Dependable Striking Power (U)

1. I concur that the subject paper contains some good ideas. Its principal weakness is the lack of consideration given to the availability of any surviving strike-back capability except that which is at sea. I do not believe that this is realistic.

2. The President's State of the Union Message has already indicated his decision to accelerate the "entire" missile program.

3. Today's climate appears to be very sensitive to any obviously parochial approach. Any study aimed at providing the Navy with the capability to do the job alone could not avoid the label of "parochial."

4. I question the wisdom of tying our justification for CVA's to the general war, nuclear retaliatory end of the spectrum so tightly that we can't ever get them untied from it. There could be a shift of emphasis, strategic and budgetary, to limited war requirements, which then may become the primary controlling factor in allocating Defense funds. We had better stay loose.

5. I do not favor pursuing a study along the lines set forth in the subject paper. However, it might be profitable to utilize some of its very good points by:
   a. Furnishing them to our Navy representatives in the various new DOD groups.
   b. Soliciting the views of the Fleet Commanders in Chief on the feasibility of preparing plans along the lines indicated.

6. Although I suspect that the results of the several DOD studies now in progress will reflect the preconceived conclusions of their monitors, and thus be almost immune to influence, there is a chance that a separate Navy study on Joint strategy would prove useful. In any case, I believe it would be of use on a continuing basis and that it should be undertaken within Op-06. This would be done with the aim of providing the Navy with a truly objective study of Joint force requirements. If conducted on an absolutely unprejudiced and objective basis it would provide us for the first time with a set of Joint force tabs which would fit into the pattern of the nation's over-all security requirements. Submission of such a set of unbiased tabs to the JCS, and through the SecNAV to SecDef, might serve a useful purpose.

[Signature]
7. If you concur with this approach I will ask Op-60 to go to work on it.

U.S.G. SHARP

ORIG: CAPT C.R. CALHOUN, Op-60G, X-55843, 31 Jan 61
TYPED: TARRAN, YN2, USN Distribution
09 Orig
06 1
608 1
60C 2