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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Oral Presentation of the Annual Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee

- I understand that you will receive the same briefing given last week to the President and to the NSC.
- I submit the following observations based on my hearing this briefing and asking a few questions last week in the Pentagon.
 - a. The claim that SAC plans to over-destroy targets seems to be borne out. For example, I understand that the assumptions used in this study in regard to target Moscow called for weapons having a total explosive yield of 100 megatons, of which some 66 megatons are assumed to have actually reached the target. For comparison, 100 megatons is the explosive equivalent of 5,000 Hiroshima-type bombs. I was advised that the study assumed that Moscow would be hit by IRBMs, fleet ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, and ICBMs before being hit by SAC airplane delivered bombs. You may wish to address some questions to this point.
 - You will note that the study assumes a destruction of targets throughout China. I believe that this was based on an assumption that the North Koreans had attacked the South Koreans.
- 3. You will note the heavy fatalities from fall-out. This will not be limited to the Soviet Union and China. Leaving aside the question of the

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morality of this type of general destruction of the Soviet Union, I have serious doubts as to the morality of a retaliation against the Soviet Union which would have serious effects on non-belligerent nations.

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4. We used to be advised that a doctrine of "restraint" governed the planning of our strategic bombing operations. It is difficult to see any fruits of any such doctrine in this briefing.

Gerard C. Smith

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