

PRIORITY

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MOSCOW SIGNAL ACTIVITY

The Soviets have been irradiating the U.S. Embassy, Moscow for more than 20 years. The purpose of this irradiation has never been understood. Approximately a decade ago medical research was instituted to determine whether the signals were harmful. That research did not produce significant indications of hazard.

Signal strengths, from their inception until May of 1975, were very low - below the Soviet standard of 0.01 milliwatts per sq. cm. for an 8 hour day and therefore much less than the generally used 10.0 mW per sq. cm. industrial standard established in the U.S.

In May 1975, a new, much stronger signal was detected. Though previous signals had not been considered a health hazard, the State Department felt that a possible hazard now existed. As a result a medical scientist who had been following Soviet research in this area was dispatched to Moscow in July to make an on-site investigation. His finding was that current medical research did not permit stating unequivocally that no hazard existed, but it did indicate that the probability was very low that a hazard existed from the levels then measured: 0.01 mW per sq. cm. for 8 to 10 hours per day.

During the next several months there were several changes in signal characteristics. A second signal of similar characteristics to the first and an increase in signal duration to 19 to 20 hours per

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day were noted. As a result, the medical scientist was again dispatched to Moscow. This time he was accompanied by a physician with considerable experience in this area and an electronics expert. Their findings were that while the power densities to which embassy staff were being subjected were not substantially different from those observed earlier in the year, the possibility of the existence of a health hazard was increased due to the increased exposure duration, certain changes in signal characteristics, and other medical considerations.

Based on the findings of this group the State Department instituted an effort to get the signal shut off and resolved to brief all embassy staff on the health hazard possibilities.