2. Chris: Andrei Kozyrev told me in a one-on-one today (Saturday) that a Yeltsin reply to President Clinton's European Security letter is on the way. His description of its contents tracks closely with the preview we'd already gotten from Mamedov of the draft. It will ask the President to write back with further assurances on how Russia's security, political, and economic interests will be protected as NATO expands, specifically on the now-famous four questions. Kozyrev says that a satisfactory presidential response might make it possible for Russia to sign the PFP documents in the near future, perhaps even before the summit.

3. Forewarned and forrormed, I told him that it sounded as though the Russian side is
TRYING TO SELL US THE SAME HORSE FOR THE THIRD OR FOURTH TIME; THAT DRAWING OUT THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS HAS ALL THE EARRMARKS OF FURTHER MOVING THE GOAL POST; THAT SUCH STALLING TACTICS ON PFP WILL NOT/NOT SLOW DOWN NATO'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECEMBER NAC DECISION; THAT BY REFUSING TO PLAY ON PFP AND THE NATHO-RUSSIA DIALOGUE, RUSSIA RISKS ISOLATING ITSELF; THAT WE BELIEVED IT WAS AGREED THE EXCHANGE WOULD CONSIST OF TWO LETTERS ONLY, ONE IN EACH DIRECTION, AND THAT NO FURTHER U.S. LETTER WAS NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE; THAT OUR GOVERNMENT HAS NO/NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING WITH RUSSIA OVER FUTURE NATO POLICY VIA PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

4. ALL THAT SAID (SEVERAL TIMES AND WITH GREAT EMPHASIS), I PRESSED KOZYREV HARD ON WHAT WOULD HE BELIEVED WOULD CONSTITUTE THE AMERICAN RESPONSE NECESSARY TO ENABLE RUSSIAN PFP SIGNING. HIS REPLY WAS AMBIGUOUS -- INDEED, SELF-CONTRADICTORY. HE ALTERNATED BETWEEN TWO ANSWERS. ANSWER NUMBER ONE: "ALL THAT'S REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO THE NEW YELTSIN LETTER IS A U.S. PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT TO TREAT THE FOUR RUSSIAN CONCernS AS "LEGITIMATE" AND TO SEEK, THROUGH ENGAGEMENT OF THE OTHER ALLIES, A GOOD-FAITH EFFORT TO REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS BY THE TIME NATO ACTUALLY TAKES IN NEW MEMBERS. ANSWER NUMBER TWO: WHAT'S REQUIRED IS A SPECIFIC, FAIRLY DETAILED U.S. PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSE NOW TO EACH OF THE FOUR QUESTIONS -- ESSENTIALLY A WRITTEN VERSION, SIGNED BY POTUS, OF THE TALKING POINTS YOU USED ORALLY WITH KOZYREV IN GENEVA. I REITERATED WHY NUMBER TWO WAS NOT /NOT ACCEPTABLE (THE PRESIDENT CAN'T COMMIT THE ALLIANCE ON THESE ISSUES; WE DON'T WANT TO GET INTO AN OPEN-ENDED CORRESPONDENCE; THE FOUR QUESTIONS ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THE AGENDA OF THE NEGOTIATION FOR PFP SIGNATURE, BUT NOT FOR PRE-SIGNATURE BILATERAL HAGGLING).

5. I PLAYED BACK TO HIM WHAT HE'D SAID, POINTING OUT THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE TWO ANSWERS HE HAD GIVEN ME TO MY QUESTION AND OFFERING THE JUDGMENT THAT NUMBER TWO WAS A TOTAL NON-STARTER. HE ADMITTED THERE WAS SUCH A CONTRADICTION AND SAID WE NEED TO AGREE ON A "FORMULA" FOR YET ANOTHER ANSWER THAT WAS "SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN THE TWO EXTREMES" AND THAT MET HIS AND YELTSIN'S POLITICAL NEEDS WHILE NOT/CROSSING THE RBD LINE I'D LAID DOWN. MUCH AS HE'D DONE WITH YOU IN GENEVA, HE CAST HIS PITCH ALMOST ENTIRELY IN TERMS OF RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE "THREAT TO RUSSIAN REFORM POSED BY THE PROSPECT OF NATO EXPANDING EASTWARD. I SAID I'D PASS ALL THIS BACK TO YOU, AND THAT WE'D BE BACK IN TOUCH VIA TOM PICKERING ONCE WE'VE THE YELTSIN LETTER. I STRESSED THAT I COULD NOT/NOT COMMIT TO A NEW POTUS LETTER. END SUMMARY.

6. KOZYREV AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS, ONE-ON-ONE (NO NOTETAKERS), OVER LUNCH IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY GUEST HOUSE. AFTER SOME PRELIMINARIES, FACING HIS CURIOUSITY ABOUT THE NEW CONGRESS, HE INVITED ME TO SUMMARIZE
MY DISCUSSIONS OF THE LAST TWO DAYS AND TO GIVE MY ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR THE SUMMIT. I STRESSED THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO HAVE A GOOD MEETING WITH YELTSIN BUT HIGHLIGHTED OUR CONCERN OVER RUSSIAN TACTICS ON NATO. I SAID THAT THE PRESENCE OF BRUSSELS/BUDAPEST IN DECEMBER HAD MADE ALL OF US EXTREMELY WARY OF A REPERITON AND THAT KOZYREV'S OWN PERFORMANCE BOTH BEFORE AND DURING YOUR LAST GENEVA MEETING HAD NOT/NOT BEEN VERY REASSURING.

7. I MADE THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE CASE FOR SIGNING THE PFP DOCUMENTS BEFORE THE SUMMIT, USING ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS I'D ALREADY USED WITH MAMEDEV, CHERNOMYDIN AND RYURIKOV (SEPTEMS). I SAID YOU HOPED VERY MUCH HE'D BE ABLE TO COMMIT TO A DATE CERTAIN FOR PFP SIGNING WHEN HE SEES YOU AT THE END OF THE MONTH. (I HAD EARLIER TOLD MAMEDEV THAT AN OFFICIAL MEETING WAS CONDITIONAL ON HIM PROVIDING A DATE CERTAIN. MAMEDEV HAD RELAYED THIS TO KOZYREV BEFORE I SAW HIM.)

8. KOZYREV THEN LAUNCHED INTO A MONOLOGUE THAT LASTED OVER AN HOUR. HE BACKED INTO THE NATO ISSUE, FIRST GIVING ME HIS VERSION OF YOUR MEETING IN GENEVA AND ENGAGING IN SOME HAND-WRINGING ABOUT WHETHER THERE COULD BE ANY 'SUCCESSES' AT THE SUMMIT. HE WONDERED OUT LOUD WHETHER ANYTHING COULD BE MADE OF A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST OR PROGRESS ON IRAN/COCOM. THESE WERE RHETHORICAL QUESTIONS WHICH HE MORE OR LESS ANSWERED HIMSELF IN THE NEGATIVE.

9. TO GIVE YOU WHAT I SUSPECT IS A FAMILIAR FLAVOR, HERE IS SOME OF WHAT HE SAID: "I'M IN NO POSITION TO ARGUE FOR PFP UNLESS YOU PROVIDE ME WITH ARGUMENTS AGAINST THOSE WHO WANT TO KILL US ON THIS ISSUE. IF YOU READ THE RUSSIAN PRESS OR LISTEN TO WHAT RUSSIAN POLITICIANS ARE SAYING - EVEN THOSE WHO ARE TRUE DEMOCRATS AND WHO FIGHT NATIONALISM AND WHO ARE REASONABLE - YOU WILL REALIZE LITERALLY NOBODY HERE UNDERSTANDS WHAT'S GOING ON WITH NATO AND WHY IT IS MOVING ITS BORDERS TOWARD RUSSIA. ALL THE ELITES ARE AGAINST IT. WHAT'S WORSE, WHAT'S BEING SAID (IN THE WEST) ON THIS SUBJECT SEEMS ALMOST CALCULATED TO INFURIATE (RUSSIANS) AND MAKE THEM MORE AGGRESSIVE. HE CITED AN EXAMPLE DUMA FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LUKIN, WHO HAS BECOME KOZYREV'S ARCH-RIVAL AND PRESUMED WOULD-BE SUCCESSOR (AND WITH WHOM I MET LATER IN THE DAY).

10. "ALL THIS NATO ENLARGEMENT TALK PUTS US IN AN AWFUL SITUATION. FOR THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, WE'VE BEEN TELLING OUR PUBLIC THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD BE ALLIES OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA AS MUCH AS THEY WERE ENEMIES OF A TOTALITARIAN SOVIET UNION. PFP WAS THE PROOF OF THAT. I USED THAT ARGUMENT REPEATEDLY AND TO GOOD EFFECT WITH MY CONSTITUENCY IN MURMANSK, WITH THE NAVAL PEOPLE THERE. THEY WERE EXCITED BY PFP, ABOUT VISITING U.S. SHIPS. BUT THAT MAKES IT ALL THE HARDER FOR THEM TO UNDERSTAND NATO ENLARGEMENT. JOINT MANEUVERS WITH NATO APPEAL TO THEM; NATO INFRASTRUCTURES MOVING EAST MAKE THEM FEEL THREATENED AND EXCLUDED."
THE STIMULUS FOR PARTNERSHIP HAS TO A LARGE EXTENT BEEN KILLED BY ENLARGEMENT.


12. "ENLARGEMENT IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM PFP. YOU HAVEN'T GIVEN US ANY ANSWERS TO THE LOGICAL QUESTIONS THAT ARISE HERE. IN EVERYTHING YOU SAY, YOU KEEP STRESSING HOW RUSSIA DOESN'T HAVE A VETO. WHEN YOU SAY YOU'LL TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR VIEWS AND OUR INTERESTS, IT SOUNDS DISMISSIVE, NOT SERIOUS. IT CAUSES MORE ANXIETIES THAN IT ALLAYS."

13. "YOU SAY THAT WE CAN ENTER NATO OURSELVES SOMEDAY, BUT THAT'S NOT REALLY SERIOUS EITHER. IF YOU WERE TO SAY 'RUSSIA FIRST,' THAT WOULD BE ONE THING. BUT WE KNOW WE'RE LAST IN LINE. THAT'S THE POSITION WE KNOW BEST AND HATE MOST."

14. "OUR MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL PEOPLE ARE INFURIATED. THEY SEE THEMSELVES BEING FROZEN OUT." HE CITED PRESS-REPORTS ABOUT HOW THE U.S. IS ALREADY MOVING TO SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO THE CEE COUNTRIES AS HAVING CAUSED A LOT OF WE-TOLD-YOU-SO OUTRAGE AMONG RUSSIAN ARMS MANUFACTURERS.

15. HE RECALLED YOUR TRIP TO TELL YELTSIN ABOUT PFP IN OCTOBER '93 AND SAID THAT YELTSIN REACTED SO FAVORABLY IN PART BECAUSE HE THOUGHT PFP WAS AN "ALTERNATIVE" TO NATO EXPANSION. HE THEN SPENT A FEW MINUTES ON HIS THEORIES ABOUT HOW PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD BEEN "TRAPPED" BY "THOSE WHO WANTED TO IMPOSE ON HIM A SIMPLISTIC AGENDA UNDER THE GUISE OF HAVING AN ARGUMENT TO USE AGAINST THE REPUBLICANS IN '96. YOU HAVE TO GIVE ME POSITIVE ANSWERS SO THAT I CAN MEET WITH OUR POLITICAL ELITES AND TALK TO THEM AND PERSUADE THEM NOT TO BE ALIENATED."

16. "WE COULD SAY YES TO PFP" -- I.E., SIGN THE DOCUMENTS -- "EVEN WITHOUT ANSWERS TO THE FOUR QUESTIONS, BUT NOT IF YOU'RE MOVING AHEAD WITH ENLARGEMENT. WITH ENLARGEMENT GOING FORWARD, EVERYTHING ABOUT PFP IS RUINED FOR US UNLESS YOU GIVE US SOMETHING SO THAT WE CAN DEAL WITH IT HERE."

17. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT KOZYREV TOLD ME THAT YELTSIN, VACATIONING IN SOCHI, WOULD BE SENDING A LETTER TO OUR PRESIDENT "WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK" AND NEEDS A REASSURING POTUS REPLY. ONLY IN THAT CASE, HE SAID, IS THERE "A
BETTING

THAT US

LIKE NUMBER

COUNTRIES. THE

CONCERNS AND IS DETERMINED TO FIND

TWO. )

FIND THE RIGHT ANSWERS.

POINT; YOU'VE IDENTIFIED THE RIGHT ISSUES,

SHAPE

21. CIRCLING

AND ENLARGEMENT,

SIGNAL PRESIDENT

YELTSIN CAN GO

HERE

OF THE CRITERIA

FOR

NEGOTIATE THIS WITH NATO.

NOTE: THAT WAS

THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF ANSWER NUMBER ONE.)

THAT

HE CLAIMS THAT YOU AND HE DISCUSSED IN

Gdynia THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW AMERICAN

Presidential LETTER IN REPLY TO THE YELTSIN

LETTER. THIS AMERICAN LETTER, HE SAYS, SHOULD

CONVEY THIS MESSAGE: "DEAR BORIS, I RECOGNIZE

YOUR POINTS; THEY'RE LEGITIMATE; LET'S

NEGOTIATE THIS WITH NATO." (NOTE: THAT WAS

THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF ANSWER NUMBER ONE.)

19. HE WENT ON TO SAY, "I'M TRYING TO DESIGN

A COMPROMISE SOLUTION, BUT I'M UNDER SEVERE

ATTACK BOTH WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY AND

OUTSIDE OF IT, BUT I CAN'T DO THAT JUST BY

PAYING LIP SERVICE TO FPP. WHAT BOTHERS ME

MOST IS THE MAY 30 NAC MEETING. IF WE SIGN

FPP BEFORE THEN, WHAT WILL THE NAC DO? WHAT

IF THE NAC COMES FORWARD WITH CRITERIA FOR

ENLARGEMENT? A LIST OF CRITERIA FOR NEW

MEMBERS?" HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YOU'D

ADDRESS THIS POINT IN GENEVA, BUT SAID

"CHRIS'S REASSURANCES MIGHT WORK FOR

DIPLOMACY PEEPS LIKE US, BUT NOT/NOT FOR

LUKIN." HE PREDICTED... BETTING ME A BOTTLE

OF THE BEST ARMENIAN COGNAC -- THAT "WITHIN

OURS" AFTER THE MAY 30 NAC MEETING, LECH

WALESA WILL ISSUE A STATEMENT SAYING THAT

POLAND MEETS 90 PERCENT OF THE CRITERIA AND

THAT THE OTHER 10 PERCENT WILL TAKE NO TIME

AT ALL TO MEET; AND THEN VARIOUS POLITICAL

FIGURES IN THE U.S., PLUS PERHAPS EVEN SOME

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS (HE EVEN USED A

NAME: "HOLBRIGHT"!!!) WOULD ENDORSE WALESA

"ON BACKGROUND." THEN LUKIN WOULD "SCREAM

AND PROTEST." PRESIDENT YELTSIN "CAN'T

AFFORD THAT KIND OF AMBUSH."

20. THAT'S WHY HE NEEDS, HE SAYS, "A LETTER

THAT WILL GIVE ME AMMUNITION TO USE IN THE

DUMA OR IN A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

AND TO TAKE TO THE RUSSIAN PUBLIC AND THAT

WILL ALLOW ME TO SAY YES, THERE IS A FPP"

HE CITED PRES. REIBTSIN ABOUT M.

US TO AFFIRM IT. THE THAT I WILL GIVE A LOT OF MY TIME TO

NEGOTIATION AND MINE MANUFACTURING.

SECRET

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TOWARD ENLARGEMENT, BUT WE HAVE THIS LETTER

FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON; IT SAYS, 1) THERE IS

NO RUSH TO ENLARGEMENT, 2) FPP IS FOR REAL

AND WILL BE AT THE CENTER OF THINGS FOR THE

NEXT 2-3 YEARS -- FPP STANDS AT THE CENTER

AND ENLARGEMENT, HOWEVER PRE-DECIDED AND

INEVITABLE, WILL BE SECONDARY FOR SOME TIME;

AND 3) HERE ARE CLEAR ANSWERS TO ALL OUR

CONCERNS. WITH SUCH A LETTER, PRESIDENT

YELTSIN CAN GO INTO THE ELECTIONS IN GOOD

SHAPE AND I CAN GO TO MURMANSK AND WIN RE-

ELECTION." (THAT SOUNDED LIKE ANSWER NUMBER

TWO.)

21. CIRCLING BACK TO THE LETTER HE'S LOOKING

FOR, HE SAID, "I NEED LANGUAGE THAT IS A

SIGNAL PRESIDENT CLINTON SHARES THESE

CONCERNS AND IS DETERMINED TO FIND

SATISFACTORY ANSWERS WITH THE OTHER NATO

COUNTRIES. THE LETTER WOULD SAY, 'I SEE YOUR

POINT; YOU'VE IDENTIFIED THE RIGHT ISSUES,

AND I'LL WORK WITH THE OTHER NATO PARTIES TO

FIND THE RIGHT ANSWERS.' " (THAT SOUNDED MORE

LIKE NUMBER ONE.)
22. "I NEED A LETTER THAT AVOIDS VAGUE, EVASIVE LANGUAGE (WHICH IS THE WAY HE CHARACTERIZED THE EXISTING PRESIDENTIAL LETTER) AND THAT I CAN USE AS AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE ON ALL FOUR QUESTIONS." (NUMBER TWO AGAIN.)

23. BY THEN HE WAS WINDING DOWN, RETURNING TO THE NEED FOR A LETTER THAT "RECOGNIZES THE FOUR POINTS, IN A FEW SIMPLE WORDS FOR EACH, AND PROMISES TO WORK TOGETHER IN ADDRESSING THEM IN A POSITIVE WAY; A LETTER THAT SAYS "OF COURSE RELATIONS WITH NATO SHOULD NOT BE DETRIMENTAL TO YOUR INTERESTS" -- WHICH BROUGHT US BACK TO NUMBER ONE.

24. MY INTERJECTIONS THROUGHOUT (MADE WITH SOME DIFFICULTY) ATTEMPTED TO SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON VARIOUS POINTS (PPP, INCLUDING IN YOUR PRESENTATION TO YELTSIN IN OCT. 93, WAS NEVER A SUBSTITUTE FOR EXPANSION) AND TO NAIL DOWN WHICH VERSION OF THE PROPOSED AMERICAN LETTER HE REALLY HAD IN MIND. WE LEFT IT THAT WE'D STUDY THE YELTSIN LETTER CLOSELY, AND BE BACK IN TOUCH THROUGH TOM PICKERING WITH OUR REACTIONS. HE ASKED US THEN TO GIVE HIM "SEVERAL DAYS" TO WORK THE ISSUE BACK TO YELTSIN AND SEE IF WE COULD FIND COMMON GROUND THAT MIGHT ALLOW PPP SIGNATURE TO GO FORWARD. I SAID OF COURSE WE WOULD GIVE HIM "REACTIONS" BUT I COULD NOT COMMIT TO ANOTHER PRESIDENTIAL LETTER. THE NEXT STEP CLEARLY IS TO WAIT FOR THE YELTSIN LETTER AND SEE WHERE WE GO FROM THERE. STROBE, PICKERING