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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jan-1988 13:01 EST

MEMORANDUM FOR: MCNAMARA

FROM: VMS MAIL user WHSR  
(WHSR@VAXE@)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
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MSR, JAN, 1988 6/15/00

SUBJECT:

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To: MCNAMARA@VAXC

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TO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0000

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SUBJECT: JAN. 6 INTERAGENCY MEETING ON USG REPONSE TO OCHOA  
RELEASE  
FOR JUSTICE  
FOR DEA

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BT  
~~SECRET~~ STATE 009662  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: SNAR PGOV CJAN CO  
SUBJECT: JAN. 6 INTERAGENCY MEETING ON USG REPONSE TO OCHOA  
RELEASE

FOR JUSTICE

FOR DEA

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: REPRESENTATIVES FROM STATE, JUSTICE, TREASURY, NSC, DEA, CIA, DOD, AND USTR MET JANUARY 6 WITH AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE TO DISCUSS US-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF OCHOA RELEASE.

PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT EVENT RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE GOC TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THE DRUG SITUATION. PARTICIPANTS ALSO AGREED THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE GOC AND THAT OUR IMMEDIATE TASK IS NOT SIMPLY RETALIATING FOR OCHOA'S RELEASE BUT PRESSING THE GOC TO TAKE STRONG ADDITIONAL STEPS TO CONFRONT THE TRAFFICKERS.

3. THE GROUP CONSIDERED CONCRETE STEPS THE GOC COULD TAKE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS RESOLVE TO TACKLE THE TRAFFICKERS AND DISCUSSED THE ADVISABILITY OF DELAYING/POSTPONING SCHEDULED VISITS BY USG OFFICIALS. IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE WOULD RETURN TO COLOMBIA WEEK OF JAN. 11 TO PRESENT PRESIDENT BARCO WITH A STRONG DEMARCHE AND DELIVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE MESSAGE OF GILLESPIE'S VISIT AND THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER WOULD BE 1) OCHOA' RELEASE HAS MADE THE JOINT STRUGGLE AGAINST TRAFFICKERS CONSIDERABLY MORE DIFFICULT, BUT WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO HELP COLOMBIA CONFRONT ITS TRAFFICKING PROBLEM AND 2) THE GOC MUST ITSELF COME TO GRIPS WITH THAT PROBLEM AND TAKE SPECIFIC, DECISIVE ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKERS ON ALL FRONTS. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

PARTICIPANTS

4. THE JAN. 6 INTERAGENCY MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE WAS CHAIRED BY ARA DAS GELBARD. ATTENDEES INCLUDED: DOJ: ASSOCIATE AG STEVE TROTT, CRIMINAL DIVISION CHIEF BILL WELD, DEPUTY JOE WHITLY AND OIA OFFICERS CHUCK SAPHOS, DREW ARENA AND ROGER YOCHELSON; TREASURY (ALSO REPRESENTING CUSTOMS): FRANK KEATING; USTR: ASST. US TRADE REP. JON ROSENBAUM; DOD: DAS BOB PASTORINO; DEA: OPS CHIEF DAVE WESTRATE AND DEPUTY TERRANCE BURKE; CIA: [REDACTED] NSC: TED MCNAMARA; STATE: INM - ANN WROBLESKI, L- MIKE KOZAK, L/LEI - ROBIN FRANK, ARA/P-BUD JACOBS, INR-BELLE SCHELL, ARA-ELLIOTT ABRAMS, BOB GELBARD, ARA/AND- MIKE SKOL, PHIL TAYLOR, NANCY MASON AND DAVE HENIFIN.

WHERE WE ARE

5. MIKE SKOL BEGAN THE SUBSTANTIVE PORTION OF THE MEETING WITH A RECAP OF CHARGE'S DELIVERY OF DIPLOMATIC REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL ARRESTS, HIS DEMARCHE TO BARCO, THE ISSUE OF NEW ARREST ORDERS FOR CARTEL MEMBERS AND RUMORS THAT NEW STATE OF SEIGE PROVISIONS WHICH WOULD REMOVE THE SUPREME COURT FROM THE EXTRADITION PROCESS.

6. SKOL PASSED OUT COPIES OF PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED SINCE DEC. 31 TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES ON US REACTION TO OCHOA'S RELEASE, AS WELL AS A COPY OF BOGOTA 00180 WHICH SUMMARIZED THE COLOMBIAN MEDIA'S REACTION TO OCHOA'S RELEASE AS OF JAN. 6. HE UNDERSCORED THAT THE REACTION IN COLOMBIA WAS PERHAPS EVEN STRONGER THAN THAT IN THE US. CUSTOMS INSPECTIONS

7. FRANK KEATING EXPLAINED THAT MIAMI CUSTOMS INSPECTORS HAD BEEN GIVEN ORDERS THAT FROM ALL FLIGHTS ORIGINATING FROM COLOMBIA, ALL PASSENGERS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SECONDARY INSPECTION AND CARGO WOULD BE SUBJECT TO INTENSIVE EXAMINATION. THIS WILL MEAN DELAYS, BUT KEATING STRESSED THAT THE EXTRA SEARCHES REFLECT CONCERN ABOUT INCREASED TRAFFICKER SHIPMENTS, NOT DELIBERATE HARASSMENT. EXTRA PERSONNEL ARE BEING ASSIGNED TO HANDLE THE WORK LOAD AND DESPITE PRESS REPORTS, NO FLOWER OR SHRIMP SHIPMENTS WILL BE DELIBERATELY LEFT TO WILT OR ROT. STEVE TROTT THOUGHT THE INSPECTIONS WERE NEEDED AS PART OF A "FULL COURT PRESS" AGAINST DRUGS, BUT ADDED THAT THE USG HAD BEEN FORCED TO TAKE THE ACTION FOLLOWING OCHOA'S RELEASE.

#### IMPACT ON TRADE

8. KEATING RECOGNIZED THAT ANY INCREASED ENFORCEMENT WILL BE SEEN BY SOME AS HARASSMENT, AND ASKED USTR TO ADVISE CUSTOMS IF THERE WAS ANY INDICATION THAT THE SEARCHES SIGNIFICANTLY DAMAGED TRADE. JON ROSENBAUM DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBLE USE OF FORMAL TRADE SANCTIONS LATER, BUT ASKED THAT USTR BE FULLY INVOLVED IN ANY DECISION.

#### WHO RULES IN COLOMBIA?

9. ARTICULATING THE CONCERNS OF MANY PARTICIPANTS, TROTT ASKED IF OCHOA'S RELEASE INDICATED THAT THE TRAFFICKEEXGQ AND THERE WAS NO LONGER A GOVERNMENT IN COLOMBIA WITH WHICH WE COULD DEAL. OTHER PARTICIPANTS NOTED THAT THE GOC WOULD BECOME IRRELEVANT IN A COUNTRY RUN BY TRAFFICKERS. THE AMBASSADOR EXPLAINED THAT, BARRING AN UNLIKELY POLITICAL CATASTROPHE, WE WOULD HAVE TO CONTINUE DEALING WITH BARCO FOR TWO MORE YEARS AND THAT THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT BARCO KNEW OF IN ADVANCE OR HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH OCHOA'S RELEASE. ANN WROBLESKI STRESSED THAT THE COLOMBIANS THEMSELVES WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHO WAS REALLY IN CHARGE; WE COULD NOT DECIDE FOR THEM.

#### KEEPING OUR EYES ON THE BALL: DOING THE DOABLE

10. THE IMPORTANT POINT TO CONSIDER, ACCORDING TO GILLESPIE, WAS THAT THE USG HAD IMPORTANT

NARCOTICS-RELATED OBJECTIVES IN COLOMBIA OTHER THAN OCHOA'S RE-ARREST (WHICH IN ANY CASE WOULD PROBABLY NOT OCCUR SOON) AND THAT WE HAD TO CONCENTRATE ON PERSUADING BARCO TO DO THE DOABLE. BARCO SHOULD BE REMINDED THAT INDECISION AND INACTION DOES "NOT KEEP FAITH" WITH THE WELL-KNOWN COLOMBIAN SACRIFICES IN THE DRUG WAR. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT CHARGE HAD PRESSED BARCO (AND RECEIVED A POSITIVE RESPONSE) ON INCREASED ERADICATION, INTERDICTION AND MAJOR LAB DESTRUCTION. GILLESPIE SAID WE HAD TO DETERMINE FOR OURSELVES WHAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE MILESTONES TO ESTABLISH AS EVIDENCE OF COLOMBIAN RESOLVE, DETERMINE WHAT NEGATIVE/POSITIVE FEEDBACK WE COULD SUPPLY, AND PROVIDE LOUD, CLEAR SIGNALS OF APPROVAL/DISAPPROVAL IN ONE VOICE.

11. BOB GELBARD, GILLESPIE AND OTHERS NOTED THAT WE MUST CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE "ENTIRE" USG, NOT JUST THE ANTI-NARCOTICS COMMUNITY, GIVES THE DRUG WAR A "HIGH PRIORITY" AND THAT THE NARCOTICS ISSUE INEVITABLY AFFECTS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF US-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS. THE GOC SHOULD BE ESPECIALLY REMINDED OF

INVITABLE US CONGRESSIONAL REACTION (MITIGATED FOR THE MOMENT BY THE HOLIDAY RECESS) TO CONTINUED INACTION FOLLOWING OCHOA'S RELEASE.

WITHOUT LOSING THE GAME

12. AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE SUGGESTED THAT OUR ACTIONS BE CAREFULLY CONSTRUCTED TO PRESENT THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE MESSAGE TO THE GOC WITHOUT LOSING THE (FOR THE MOMENT) GENERALLY POSITIVE SUPPORT OF THE COLOMBIAN MEDIA. ALL AGREED WITH TROTT'S OBSERVATION THAT PRIVATE DEMANDS FOR GOC ACTION WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PUBLIC BASHING. GILLESPIE ADDED THAT FOCUSED ACTIONS, SUCH AS CUSTOMS' INCREASED INSPECTIONS, WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN REMINDING BARCO AND THE GOC OF THE CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF NARCOTICS COOPERATION IN OUR RELATIONS. GELBARD STRESSED THAT BARCO'S STATED WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE HAD TO BECOME A WILLINGNESS, PROVEN IN ACTION, OF THE ENTIRE GOC.

KEEPING SCORE: INDICATORS OF RENEWED GOC COMMITMENT

13. DAVE WESTRATE SUGGESTED THAT HITTING THE MAJOR TRAFFICKERS (AND SHOWING THEM THAT EXTRADITION IS NOT THE ONLY EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST THEM) SHOULD STILL BE OUR (AND THE GOC'S) GOAL.

GOC BENCHMARKS WOULD INCLUDE:

A) SEIZING TRAFFICKER ASSETS AND RAIDING THEIR PROPERTY. B) HITTING MAJOR COCAINE HCL LABS AND C) INCREASING ANTI-NARCOTICS COOPERATION WITH PERU AND BRAZIL.

14. BILL WELD RECOMMENDED THAT THE GOC AGREE TO ESTABLISH A BILATERAL WORKING GROUP TO SUGGEST INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS, MODELED AFTER THE US-ITALIAN GROUP THAT LAID THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE RECENT MAFIA CRACKDOWN. GILLESPIE SUPPORTED THE IDEA IN GENERAL, BUT CAUTIONED THAT INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS OR ANOTHER "STUDY GROUP" WOULD NOT SOLVE THE GOC'S SHORT TERM PROBLEMS. MIKE SKOL ADDED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PROGRAM ALREADY ADDRESSED THE ISSUE (ADMIN OF JUSTICE CONCERNS RAISED SEPTEL). WELD ALSO THOUGHT THE GOC SHOULD HIT MORE IMPORTANT LABS, INCREASE INTERDICTION, BEGIN AERIAL ERADICATION, FIND A WORKABLE MEANS FOR QUICK EXTRADITIONS, ALLOW INCREASED DEA INVOLVEMENT IN GOC LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS AND IMPROVE PROCEDURES TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR US FORCES TO BOARD COLOMBIAN FLAG VESSELS (HT III OPS).

KEEPING THE HEAT ON THE GOC: DEMARCHE AND LETTER

15. PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT AMBASSADOR GILLESPIE SHOULD MAKE A SPECIAL TRIP TO BOGOTA TO REITERATE OUR CONCERNS, PROVIDE A LIST OF BENCHMARK ACTIONS THE GOC COULD TAKE (DRAWN FROM IDEAS DISCUSSED ABOVE), OBTAIN SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS FROM BARCO ON WHAT ACTIONS THE GOC WOULD TAKE AND DELIVER A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN UNDERSCORING HOW SERIOUSLY THE USG VIEWS THE COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS PROBLEM. FYI: GILLESPIE WILL BRING FINAL LIST OF BENCHMARKS REVIEWED/CLEARED BY INTER-AGENCY GROUP ON JAN. 12. END FYI.

OTHER POSSIBLE USG ACTIONS

16. IN ADDITION TO GILLESPIE'S TRIP, PARTICIPANTS REVIEWED THE FOLLOWING CURRENT/FUTURE USG ACTIONS. /BOB GELBARD CAUTIONED THAT WE NOT TAKE ANY ACTION THAT WOULD BE SELF-DEFEATING; OUR GOAL

SHOULD NOT ONLY BE TO SEND BARCO AND THE GOC STRONG, CLEAR SIGNALS OF OUR CONCERN, BUT ALSO TO RESUME MORE NORMAL RELATIONS QUICKLY IF THE GOC TAKES DECISIVE, POSITIVE ACTIONS.

CURRENT:

A) CONTINUE INCREASED SECONDARY INSPECTIONS OF ALL PASSENGERS/MOST CARGO FROM COLOMBIA FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE;

B) CONTINUE POST'S CRACKDOWN ON VISA ISSUANCE TO MONEY LAUNDERERS FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO AID/ABET TRAFFICKERS;

FUTURE:

C) BILATERAL TRADE TALKS - USTR WILL NOT RESPOND FOR THE MOMENT TO YOHAI'S REQUEST TO RESCHEDULE TALKS FROM FEB. UNTIL MAR.;

D) GELBARD/GRUNER TRIP PLANNED FOR JAN. - POSTPONE FOR THE MOMENT;

E) INM HOOBLER/OLMSTEAD VISIT (SET FOR MID-JAN.) - WILL CONTINUE AS PLANNED;

F) DOD DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS SURVEY (TO HAVE BEGUN MID-JAN.) - PARTICIPANTS SUGGESTED DELAYING, BOB PASTORINO CONCERNED THAT NEXT OPPORTUNITY TO ASSEMBLE TEAM MAY NOT BE UNTIL SUMMER. DELAY OR CANCELLATION OF SURVEY COULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. OVERTAKEN BY GOC DECISION TO CANCEL SURVEY.

G) CINCSOUTH VISIT (SET FOR FEB. 10-13) - REMAIN AS SCHEDULED FOR THE MOMENT; SUFFICIENT TIME TO POSTPONE IF WARRANTED (GEN. WOERNER HAS ALREADY FORMALLY ACCEPTED);

H) ATA COMMAND POST EXERCISE (SET FOR LATE JAN.) - WILL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO POSTPONE CLOSER TO SCHEDULED DATE;

I) COMMENTS BY THE SECRETARY - EMPHASIZE CONTINUED HIGH-LEVEL USG CONCERN ABOUT DRUG PROBLEM; TROTT AND OTHERS MENTIONED CONTINUING US CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN THAT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NOT SAID ENOUGH RECENTLY ON THE NARCOTICS ISSUE TO EMPHASIZE CONTINUED USG INTEREST; FYI: SECRETARY'S MENTION OF IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED WAR ON DRUGS TO US FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES DURING JAN. 7 PRESS CONFERENCE AND HIS MEETING WITH AMB. GILLESPIE JAN. 13 UNDERSCORE DEPARTMENTAL CONCERN. END FYI.

J) CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENTS - USE CONGRESSIONAL RETURN JAN. 19 AS DEADLINE FOR THE GOC TO BEGIN RESPONDING TO SUGGESTED BENCHMARKS. ROSENBAUM POINTED OUT THAT CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN COULD BE EXPRESSED IN RESPONSE TO PERIPHERAL ISSUES, I.E., GOC LOBBYISTS' REQUESTS FOR USG SUPPORT IN COFFEE AGREEMENT MATTERS.

17. INTER-AGENCY GROUP WILL REVIEW THESE ACTIONS AGAIN PENDING OUTCOME OF BARCO-GILLESPIE MEETING. DEPARTMENT WILL ADVISE OF CONTINUED DEVELOPMENTS.

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