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TELECON Amb. Dobrynin/The Secretary December 10, 1975 Time: 10:15 am

- K: On the Embassy signal, it is still coming in very strong and from several directions, which has a ricocheting effect. It will be a major problem to us.
- D: There is no change,
- K: No change,
- D: The only thing I will promise you is I will send one more telegram.
- K: And Eagleburger will deal with you while I am away. He is the only man who knows it in detail.
- D: I will receive a reply and put in touch with you.
- K: Secondly, on Angola. We cannot think of any other solution except to ask outside countries to promise not to send more arms in. If you are worried about the border in Zaire, we are willing to consider a UN force there. We promise you we would exercise restraint on our part and to get all foreign forces out.
- D: You are asking us to put this on the same level politically. I XXXXXXX see no problem with this kind of thing. I already reported what the President mentioned yesterday. What you are saying, I am going to add. The question really is in this case not very easy to control. It is in the capital of the country and no one knows where they are.
- K: But look it will be easily known if something comes in or not. If we don't keep our word, that will affect our relationship.
- D: Do you have any ideas if Africa could do something? It is their business. It is not natural for us really.
- K: No, but the way we could do it is to have the Organization of African Unity ask all outside powers, you see, and then we would both have an excuse to do it.
- D: Ask whom?
- K: Ask all outside powers to stop supplying arms.

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D: OK, I will pass this on. A public statement from both sides? Who is going to control it. K: We would be prepared to have the Organization of African Unity control it. D: Who is going to control South Africa? K: We have nothing to do directly with South Africa, but we would bring major pressure on them. But if they continue? D: (no+) K: Look, we are trying to win. We are trying to get everybody out of it. D: I really don't have to do this for the time being, I would like some political solution but to stop something very difficult to control. K: The political solution--why not let the MPA talk to the other units. D: You mean they should appeal or we should appeal to them to sit down and talk. K: We should all appeal to them to sit down and talk. D: You have more information. I have very little information. K: We would be prepared to urge them all to sit down and talk. Appeal to them to sit down and talk from the two of us or D: a member of the Security Council. What do you think is better? K: It could be an appeal from the Organization of African Unity which the two of us support, In this way and as a second part of the deal, maybe not as a D: first one, politically I am sure he would understand. К: But there has to be an end of supplies. This has to be part of I think it would make a good impression here. it.

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- D: The question is themselves. Whether they are going to take this from us.
- K: I think if the two of us agree, we can get them to agree.
- D: I will send this to Moscow and see what their reaction is.
- K: And you will let me know of the visit?
- D: He is now in Warsaw.
- K: How do you interpret his speech? I haven't seen it.
- D: He is a bit **xxxxxix** critical on how the West handled it and picked up two or three issues on the West. But he didn't say anything about the whole. He was making the speech specifically on this item. You haven't seen it because very few Western countries publish, but we published 11 million copies. Not a single paper published it here, in the UK, West Germany, France, except the communist paper, and Italy. (Said something about the press publishing all the unpleasant things.)
- K: I am against Basket III because I am afraid I would have to practice it in the State Department.
- D: They have the same problem. That is why he put it this way. He is trying to find a solution on the SALT talk. He is still hoping he can sit down.
- K: I had a talk with the President. I think we will find a solution.
- D: In three or four weeks time?
- K: It would have been a disaster if we had come. Actually it wouldn't have been so good in Moscow either. You wouldn't have had a chance to study it. We will settle it. I have never lost an internal fight over an extended period.
- D: You will reach a compromise.

- K: I am very-confident. I had a talk with Hyland this morning to go over what we can do and we can do it.
- D: You know as well.
- K: You have to make concessions on your own but they don't all have to come from you.
- D: This is important. So when you see this I believe you. We will work in that direction maybe beginning of January. Make it the middle. I hope this time it is acceptable to Brezhnev.
- K: We will not change the time. I will probably have something for you by the 10th of January.
- D: When will you be back?
- K: By the 17th in the evening,
- D: He will be back in Moscow in 3 or 4 days. It will take around a week to answer.

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