MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Christopher  Kozyrev
Madison Room, 8th floor
State Department
April 26, 1995 3:00 - 5:00 pm

Secretary Christopher began the meeting by thanking Kozyrev for coming down from New York. He said that he wanted to put forward a notional schedule for the next couple of days. He said that he had set aside the whole afternoon to talk to Kozyrev; that we would take as long as necessary for the discussion. Then they would go out and meet briefly with the press. This was however not a press occasion and the Secretary hoped that we would not make too much news. The Secretary then said that if we meet the understanding that you and Strobe discussed then we would go over and meet with the President tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. He said that he liked Kozyrev's phrase that the summit is doomed to success if we do our work. Well, we will do our work. We've taken a few hits but we can still make important progress in this relationship. The key issue that will provide the basis for measuring the summit is European security. That is the basic issue by which the Summit will be judged in our country and in other countries as well. We have discussed this issue since our very first meeting. This meeting can be critical in putting the whole thing in context and that context should include the following elements. First, is the President's main idea which is integration. That is an idea that ought to be reassuring to
you and to us. Let me also talk about what is likely to happen at the May Ministerial of the NAC. You are obviously concerned about NATO expansion accelerating or moving on to a faster track. The antidote to that concern is a Ministerial of the NAC that provides the answers to the questions you have been asking. If you indicate at the May 10th Summit that the Partnership for Peace documents have been forwarded and that they will soon be formally signed as agreed and if that is in the communique then the NAC Ministerial will do the following: first it will make clear that NATO expansion is a careful, deliberate process. That it will proceed no faster and no slower than NATO has already stated. Second, there will be a reference at the NAC to the internal study of expansion. There will be a reference to progress in the study of expansion and a statement the results of the study will be available to all interested members of the Partnership for Peace in September or October. Those briefings by the NATO teams in capitals will produce questions which will then be reviewed in December. Russia can be first to receive these briefings when the briefings are ready for presentation. There will be no surprises in this process. The NAC Ministerial in May will contain a reiteration of the timetable that we have talked about before and that means that the process will continue no faster and no slower. It will be steady, careful and deliberate. To counterbalance the element in the NAC
Ministerial having to do with NATO expansion, there will be other elements as well. One of those is that the United States will take the lead in putting the Partnership for Peace in the spotlight of the May Ministerial. Actually there has been a lot of activity on P4P already, but we can take the lead at the May Ministerial. We can raise the visibility of P4P as a permanent aspect of European security. If you have already signed the Beyond Partnership for Peace document, then we can use the May Ministerial to launch the NATO-Russia dialogue: While the President has made clear that NATO is not hostile to Russia, the May meeting could really launch the NATO-Russia dialogue. On enlargement, we would make clear that we're simply on track, not faster, not slower. I'd also hope to mention integration and more reliance on the OSCE at the May Ministerial. In the September-October timeframe NATO will have its hands full dealing with all the Partnership for Peace members who want a briefing. In other words, September-October will be occupied with reports and the questions that those reports generate. At the December Ministerial, NATO will be concentrating on answering a further round of questions. The December Ministerial will produce another round of consultations that will stretch into 1996. I hope that by December we could have a framework of principles and parameters to govern the NATO-Russia relationship. It is probably too much to hope that there will be an actual agreement by December
but certainly a framework will help set the stage for a formal understanding. I hope that based on this understanding you will be able to feel comfortable in recommending to your President that we adopt this approach and move forward quickly with the two outstanding documents. Frankly, I have been frustrated by the delay because it has made it hard to proceed with the NATO-Russia dialogue. So I hope you can recommend this approach to your President.

Kozyrev then replied: I have some concern about public statements that have created a greater problem than we need to have. We need somehow to step down the rhetoric about expansion. Stones are falling on our head before anything happens in reality. Nobody has actually entered NATO yet. But there is so much talk around about the expansion of NATO and about the acceleration of that expansion that it is like an echo in a valley in the mountains that causes an avalanche. We need to beware of terminology and clichés that play into the hands of those who would like to use the NATO expansion issue to do damage to President Yeltsin, to me, and to others. I am thinking of people like Lukin. He has made a lot out of talk about no vetoes. Lukin uses the "no veto" talk to say that we're not really at the table. The best answer to people like Lukin is dialogue and that's one reason I like the emphasis on dialogue to be at the main Ministerial. Cherkin gave an
interview recently that is the start of a public campaign very much along the lines of what Dick Gardner has proposed about how to overcome the perception that NATO expansion means the isolation of Russia. We must avoid rhetoric that seems to push Russia aside. That means also we must avoid the characterization of expansion of being either "speedy" or "slow." For our part we will avoid saying "we have slowed it down." There is also the question of how to present this issue to third world countries. They will all ask you if you bowed to Russian pressure and they will ask us if we exercised a veto. Both those questions are very unpleasant. As to substance, all this that you have proposed sounds pragmatic enough. There is really no other way to handle the issue. I am prepared to recommend this course of action. In fact, I already did recommend something very much along these lines. Namely a highlighting or putting forward a Partnership for Peace and also something in the meeting in Moscow that makes clear the significance of Partnership for Peace as a program in itself. But my recommendation is not necessarily a final judgment, though I have been successful so far as in the letter. Secretary Christopher intervenes and says I liked one sentence in the letter particularly. Kozyrev says that he wanted what he said to be off the record says yes well that passage of the letter already cost me dearly. I've shed a lot of blood. In any event, its not a hundred percent sure that I
can deliver but there is a good chance that I can. Back in Moscow there is quite an attempt to torpedo the Partnership for Peace not to mention the NATO-Russia dialogue. That attempt must be stopped and it will cost a lot of additional blood. Also, there must be no linkage between the signing of the documents and the criteria resulting from the study in May. I worry about Walesa using the May Ministerial and the study as a pretext to issue statements on how Poland will be a new member by a particular date. If that happens we will all find ourselves in a very stupid position. The Russian people will feel cheated. They will feel that things are moving much faster than they had been led to expect. If we can manage that problem and get momentum in a positive sense between Russia and NATO without unexpected developments or rhetoric, I think that the Summit will be successful and the relationship will be very much on track.

Secretary Christopher then replied: I will undertake for my part to lower the rhetoric as far as we can. But the rhetoric from your side has also caused pain. There is what you said in Brussels, what President Yeltsin said in Budapest, what you’ve said in Paris and Copenhagen. Particularly when you talk about "putting expansion on ice" -- that is self-defeating. It inflames people who favor NATO acceleration. So I urge you in our common interest to watch out for this kind of rhetoric. I
agree that the study must not establish criteria that create problems. We must make sure that the study is not fairly susceptible to the interpretation that you're concerning about. Of course we can't control what all politicians and members of the press say but by being pro-active in Partnership for Peace you can help give validity to the Partnership and avoid problems of the kind you're concerned about. The timing could be very helpful here. We will have three or four months in order to make clear that the Partnership for Peace really is taking on new life and that the NATO-Russia dialogue is beginning (before NATO begins its briefings of the PFP members in the fall). Still, of course, I'm concerned about collateral damage. Let's make sure that we get as much accomplished before the 1996 elections as possible in both your country and mine. I realize of course you can only recommend, you cannot insure the outcome. But in your brief meeting with the President tomorrow will give him a chance to endorse this plan and also the phone call afterwards to President Yeltsin will give him a chance to say that he liked President Yeltsin's letters. I see that your fingerprints and perhaps your handprints were all over the letter.

Kozyrev interjects they were my blood meaning bloody fingerprints and handprints. Kozyrev then underscores that Russia will never be in the position of endorsing an
"accelerated NATO expansion tract." We will be on record opposing hasty NATO expansion. Anything that looks like an avalanche we cannot favor. The question still comes up on how to handle this at the Summit in Moscow. Keep in mind what we're dealing with domestically. When I speak about freezing NATO expansion that's one thing, its another when people talk about military countermeasures. It's very important for Perry and Grachev to concentrate on the practical aspects of Partnership. We also have to find a way to make more central what we call a new model of security as opposed to NATO being central to European security.

Talbott asks whether Partnership for Peace and the NATO-Russia dialogue can be part of the new security model as Russia sees it.

Kozyrev says yes as long as they are part of the model and the model is not seen as subordinate to NATO and the Partnership for Peace. He then continues we will put emphasis on the new model security not in an aggressive way but because it's our position. In any event nothing can imply agreement by Moscow to speedy NATO enlargement process.

Secretary Christopher then speaks. You must recognize that there is a lot of difference between your objection to what you
call an avalanche or too speedy enlargement on the one hand and
living with a gradual process that you may not welcome or
applaud but that you nonetheless accept. Secretary Christopher
then calls upon Talbott to add anything that seems germane.

Talbott reports on his conversation with the Polish Foreign
Minister an hour or so before and how the US was urging the
Poles to be helpful in three respects: first, to emphasize the
importance and vitality for Partnership for Peace in its own
right rather than treating it as a very temporary expedient
that will disappear as soon as NATO takes in new members.
Second to accentuate the rationale for NATO expansion that
relates to stability and security in central Europe rather than
playing out the anti-Russian rationale and third, not to
publicly or otherwise speculate on dates when new members might
come into NATO when such speculation goes beyond anything that
the United States or the alliance has committed itself to.

Kozyrev says he's sure it's fine to make those points to the
Policy Foreign Minister Bartoszewski, but he's not the problem,
clearly implying that Walesa is the problem. Kozyrev then
continues, the question is still how to frame this whole
presentation in Moscow. How do we answer the question about
speeding up or slowing down of the process. People will want
to attribute victory or defeat to one side or the other. We
need two or three catch phrases that make clear that this is not a win/lose situation. An example might be a phrase "no hasty process" or the phrase "what's important is that the dialogue goes forward."

Secretary Christopher then says while he leaves it to others to come up with the exact phrases, we might try something along the lines of . . . a balanced and integrated approach that includes the reinvigorated Partnership for Peace, an active NATO-Russia dialogue, a deliberate and gradual process of expansion, a steadily evolving OSCE and Russia's importance to the process as a whole. There must be no winners and no losers.

Kozyrev: Yes, yes. We need simple language, cliches with three, four, five words.

Secretary Christopher: I'll tell the President that you're prepared to put forward the approach that we've discussed.

Kozyrev: Yes, it's important that the President puts this to Yeltsin in the following way "Christopher and Kozyrev have presented me with a framework that preserves the Partnership and that puts an emphasis on the Partnership and the development of a NATO-Russia relationship. I need, Kozyrev, continues, I need an ally."
Secretary Christopher: For this package you have an ally at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

Kozyrev: Well I need an ally soon because the invasion has already started. It's already 1944 in the war that I'm fighting back home.

Secretary Christopher: Let's turn to some security issues. In Iran he executes the points in the paper.

Kozyrev on Iran: I'm concerned about (this is Iran reactor sales) I'm concerned about additional arrangements by Mikhailov. I could use an ally on that subject as well but it's too sensitive for me to bring up in the Presidential conversation tomorrow. Besides we have enough trouble with NATO. But I will tell you that we will abrogate everything except the reactor deal itself with very strict controls. It makes me and some other people very unhappy what Mikhailov is doing. I discussed that with the President recently and he didn't know these things. Now I'm pretty sure that he will stop the dangerous part of this activity. The question is how to do it in a way that avoids the appearance of an American victory. If you bring to our knowledge something that is truly dangerous, it's in the normal course of Partnership relationship of a partnerlike relation but we need to step down the rhetoric and
move very practically along the same tract. If our presidents discuss this eyeball to eyeball in Moscow, President Yeltsin will probably be quite blunt in saying that this activity has been shut down.

On the issue of the experts group working on the reactor sales issue, Kozyrev agreed that the experts would report back to their ministers.

Secretary Christopher: We must be able to create a situation where we agree on something its not seen as a concession by one or a victory for the other side.

Kozyrev: Yes, we need a win, win result. We have to concentrate on that.

Secretary Christopher then went through his ABM points.

Kozyrev: The focus is in the Duma. We need an agreement not to disagree but an agreement to continue work and finding an answer. This is crucial to the ratification of START II.

Secretary Christopher: We have a mirror image on our own side. The new Republican majority is surprisingly intense about the ABM issue.
Kozyrev: Give me some advice on how to behave with the Republicans that I'll be meeting here.

Secretary Christopher: I think you should simply be very candid that our whole arms control regime is dependent on the ABM Treaty. He then turns to biological weapons points.

Kozyrev says the experts are still wrestling with definitions and the question of parity and mutuality. It deserves some attention at the Summit. He refers to the work that's been done among Kissylayak, Lynn Davis and Holun.

Christopher then raises COCOM, says that the Vice President has written a new letter to Chernomyrdin.

Kozyrev: COCOM is one of the best issues for a successful Summit. It might be a major breakthrough.

Secretary Christopher then raises SLV/SM-65. The focus is in the Luma. We to disagree but an agreement to continue.

Kozyrev seems not very interested and certainly not very well briefed, he turns the matter over to Spassky who says that the issue is strictly commercial and that the space launch vehicles when used for commercial purposes are not covered by START.
Secretary Christopher says that our positions are not congruent. Let's let our experts continue to work the problem. Secretary Christopher then raises CFE.

Kozyrev says that there is dissatisfaction and growing anxiety in Moscow. It seems our partners are trying to avoid this issue. President Yeltsin will certainly bring it up at the Summit. The CFE flanking issue is linked to NATO expansion. CFE III seems to us to be a positive way to go.

Talbott intervenes and says the important thing is that Russia not abrogate the CFE Treaty unilaterally and that whatever solution we find be genuinely negotiated and multilateral. Kozyrev says that is my preference and Mamedov's and others back home but there has been no reply to President Yeltsin's letter to President Clinton of last year. That delay creates a vacuum which has been filled by fear, which in turn fans the possibility of unpleasant alternatives. We would prefer alternatives that address the issue in the framework of the treaties such as exclusion zones. But the longer there is ambiguity the more danger there is of extreme alternatives.

Secretary Christopher: Your mention of the flank limits takes us into the Caucasus. He then urges that on Chechnya there be
an open ended ceasefire rather than a 10-day or 2-week ceasefire over the period of the summer which he says would be cruel and artificial looking. Secretary Christopher also urges an OSCE Mission for the North Caucasus. He then raises the issues of Fred Cuny and Steve Levine. On Cuny, Kozyrev says I don't want to raise any expectations. This issue is beyond my control but there is slight indication of hope. We have had ambiguous indications from our secret service. This issue is (that Cuny is still alive) This issue is very much in the focus of all the agencies concerned certainly the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior.

Secretary Christopher then turns to Bosnia says its good that the contact group is getting together in Paris to discuss recognition among other things.

Kozyrev seems unaware of the meeting and what level it will take place at. He then makes an argument for trying to engage Milosovic into the give and take on the issue of recognition. Says that we should give more emphasis to significant sanctions relief as opposed to smaller symbolic sanctions relief. Says there is a chance of bringing Milosovic in as a real partner into the process to influence Karadzic although Milosovic has over estimated his influence before. He said we have independent contact with Mladic and some chance of influencing him.
Secretary Christopher said the Contact Group needs to define what is meant by recognition.

Kozyrev says that control of the borders is a tricky thing, that the borders between Serbia and Bosnia are just as porous as those between Ukraine and Russia and so its much harder to carry out real control.

Secretary Christopher says that when a border is marked by a river it is much easier to control it and the stories that are coming out about the porousness of the border are dramatic and exciting. He also urges lets get the parties not to launch any offenses.

Kozyrev says yes including the Moslem side. Kozyrev argues that at Halifax its important that the dinner discussion be highly substantive. After some concluding pleasantries about tennis and the weather in which the Secretary guarantees good weather for the weekend. Kozyrev says that if he had known the Secretary had such good connections he would have behaved differently on some issues. Kozyrev then comes back and says in talking about press points, how to handle a press conference we're sure to get questions about who beat whom on NATO and is the honeymoon over.
Secretary Christopher says that metaphors are always dangerous Andrey but to make a serious point there was probably a period when our view was too rosey and glowing now we have a more mature, more realistic relationship.

Kozyrev says that we should present the Middle East cosponsorship as a success story and asks if there is any good news on the Syria front.

Christopher says that the Syria tract is "not dead.

Kozyrev concludes with a request that American officials who visit the Baltic States avoid language that suggest complete normality. He says language there hurts the Russian speaking population and hurts in Russia itself. These issues have to be handled in a sensitivity way.

The End