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TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A. III)  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETING WITH RUSSIAN  
PRESIDENT YELTSIN, JANUARY 29, 1992

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY BAKER, AMBASSADOR STRAUSS, MR.  
ROSS, A/S TUTWILER, A/S NILES; PRESIDENT YELTSIN.  
FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER  
MAMEDOV, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR RURIKOV.

1. SUMMARY. DURING A TWO HOUR MEETING AT THE KREMLIN  
JANUARY 29, SECRETARY BAKER AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN AGREED  
THAT THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA HAD TAKEN A DECISIVE  
TURN AWAY FROM THE CONFRONTATION OF THE LAST 40 PLUS  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 059079 261501Z  
YEARS AND THAT THE FEBRUARY 1 CAMP DAVID MEETING BETWEEN  
PRESIDENTS BUSH AND YELTSIN REPRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY  
TO BEGIN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON  
TRUST AND COOPERATION. YELTSIN SPOKE WITH CONSIDERABLE  
FRANKNESS OF THE CHANGES HE HAS MADE AND ENVISAGES, AND  
HE PRAISED THE INITIATIVES PRESIDENT BUSH HAS TAKEN  
TOWARD RUSSIA. WHILE YELTSIN IS CLEARLY PREPARED TO GO  
GREAT DISTANCES WITH US IN AREAS SUCH AS NUCLEAR  
DISARMAMENT, HE IS ALSO SEEKING RECIPROCAL STEPS FROM  
US, IN PART TO GUARD HIS FLANKS AT HOME AGAINST THE

ARRAY OF OLD THINKERS WHO MUST BE OUTRAGED AT HIS LATEST  
BOLD MOVES. END SUMMARY.

2. YELTSIN OPENED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING THE SECRETARY  
TO THE KREMLIN, RECALLING THAT THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN  
PREPARED TO MEET HIM IN WASHINGTON IN 1989 WHEN OTHERS  
WOULD NOT. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE AT THE PROPOSALS  
PRESIDENT BUSH UNVEILED IN THE STATE OF THE UNION  
ADDRESS AND THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HOLDING THE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Geoffrey Chapman, Senior  
Reviewer

JANUARY 22-23 WASHINGTON MEETING ON AID TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEW STATES, FOR SUPPORTING RUSSIA AS THE USSR'S SUCCESSOR IN THE UNSC AND WITH THE IMF/IBRD. REFERRING TO HIS JANUARY 29 ADDRESS TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE, YELTSIN WELCOMED THE "NEW TRADITION" THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF SUCH STATEMENTS IS EXCHANGED IN ADVANCE AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT RUSSIAN AND U.S. POSITIONS ARE "SO CLOSE."

3. THE SECRETARY AGREED WITH YELTSIN'S OBSERVATIONS, NOTING HOW MUCH BETTER THIS IS THAN THE OLD HABIT OF  
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 059079 261501Z  
"ONEUPSMANSHIP" IN WHICH EACH SIDE SOUGHT TO OUTFLANK THE OTHER. THE REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN THE WORLD MEAN THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA HAVE A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO DO GREAT THINGS TOGETHER, INCLUDING IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THREE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE CONVINCED HIM, THE SECRETARY ADDED, THAT WITHOUT SUFFICIENT POLITICAL WILL AT THE TOP, THIS OPPORTUNITY WOULD NOT BE REALIZED. YELTSIN AGREED, OBSERVING THAT "THE MILITARIES WON'T DO IT BY THEMSELVES." CONTINUING, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY PRESIDENTS BUSH AND YELTSIN LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGES AT CAMP DAVID. TO PROMOTE THIS PROCESS, HE SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN FONMIN KOZYREV A NON-PAPER ANALYZING OUR PROPOSALS FOR STRATEGIC ARMS CUTS AND HAD, IN TURN, RECEIVED AN ANALYSIS OF YELTSIN'S IDEAS.

4. THE SECRETARY ASSURED YELTSIN THAT IT WAS NOT OUR AIM TO CREATE ANY STRATEGIC IMBALANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE U.S. FOR SOME TIME, HE SAID, WE HAD SOUGHT, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THE FORMER SOVIET UNION ON FORCE STRUCTURES AND MODERNIZATION PLANS WITHOUT WHICH A FUNDAMENTAL TURN IN THE RELATIONSHIP COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED. NOW, HE SAID, SUCH A DIALOGUE WAS POSSIBLE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HOPED THE RUSSIAN SIDE SAW THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO TALK ABOUT NAVAL ARMS CONTROL. YELTSIN SAID THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD AND APPRECIATED ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE.

5. YELTSIN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO GO BEYOND THE NUCLEAR AREA AND OUTLINE SOME ADDITIONAL TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION  
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 059079 261501Z  
AT CAMP DAVID. THERE ARE, HE SAID, OTHER AREAS IN WHICH HE WISHED TO "PUT OUR HOUSE IN ORDER" ON TROOP REDUCTIONS, YELTSIN SAID THAT HE PLANNED TO CORRECT THE FALSE STORY PUT OUT BY THE FORMER SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT THE ANNOUNCED CUT OF 700,000 IN TOTAL STRENGTH WOULD BRING THE ARMY DOWN TO 3 MILLION. ACTUALLY, THE BASE

STRENGTH AT THE TIME OF THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WAS 3.2 MILLION, NOT 3.7 MILLION. YELTSIN SAID THAT THE TROOP STRENGTH WOULD BE REDUCED TO 2. 5 MILLION, A REAL CUT OF 700,000. FINALLY, HE SAID HE WOULD ADVISE PRESIDENT BUSH AT CAMP DAVID OF SOME NEW INFORMATION "ON THE LOCATION AND NUMBERS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS." IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION, YELTSIN SAID THAT THE CLARIFICATIONS RELATED TO THE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR NAVAL AND ANTI-AIR SYSTEMS. BY INFERENCE, YELTSIN INDICATED HE OBTAINED THIS INFORMATION DURING HIS JANUARY 28 VISIT TO THE BLACK SEA FLEET.

*tactical*

6. CONTINUING, YELTSIN SAID HE HAD RECENTLY MET WITH A LARGE GROUP OF SPECIALISTS FROM ALL AREAS OF THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, CIVIL AND MILITARY, INCLUDING ACADEMICIAN KHARITON, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS THE "FATHER OF OUR A-BOMB." HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ABOUT THAT MEETING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S./RUSSIAN COOPERATION WHEN HE SAW THE PRESIDENT AT CAMP DAVID.

7. YELTSIN THEN TURNED TO "HIS SECOND PROBLEM." NAMELY THE 1972 ABM TREATY. RUSSIA, HE SAID, WISHED TO CONFIRM THAT TREATY AND MOVE TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES TO ESTABLISH WHAT HE CALLED A "GLOBAL SYSTEM OF PROTECTION"  
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 059079 261501Z  
AGAINST POSSIBLE MISSILE ATTACKS, "ACCIDENTAL OR INTENTIONAL, PERHAPS FROM THE ISLAMIC WORLD." HE SAID THAT A RUSSIAN SCIENTIST, ACADEMICIAN PONOMAREV-STEPNOI, HAD BEEN TOLD BY "UNITED STATES COLLEAGUES" AT A SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS IN JANUARY THAT THE U.S. WAS INTERESTED IN SUCH COOPERATION. THE TWO COUNTRIES, HE SAID, SHOULD JOINTLY DEVELOP, DEPLOY AND OPERATE A "GLOBAL SYSTEM OF PROTECTION." WHAT BETTER WAY, HE ASKED, TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE NO LONGER ENEMIES BUT REALLY ALLIES.

8. THE THIRD PROBLEM RAISED BY YELTSIN CONCERNED THE DISPOSITION OF THE LARGE AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM 239 AND URANIUM 238 WHICH WOULD BECOME AVAILABLE FROM THE DISMANTLING OF LARGE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RISK OF STORING THIS

MATERIAL SINCE IT WAS SUSCEPTIBLE TO THEFT BY PEOPLE LIKE THE IRAQIS. HIS SOLUTION, HE SAID, WAS TO COMBINE THE TWO ELEMENTS, ADDING NEUTRAL MATERIALS, TO CREATE A MIX THAT COULD BE USED IN CIVILIAN POWER STATIONS BASED ON FAST NEUTRONS. HOWEVER, RUSSIA DID NOT HAVE SECURE STORAGE FOR THESE MATERIALS AND NEEDED HELP FROM THE U.S.

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9. THE SECRETARY SAID THESE WERE INTERESTING IDEAS AND WERE NOT TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM SOME ON OUR SIDE. THE

U.S., HE SAID, WAS PLEASED TO ENGAGE WITH RUSSIA AT CAMP DAVID AND BEYOND. HE SUGGESTED THAT THESE WERE THE SORTS OF PROJECTS THE U.S. CONGRESS WOULD BE PREPARED TO FUND, DESPITE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AT HOME. YELTSIN SAID THAT THE  
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 059079 261501Z

\$400 million and brain drain

\$400 MILLION FROM THE FY92 DOD BUDGET MIGHT SUFFICE FOR THE NECESSARY STORAGE FACILITIES, BUT MUCH MORE WOULD BE NEEDED TO FUND THE SORT OF PROJECT HE WAS PROPOSING. THE SECRETARY CLARIFIED THAT THE \$400 MILLION WAS NOT EARMARKED ONLY FOR STORAGE FACILITIES, BUT HE ADDED THAT YELTSIN'S IDEA WOULD APPEAR TO BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF BOTH COUNTRIES. YELTSIN ADDED THAT HIS PROJECT WOULD ALSO ENABLE RUSSIA TO DEAL WITH THE "BRAIN DRAIN" PROBLEM BY FINDING AN HONORABLE USE OF THE TALENTS OF NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED A LETTER FROM FONMIN KOZYREV ON THIS POINT. YELTSIN OBSERVED THAT STORING WARHEADS WAS ONLY A "TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT" SINCE THE WARHEADS COULD EASILY BE REUNITED WITH THE DELIVERY VEHICLES AND A LARGE NUMBER OF WARHEADS AT ONE SITE CREATED A VERY TEMPTING TARGET FOR "IRRESPONSIBLE POLITICIANS."

10. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE WERE VERY PLEASED WITH THE RAPID PROGRESS BEING MADE IN REMOVING TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS TO RUSSIA FOR DISABLING/DISMANTLING. YELTSIN OBSERVED THAT THIS RELATED TO ANTI-AIR WARHEADS AND GRAVITY BOMBS. (COMMENT: THIS REMARK DOES NOT CORRESPOND WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. END COMMENT) THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT HE PLANNED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH FONMIN KOZYREV TO ENSURE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL/DISMANTLING PROCESS GOES AS RAPIDLY AND SMOOTHLY AS POSSIBLE.

11. AS FAR AS THE ABM TREATY, THE SECRETARY SAID YELTSIN SHOULD NOT BE MISLED BY PRESS ACCOUNTS. WE ARE NOT WALKING AWAY FROM THAT AGREEMENT. INDEED, OUR POSITION  
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 059079 261501Z

IS THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) SHOULD FULFILL ALL OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU). INCLUDING THE ABM TREATY. THERE ARE OTHER US/FSU TREATIES THAT WE HAVE

NOT MENTIONED SUCH AS THE TTBT AND THE PNET THAT WE ALSO EXPECT THE CIS MEMBERS TO RESPECT, HE ADDED. AS REGARDS MISSILE DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY RECALLED THAT IN HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, PRESIDENT BUSH HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GPALS PROGRAM, WHICH SEEMS SIMILAR TO WHAT YELTSIN HAD PROPOSED. WE WILL LOOK AT YELTSIN'S IDEA OF A "GLOBAL PROTECTION SYSTEM," HE SAID, ADDING THAT THIS PROPOSAL WILL REQUIRE A LOT OF

THOUGHT. YELTSIN SAID HE PLANNED TO BRING ACADEMICIAN VELIKHOV WITH HIM TO CAMP DAVID (IN ADDITION TO MINS KOZYREV AND SHAPOSHNIKOV) TO EXPLAIN HIS IDEA. (COMMENT: YELTSIN OBSERVED THAT HIS CHIEF OF STAFF PETROV AND DEPRIMIN BURBULIS WOULD NOT BE COMING ON THE TRIP AS THEY HAD TO REMAIN IN MOSCOW TO DEAL WITH A "DIFFICULT SITUATION," WHICH HE DID NOT FURTHER EXPLAIN. END COMMENT.)

12. TURNING TO CAMP DAVID, THE SECRETARY SAID OUR PROPOSED AGENDA INCLUDED: 1) THE STATUS OF RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC REFORM; 2) HOW YELTSIN SEES DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CIS, INCLUDING ISSUES SUCH AS THE DISPOSITION OF THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION; 3) STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROPOSALS OF THE TWO PRESIDENTS; AND 4) ISSUES INVOLVING THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE "BRAIN DRAIN" AND NON-PROLIFERATION IN GENERAL, INCLUDING THE "DO'S AND DON'T'S" OF  
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 059079 261501Z  
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. FINALLY, AS A QUESTION TO YELTSIN AND NOTING THAT HE HAD NOT HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE IDEA WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT A JOINT STATEMENT ON THE NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES WAS A POSSIBILITY.

13. YELTSIN THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR THIS INFORMATION, WHICH HE SAID WOULD ENABLE THE RUSSIAN SIDE BETTER TO PREPARE FOR CAMP DAVID. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ATTRACTED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT STATEMENT, WHICH HE SAID WOULD HAVE WORLD-WIDE SIGNIFICANCE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF PRESIDENT BUSH LIKED THE IDEA, WE WOULD PREPARE A BRIEF DRAFT AND GET IT TO THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION IN NEW YORK JANUARY 31. HE OBSERVED THAT IN HIS EXPERIENCE, U.S./SOVIET RELATIONS, WHATEVER THE ISSUE, HAD BEEN TERRIBLY BURDENED BY THE ACCUMULATED DISTRUST OF MORE THAN 40 YEARS. WE NEED TO OVERCOME AN UNDERSTANDABLE TENDENCY ON THE PART OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO ASSOCIATE RUSSIA WITH CONFRONTATION. THIS WAS PARTLY THE MOTIVATION FOR OUR INITIATIVE IN CALLING THE JANUARY 22/23 CONFERENCE ON COORDINATING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE FSU. A SHORT STATEMENT THAT STRESSED THE NEW

QUALITY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND A DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA WOULD SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE. YELTSIN OBSERVED THAT THE BEST ANSWER TO THOSE WHO SAY "DON'T HELP RUSSIA" IS THAT A FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA WOULD SURELY LEAD BACK TO CONFRONTATION.

14. SECRETARY BAKER AGREED, ADDING THAT THIS HAD BEEN A  
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 059079 261501Z

KEY THEME OF THE JANUARY 22/23 CONFERENCE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE U.S. WAS UNIQUELY ABLE TO ATTRACT THE WIDE RANGE OF PARTICIPANTS TO THE CONFERENCE. HE NOTED THE "PROJECT PROVIDE HOPE" INITIATIVE BEGINNING FEBRUARY 10. OUR PLANS TO OPEN SMALL EMBASSIES IN ALMA ATA, BISHKEK, MINSK AND YEREVAN BY JANUARY 31 AND HIS PLAN TO VISIT MOST OF THE OTHER STATES OF THE FSU BEGINNING FEBRUARY 10 AS SIGNS OF OUR INTENTION TO REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE FSU. HE ADDED THAT FOLLOWING HIS TRIP TO THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO STOP IN MOSCOW IF THIS WOULD BE USEFUL IN ENSURING CONTINUED PROGRESS IN THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE.

15. YELTSIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR "PROJECT PROVIDE HOPE," WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE A GOOD EXAMPLE FOR OTHERS. TURNING TO THE CIS, YELTSIN REFERRED TO IT AS A "FRAGILE INFANT," AND WARNED THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS TO EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM THE CIS AT THIS POINT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO MENTION THREE POINTS WE HAD PICKED UP IN CONTACTS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CIS: 1) WITH UKRAINE, BYELARUS, AND KAZAKHSTAN, WE FOUND GREAT SENSITIVITY ON THE FORM OF THE RATIFICATION OF START AND CFE; 2) ESPECIALLY WITH KAZAKHSTAN, WE FOUND CONCERN THAT THE STATES OTHER THAN RUSSIA WERE NOT RECEIVING THEIR FAIR SHARE OF GRAIN CREDITS AND DELIVERIES AS HAD BEEN AGREED WITH THE SILAYEV COMMITTEE; AND 3) WE HAD GONE BACK TO KAZAKHSTAN, INCLUDING IN A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO NAZARBAYEV, TO CLARIFY THAT STATE'S INTENTIONS ON ADHERENCE TO THE NPT. IN REPLY, YELTSIN SAID HE COULD UNDERSTAND U.S. CONCERNS. ON START

SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 059079 261501Z

RATIFICATION, HE SAID THAT RUSSIA AND THE OTHER THREE NUCLEAR STATES HAD AGREED THAT THEY WOULD RATIFY THE TREATY AT THE SAME HOUR ON THE SAME DAY. ONLY THE EXACT DATE REMAINED TO BE DETERMINED. PROBABLY AT A FEBRUARY 14 CIS SUMMIT IN MINSK AT WHICH YELTSIN SAID HE HOPES ALL THE MAJOR OPEN QUESTIONS REGARDING THE MILITARY COULD BE RESOLVED. THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT OUR RATIFICATION PROCESS WILL BEGIN NEXT WEEK WITH HIS SFRC TESTIMONY. ON GRAIN DELIVERIES, YELTSIN SAID THERE WAS A PROBLEM. HE NOTED THAT THE VNESHEKONOMBANK (VEB), WHICH HAD MADE THE CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS, WAS EFFECTIVELY

BANKRUPT, LEAVING EACH STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR CUTTING ITS OWN DEALS AND ARRANGING CREDITS, AS RUSSIA HAD DONE.

16. TURNING TO KAZAKHSTAN AND THE NPT, YELTSIN SOUGHT, UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO CLARIFY MATTERS. HE SAID NAZARBAYEV HAD TOLD HIM THAT ONCE ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE OUT OF KAZAKHSTAN, THE COUNTRY WOULD JOIN THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR STATE. THAT COULD BE A LONG TIME, THE

SECRETARY OBSERVED, ADDING THAT THE FACT THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED ON KAZAKH SOIL DID NOT MEAN THAT IT HAD TO ADHERE TO THE NPT AS A NUCLEAR STATE. YELTSIN SAID THAT THE ONLY QUESTION CONCERNED THE STRATEGIC WARHEADS; ALL OF THE TACTICAL WARHEADS WOULD BE OUT OF KAZAKHSTAN BY JULY 1, 1992. HE CLAIMED THAT DISMANTLING THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN KAZAKHSTAN WAS A MUCH MORE COMPLICATED MATTER' AND HE ADDED THAT "ONCE WE AGREE ON HOW WE ARE GOING TO DO IT, EVEN ON PAPER. HE WILL SIGN THE NPT." YELTSIN SAID NAZARBAYEV DOUBTS THAT IT WILL PROVE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE TO  
SECRET

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PAGE 11 STATE 059079 261501Z  
DISMANTLE AND STORE THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS PRESENTLY ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN KAZAKHSTAN.

17. RETURNING TO HIS JANUARY 28 VISIT TO THE BLACK SEA FLEET, YELTSIN OBSERVED THAT 30 PERCENT OF THE UNITS ARE NUCLEAR CAPABLE. THE OBJECT, HE SAID, IS TO GET THE WEAPONS TO NOVOROSSYSK, ADDING THAT "WE WANT TO WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THIS." YELTSIN SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL TO TAKE ALL THE NUCLEAR CAPABLE SHIPS TO THE NORTHERN FLEET AS THE BARENTS SEA WAS NOW "NUCLEAR FREE" (COMMENT: CLEARLY NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT THAT THE NORTHERN FLEET HAS THE LARGEST SHARE OF RUSSIA'S SSBN FORCE. END COMMENT). ALSO INCONSISTENTLY, HE SAID THAT ALL OF THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS WERE OUT OF UKRAINE EXCEPT FOR THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH THE BLACK SEA FLEET AND THAT "ALMOST ALL" WERE OUT OF KAZAKHSTAN.

18. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL, YELTSIN SAID THAT THE FOUR NUCLEAR REPUBLICS HAD SIGNED AN AGREEMENT AT THE ALMA ATA SUMMIT ACCORDING TO WHICH THE PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WEAPONS. DEFMIN SHAPOSHNIKOV HAS A "SECONDARY" BUTTON. HE ADDED. AT THE SAME TIME, HE SAID, THE FOUR LEADERS AGREED TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL TELEPHONE LINK WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM, IF NEEDED, TO HAVE A CONFERENCE CALL. THIS LINK, WHICH WILL BE OPERATIONAL IN "A FEW DAYS," WILL ALLOW FOR THE NECESSARY "POLITICAL CONSULTATION" SHOULD A SITUATION ARISE IN WHICH THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS PROPOSED. ONLY IF ALL FOUR AGREE, YELTSIN SAID,

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 059079 261501Z  
THEN "GOD FORBID, I WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PUSH THE BUTTON." HE ADDED THAT, "IN ANY CASE' IN A FEW DAYS, THEY WON'T BE AIMED AT THE UNITED STATES."

19. SECRETARY BAKER ASKED FOR A CLARIFICATION ON THE TARGETTING POINT. DID THE CHANGE APPLY ONLY TO U.S.

CITIES OR TO THE ENTIRE COUNTRY, HE ASKED. YELTSIN SAID IT WAS TRUE THAT IN HIS ABC INTERVIEW HE HAD SPOKEN ONLY OF CITIES. HE ADDED THAT IF HE COULD AGREE WITH PRESIDENT BUSH ON A "PACKET" OF MEASURES, AS HE HAD PROPOSED, NONE OF THE RUSSIAN MISSILES WOULD BE TARGETTED ON THE UNITED STATES SINCE THE TWO COUNTRIES WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY ALLIES. "SPEKAING FRANKLY," YELTSIN ADDED, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO RETARGET A MISSILE IN TWO HOURS, AND THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA NEEDED TO DISCUSS HOW SUCH AN ACTION COULD BE EXCLUDED. SECRETARY BAKER SAID HE WAS UNAWARE OF A MEANS TO DO THAT. YELTSIN SUGGESTED THAT A SHIFT BY RUSSIA FROM ICBM'S TO SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS MIGHT BE A SOLUTION; THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS WOULD NOT WORK FOR THE UNITED STATES SINCE COUNTRIES TO RUSSIA'S SOUTH, WHICH MIGHT REPRESENT A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, COULD ONLY BE REACHED FROM THE U.S. BY ICBM'S. ON A "VERY CONFIDENTIAL" BASIS, (COMMENT: AND FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. END COMMENT) YELTSIN SAID THAT RUSSIA WAS CONSIDERING WHETHER DURING ROUTINE MAINTANENCE OF MISSILES IN THE OTHER THREE REPUBLICS, A MINOR COMPONENT COULD BE SWITCHED WHICH WOULD HAVE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF DISABLING THE SYSTEMS.

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missile & they  
use it.

20. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THIS IS WHERE GPALS,  
SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 059079 261501Z  
OR YELTSIN'S "GLOBAL SYSTEM," MIGHT ENTER THE PICTURE. YELTSIN AGREED, ADDING THAT THE SYSTEM HE ENVISAGED MIGHT BE SPACE BASED. HE ADDED THAT RUSSIA WAS ALSO PREPARED TO TERMINATE ALL SSBN PATROLS ON A MUTUAL BASIS. RUSSIA WAS FOLLOWING WITH GREAT INTEREST THE PROPOSALS PRESIDENT BUSH HAD MADE ON LIMITING DEPLOYMENTS OF THE D-5 MISSILE AND THE W-88 WARHEAD. SECRETARY BAKER NOTED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH WAS PROPOSING A 30 PERCENT DECLINE IN OUR DEPLOYMENTS OF SSBN WARHEADS. AS FAR AS SSBN PATROLS, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THESE WERE A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF OUR DETERRENT POSTURE. BUT, HE ADDED, ALL THESE IDEAS WERE WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION. IT WAS, HE SAID, HEARTENING TO SEE THE SCOPE AND DIRECTION OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA'S THINKING ON THESE ISSUES.

21. THE SECRETARY TURNED TO THE RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM, NOTING THAT WE DO NOT FEEL THAT WE CURRENTLY

HAVE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT RUSSIA HAS IN MIND. WE WOULD, HE SAID, WELCOME A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THIS PROGRAM WITH DEPPRIMIN GAIDAR. OUR INTEREST, HE SAID, REFLECTS OUR VIEW THAT WE HAVE A MAJOR INTEREST IN THE SUCCESS OF THIS PROGRAM. HE ADVISED YELTSIN THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS CONTINUING TO PRESS THE IMF AND THE IBRD TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY TO BRING RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEW STATES IN TO FULL MEMBERSHIP. YELTSIN SAID

THAT GAIDAR WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON ON FEBRUARY  
1 AND WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH U.S.  
OFFICIALS. AMBASSADOR STRAUSS CONFIRMED THAT GAIDAR  
WILL BE MEETING WITH A GROUP HEADED BY CEA CHAIRMAN

SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 059079 261501Z  
BOSKIN AND INCLUDING FED CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. YELTSIN  
EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH CONGRESSIONAL  
LEADERS AT THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY ON FEBRUARY 1 IMMEDIATELY  
PRIOR TO HIS TRIP TO CAMP DAVID. THE SECRETARY SAID HE  
HAD RAISED WITH KOZYREV A POSSIBLE PROBLEM ARISING FROM  
THE FAILURE OF THE RUSSIAN CENTRAL BANK TO PROVIDE ALL  
THE REQUIRED DATA TO THE IMF. YELTSIN SAID THAT HIS  
GOVERNMENT HAD RESOLVED THAT POTENTIAL PROBLEM BY MAKING  
THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT AND NOT THE CENTRAL RESPONSIBLE  
FOR COMPILING AND SUPPLYING THE INFORMATION.  
BAKER

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