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# The U.S. Election Assistance Commission: An Overview

The 2000 presidential election exposed weaknesses in state election systems. Congress responded with the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252). Among other changes, such as setting certain national requirements for election administration, HAVA created a federal agency to help states, territories, and localities administer federal elections: the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

Proposals have since been introduced both to terminate the EAC and to extend or expand it. Most recently, the agency has taken on new roles as part of the federal response to attempted foreign interference in the 2016 elections.

## Duties

States, territories, and localities have traditionally had primary responsibility for administering elections. Some were concerned that creating a federal election administration agency would shift that balance.

Congress responded by restricting the EAC’s ability to *compel* state, territorial, or local action. The EAC is not charged with enforcing HAVA’s national requirements, and its rulemaking authority is limited to the voter registration form and reports required by the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-31).

Most of the EAC’s duties are aimed instead at *incentivizing* action via funding or *facilitating* action by collecting and sharing information. HAVA assigned the agency a number of responsibilities, including

- administering formula payments to states, territories, and the District of Columbia (D.C.) to make general improvements to election administration, replace lever and punch card voting systems, and comply with HAVA’s national requirements;
- awarding grants for youth voter participation initiatives and voting technology research and pilot programs;
- certifying voting systems and accrediting voting system testing laboratories;
- adopting voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG) and voluntary guidance for complying with HAVA’s national requirements;
- collecting and sharing data and best practices; and
- conducting election administration research.

The EAC has also taken on new roles in response to foreign election interference efforts. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community, Russian hackers targeted state election systems in 2016. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responded in January 2017 by designating election systems as critical infrastructure.

The EAC has helped establish the new Election Infrastructure Subsector (EIS). For example, it has served as an intermediary between DHS and state and local election officials, helped launch the EIS’s Government and Sector Coordinating Councils, and participated in EIS training exercises. For more on the EIS, see CRS In Focus IF10677, *The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure*, by Eric A. Fischer.

## Structure


The EAC consists of a four-member commission, an Office of Inspector General (OIG), and a staff, assisted by three advisory bodies: a Standards Board, a Board of Advisors, and a Technical Guidelines Development Committee.

The Standards Board and Board of Advisors review proposed voluntary guidance, including the VVSG, and consult on tasks like research and long-term planning. The Technical Guidelines Development Committee, which includes representatives of the two boards and is chaired by the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), helps develop the VVSG.

The members of the commission, who are required to have elections experience or expertise, are recommended by congressional leaders, nominated by the President, and subject to Senate confirmation. No more than two of the four may be affiliated with the same political party, and each may serve up to two four-year terms.

HAVA mandates a three-vote majority for actions that require commission approval, such as adopting the VVSG. The EAC lacked that policymaking quorum from December 2010 to January 2015 and again for just over 10 months following the departure of Commissioner Matthew Masterson in March 2018; see **Figure 1** for details.

**Figure 1. EAC Commissioner Terms of Service**



Source: CRS, based on data from the EAC and Congress.gov.

In 2018, President Donald Trump nominated Donald Palmer to succeed Commissioner Masterson and Benjamin Hovland to the seat vacated by Commissioner Rosemary Rodriguez in 2009. Both nominees were confirmed by the

Senate in January 2019 and took office in February 2019, restoring the commission's quorum.

**Table I. Proposed and Enacted Funding for EAC Operations from FY2006 to FY2019 (nominal \$, in millions)**  
Figures for the House and Senate reflect chamber-passed, committee-reported, or other proposed levels, as indicated

Fiscal Year	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
Enacted	11.4	11.3	12.3	12.9	13.4	13.1	8.8	8.8	8.1	8.1	8.1	8.2	8.6	8.0
President	14.8	12.0	12.2	12.7	13.3	13.6	10.5	8.8	8.3	8.1	8.1	8.3	7.7	7.7
House <sup>a</sup>	13.1	12.0	12.2	12.9	13.4	12.7	5.2	4.4	0.0	0.0	4.8	4.9	5.5	8.6 <sup>b</sup>
Senate <sup>a</sup>	9.9	12.1	12.2	12.7	13.3	13.6	11.5	8.8	8.3	8.1	8.1	8.1	7.7	7.7

**Source:** CRS, based on data from the President's budget requests and appropriations bills, drafts, and reports.

**Notes:** Figures are from appropriations for EAC salaries and expenses, including funds designated for the OIG. They are rounded and do not reflect rescissions, sequestration reductions, or funds designated for NIST, mock election grants, or the Help America Vote College Program.

- Figures for the House and Senate indicate the latest chamber-specific action: **bold** for a chamber-passed bill and regular text for a measure that did not pass the chamber. With the exception of the Senate figures for FY2015 and FY2018, which are from the subcommittee bill and committee chairman's draft, respectively, figures in regular text are from committee-reported measures.
- This figure reflects the level in House-passed bill H.R. 6147. The House later passed other bills that would have provided other funding levels.

## Funding

The EAC has received funding for operational expenses, such as staff salaries, and for the payments and grants it administers. The majority of its funding to date has been for formula payments to states, territories, and D.C.

HAVA authorized \$3.65 billion for formula payments. Congress appropriated close to \$3 billion of that total—including some for the U.S. General Services Administration to distribute while the EAC was being set up—in the first two fiscal years after HAVA was enacted. It appropriated another \$285 million to the EAC for formula payments between FY2008 and FY2010.

Almost 90% of the HAVA funding for formula payments had been appropriated by the end of FY2010. Citing the distribution of most of that funding, as well as concerns about the EAC's efficiency and effectiveness, the House Appropriations Committee recommended reducing the President's FY2012 request for EAC operations by 50%.

The committee recommended similar or more substantial cuts in subsequent years. The House approved some of the committee's recommendations, although the enacted appropriations bills have hewed more closely to presidential and Senate proposals; see **Table 1** for details.

Congress appropriated additional funding to the EAC for HAVA formula payments in March 2018, following the reports of 2016 foreign interference efforts. According to the explanatory statement accompanying the bill, Congress intended the \$380 million appropriation to be used to help secure elections. For more on this funding, see CRS In Focus IF10925, *State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations*, by Karen L. Shanton.

In the following funding cycle—for FY2019—the House Appropriations Committee recommended increasing funding for EAC operations above the President's \$7.7 million budget request, to \$8.6 million. The enacted bill included \$8.0 million for EAC operations.

## Legislative Activity

HAVA explicitly authorized funding for EAC operations for three years, but it provided for commissioners to serve up to two four-year terms and did not include a sunset provision for the agency. That has left room for debate about how permanent the EAC should be.

Some say that the duties the EAC performs are essential to assuring fair and accurate elections and that they could not be carried out as effectively by other agencies. Emphasizing that the EAC is the only federal agency dedicated to helping states, territories, and localities administer elections, they have called for it to be officially reauthorized. In some cases, they have also proposed expanding its duties or authority. Such proposals have ranged from adding new versions of its existing responsibilities, such as administering new grants, to making more extensive changes, such as striking the limit on EAC rulemaking.

Others have viewed the agency as more temporary. Legislation to terminate the EAC was introduced in each Congress from the 112<sup>th</sup> through the 115<sup>th</sup>. When legislation to terminate the EAC was first introduced, the agency was nearing the end of some of the bigger projects it had been assigned by HAVA. The National Association of Secretaries of State, which represents many states' top election officials, had also renewed a resolution the previous year calling for the EAC's elimination. As a result, some Members of Congress said at the time that the agency had outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded, with outstanding duties transferred to other entities.

The 115<sup>th</sup> Congress saw legislative activity on both sides of the debate. Legislation to terminate the EAC was reintroduced in January 2017. There were also proposals to extend or expand the agency, including bills that would have directed it to award grants for post-election audits and to form an election cybersecurity advisory panel. None of that legislation was enacted.

For more on the EAC, see CRS Report R45770, *The U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress*, by Karen L. Shanton.

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