



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Around 11:00 a.m. yesterday, October 29th, Ambassador Dobrynin telephoned me and said he would like to see me. I made arrangements to see him in my office at 7:45 p.m. that evening.

He brought me a letter from Mr. Khrushchev which was unsigned and which was addressed to President Kennedy. I read the letter twice and felt it did not properly set forth my conversation of the previous Saturday night with Ambassador Dobrynin. However, I said nothing at the time and he left.

After consultation with Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson, I met with Ambassador Dobrynin again in my office at 2:15 p.m. October 30th. I told him I read the letter and had studied it overnight. I said that I thought it was misleading and that it would require a letter of clarification from President Kennedy.

I repeated what I had told him the other evening that if

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the missile bases and other offensive weapons were not withdrawn from Cuba, drastic action was going to be necessary by the United States. I also repeated what I had said earlier that there never could be any kind of a deal or arrangement as far as the Turkish missile bases were concerned. He said he understood that Saturday night and that he still understood that to be the fact. I said this was an area where Mr. Khrushchev's letter tended to be misleading and also, there were some references to Mr. Khrushchev's letter of October 27th which had played no part in our discussion and that was also misleading. He replied that he understood.

I repeated to him that within the next four or five months we expected to work out with our NATO allies a satisfactory resolution of this problem and I would hope that this and many of the other difficulties between our two countries could be resolved if the Cuban matter was satisfactorily disposed of. He said he understood there was no arrangement and he said he was anxious to know whether the President was personally aware of all of these matters. I said he was, as well as Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Thompson.

He said of course they never intended to publish this correspondence and I said, "Speaking quite frankly, you also told

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me your government never intended to put missiles in Cuba." There is a feeling of mistrust, I said, and letters which are apt to be misleading such as this one could make the relationship more complicated and difficult. He understood our conversation, I said, and in my judgment nothing more was necessary. It was a mistake, I said, to try to formalize our relationship but if they felt that this was necessary then they should deal exclusively with the State Department, not with me. I said I thought we should do what we could to reestablish the relationship between Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy and I did not feel correspondence on our conversations was very helpful at this time. I said if the President answered the letter he would be forced to write a letter which would not make them happy and that this would complicate rather than clarify matters.

He said he understood, picked up the letter, and with several polite exchanges, I took him down in the elevator and he left.

The meeting lasted approximately fifteen minutes.

RFK:amn