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Op-06/rfd
BM-0034-61

TO : Op-60

DATE: 2 Feb 1961

FROM : Op-06

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3060

SUBJECT: Dependable Striking Power (U)

1. I discussed the "Dependable Striking Power" paper with Admiral Burke. I told him that our feeling was as outlined in 06 memo and that also I concurred with Rear Admiral Moorer's comments which are attached. I told him that there were some good ideas in the paper but that generally I felt the LRR-60 is a better plan. I told him that I would prefer not to give this to my people as a study to turn out, but rather to give it to them as ideas they might use. I also said that I thought turning out a study on composition of the Navy was getting into Op-93's business and I didn't want to do that.

2. Admiral Burke expressed agreement with the above.

WGS

U. S. G. SHARP

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Op-06B

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-93/ejs
Ser: 0015P93
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From: Director, Long Range Objectives Group
To: Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans & Policy) (Op-06)

Subj: "Dependable Striking Power"; Comments on (U)

1. The following comments are submitted with respect to the proposal on "dependable striking power" submitted by RADM George Miller.

Basic Letter

2. Concur that the "second phase" or strike back plans are extremely deficient or non-existent and should be developed now. The optimum target list should cover all of Eurasia and contiguous areas. Contingency planning would of necessity, have to be coordinated through the Unified Commander and the JCS. The idea of a new CINCUS Fleets, who would remain at sea continuously, appears to be a good one.

4. Delay action with respect to Congress and Press media until concept well accepted in DOD.

Enclosure (1)

3. Concur in general, but the full strength of this argument is based on two assumptions that are not completely true:

(1) That all shore based missiles are fixed (MINUTEMAN may be on the rails).

(2) That the USSR will know the exact coordinates of all enemy fixed missile sites.

The above two items are almost true but not quite and should be qualified accordingly.

4. Concur in general. However, now is the time to do some advance thinking with respect to ICBM's with terminal homing, or missile ram jets with terminal homing. These

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two items are some time away but we will hear more of them in rebuttal as we continue to emphasize the point that ships at sea are not suitable targets for ballistic missiles.

5. The attainment of these force objectives would require significant reorientation in terms of dollars as well as manpower. I do not believe they are realistic in the time span suggested. The USAF is too entrenched in aerospace to permit such a radical shift in funding. In carrier and cruiser requirements, consideration must also be given to ASW protection as well as replenishment support.

6. and 7. The Southern Fleet is a good idea and we shall definitely move in that direction as time goes on. Such a Fleet will undoubtedly take the form of several widely scattered task groups in the southern hemisphere, including the Indian Ocean. We should begin now to take a look at the number of assumptions available in the southern islands, preferably the small islands where we can maximize political and security problems which we can use without delay for afloat logistic support; such development to include logistic airstrips ashore. In addition, we should look into the southern hemisphere for allied bases and facilities which might be used in the "strike back" operations mentioned in paragraph 2 of the basic letter.

*I do not
share the same
enthusiasm for
the "Southern Fleet"
idea, except
perhaps Arabian
Sea area.*

2. In my opinion, the requirements set forth in LRR-60 present a more solid goal which we might strive for. The 45 POLARIS missiles with 8 AS plus 18 CVA for combined limited and general war purposes, all controlled from fleet command ships would give us formidable forces. I believe we will be more successful in achieving such a program as Admiral Miller suggests if we attempt a positive approach and recognize that the other two services although without the survival potential of forces afloat can also make a significant contribution.

T. H. Moorer

T. H. MOORER
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy

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