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E bir EXERCISE MIGHTY DERRINGER

As a planner and an O-Conus site monitor for exercise Mighty Derringer 1 for ind a broad perspective from which to observe the exercise. The following points/issues are/acknowledged to be rather pointed but provide my real moressions and ageabeing documented for consideration in whatever more general. essment of the exercise is made. Specific personal reference Leliberately avoided

- (1) The overall planning was quite good considering the scope and complexity of the exercise was both negations between the agencies and free listic and logically continuous technical/scenario play To a great extent this was accomplished; but in several areas we could have done a much better job:
- (a) Actors The overall actor play was excellent and added a degree of realism the basis positive ingracient in the example. Of most igniticance was the actor play by Eliciand the President or pontaged by the example of the president of the player want to be president of the player want to be president. The sleeping accampdations were quite adequate, as were the bath facilities. The food was nothing less
- than excellent. Logistic support by the NTS/DOE staff was excellent in all
- (c) Device Site. The coordination of the "literal" terrorist actions and the setup of the access problem was not as well coordinated as it should have been . We should have had a splanned sonly players at the site not a multitude of "vested" controllers continously at the site. controllers, other controllers, and monitor visitors" provided too much activity and visibility; this sitered the play of the exercise (modified site Information, EST play (etc.)

(d) Device

(b) (1), (b) (3)



2 The flow of evidence and intelligence information from the Janners and from "found" at the site was not as well done as it might have

b. Play.

(1) EST/Pre-Assault. EST appeared well coordinated and effective but the presence of controllers at the device site altered the successfulness of

their activities.

2. (2) Assault: Well organized and conducted with the bexpected military discipling and preciseness. The play which included live stire attendant he provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military military military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking provided no real assessment of the interactions of the military manniking military military military manniking military militar provided no real assessment of the interactions that might occurreduring a real "terror stropposed" assault. Also, the assault team commanded and directed EO (which deployed with limited EOD assets and no technical commo link) to complete the najority of the access problem prior to turning over the site for NEST/EODEcontroligible practice needs to be reviewed and considered. Very god coordination existed between DODJ and EOD and DOE 21 no make coordination.

phase went well despite a considerable departure from the deliberate access methodology normally expected. This was the consequence of the access problem being very simple and involving only minor, panelty devices a constaint of the same of the

(b)(1)

independently did well-pout coordination and detailed extensive information precluded some activities of the DOE (assessments as a description of the DOE (assessments) and the device design as soon as seven fragger to the device design as soon as seven fragger to the lack of all details being available to all players -- slight changes in details elters considered to activations. the motivational assessments and implications. 在在中国的国际中的国际中的国际的国际。

(6) Mitigation.

(b)(1)



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- (7) Command and Control.
- (a) Who is in control of different activities during the IS./DODJ phase?
 - (b) Does DOE and DOD work for the DOS or should DOD/ECO work for
- (c) Does DODJ have the knowledge and the technical IND contermeasures perspective to unilaterally direct access operations?
 - (8) General.
- (a) Safety of personel near a potentially detonating nuclear by the was not played too many players were at the forward staging area, no fallback of personnel occurred during more hazardous operations, no detailed enaction of CP/TOC was planned/implemented prior to disablement, etc.
 - <u>(b)</u> DODJ.

If one were to "end game" the situation, the DODJ might be able to provide the same end result, but in a very quick and effective manner. Speed may be the essense of a real operation. The probability of s coess may not be too different than that obtainable from a complete DOE/EOD N ST operation.

(b) (1)

- (d) Deployment/Notification. Headquarters deployment methods for DOD/EOD and DOE could be improved.
- (e) Logistics. It appears that too much emphasis and player numbers are devoted to logistics versus the essential technical activities; I'm -mat sure of the essential value in much of the logistics.
 - (f) Technical.

1 Efforts tend to be overburdened by peripheral calculations not discussions. We may be trying to do too much "theoretical" and other unessential work in the field.

(b)(3)

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(7) Disablement. Good disablement planning and analysis. Home laboratory explosive tests and analysis were conducted. Significant squared ganizational/personal interface problems occurred.

(b) (1)

it is essential that reliable calculations and tests be conducted to document conclusively the differing technical options.

- (8) Commo. Effective and provided the necessary support.
- (9) Command. Very good decision making, leadership, and management of the individual organizational elements, and the overall operation. DOS, DOD/EOD, DODJ, EST, DOS were all exceptionally and professionally directed.
 - c. Lessons Learned/Issues for Considerations.
- (1) Security. Deployment in the U.S. or overseas must incorporate ubstantial security elements for both control of classified material and for site security. Host government personnel or FBI personnel are not considered either appropriate or of sufficient number to accomplish the role.
- (2) DOD Command. After an assault a DOD General officer must be in command of the DOD assets at the incident site -- unless it is formally greed/directed that DOD/EOD will report/work to the DOE OSC.
- (3) EOD. Currently, EOD interfaces with DOE elements, but works for the senior DOD commander and through him reports to the DOS or FBI.
- (4) Personalities/Stress. Interpersonal relationship problems were drawn into focus by the interactions of several of the key players. jignificant considerations should be made relative to who can successfully 'play" in the large field organization typical of an INO incident; and who might not be good choices.
- (5) Personnel Numbers. The entire operation was slowed and overburdened by the number of personnel involved. More could be accomplished, and probably accomplished as well, with many fewer players. Many fewer non-productive/useless conflicts in direction, coordination, decisions, etc. would result. Quicker implementation of activities would occur. (Too many people tended to overburden actual accomplishment of activities.) In all arganizations small, "skeleton" teams for each technical/support element might provide a superior field organization.
- (6) Intelligence. There is too great a prevalence to believe what might, and probably is, very inconclusive intelligence information:
- (a) Can we believe a calendar marked -- 10 December -- as positive indication of device functioning time?
- (b) Can we derive detailed technical implications from gross "weights" of containers obtained from third level sources?
 - (c) How much credence should be placed on debriefs of locals?



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


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(b) (1)

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