON FIRST.

THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS AN APPRAISAL WHICH POINTS OUT
THAT THE SOVIET MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT CONSTITUTE THE
PRIMARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT BALLISTIC
MISSILES WILL GREATLY INCREASE THE ABILITY OF THE USSR TO
ACHIEVE SURPRISE IN THE INITIAL ATTACK. IT IS NOTED ALSO
THAT THE USSR HAS MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS IN SPACE.

THIS IS THE PRELIMINARY SKIRMISH -- A TESTING OF
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES AND IDENTIFIES MANY OF THE SPLITS
WHICH WILL DEVELOP.

AFTER REVIEWING THE COMMENTS OF THE SERVICES ON THE
STRATEGIC APPRAISAL, PLUS HOLDING NUMEROUS MEETINGS OF
SERVICE ACTION OFFICERS, THE BASIC WAR PLAN ORCH CAN FINALLY
INCLUDES MOST OF THE POINTS DESIRED BY THE SERVICES. THE
RESULT -- A DRAFT STRATEGIC APPRAISAL THAT WILL SUBST THE
CLAIMS OF EACH SERVICE FOR MAJOR FORCES, NOW THE SERVICES
ADDRESS THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT, HERE THE SITUATION BECOMES
MORE BINDING BECAUSE
MORE BINDING BECAUSE THE CONCEPT ADOPTED CAN SHAPE THE
FORCE OBJECTIVES.

The Air Force advocates a concept of preparing for a
general war which will occur under, at best, tactical
warning. This would require readiness to employ substantial
numbers of nuclear weapons from the outset, -- that is, an
immediately responsive offense, and retains substantial
forces for air defense of the United States. The Air Force
believes that the military posture supporting this concept
would do most to deter war, whether general or limited;
would put us in a position most likely to end in victory,
regardless of how a general war might start.

The Navy proposes adoption of several strategies which
include the possible employment of nuclear weapons from the
outset of a general war, delayed use of nuclear weapons,
and restricted use of nuclear weapons. They would also
emphasize the preparation for limited wars, which might or
might not involve the use of nuclear weapons. They are
extremely flexible in the matter of strategic concept.

The Army supports the multiple concepts proposed by
the Navy, but would include the thought that major penetration
and occupation of Soviet territory will be the only means for
ultimate achievement of U.S. and Allied general war
objectives.

In observing these diverse views on strategy, you are
aware that they are to be expected because they involve
the basic doctrine and
The basic doctrine and concepts of our land, sea and air forces, these doctrinal concepts are deep-rooted.

There is little yielding or compromise of basic philosophy on the part of the services, but the basic war plans branch, with the benefit of service comments, must push forward to the next stage in development. The annual budget cycle won't wait! It is now late March, 1960, and no agreement is in sight.

Finally, the views of the Joint Staff and the divergent views of the services are forwarded to the Director, and because of the significance of the subject and the basic nature of the underlying disagreements, a decision is made to forward the plan, at this stage, to the Chiefs for additional guidance on the points at issue.

After several strenuous sessions, the Joint Chiefs themselves are unable to resolve the splits on the concept, but the discussions are useful for elaborating upon views and convictions. At last, the Joint Chiefs are able to negotiate a solution -- a concept generally in accordance with that which was finally agreed to in the last joint strategic capabilities plan. Briefly, this envisages a general war initiated with a Soviet nuclear attack with little or no warning, or as the result of a lesser conflict broadening into general war. The governing principle in the employment of nuclear weapons during the initial strategic operation is that the U.S. and its allies must emerge with the
EMERGE WITH THE RESIDUAL OVER-ALL ADVANTAGE AND, CONCURRENTLY, OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS MUST BE DESIGNED SO AS TO MINIMIZE LOSS AND DAMAGE TO THE U. S. AND ITS ALLIES.

DURING THESE INITIAL OPERATIONS, OTHER ACTIONS AND DEPLOYMENTS, BY ARMY, NAVAL AND AIR FORCE FORCES, WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE CONCEPT.

IN ADDITION, INCREASED EMPHASIS IS GIVEN TO CONFLICTS SHORT OF GENERAL WAR. THE ARMY AND NAVY POSITION REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT THAT THESE LESSER CONFLICTS WILL BE "MORE LIKELY," IN THE JSOF PERIOD, THE AIR FORCE POSITION WAS AIMED AT COMPLETING THE COMPARISON. IN OTHER WORDS, CONFLICTS SHORT OF GENERAL WAR WILL BE MORE LIKELY THAN WHAT? THAN GENERAL WAR? CERTAINLY, THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CONTINUE TO BE. SO, MORE LIKELY IN 1965 THAN 1960? THE AIR FORCE THINKS NOT. RATHER, THE RISKS INVOLVED PROBABLY WILL CAUSE AN INCREASED RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN LOCAL AGGRESSION, ESPECIALLY WHERE MAJOR ISSUES ARE KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED, AND WHERE THE DANGER OF THE CONFLICT EXPANDING TO GENERAL WAR IS GREATER.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR 1965 NOW CONTAINS MUCH DISCUSSION ON LIMITED WAR, AND FIRMLY RECOGNIZES THAT THE CAPABILITY OF THE U. S. TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY AND SWIFTLY WITH THESE CONFLICTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE CRUCIAL TO OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS.

WITH THE JCS SOLUTION, THE BASIC WAR PLANS BRANCH GOES BACK TO WORK. THE ENSUING DEVELOPMENT OF A PLAN BASED UPON THE APPROVED CONCEPT
THE APPROVED CONCEPT OFFERS NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM, SINCE
CONCEPT IS SO BROADLY STATED AS TO ALLOW COMPLETE LATITUDE
FOR UNILATERAL SERVICE INTERPRETATION. ALL OF THE SERVICES
CONCUR IN THE PROPOSAL AND IT IS APPROVED BY THE DIRECTOR
OF THE JOINT STAFF, THERE, WITH NO POINTS AT ISSUE IT IS
NOT NECESSARY TO PASS IT TO THE CHIEFS OR THE OPERATIONS
DEPUTIES. THE SERVICES ARE NOW REQUIRED TO SUBMIT "FORCE
TABLES" BASED UPON THEIR UNILATERAL ASSESSMENT OF FORCE
REQUIREMENTS AND MOBILIZATION CAPABILITIES.

THIS IS THE REAL HEART OF THE PROBLEM, SINCE FORCES
EQUATE TO RESOURCES AND BUDGET.

THE FORCE OBJECTIVES PROPOSED BY THE ARMY INCLUDE A
SUBSTANTIAL D-DAY FORCE OF 14 DIVISIONS. OF THESE, SIX
WILL BE LOCATED IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THE REMAINDER
DEPLOYED TO EUROPE, KOREA AND HAWAII. THE U.S. BASED
DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE STRAC COMPOSED OF 3 DIVISIONS
AVAILABLE FOR DEPLOYMENT IN LOCAL AGGRESSIONS. A LARGE
MOBILIZATION BASE WOULD BE PROVIDED TO PERMIT A Tremendous
EXPANSION IN GROUND FORCES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT STRATEGIC
WARNING OR LIMITED WAR WOULD PERMIT MOBILIZATION PRIOR TO
D-DAY OF A GENERAL WAR. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY PROPOSES TO
INCREASE GREATLY THE NUMBERS OF SEPARATE MISSILE BATTALIONS
AND ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENTS. THESE WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH
NUCLEAR ARTILLERY AND GUIDED MISSILES WITH FROM 20 TO 1000
MILES RANGE. IN ADDITION, THE ARMY PROPOSES TO MAKE
SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF AAA BATTALIONS WHICH
WOULD BE EQUIPPED
would be equipped with a modified version of the Nike-Hercules while preparing the way for major procurement of Nike-Zeus.

The Navy force objectives contemplate continued modernization of the attack carrier force, to include conversion to super carriers, along with supporting vessels. They also state a requirement for a cruiser and submarine force, nuclear powered, to launch surface-to-air as well as surface-to-surface missiles and surround the carrier forces with a more extensive and costly air defense structure than that devoted to the defense of the entire North American continent. In addition, they want 21 nuclear powered submarines equipped with the Polaris missile and long lead time procurement for an additional number leading to a force of 45 Polaris submarines. Three Marine divisions with their own wings for air support are included. As with the Army objectives, there is emphasis on long term mobilization.

Air Force force objectives reflect 87 major combat wings and 84 support squadrons -- tankers and airlift -- with increased numbers of missile units.

A review of the three services' force objectives indicates clearly that there are diverse interpretations of the roles and missions. All three services have indicated a requirement for the ICBM. The Army and the Air Force have competing requirements for surface-to-surface missiles in
SURFACE MISSILES IN THE 300 TO 1500 MILE RANGE, AND BOTH
THE ARMY AND THE NAVY ARE COMPETING WITH THE AIR FORCE FOR
STRATEGIC AIR ROLES; THE ARMY AND MARINES CONTINUE THEIR
PRIVATE COMPETITION IN THE ROLE OF LAND WARFARE. NEW WEAPONS
HAVE COMPOUNDED THE PROBLEM OF RESOLVING DIVERGENT SERVICE
PHILOSOPHIES AS EACH STRIVES TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE
NEW WEAPONS AND THUS INCREASE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL
SECURITY. ESTABLISHED ROLES AND MISSIONS HAVE LITTLE
RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON THE GRAB FOR MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS.
BEHIND THE SCENES IS A DEFINITE OVERTONE OF SUSPICION, AND
DESIRE TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT ROLE IN SPACE, OR FAILING
THAT, TO DENY THAT ROLE TO ANOTHER SERVICE. EACH IS MAKING
A STRONG, COMPETITIVE BID FOR THE DEFENSE DOLLAR; RECOGNITION
AS THE DECISIVE FORCE AND, FAILING THAT, SERVICE "SURVIVAL"
IN THE NAME OF BEING A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO NATIONAL
DEFENSE.

THESE ELEMENTS OF STRUGGLE, IF YOU WILL, ARE PRESENT
AT EACH LEVEL OF JOINT PLANNING. ONE FUNDAMENTAL LESSON
FOR SUCCESSFUL JOINT PLANNING IS TO KEEP PERSONALITIES OUT
OF THE BUSINESS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
SHOULD BE DEALT WITH ON AN IMPERSONAL, NOT AN EMOTIONAL
BASIS. IN JOINT PLANNING YOU WILL SEE CASES OF DECEPTION
AND COLLUSION -- JUST AS YOU WOULD SEE IN ANY POKER GAME.
THE SIMPLE RESULT IS THAT IF SOMEBODY WINS SOMEBODY MUST
LOSE, SO THE EFFORT IS TO CUT THE LOSSES AND MAXIMIZE THE
GAINS, AND SO EVERYBODY GETS SOMETHING. WITHIN THIS
FRAMEWORK, CONVICTIONS IN
FRAMEWORK, CONVICTIONS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST MUST BE
HELD STRONGLY AND EXPLAINED CLEARLY — PREFERABLY WHILE
FURTHERING CONSENSUAL PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE
OTHER PLANNERS.

TO THIS END, AN OCCASIONAL LIGHT TOUCH CAN HELP. AS
AN EXAMPLE, RECENTLY THE ARMY PLANNER AND THE AIR FORCE
PLANNER EXchanged SOME DOCUMENTS. THE ISSUE AT HAND WAS
THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE VIEWS WERE
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED. THE AIR FORCE PLANNER PRESENTED
THE ARMY PLANNER WITH A SUGGESTION:

CHART 7 ON

CHART 7 OFF

BUT LONG AFTERWARD, THE ARMY SENT ANOTHER PLANNING
FACTOR TO THE AIR FORCE.

CHART 8 ON

CHART 8 OFF

BUT IT IS NOW APRIL OF 1960, AND THE OBJECTIVE FORCE
PLAN MUST PROCEED.

I HAVE TOLD YOU, GENERALLY, HOW THE SERVICES DEVELOP
JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR OVER-ALL FORCES; HOW THE SERVICE
PLANNERS ARE CALLED UPON TO TAKE A DETAILED LOOK AT THE
SUBMISSIONS MADE BY EACH OF THE OTHER SERVICES: THIS IS A
RELATIVELY NEW PROCEDURE — BUT A SIGNIFICANT ONE. IN MANY
RESPECTS, THIS IS LIKE TELLING A NEIGHBOR WHY YOU DON'T LIKE
HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN — A REAL CONTROVERSIAL EXERCISE, AS
YOU WILL APPRECIATE.

NATURALLY, THE FIRST
NATURALLY, THE FIRST ATTACK IS AGAINST THE AIR FORCE
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE -- BIG
MISSILES, B-52 WINGS, AND AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES. THE
ARMY AND NAVY CHALLENGE THE NEED FOR THE NUMBERS PROPOSED
BY THE AIR FORCE, AND RESIST THE DEVELOPMENT COSTS FOR
LATER GENERATION MISSILES. FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT OVER
THE THREAT ASSESSMENT STILL PERSISTS.

BUT THE AIR FORCE HAS DONE ITS HOMEWORK, ALSO, AND IT
POINTS OUT THAT THE PROGRAM SUBMITTED BY THE ARMY FOR THE
MIKE-ZEUS -- THROUGH THE PERIOD OF THE JSP -- WILL COST
$13 BILLION, FOR ONLY 27 MIKE-ZEUS SITES. ALL PLANNERS
ARE IN AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR URGENT RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT IN THE ANTI-ICBM AREA, BUT THE NAVY JOINS THE
AIR FORCE IN RESISTING THIS VASTLY EXPENSIVE PROGRAM FOR
PRODUCTION OF A WEAPON WITH LIMITED DEFENSE PROSPECTS...
THEY CONSIDER SUCH A PROGRAM PREMATURE AND TECHNICALLY
QUESTIONABLE.

THE ARMY AND THE AIR Force JOIN IN QUESTIONING THE NAVY'S
INSISTENCE ON RETAINING THE LARGE ATTACK CARRIER FLEETS
THROUGHOUT THIS TIME PERIOD, AND SUGGEST THAT THE NAVY
DIVORCE THESE EXPENSIVE CARRIERS FROM THE STRATEGIC ROLE,
REDUCE THEIR NUMBERS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE ANTI-SUBMARINE
DEFENSE OF THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES.

WHILE THEY ARE INVOLVED IN THIS ATTACK, THE AIR FORCE
PLANNER DISCOVERS THAT THE NAVY'S PROGRAM FOR THE DEFENSE
OF THESE CARRIER ATTACK FORCES AGAINST THE AIR-BREATHING
THREAT HAS A PRICE.
THREAT HAS A PRICE TAG OF SOME $12.4 BILLION THROUGH 1966, WHICH IS ONE-HALF A BILLION MORE THAN THE TOTAL PROGRAMMED COST BY ALL SERVICES FOR AIR DEFENSE FOR THE ENTIRE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT FOR THE SAME PERIOD. THIS DISCOVERY REALLY CAUSES A FUROR.

PROGRESS, HOWEVER, IS BEING MADE IN THE AREA OF MOBILIZATION PLANNING -- ALL THE SERVICE PLANNERS AGREE THAT, AFTER D-DAY OF A GENERAL WAR, LARGE MOBILIZATION FORCES AND INCREASED PRODUCTION -- ON THE STYLE OF WORLD WAR II, WILL NOT BE PROBABLE! PROGRESS -- BUT ONLY FIFTEEN YEARS LATE.

SO, THEY TACKLE THE PLANNING PROBLEM OF HOW LARGE TO MAKE THE MOBILIZATION SUPPORT BASE. THE AIR FORCE SUPPORTS ONLY THAT REQUIRED FOR THE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD UNITS BROUGHT INTO ACTIVE STATUS ON D-DAY -- THOSE WITH AN INITIAL GENERAL WAR MISSION. TO SUPPORT THIS PROPOSAL, THE AIR FORCE SAYS THAT THE HARDWARE IN STORAGE FOR USE BY LATER FORCE MOBILIZATION MAY BE DESTROYED, OR DENIED THROUGH DISRUPTION OF TRANSPORTATION. ALSO, IF STOCKS AND FACILITIES ARE DESTROYED AND CHAOS EXISTS, THEN THESE FORCES SHOULD BE USED PRIMARILY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE AND RECONSTITUTION -- AND WE CAN'T AFFORD CONCERN FOR CONVENTIONAL TROOP-TYPE EQUIPMENT IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT.

AND SO IT GOES -- UNTIL FIRM ISSUES ARE DRAWN UP BY THE SERVICES AND THE JOINT PLANNERS -- TEN ALL DAY SESSIONS WITH SERVICE PLANNERS. THE J-5 STRIKES A COMPROMISE POSITION, AS HE IS EMPOWERED
As he is empowered to do, forwards it to the Joint Chiefs; showing by a breakout, the areas of service disagreement.

The Joint Objectives Plan is then put on the agenda of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a meeting in May -- and to stay on the agenda until resolved. (On JCS agenda 24 times from 20 May to 14 September -- considered 13 times, deferred 11 times.)

When they get into the problem, the Chiefs recognize through experience that they can't resolve the major differences -- they are too fundamental, and they are vital to each of the service positions. So -- they effect agreements in the less sensitive areas, and forward the major issues as splits to the Secretary of Defense for his decision.

Late in May, they get the Secretary's decision -- generally along these lines:

CHART 10 ON

-- This costs too much --

CHART 10 OFF

As General Brown probably told you a couple of weeks ago -- the force tabs priced out at about $55 billion.

Well, if you sense that we are more or less back where we started -- you're right. I don't say that this is good -- but it is a fact of life -- in joint planning, at least.

The Joint Chiefs know that the scope and nature of these final problems are such that the planners can't do much more with them -- so, they and their operations deputies (ours, of course, is
(Ours, of course, is Lt. General Gerhart, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs) tackle the big problems, themselves -- with a lot of midnight work for the action officers to provide positions, facts, arguments, support, and the like, for their chief.

As we go into this major JCS exercise, at the highest military level, I think it would be appropriate to give you a first hand impression of the army chief on this process -- General Decker had this poignant remark, which he made to a Washington reporter last month:

CHART 11 ON

... IF YOU DON'T FIGHT, YOU'RE DEAD.... (PAUSE)

CHART 11 OFF

So now the chiefs personally review their own service submissions in great detail. They check these against the forces, the requests, and the statements of the unified and specified commands -- the CINCs.

Since the CINCs have the operational responsibility to make any of these plans work -- and must implement the strategy given, their comments are given great weight.

This is particularly true now, since the joint chiefs realize that, to get agreements, they are going to have to adjust the relative priorities within commands, and between commands. They are going to have to set the ground rules for a "give and take" process.

In this final, personal review -- the chiefs start out by a fundamental review of the service positions on basic military objectives. A good starting point for us, today,
IS TO REVIEW -- AS THEY WOULD -- THE KEY STATEMENT ON 
NATIONAL STRATEGY AS IT IS SET OUT IN BASIC NATIONAL 
SECURITY POLICY:

CHART 12 ON 
(EXTRACT OF BNSP) 

...THIS IS AN EXTRACT FROM OUR BASIC NATIONAL 
SECURITY POLICY.... WHILE WE STUDY IT FOR A FEW MOMENTS --

LET ME POINT OUT THAT THE AIR FORCE VIEWS THIS "DETERRENCE
OF WAR" AS THE OVER-ALL NATIONAL OBJECTIVE WITH THE SUPPORTING
MILITARY OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING THE CAPABILITY TO PREVAIL IN
WAR IF DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL. SO, THE AIR FORCE WOULD
TRANSLATE THIS INTO A MILITARY STRATEGY AND TASKS WHICH
LEAD TO CREATION OF A WAR WINNING MILITARY FORCE, NOT THE
PYRRHIC VICTORY KIND, BUT WINNING SUCCESSFULLY -- WHICH
ENSURES THE SURVIVAL OF THE U. S. AS THE DOMINANT NATIONAL
POWER.

CHART 12 ON 

NOW, THE CHIEFS TAKE UP THE INDIVIDUAL ITEMS OF
EXPENSIVE HARDWARE WHICH IS GEARED, PRIMARILY, TO THE
GENERAL WAR THREAT --

CHART 13 ON 

(GENERAL WAR CONCEPTS OF THE SERVICES)

WHEN FUTURE FORCE OBJECTIVES ARE CONSIDERED, THEY MUST
BE VIEWED FROM THE CONCEPTUAL BELIEFS OF THE SERVICES
PROPOSING THEM. THAT IS WHY I WANT TO PUT THIS RATHER
FUNDAMENTAL TYPE OF CHART IN FRONT OF YOU, AS WE CONSIDER
THE "SPLIT" VIEWS OF THE CHIEFS.

THE AIR FORCE
THE AIR FORCE SAYS THAT IN ORDER FOR A CONDITION OF
COMPLETE DETERRENCE TO EXIST, THE SOVIETS -- OUR "GENERAL
WAR" ENEMY -- MUST BE CONVINCED THAT OUR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
CAPABILITY, PLUS THE SUM TOTAL OF OTHER U. S. AND ALLIED
FORCES, MUST BE ABLE TO INFLECT AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF
DESTRUCTION ON THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC -- NO MATTER HOW WAR
STARTS, WHILE PRESERVING THE DOMINANT POSITION OF THE U. S.

THUS, IN THE PLANNING FOR THAT WAR, GENERAL WHITE HOLDS
TO THE POSITION THAT WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR CAPABILITY OF
DESTROYING OR DISARMING HIS MILITARY FORCES WHICH CONSTITUTE
A THREAT TO THE U. S. AND ITS ALLIES -- THE AIR FORCE
CONSIDERS AN ENEMY'S MILITARY FORCE AS THE ONE THING THAT
IS ALWAYS "UNACCEPTABLE" FOR HIM TO loose. NO MATTER WHAT
ELSE HE MIGHT BE WILLING TO SACRIFICE -- HE CANNOT AFFORD
TO ENGAGE US IN WAR IF HE STANDS TO loose THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF HIS MILITARY FORCE. THIS IS "COUNTERFORCE."

IN THE SHORT TIME SINCE THE EARLY '50s, YOU AND I HAVE
SEEN THE UNITED STATES CHANGE FROM A RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE
SANCTUARY TO A PRIME TARGET ONLY 30 MINUTES AT MOST AWAY
FROM A SOVIET DECISION TO STRIKE!

THE AIR FORCE VIENS A GENERAL WAR AS ONE IN WHICH WE
MUST FIGHT AN ENEMY WHO HAS THE CAPABILITY TO USE MODERN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES. TODAY THE USSR IS OUR ONLY ENEMY IN THIS
DEFINITION, BECAUSE HE IS THE ONLY ONE WHO CAN APPLY THAT
KIND OF FORCE AGAINST US. IN THE FUTURE, IT MAY WELL
INCLUDE RED CHINA.

THE AIR FORCE
THE AIR FORCE BELIEVES THAT THE PRIMARY THREAT REQUIRES PRIME ATTENTION IN OUR FORCE PLANNING AND PRIORITY IN FORCE BUDGETING. THE AIR FORCE, CERTAINLY WOULD NOT DENY THE MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR CAPABLE FORCES WITH THE UNIQUE CAPABILITIES TO FIGHT LOCALIZED CONFLICT, OR LIMITED WARS, WITH LIMITED ENEMIES -- BUT, THE EQUIPPING AND MAINTAINING OF IN-BEING FORCES FOR SMALL WARS MUST NOT DILUTE AND REDUCE OUR STRENGTH TO OPPOSE THE PRIMARY THREAT.

BUT THE ARMY ARGUES, WITH HONEST CONVINCION, THAT WE DON'T NEED ALL THIS... THEY SAY "WE AGREE WITH A DETERRENT FORCE FOR GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR" ... NOTE, THEY SAY GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR ... "BUT, THE ARMY SAYS IT NEED NOT BE A WAR-WINNING FORCE, SINCE A SMALLER AND LESS EXPENSIVE DETERRENT FORCE CAN PREVENT THE ENEMY FROM CONSIDERING THIS EXTREME ALTERNATIVE." ... THIS, SAYS THE ARMY, WE CAN HAVE "MUTUAL DETERRENCE" TO GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR, AND CAN EXPECT TO HAVE TO FIGHT ONLY A GENERAL CONVENTIONAL... OR NEARLY NON-NUCLEAR WAR ... THEREFORE, THE AIR FORCES' LARGE STRATEGIC FORCE IS NOT NECESSARY; REDUCE IT AND MAKE THE MONEY AND RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR A LARGER CONVENTIONAL-TYPE GROUND FORCE, AND MORE MOBILITY FOR SUCH FORCE.

THE AIR FORCE LOOKS AT THE ENEMY THAT THE ARMY WOULD HAVE US FIGHT IN THIS LARGE-SCALE CONVENTIONAL-TYPE WAR, WHICH INCLUDES THE SOVIETS ... AND SEES NO END TO THE DRAIN ON U. S. RESOURCES INVOLVED. ALSO, THE AIR FORCE ARGUES ... IF WE BEGIN TO EQUIP FOR THIS TYPE OF ENGAGEMENT, WE WILL TELEGRAPH OUR INTENTIONS
TELEGRAPH OUR INTENTIONS TO THE ENEMY THAT WE WILL RESPOND "IN KIND" TO HIS ARMED AGGRESSION; THUS, WILL BE INVITING HIM TO FIGHT -- ON HIS TERMS -- AND WILL BE PASSING THE CONTROL OF THE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ENEMY DECISION-MAKERS.

RATHER THAN DETERRE HIS USE OF FORCE, WE WOULD BE ENCOURAGING HIM TO "MIDDLE" US TO DEATH IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR OF ATTIRITION. OR--SHOULD HE CHOOSE TO EXERCISE HIS STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY, WE WOULD BE IRREVOCABLY DEFEATED.

THE NAVY WOULD COMPLETELY FOREGO ANY ATTEMPT AT "COUNTERFORCE". IN GENERAL WAR, WEAPONS FOR A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE, AND POSTULATES THAT THE ABILITY TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST A SMALL NUMBER OF SOVIET CITIES -- SOFT-TARGETS WITH BIG PAY-OFF IN DETERRENT VALUE, THROUGH POPULATION AND URBAN DESTRUCTION--WILL BE ENOUGH. THEIR FINITE DETERRENCE IN THIS AREA INDICATES DISAGREEMENT WITH A WAR-WINNING OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR. NOTE THAT THEY, TOO, MAKE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TYPES OF GENERAL WARS.

Navy planners consider "FINITE DETERRENCE" AS ADEQUATE TO DETER, AND THEY COUNT THE TARGETS NECESSARY TO DO THE JOB -- SURPRISINGLY, IT COMES TO EXACTLY 45 POLARIS SUBMARINES--GIVE OR TAKE A FEW -- PLUS, THE 5 THEY WOULD ADD ON TO PROVIDE NATO WITH ITS SEPARATE DETERRENT FORCE.

... THEY ARE NOT TOO CLEAR ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL CONVENTIONAL WAR AS ESPoused by THE ARMY, BUT THEY REALLY DON'T RULE OUT ANYTHING, CLAIMING THE FLEXIBILITY THAT I MENTIONED BEFORE -- TO PERMIT THEM TO ADJUST FORCES EITHER WAY.

THE AIR FORCE
THE AIR FORCE ANSWERS THE ARMY'S ARGUMENT ON "MUTUAL DETERRENCE" BY CLAiming IT IS MISLEADING -- IT IMPLIES THAT THE USSR MUST ALSO DETER THE UNITED STATES, AND THE AIR FORCE IS NOT GOING TO SUBSCRIBE TO A U.S. STRATEGY THAT HAS AS ONE OF ITS POSTULATES OUR OWN DETERRENCE.

WHO'S NATIONAL POLICY ARE WE SERVING? -- Thus, the air force says that mutual deterrence is not a strategy for general war -- it is an indication that we don't have a strategy in this area.

AS FOR THE NAVY'S "LIMITED DETERRENCE," THE AIR FORCE SEES THIS AS AN OPEN STRATEGIC INVITATION TO ACTS OF SOVIET MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST OUR ALLIES OR IN PERIPHERAL AREAS -- AGAINST WHICH WE CAN DO NOTHING BECAUSE OF STRATEGIC INADEQUACY. WE COULD NEVER HONOR A TREATY COMMITMENT WITH SUCH A FORCE SINCE IT HAS NEITHER A CREDIBLE FIRST OR SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY, AND ONCE COMMITTED, THE SOVIETS WOULD RETAIN A DECISIVE RESIDUAL FORCE. "Also," the pure retaliatory nature of such a force prevents the president from making a decision against alternative courses of strategic action -- committing him only to the "retaliatory" response... There is a definite need end a "place for a "retaliatory" force in our overall counterforce concept... But, standing alone... a retaliatory force is not enough... it is a part of a strategy... not a whole strategy.

CHART 13 OFF

Next, the Joint Chiefs turn to a discussion of the forces and mobilization concepts for conflicts short of general war. First,
GENERAL WAR. FIRST, WHAT IS MEANT BY "LIMITED WAR" IN OUR U. S. MILITARY PLANNING.

ACADEMICALLY, OF COURSE, IT MEANS A CONFLICT IN WHICH THE OBJECTIVE, THE FORCE, THE TERRITORY, AND THE LIKE, ARE LIMITED.

PHILOSOPHICALLY, IT MEANS A WAR IN WHICH THE SURVIVAL OF OUR NATION IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE ISSUE -- OR SOMETHING IN A LIKE VEIN.

BUT FOR COLD HARD MILITARY PLANNING -- THE AIR FORCE SAYS THAT YOU CAN'T BE SURE OF ANY OF THESE "LIMITATIONS" UNLESS YOUR ENEMY IS INCAPABLE OF EXCEEDING ONE OF THE LIMITATIONS -- THIS, WE SAY THAT ANY LIMITED WAR IN THE TIME FRAME OF OUR CONSIDERATION MUST BE ONE IN WHICH WE ARE OVERTLY ENGAGED WITH SOMEBODY OTHER THAN THE SOVIET UNION.

THOUGH THE SERVICES DO NOT AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THIS POSITION, ALL ARE GENERALLY AGREED THAT WE MUST HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND THE FLEXIBILITY TO ENGAGE IN LIMITED WARS -- BUT AGAIN THEY DISAGREE ON HOW, AND WITH WHAT FORCES, SUCH WARS SHOULD BE PLANNED.

CHART 14 ON LIMITED WAR CONCEPTS.

THE AIR FORCE VISUALIZES THIS TYPE OF WAR AS A CONFLICT OF VARIABLE INTENSITY WITH AN ENEMY THAT DOES NOT POSSESS IN BEING, THE CAPABILITY OF MATCHING OUR WEAPONS -- AND OVER WHICH WE CAN, BY MILITARY SUPERIORITY WHICH WE POSSESS, IMPOSE OUR WILL -- SHOULD THE DECISION BE MADE TO EMPLOY THAT SUPERIORITY. TODAY

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THAT SUPERIORITY. TODAY SUCH ENEMIES INCLUDE ALL POWERS
EXCEPT THE SOVIETS...TOMORROW MAY BE DIFFERENT.

THE ARMY SEES THIS TYPE OF WAR AS A SITUATION IN WHICH
THE LOCAL FORCES -- THE INDIGENOUS GROUND AND AIR FORCES OF
OUR ALLIES -- ARE INSIGNIFICANT OR NON-EXISTENT. THEY
VISUALIZE THAT ARLIFT OF MANY AMERICAN SOLDIERS, TANKS,
AND OTHER MOBILE BATTLEFIELD EQUIPMENT IS IMPERATIVE --
AND IMMEDIATE, THEY WOULD EXTEND LIMITED WAR CONCEPTS TO
ANY ENEMY, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION, AND WOULD HAVE US USE
THE THEORY OF MILITARY MASS, PLUS MOBILITY, TO CONTAIN THIS
WAR. THE ARMY SAYS THAT, WHATEVER THE ENEMY HAS IN THE WAY
OF IMPLEMENTS AND FORCES FOR LIMITED WAR, WE MUST MEET HIM.
THIS IS THE RATIONALE OF THEIR "GRADUATED DETERRENCE" --
AS I HAVE SAID EARLIER, IT IS AN "OPEN-END" SORT OF THING.

THE NAVY'S VIEW OF LIMITED WAR IS PRIMARILY ONE WHERE
THERE ARE LIMITED FORWARD ALLIED AIR BASES -- AND TOWARD
THIS END THEY ARE CONSTANTLY ATTACKING THE VULNERABILITY OF
OUR GLOBAL NETWORK OF BASES. SO, WITH LIMITED BASES, NO
CONSEQUENTIAL ARLIFT CAPABILITY -- THE NAVY SUPPLIES THE
ANSWER THROUGH THEIR RELATIVELY INVULNERABLE TASK FORCES,
OPERATING IN SANCTUARIES OF FRIENDLY WATER, IMMEDIATELY
ADJACENT TO THE COMBAT AREA. NAVAL POWER, SPEARHEADED BY
NAVAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS, FROM NAVAL ATTACK CARRIERS
AND THEIR MARINE AERIAL ENVELOPMENT TACTICS -- CAN PROVIDE
THE ANSWER TO LIMITED WARS.

IN SIMPLE WORDS, -- ALL THE SERVICES HAVE THEIR FAVORITE
SOLUTIONS TO THE
Solutions to the limited war problems — each tends to

talk about and plan for the limited war forces that makes

the best selling points for the budget.

CHART 14 OFF

Well, it is late in the summer of 1960 -- 100% agreement

on all aspects of the objective forces is still lacking.

This plan, with as much agreement as is possible, is

forwarded again to the Secretary of Defense. Cuts have

been made, priorities adjusted -- but, to prevent piecemeal

decisions from disrupting programs beyond repair, the

services now submit graduated force "packages." These

follow four patterns -- or force increments -- you could

call them a high budget force, a middle budget force, a

low, and a drastically low budget force.

Using this approach, the plan goes forward. In

September, the decisions begin to come down from the

Secretary. -- Decisions in the form of budgetary ceilings,

personnel ceilings, and force levels for the three services,

within which planning and hard goods buying is authorized.

These decisions represent the political calculations

of the threat, impact of administration fiscal policies,

and national commitments to our allies. The primary

consideration, of course, is how loose, or how tight are

the purse strings. Thus, the actual "forces" in the J-50

are not literally "approved" -- but, the services now have

the necessary guidance to continue planning for and support

of their fighting machines.

Up to now,
UP TO NOW, YOU HAVE BEEN PLACED IN A POSITION OF
OBSERVING A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM OF JOINT PLANNING -- A
RATHER DISMAL PICTURE. AT THIS POINT, LET'S RETURN TO
JANUARY 1961. I MUST EXPLAIN THAT I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING
ONLY THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED. THERE IS A GREAT
DEAL TO BE SAID ON THE CREDIT SIDE OF THE JOINT PLANNING
LEDGER. THE NUMBER OF PROBLEMS UPON WHICH RESOLUTION IS NOT
ACHIEVED IS SMALL BY COMPARISON WITH THOSE WHICH ARE
RESOLVED SUCCESSFULLY AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
NATION. UNFORTUNATELY, THE "SPLIT" ISSUES ARE, INVARIABLY,
SIGNIFICANT ONES -- DIRECTLY TOUCHING ON VITAL NATIONAL
INTERESTS. ON THESE RIDE THE KEY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND
DECISIVE TALKS IN OUR MILITARY ENDEAVOR.

THE DAY-TO-DAY LABORS OF THE JOINT PLANNERS ARE
EXHAUSTIVE, DETAILED, AND GENERALLY SUBSTANTIVE -- AND IT
IS MY BELIEF THAT A REAL SERVICE IS PERFORMED IN THE
PRESENTATION OF PAPERS WHICH THE JOINT CHIEFS ARE ABLE, IN
THE MAIN, TO ACCEPT WITH A MINIMUM OF TIME AND LABOR. THE
JOINT CHIEFS, THEMSELVES, RESOLVE MOST OF THE "SPLITS";
INDICATING THAT RESOLUTION IS USUALLY POSSIBLE AT THAT LEVEL,
WHERE THE BROADER VIEW PREVAILS. THIS RESULT IS, OF COURSE,
A DESIRABLE ONE -- BUT IT STILL HAS FAR TO GO TO SERVE THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION IN THESE VITAL DIVERGENCIES
WHERE TRUE AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED DUE TO SERVICE-
CENTERED CONVICTIONS.

IN MY HYPOTHETICAL
In my hypothetical example of the development of JSOP-66, at least the issues were developed and discussed, even though complete resolution was not accomplished at any level. This has some advantages — but it is clearly a laborious and relatively ineffective way to get a job done. Probably the most significant thing to be learned here is that we still haven't found the answer to the problem of making the very best use and the best decision concerning the national resources which the military establishment represents. General Richardson's presentation which follows mine is certainly pertinent in this regard.

Almost every one of us here will be participants in, or will be affected by, the reorganization studies and proposals fostered by the incoming administration. As you know, the Air Force has publicly stated support for a reorganization of our decision and military policy making machinery "at the top." In order to serve, more faithfully and directly, the national interest, we look forward to the day when overriding service-orientated loyalty will disappear. I'm afraid my view is that in this regard we cannot afford evolution — we must legislate so as to evolve on a time table.

This opportunity of yours is one of the best vehicles to provide the background, the problems, the alternatives, and the tasks that face the military today and in the future.

Only judgment, clear
ONLY JUDGMENT, CLEAR AND UNBIASED, CAN PRODUCE THE BEST SOLUTIONS ... AND ONLY MILITARY JUDGMENT CAN PRODUCE MILITARY SOLUTIONS. WE SEE TODAY A PROLIFERATION OF EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY CONCEPT AND STRATEGY, INCLUDING SCIENTISTS, PROFESSORS, ECONOMISTS, AND COLUMNISTS. THEIR VIEWS ARE WIDELY READ, DISCUSSED AND, TO VARYING DEGREES, HAILED AS AUTHORITY. WHERE IS THE CLEAR STATEMENT OF MILITARY VIEWS BY MILITARY LEADERSHIP WHICH WE SHOULD EXPECT FROM A COUNTRY PREEMINENT IN THESE MATTERS? THE VOICE OF MILITARY AUTHORITY IS CONSPICUOUSLY SILENT, UNLESS HEARD IN CONTENTION AND CONTROVERSY.

LET'S TAKE ONE FINAL LOOK AT THE EFFECT OF JOINT PLANNING AS IT APPEARS TO THE MAN WHO, MORE THAN ANY OTHER, WILL CONTROL OUR NATION'S DESTINY DURING THESE NEXT FOUR YEARS.

CHART 15 ON
(KENNEDY'S - "MERELY TO CRITICIZE IS NOT ENOUGH," STATEMENT)

WE WON'T SATISFY THIS CRITICISM WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL AND FAR REACHING CHANGES. THE BONE ILLUSTRATION HE GIVES ALSO BRINGS TO MIND THE LESSON OF HISTORY THAT, WHEN SOME FORGOT TO PREPARE FOR WAR, THE GLORY OF HER LAW, HER TECHNICAL SKILL - HER HIGH STANDARD OF LIVING - NONE OF THESE PROTECTED HER FROM THE VANDALS AND VISIGOThS -- MEN WITH CLUBS - AND A LOW STANDARD OF DYING.

CHART 15 OFF

THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, AND THE NATION HAVE A RIGHT TO LOOK TO THE MILITARY FOR REAL "DEFENSE" AND NOT FOR ARTICULATE HAGGLING. THE CHALLENGES TO US ARE NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIREMENTS IN THE FULLEST SENSE OF THAT PHRASE -- THE COMPETITION AGAINST A WAR-WINNING STRATEGY SHOULD BE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN -- NOT IN THE PENTAGON!