This paper was prepared in my Hudson incarnation. I think parts of it are germane to our 2:00 p.m. meeting.
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Implications for U.S. Policy of a Pakistani Nuclear Test

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Within the next year or so, Pakistan most probably will acquire nuclear explosive material. While it is possible that the emerging new strategic relationship between the United States and Pakistan will tip the balance against shaking the boat by a nuclear explosion, it is more likely that domestic political considerations will lead General Zia to test.

Standing behind the nonproliferation regime and influencing onlookers' perceptions of their freedom of action--especially if safeguards had been violated--would suggest a strong punitive response to a Pakistani test. And pressures within the U.S. Congress and the public for sanctions are likely to be quite intense. But other considerations--including retaining Pakistan's cooperation in buttressing the Western position in the Gulf and holding down the level of its nuclear weapons activities--will argue for a more muted American reaction. It is important to begin thinking about how to balance these competing objectives and pressures while identifying the range of potential U.S. responses.

Would the costs of a more muted response be less, for example, if Pakistan had not violated safeguards, or if it announced that, having matched India's "PNE," it was seeking an agreement with India that both countries stop at that level of proliferation? What other factors might affect that balance? In turn, taking account of Pakistan's limited vulnerability to sanctions, what response might minimize the adverse

impact of a Pakistani test on onlookers' perceptions of their freedom of action? Are there any available responses--perhaps a multilateral ban on nuclear energy dealings with Pakistan--that would demonstrate U.S. readiness to stand behind the nonproliferation regime without undermining U.S. efforts to establish a strategic consensus in the Perisan Gulf and Indian Ocean? Further, what conditions might be set for lifting any sanctions?

How a nuclear test might affect the risks to the United States of a closer strategic relationship with Pakistan--assuming, of course, that those ties are not severed in response to that test--also needs to be more carefully assessed. Both the types and magnitude of risk will depend heavily on how the U.S.-Pakistani strategic relationship evolves between now and a Pakistani test as well as on India's response to that new relationship and to such a test. Particular attention should be paid to any scenarios in which the United States might be drawn into an Indo-Pakistani nuclear confrontation. Possible misuse of U.S.-supplied equipment if Pakistan moved to deploy a full-fledged nuclear force also needs analysis.

Even after a Pakistani test, there are various possible proliferation firebreaks short of all-out nuclear weapons production and deployment of full-fledged nuclear forces by India and Pakistan. These include, for example:

--a Pakistani test of a "PNE" followed by the shelving of Pakistan's program and continued Indian restraint;

--symbolic "PNE" programs on both sides; and

--limited Indian and Pakistani testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, but without deployment of full-fledged nuclear forces.

Moreover, both countries may have reasons to avoid an all-out nuclear arms race, ranging from India's possible reluctance to sacrifice modernization of its conventional forces to a potential concern on General Zia's part that nuclear weapons might fall into the hands of his domestic opponents. Consequently, contingency planning about measures to hold down the level of proliferation in South Asia could have a high payoff.

The identification and evaluation of any possible carrots and sticks that might be brought to bear by the United States with other countries' support is an obvious starting point. Would the prospect of access to U.S. arms enhance Pakistani incentives for nuclear restraint? Would deferring imposition of sanctions after a test be a means of preserving leverage to affect later Pakistani activities? Conversely, once Pakistan had demonstrated its ability to test, might it be induced to shelve its program and put its facilities under safeguards in return for access to civilian nuclear energy technology? Or, could the Saudis be induced to use their influence in Islamabad to urge nuclear restraint? What are the chances of the Soviets doing the same in Delhi?

Assuming some interest on the part of India and Pakistan in nuclear restraint, diplomatic exchanges and meetings between them on how to avoid a full-fledged nuclear arms race also might be encouraged. Such a strategic dialogue could dampen domestic political pressures in both countries for immediate additional nuclear weapons testing, allow

the respective leaders to sound out possible interest on the other side in mutual restraint, and check scientific and bureaucratic momentum that could lead to the more advanced levels of nuclear weapons activity. Equally important, that dialogue might take up possible regional nuclear arms control measures.

Among possible regional arms control measures which could help dampen pressures on both sides for more extensive nuclear weapons capabilities might be declarations by India and Pakistan that they would not use nuclear weapons first. Qualitative and quantitative limitations on each side's nuclear weapons activities also could be pursued, including de facto or de jure agreements on force size, deployment, types of weapons, and so on. Confidence-building measures, ranging from the stationing of observers in each other's country to reduce the fear of surprise attack to discussion of command and control arrangements might also lessen pressures for augmented nuclear weapons arsenals. More detailed assessment is needed of these sorts of measures as well as of how the United States and other likeminded countries could best support such a strategic dialogue in South Asia after a Pakistani nuclear test. Bearing in mind that U.S. observers now verify the Sinai disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, this analysis should not overlook the possibility of more direct involvement by the United States in the implementation and verification of such limitations.

But in the final analysis the prospects for holding down the level of proliferation in South Asia after a Pakistani test may depend heavily

on the characteristics of that test. If Pakistan detonates a nuclear explosive device but labels it a "PNE" and declares its readiness to stop its nuclear testing now that it has matched India's 1974 test, the chances of holding down the level of South Asian proliferation would be increased. Thus, even if the prospects of preventing a Pakistani test are dimming, it still is important to try to influence how Pakistan conducts and publicly explains that test.