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United States Department of State

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Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20520

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JDN

April 9, 1987

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MEMORANDUM

TO: OES - John Negroponte
FROM: OES/N - Fred McGoldrick, Acting
SUBJECT: Pakistan

The attached paper was prepared at the Secretary's request. It has been held very closely, and I was just able to lay my hands on it this afternoon. We had no role in its preparation. I see no difficulty with it, but I'm skeptical that we will be able to put together the proposed Congressional delegation within the time frame suggested. I'm also skeptical that the proposed Hinton demarche will produce anything dramatic. The proposed Presidential emmissary may hopefully bring about some helpful results.

Attachment:
As stated

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by JPL DATE 8/29/91
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ACTION PLAN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB
REVIEWED BY JPL DATE 8/28/91

RELEASE DECLASSIFY
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TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: P - Michael H. Armacost
S/NP - Richard T. Kennedy GS for
FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy
SUBJECT: Action Plan on Pakistan Nuclear and Security Problems

ISSUE FOR DECISION:

Whether to approve a plan to address pressing nuclear, security, and Congressional concerns affecting our relations with Pakistan.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS:

As Congressional consideration of our foreign assistance request gets underway, we are facing strong pressure to add additional non-proliferation conditions to the Symington waiver for Pakistan. At the same time, Communist military pressure on Pakistan has increased dramatically in recent weeks. Stepped-up cross-border air raids have led to an urgent Pakistani request for additional U.S. military support.

Recent publicity on Pakistani nuclear activities (e.g. Deane Hinton's speech, the A.Q. Khan interview, and Zia's recent statements) has fed support in both Senate and House for limiting the Symington amendment to two years or conditioning aid on a halt in Pakistani production of highly enriched uranium. The Pakistanis have so far not responded constructively to our request that they take concrete actions to demonstrate compliance with their assurances on uranium enrichment and restraint in other key nuclear areas. We are concerned as well that India may be reassessing its nuclear posture, and could re-start an overt nuclear explosives

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program. Zia has affirmed that Pakistan has no intention to acquire nuclear weapons, even though it has the required technical capabilities. He has approached a threshold which he cannot cross without blatantly violating his pledge not to embarrass the President.

The nuclear issue has both short and long-term components. We have no illusions that under present conditions India could be brought to sign the NPT or accept full-scope safeguards. Thus it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get Pakistan to do so. At the same time, to keep Congress on board, and to secure our non-proliferation interests over the long term, we need not only to obtain specific actions demonstrating restraint, but in a systematic way to convince Pakistan to "rest on its oars" and avoid further elaboration of its nuclear capabilities. This will require Indian restraint as well.

We need to respond to this confluence of Congressional concern about Pakistani nuclear activities and escalating Soviet pressure. Our objectives are to obtain a concrete demonstration of Pakistani nuclear restraint in time to influence Congressional thinking, while bolstering Pakistan's security and inducing Indian cooperation in avoiding a regional nuclear competition. Candidly, we believe it unlikely that Pakistan will move significantly on the nuclear issue, especially on enrichment, in response to further executive branch requests. Nevertheless, we must continue the pressure on the GOP. Correspondingly, our strategy should include the following elements:

PHASE I: Hinton Demarche

Following the recent shoot-down of an intruding Afghan aircraft, the Pakistanis asked us to provide help with air defense, including lease of an AEW platform and Hawk missiles. There are legal impediments to leasing AEW, and serious financing problems for both systems. We believe, however, that it is important to be responsive to the Pakistani request, and propose to instruct Amb. Hinton to tell them that we are prepared to provide additional AIM-9L missiles on an urgent basis, should stepped-up incursions deplete Pakistani stocks, and to offer a mid-May exercise with E-2C AEW aircraft operating off a U.S. aircraft carrier. We should also be able to provide an immediate replacement for the Pakistani F-16 recently lost, once certain technical details have been settled.

DOD is also urgently examining possibilities for making an AEW aircraft available to Pakistan. We may be able to follow the exercise proposed for May with additional exercises involving E-2C aircraft. In principle, we could link such an exercise to an offer to sell Pakistan E-2C's, either by

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reallocating new production aircraft or from the Navy's inventory. DOD is strongly opposed to either of these options, however, in view of current Navy shortages and operational needs. The Pakistanis have repeatedly expressed a preference for the E-3A (AWACS) AEW system, for which there would be an even longer leadtime than for E-2C. Any AEW purchase would require substantial Saudi funding, and we will need to take the matter up again at senior levels in Riyadh (we have in mind a Weinberger-Sultan message).

Ambassador Kennedy believes that a clear linkage should be made now between our security assistance and Pakistani action on non-proliferation to give further evidence to Pakistan of the seriousness of our concern on the nuclear issue and to evidence to the Congress that we are in fact deriving what leverage we can on the nuclear issue from our military efforts. NEA opposes this proposal, and notes that the PRG has already considered and rejected it.

With respect to the nuclear issue, we recommend that Hinton provide Zia with an appraisal of the Congressional state-of-play and be instructed to say that concrete steps on enrichment and other nuclear concerns will be necessary to avoid imposition of additional non-proliferation conditions on the assistance package. We will stress the need for Pakistan to observe the nuclear firebreaks we have already asked for:

- No assembly of a nuclear device;
- Compliance with their assurance to restrict uranium enrichment to 5%;
- No more nuclear weapons-related high explosives tests;
- No more illegal procurements in the U.S. for the nuclear program.

Hinton should indicate that a mere repetition of Pakistani verbal assurances will be insufficient, and that to be credible, Pakistan will need to offer some arrangement for on-site inspection of its uranium enrichment facility. (Kennedy points out, however, that we should be under no illusion that steps or visitations short of the equivalent of IAEA safeguards would give any real assurance. Such steps would have little more than cosmetic value and probably would not satisfy the Congress for long.)

We also propose to deliver a message to India urging restraint on their part and a positive response to existing Pakistani proposals. We need to make clear to the Indians that they cannot use the nuclear issue to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Pakistan, given strong Congressional support for our assistance program, and further, that they cannot rely on the U.S. to solve the South Asian nuclear problem without action by India. The upcoming visit by Natwar Singh will provide an opportunity to make these points.

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PHASE II: Congressional Game Plan

We have succeeded in avoiding crippling nuclear amendments to the foreign assistance authorization at the HFAC markup on April 7, although it provides only a two-year Symington amendment waiver. We now need to make calls to key members of the SFRC and the Senate leadership to discourage unacceptable amendments in the SFRC mark up scheduled for April 8. The SFRC staff draft currently circulating would in our view be unacceptable to the Administration. Among other provisions, it would impose a new Presidential certification that Pakistan had provided reliable assurances against production of highly enriched uranium.

7. We should encourage a Senate delegation to visit Pakistan and India during the recess. (John Whitehead is calling Senator Byrd about this.) The senators could impress on the Pakistanis the inevitability of concrete action on enrichment and seek to persuade the Indians that they cannot expect Congress to end assistance to Pakistan over the nuclear issue, particularly since India has been unwilling to respond to the existing Pakistani non-proliferation proposals.

PHASE III: A Presidential Emissary

Obtaining any lasting solution to the nuclear issue, (and therefore securing our relationship with Pakistan over the long term) will require moving beyond unilateral Pakistani restraint to establishment of a regional understanding which includes India. To move the process along, we should dispatch a Presidential emissary who could engage both Islamabad and New Delhi on the nuclear issue. A specially designated envoy would have enhanced credibility in both capitals, and would be in a position to make a sustained effort over a period of time to bring the two sides together. Legislative action (pending or completed) is likely to give the emissary increased leverage. At the same time, the emissary's mission itself would help to demonstrate to the Congress a serious Administration commitment to non-proliferation in South Asia.

The emissary could be a senior Department official (e.g. John Whitehead, Mike Armacost, Phil Habib, or Dick Walters) or someone currently outside of government but strongly identified with the Administration (e.g. Paul Laxalt, John Tower, Don Rumsfeld). The Vice President might also be personally involved, possibly making a visit to the region as part of the process.

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The emissary would be sent after the SFRC markup but before the final Congressional outcome is in hand. (Mid-May is probably the earliest that he could go.) We would hope he could secure concrete Pakistani actions on nuclear firebreaks that would help us to protect the assistance package on the Hill. He would pursue a frank discussion of the nuclear issue in Islamabad, urging the Pakistanis to "rest on their oars" and not go beyond their present level of nuclear capability. In particular, he could press for Pakistani acceptance of verification measures on uranium enrichment. To maintain the focus of his mission on the nuclear issue and to preserve his credibility in New Delhi, the special emissary should not discuss further security assistance to Pakistan, but he could point out that progress on the nuclear issue would inevitably create more favorable conditions for further sales of sophisticated military equipment.

In New Delhi, the emissary would seek to convince the Indians that there is an opportunity to avoid Pakistani acquisition of nuclear weapons, but only if India is prepared to participate actively in regional arrangements. We need to convince India that it would have much to gain from putting forth proposals of its own in this regard. He would also press India to refrain from undertaking any nuclear weapons activities of its own. As an initial step, he could seek agreement on an interim India-Pakistani agreement against acquisition or testing of nuclear explosives, or other similar confidence-building measures.

We should also give consideration to engaging other nuclear weapons states in the effort, most importantly the Soviets and the Chinese. The UK has proposed a multilateral approach to the South Asian nuclear issue, involving the U.S., Soviets and possibly others. The Soviets continue to press for the use of "U.S. leverage" on Pakistan, and the Europeans are raising questions about U.S. non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan.

Amb. Hinton has recently sent you a cable requesting authorization to pursue nuclear discussions with the Pakistanis. He proposes that we offer Pakistan additional security assurances (including assurances against Indian attack), as part of a deal which would include Pakistani NPT adherence, although he notes that these assurances should be carefully phrased to avoid a deep U.S. commitment. Hinton also would include a U.S. offer of assistance with construction of a nuclear power reactor in his proposal to Pakistan. (Amb. Kennedy has repeatedly informed the Pakistanis that if they would undertake the NPT, we would desist from our strong effort to discourage other countries from helping their power program

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and would be prepared to directly assist them ourselves. Up to now, this has had no effect.) We are studying Hinton's ideas, and will be making recommendations shortly for your response.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you endorse the strategy outlined above.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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