

INTRODUCTION

REQUEST OF SECRETARY OF NAVY FOR THIS REPORT

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, June 19, 1945.

Mr. F. EBERSTADT,
New York City, N. Y.

DEAR MR. EBERSTADT: I would appreciate your making a study of and preparing a report to me with recommendations on the following matters:

1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?

2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security?

3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL.

LETTER TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TRANSMITTING REPORT

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Washington, September 25, 1945.

The Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

SIR: Military efficiency is not the only condition which should influence the form of our postwar military organization. To be acceptable, any such organization must fall within the framework of our traditions and customs. It must be of such size and nature as to command public support. It must be aimed at curing the weaknesses disclosed in the late wars. And finally, it must be conducive to fostering those policies and objectives which contribute to the service and protection of our national security.

Since it seemed unlikely that any one form of military organization would equally meet all of these requirements, our ultimate choice fell on that form which promised to advance what appeared to us to be the more essential ones. Within its framework, we undertook to suggest organizational machinery and procedures for the attainment of other important but less vital goals.

The military services are but a part of the national machinery of peace or war. An effective national security policy calls for active,

intimate, and continuous relationships not alone between the military services themselves but also between the military services and many other departments and agencies of Government.

This consideration guided our answer to your last and broadest question. Here we have attempted to sketch the major organizations and relationships which are involved in promoting the maintenance of peace or, in default of this, in marshalling our national resources fully, promptly, and effectively in our defense.

We have suggested new organizational forms responsible to our new world position, our new international obligations, and the new technological developments emerging from the war.

Throughout this report, we have kept in mind two major conditions precedent to effective operation of any form of organization:

1. That all organizational forms must remain sufficiently flexible not only to permit, but to encourage, such changes in method and policy as are necessary to meet changing conditions.
2. That experience does not indicate, nor study disclose, any organizational substitute for alert and competent men in positions of authority and responsibility.

The essentiality of these two conditions is generally recognized. Hence, we have not emphasized them in our report.

In order that our report might be founded on more than casual opinions, we needed much definite information. To provide it, a series of investigations was undertaken which furnished the basis for the chapters of the studies listed in the table of contents of this report.

Conclusions and recommendations applicable to the subject matter are contained in various chapters of the studies.

I take this opportunity to record my thanks and appreciation to those who constituted my staff. While I assume full responsibility for all elements of the report, their interest and help were essential to its preparation. Their names and the chapters for which they were respectively responsible are set forth at the beginning of the studies. I cannot speak too highly of their diligence, enthusiasm and sincerity of purpose. They well deserve such formal recognition as is appropriate in the circumstances.

Delivery of this report constitutes fulfillment of the task outlined in your letter. I remain at your disposal for anything further that you may wish me to do in this connection.

Respectfully yours,

F. EBERSTADT.

MEANING OF TERM UNIFICATION AS USED IN THIS REPORT

We want to make it clear at the outset that nothing in this report is intended to question the essentiality of unified command in the zone or theater of operations. Experience in the late war has substantiated the lessons of military history in this respect and we accept them without question.

The unification with which this report deals concerns the War and Navy Departments, the great administrative organizations that make plans and preparations for our defense and that train our forces and marshal our resources for the final unified impact on the enemy.

It is important throughout this report to keep this distinction in mind.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

We sum up our conclusions with respect to the three questions contained in your letter of June 19 as follows:

1. *Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head improve our national security?*

We do not believe that under present conditions unification of the Army and Navy under a single head would improve our national security.

It is difficult accurately to weight the merits and defects of a military system which has successfully borne the huge strains and burdens of the greatest war in history against those of a proposed system that has been presented only in general form.

The weaknesses of our present system—as well as its strengths—have emerged under the stress of war, while military unification in this country has never been put to the acid test of modern war.

In theory and in logic unification appears highly plausible. It looks good on paper. It sounds good in words. There are many appealing arguments in support of unification; but it lacks equally convincing support in actual practice.

The experience of foreign countries which have adopted military unification does not commend it to our use. In our early history we tried and abandoned it. Business mergers, not nearly so vast and diverse as the military services, have often proved unduly cumbersome and failed to realize their promised benefits. It seems highly doubtful that one civilian Secretary, with limited tenure of office, could successfully administer the huge and complex structure resulting from a unification of our military services.

The processes of democratic government in this country have sometimes seemed cumbersome and slow, even under the urgent stress of war. We have often longed for the one-man decision and have been inclined to minimize the tremendous benefits that arise from the parallel, competitive, and sometimes conflicting efforts which our system permits. At times we have looked with envy at those systems which we believed dispensed with these time-consuming processes. It has been enlightening, however, to find on closer examination that they suffered from similar disadvantages without enjoying the vital benefits of ours.

It is not without significance that in nations where considerations of military efficiency have dominated political philosophy and where civilian control of the military has not in fact prevailed, a unified military structure has found favor. Generally speaking, it has accomplished the subordination of civilian to military life—to their own and other nations' grief.

The very plausibility of unification challenges analysis. It seems to be such a simple and easy panacea for solving difficult and complicated problems. Experienced men, however, will hesitate to accept at full face value all of the virtues claimed for it. They will be reluctant to discard the proven and effective system which we now possess for something new and untried.

We have recently seen that there is a great difference between conferring legal power to unify on an individual or organization and its effective exercise. The War Production Board, the Office of War Mobilization, and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, all possessed the power to unify, but their achievements along these lines fell considerably short of accomplishing unification.

In arriving at these conclusions, we have not left out of account two elements which may in the future greatly influence the size and nature of our Military Establishment.

Experience and knowledge, however, are not presently at hand adequately to appraise in these terms the implications of the substantially increased international commitments of a political and military nature which we have assumed under the United Nations Charter, by the Act of Chapultepec, in the occupation of two widely separated enemy countries, and otherwise.

Equally meager are the data essential to a reasonably dependable forecast of the repercussions on world peace, on our national security, and on our military and industrial organization, of the epochal scientific discoveries and engineering developments of the war culminating in the release of atomic energy in the atomic bomb.

Until a reliable estimate of the effects of these two fundamentally new elements can be made, their possible consequences should not be anticipated by changes in our military organization that might impair our national security.

Before abandoning or jeopardizing our present system we should first be sure (1) that we cannot effectively cure present ills within the existing framework; (2) that unification will, in fact, cure these ills; and (3) that unification will not bring in its wake other, and perhaps worse, ailments.

We are convinced that present ills can to a very considerable extent be remedied within the existing framework. We do not believe that unification will in practice offer a better vehicle for their cure, and we fear that unification would open the door to other and even greater weaknesses than those of our present system.

Insofar as recent plans for unification fail to deal with the need of each of the military services to get its own house in order, they fail to respond to a presently urgent military need. Insofar as they are concerned simply with a merger of the military services, they fail to meet the essential need for stronger organizational ties between the military services and other governmental agencies, as well as with the civilian economy, in support of our national security.

Our present situation calls for action far more drastic and far-reaching than simply unification of the military services. It calls for a complete realignment of our governmental organizations to serve our national security in the light of our new world power and position, our new international commitments and risks and the epochal new scientific discoveries.

This brings us to your second question.

2. *If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services and departments has our war experience indicated as desirable to improve our national security?*

Experience in the late war has revealed serious weaknesses in our present organizational set-up—weaknesses between and within the services, as well as in their relationships to other important elements concerned with our national security.

Mostly they were defects of coordination. Gaps between foreign and military policy—between the State Department and the Military Establishments. Gaps between strategic planning and its logistic implementation—between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military and civilian agencies responsible for industrial mobilization. Gaps between and within the military services—principally in the field of procurement and logistics. Gaps in information and intelligence—between the executive and legislative branches of our Government, between the several departments, and between Government and the people.

We have concluded that these faults were due principally to lack of appropriate and seasoned mechanisms and of adequate plans, policies, and procedures for coordination; lack of clear understanding and appreciation by one group or individual of the relation of others to the over-all job. These ills are susceptible of cure without dangerous experiments with our present set-up.

In our recommendations, we have indicated the form of military organization which we think best adapted to dealing with the problems that face us, viz, a coordinate one having three departments—War, Navy, and Air—each headed by a civilian secretary of Cabinet rank and tied together by strong ligaments of coordination expressed by formal interorganizational links.

Obviously, neither the coordinate nor the unified form will equally advance all desirable objectives of postwar military policy. Our conclusion is that the coordinate form appears better adapted to advance those policies which seem more important.

This form would, in our opinion, foster civilian and congressional influence and control over the military departments. It would, among other advantages, favor sound and efficient balance in the development of each arm of the service; it would furnish a broader basis for considerations of military and foreign policy and would be more responsive to new developments in the scientific field.

We thus come to your final question.

3. *What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?*

The question of the form of organization of our military forces must be viewed in its proper perspective as only one part of a much larger picture encompassing many elements, military and civilian, governmental and private, which contribute to our national security and defense. It is obviously impossible to unify all these elements under one command, short of the President.

Our goal should be to bind them together in such a way as to achieve the most productive and harmonious whole. This calls for coordina-

tion as well as command, for parallel as well as subordinated effort. Where to use one and where to use the other are questions of balanced judgment and adjustment to be determined by the principles and traditions of our form of government, the lessons of experience, and the basic policies and objectives to be achieved.

The necessity of integrating all these elements into an alert, smoothly working and efficient machine is more important now than ever before. Such integration is compelled by our present world commitments and risks, by the tremendously increased scope and tempo of modern warfare, and by the epochal scientific discoveries culminating in the atomic bomb.

This will involve, among others, organizational ties between the Department of State and the military departments, ties between the military departments in strategy and logistics, ties between the military departments and the agencies responsible for planning and carrying out mobilization of our industrial and human resources, between the gathering of information and intelligence and its dissemination and use, between scientific advances and their military application.

The next war will probably break out with little or no warning and will almost immediately achieve its maximum tempo of violence and destruction. Contrasting with the shortened opportunity for defensive preparation is the increased length of time necessary to prepare the complicated offensive and defensive weapons and organizational structure essential to modern warfare.

The nation not fully prepared will be at a greater disadvantage than ever before.

The great need, therefore, is that we be prepared always and all along the line, not simply to defend ourselves after an attack, but through all available political, military, and economic means to forestall any such attack. The knowledge that we are so prepared and alert will in itself be a great influence for world peace.

Much has been said about the importance of waging peace, as well as war. We have tried to suggest an organizational structure adapted to both purposes.

There is attached, marked "Exhibit 1," an organization chart depicting our recommendations for tying together on the one hand the political and military organizations and on the other the economic and civilian ones, with provision for linking the two.

Our specific recommendations follow.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend:

1. Organization of the military forces into three coordinate departments

The organization of our military services into three Departments of War, Navy, and Air, each headed by a civilian secretary of Cabinet rank, supported by a civilian under secretary and such assistant secretaries as may be necessary, and commanded by a military officer.

(a) *Establishment of a separate Military Department for Air.*—In pursuance of the foregoing, the establishment of a Department of Air to which would be transferred generally the functions, powers, operations, and jurisdictions of the present Army Air Forces, as well as military air transport.

This recommendation is subject to the two that follow.

(b) *Maintenance of a Navy air arm.*—The maintenance of the most intimate relationship between the fleet and those aircraft which serve with it is so vital that any impairment of the present relationship would seem extremely ill-advised. Our own experience and that of other countries fortifies this conclusion.

(c) *Maintenance of an Army air arm.*—The Army should retain control over such air components as are peculiar to its needs. Artillery-spotting and liaison are typical examples.

2. *Creation of a National Security Council*

To afford a permanent vehicle for maintaining active, close, and continuous contact between the departments and agencies of our Government responsible, respectively, for our foreign and military policies and their implementation, we recommend the establishment of a National Security Council.

The National Security Council would be the keystone of our organizational structure for national security.

It should be charged with the duty (1) of formulating and coordinating over-all policies in the political and military fields, (2) of assessing and appraising our foreign objectives, commitments and risks, and (3) of keeping these in balance with our military power, in being and potential.

It would be a policy-forming and advisory, not an executive, body.

Its membership should consist of the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, and Air, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board (recommendation No. 4 below). Provision should be made for such additions to its membership as the President may from time to time deem proper.

The President should be its Chairman. In his absence, the Vice President, being next in Presidential succession, or the senior member of the Cabinet, the Secretary of State, would act in this capacity.

The National Security Council should have a permanent secretariat, headed by a full-time executive, charged with preparing its agenda, providing data essential to its deliberations, and distributing its conclusions to the departments and agencies concerned for information and appropriate action.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be a part of, and meet with, the Council.

The National Security Council should take over the functions at present performed by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

The Central Intelligence Agency (recommendation No. 9 below) should be a part of, and report to, the National Security Council. Its product is an important part of the grist of the Council's mill.

The Council should also control the policies and activities of the organizations responsible for the conduct of psychological and economic warfare and should maintain close relations with the civilian agency set up to coordinate military and civilian scientific research and development (recommendation No. 7 below).

It should review, and advise the President on, the combined military budget.

The Council should render annual reports to the President and to Congress. To the extent that national security does not absolutely

require secrecy, its reports should be published. Thus the public would be kept posted on these vital matters by an authoritative and dependable source. In this way, the Council could aid in building up public support for clear-cut, consistent, and effective foreign and military policies.

In time of war, combination of the National Security Council with appropriate elements of the National Security Resources Board (recommendation No. 4 below) would constitute the basis of a war cabinet.

3. Continuation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff has proved its worth and should be continued but continuation of so powerful a military group without legal definition of its authority or responsibility seems at variance with our customs and traditions. Therefore, we recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be established, and its authority and responsibilities be defined, by statute.

Among its responsibilities should be the following:

- (a) Preparation of strategic plans and strategic direction of all United States military forces;
- (b) Preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment to the services of logistic responsibilities, in accordance with such plans; and
- (c) Approval of major requirement programs—matériel and personnel—of the services in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consist of the highest military officer of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Forces. Provision should also be made for inclusion of the Chief of Staff to the President if he desires to have one.

A full-time joint staff, under a chief of the joint staff as executive, should be established to serve them.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should, of course, be available at all times to advise the President and the National Security Council on military matters.

Provision should also be made for close and continuous working relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and (a) the National Security Resources Board (recommendation No. 4 below) and (b) the Military Munitions Board (recommendation No. 5 below).

4. Creation of a National Security Resources Board

In order that there may always exist an organization ready and able to implement military plans in the industrial mobilization and civilian fields, we recommend the creation of a National Security Resources Board and its maintenance, during peacetime as well as in war.

This organization should be charged with the duty of formulating plans and programs—and keeping them up to date—and of maintaining a skeleton organization for the prompt and effective translation of military plans into industrial and civilian mobilization. It would be a logical outgrowth of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion when the latter's present duties have been completed.

The National Security Resources Board should be established promptly while the lessons of this war are still fresh in the public mind. If this is not done soon it will probably not be done at all.

Its Chairman should be an appointee of the President with full power of decision similar to the power now conferred upon the Chairman of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

Its membership would initially consist of the Secretaries of War, Navy, and Air and of the heads of the agencies at present charged with important civilian mobilization functions, such as the War Production Board, the Maritime Commission, the Office of Defense Transportation, the Office of Price Administration, the War Food Administration, the War Manpower Commission, etc. The Chairman of the Military Munitions Board (recommendation No. 5 below) should also be a member. A considerable identity of membership between the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board has importance in terms of foreign and military policy, since they necessarily are greatly influenced by domestic, economic, and social policies in time of peace as well as war.

As the activities of the present emergency agencies draw to a close their residual functions should be assigned to appropriate regular departments and agencies of government; for example, the War Manpower Commission's functions to the Department of Labor, the Office of Price Administration to the Treasury, the War Production Board to the Department of Commerce, etc. As this process occurred the Secretary of the department or head of the permanent agency into which each emergency agency was merged would assume membership on the National Security Resources Board.

Assignment of regular and specific duties relating to our national security to the regular departments of government would have the beneficial effect of—

(a) Affording to the regular departments of government an opportunity to become familiar with, and to participate in, matters of national security and industrial mobilization;

(b) Maintaining in skeleton form organizations which could, if necessary, be properly expanded, thus avoiding the undesirable alternative of resort to emergency agencies hastily created;

(c) Providing cadres of personnel familiar with the problems and procedures of civilian mobilization; and

(d) Impressing on these departments a realization of the duty of all to keep constantly on the alert in matters of national security.

One of the first tasks of the National Security Resources Board should be to take an inventory of our resources, so severely depleted by the war. It should keep our national balance sheet of resources solvent through (1) exercising supervision over the disposal of our present surpluses, (2) advocating sound policies of conservation of our basic materials, (3) guarding against a recurrence of our late deplorable situation in strategic materials, and (4) developing and maintaining adequate information on the manpower, resources, and productive facilities of the Nation.

In order to maintain close contact with the civilian economy the National Security Resources Board should have an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of business, industry, labor, and agriculture. Periodic changes in membership would broaden the interest and qualification of these groups in matters of national security. Congressional association with this Advisory Committee seems worthy of consideration. It would be in harmony with recommendation No. 11 below.

5. *Creation of a Military Munitions Board*

The late war has brought to light many weaknesses in the inter-relations of the military services in the fields of procurement and logistics. To deal with those aspects of the problem which are not within the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend the creation of a Military Munitions Board.

The Military Munitions Board should possess broader powers than those heretofore enjoyed by the Army and Navy Munitions Board which it would presumably succeed. It should be the top military agency in this field charged by statute with full, clear, and definite authority and responsibilities. It should, so to speak, parallel in the procurement and related logistics fields the authority and responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the field of military strategy and operations.

It should be a staff, not an operating agency.

It should be responsible not only for joint planning and coordination between the services but also for definition of the policies and practices of execution by the services in this field. It should, for example, make provision for establishment of standard practices in contracting, designs, specifications, and terminology. Its policies should, of course, be subject to, and consistent with, those of the National Security Resources Board.

It should consist of the Under Secretaries of the coordinate military departments, assuming that they will be responsible for procurement and logistic matters in their respective departments. The Chairman of the Maritime Commission should sit with the Board when matters affecting the Maritime Commission are being considered.

It should have a civilian Chairman appointed by the President, who should possess final powers of decision on matters within the Board's jurisdiction. In giving the Chairman of the Military Munitions Board broad and definite powers of decision, we correct a weakness of joint committee action.

The Military Munitions Board should have an Executive Committee consisting of the chief military officers of each service in the procurement and logistics field, and such other committees as are necessary to carry out its functions.

It should have a full-time staff.

In order that the procurement and logistics programs may support strategic plans, it should maintain close and continuous liaison with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Its Chairman should be a member of the National Security Resources Board, and it should maintain liaison with the civilian mobilization agencies at the Secretarial and staff levels.

In the field of military procurement and logistics, varied conditions call for different procedures. Unified purchasing could be effected for a very considerable portion of our military purchases. In other cases, joint or predominant-interest purchasing would seem preferable. In still other cases, the particularly close relation of the item to its use indicates that the user should be the purchaser. The Board would be expected to adopt and apply the best system to each situation.

It should make a thorough study of the purposes, functions, and reasons for the existence of the vast number of joint committees now operating in the procurement and logistics field. It should consolidate

and combine these committees into an orderly and coordinated pattern and lay down the policies and procedures governing the operation of such of these committees as are retained.

6. Study and regrouping of present joint committees

In the absence of defined policies, plans and procedures providing for joint action by the military services in various appropriate fields, a host of joint committees have sprung up in response to individual problems which do not fall within the immediate jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and which would not logically be included under the supervision of the Military Munitions Board. We recommend that the military services undertake a joint study of these committees with a view to regrouping, combining, or dissolving them.

7. Encouragement of scientific research and development

Radical measures should be taken to assure the continued vitality of coordinated scientific research and development within and between the services and between the services and scientific thought and development in civilian academic and industrial institutions.

We recommend starting at the very top by the appointment in each service of a thoroughly qualified Assistant Secretary for Research and Development who would have as his executive the senior military officer charged with the duty of directing and coordinating research and development within each service. Such Assistant Secretaries and their military executive officers would logically constitute representatives of the military services on any civilian agency which may be created to link civilian and military scientific research and development.

We recommend the creation of such a civilian agency.

Each service should make careful study of its own situation with a view to establishing such arrangements as may be conducive to stimulating sensitivity to scientific research and development and should give full recognition, in rank and in participation in policy decisions, to those responsible for scientific research and development in the military services.

Further recommendations along these lines are included at the end of chapter I of volume III of this report entitled "Science and the Armed Services."

8. Creation of a Military Education and Training Board

The several systems of education and training of the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and Marine Corps should be reviewed together and as a whole, by an over-all authority responsible for adjusting them into a balanced and integrated program, designed to instill a mental attitude of cooperation and an alert understanding of the many-sided character of modern war, without impairing technical proficiency or the morale which grows out of tradition and service pride. Such reviews should be periodic to keep military education and training abreast of new needs as they arise or may be foreseen.

To this end, we recommend the creation by statute of a Military Education and Training Board, and of an Advisory Board on Military Education and Training.

The Military Education and Training Board should consist of the Chief of Naval Personnel, an officer of the Army who should be charged with corresponding responsibility for education and train-

ing within the Army, and an officer of the Air Forces responsible for education and training within the Air Forces. It should have a full-time joint staff, and such standing and ad hoc committees as it may deem necessary to carry out its duties.

The Advisory Board on Military Education and Training should consist of a chairman and four additional members, all of whom should be civilians appointed by the President. The Chairman should be a man of the highest stature in the field of education. It would be desirable to include in the membership at least one man particularly qualified in scientific and technical education, one man whose special qualifications lie in the fields of history, government, law, or economics, and one man experienced in large-scale industrial training. But we do not recommend adherence to any fixed distribution of special fields of expertness. The primary emphasis should be on the quality of the men.

The Military Education and Training Board should be under the supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Advisory Board should be responsible for advising the Military Board on its own initiative as well as at the request of the Military Board.

9. Creation of a Central Intelligence Agency

The National Security Council cannot possibly fulfill its role nor the military departments perform their duty to the Nation unless they are in possession of timely, full, and authoritative information on conditions and developments in the outside world that relate to, and should influence, our foreign and military policies.

Such intelligence is the product of collecting, analyzing, evaluating, and synthesizing information. Complete, up-to-date, and accurate intelligence, properly analyzed, and made available in usable form, is an essential factor in the effective formulation and conduct of our foreign and military policies. Such intelligence has always been of great importance. With the uncertainties of the postwar world, and the developments, present and prospective, in the field of new weapons, timely and accurate intelligence has become vital to our national security.

Thus it is imperative that we establish and maintain an intelligence agency which will assure such information concerning military, political, economic, and technological developments aboard and provide means for its proper evaluation and dissemination.

We recommend, therefore, that a Central Intelligence Agency be established within, and report to, the National Security Council. Its services should also be available to other departments and agencies of government concerned with national security.

The collection of information can and should be made through the military services and other departments and agencies of the government, as well as through private sources on behalf of government. All information so collected should be available to the Central Intelligence Agency. Its compilation, analysis, evaluation, and dissemination, however, particularly as relating to matters of national security, should be coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

It should be headed by an experienced and competent executive director supported by a thoroughly trained and adequate staff capable of proper evaluation of the technical material at its disposal.

Related to intelligence is the matter of communications. Recommendations in this field are contained in chapter IV of volume III of this report.

10. Attainment of maximum symmetry in the administrative structures of the coordinate military departments

Coordination between the military services, particularly in the fields of administration, procurement, and logistics has been handicapped by the extreme dissimilarity in the nature of these organizations and in location of administrative functions within them. The Army is organized on vertical lines, while the organization of the Navy follows no well-defined pattern but is largely a matter of historical development.

These differences are illustrated in the two charts, exhibits 2 and 3 attached, showing in broad outline the Army and Navy organizations, respectively.

Both departments have had the benefit from time to time of independent organizational studies, and, based thereon, have instituted changes aimed at improving organization and administration, but such independent approaches to the problem have not tended to increase symmetry between them.

It would facilitate cooperation between the departments if a study of both military departments were made by the same group and their recommendations made, not only with a view to improving the organizational and administrative structure of each department, but also with a view to creating greater clarity and symmetry between them in the placement of similar functions and authority. This might be dealt with by the commission suggested in recommendation No. 12 below.

11. The maintenance of close working relations with Congress

To suggest organizational changes in the legislative branch for dealing with military policy is beyond the scope of this report. More significant than any such formal arrangements, in our judgment, is recognition on the part of officials of the importance of keeping the Members of Congress informed on problems and developments with which the military departments are currently concerned.

There is at present considerable duplication of effort resulting from working out a program with the responsible administrative heads of the Departments and then having to go through the process all over again to win congressional acceptance. If Members of Congress who have the confidence of the House and Senate were invited to participate in discussions involving departmental programs, much energy might be saved and the path cleared for better congressional understanding.

Such informal contacts suited to particular needs and situations, supplementing regular congressional committee relations, seem preferable to setting up formal committees for legislative relations with the departments.

Close relations between congressional leaders and the National Security Council and the National Security Resources Board would increase mutual understanding and fortify continuity and unity of purpose in the fields of military and foreign policy.

12. *Appointment of a commission to make an over-all study of the problems of national security*

Recent studies and discussions have revolved around specific elements of military policy, such as unification of the services, universal military training, arrangements for stimulating scientific research, etc. Such individual approaches to the problem are, of course, useful. Far more urgent, however, is the need for an over-all audit of our war effort and a study of our whole machinery of national security in the light of our experiences in the late wars and particularly in the light of our new and greatly expanded international commitments and the revolutionary developments in the application of scientific discoveries to military weapons and industrial uses.

In view of the great national importance of these problems, we recommend that the President, or Congress, or both, establish a commission to make such a study, carefully and deliberately. The reports of this commission should be published so that the American people may have the benefit of knowing its findings and recommendations.

We recommend that the members of the commission be chosen not only on the basis of their knowledge of military matters, but also with particular attention to their qualifications in matters of foreign policy, industrial, labor, and economic matters, scientific research and development, and organizational problems. Representatives of the military services should, of course, be constantly at their disposal as guides and advisers.

The hearings and reports of the Truman and Woodrum committees have prepared the way for such a study.

In order not to lose time, we should, pending completion of such an over-all study, proceed immediately with those improvements for which the need is clearly indicated.

A general discussion of the considerations which led to the foregoing conclusions and recommendations follows.