1. SUMMARY. AT THEIR JANUARY 29 MEETING, SECRETARY BAKER AND DEFMIN SHAPOSHNIKOV AGREED THAT CHANGES IN U.S./RUSSIAN RELATIONS, EXEMPLIFIED BY THE NUCLEAR SECRET DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY PRESIDENTS BUSH AND YELTSIN, HAD CREATED AN UNPRECEDENTED OPPORTUNITY FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN U.S./RUSSIAN RELATIONS. NONETHELESS, SHAPOSHNIKOV SHOWED CONTINUING SENSITIVITY TO THE NEED FOR RECIPROCITY IN CUTS AND BALANCE AT END POINT. HE DISCUSSED CONTROVERSIES WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) OVER THE DIVISION OF MILITARY ASSETS WITH A MIXTURE OF OPTIMISM THAT SOLUTIONS WERE AT HAND AND SENSE THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. FOR AN OFFICER RAISED IN THE SOVIET SCHOOL, SHAPOSHNIKOV DISPLAYED EXTRAORDINARY RESPECT FOR DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON THE NEED TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON RULES FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. END SUMMARY.

2. IN WELCOMING SECRETARY BAKER BACK TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY, SHAPOSHNIKOV OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. AND RUSSIA SHOULD TALK "MORE AND MORE. IT HELPS US AVOID MISTAKES." THE SECRETARY STRESSED OUR ADMIRATION FOR

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Geoffrey Chapman, Senior Reviewer
THE MANNER IN WHICH SHAPOSHNIKOV WAS CONDUCTING THE
COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CIS ON DIVISION OF
MILITARY ASSETS. IN REPLY, SHAPOSHNIKOV INDICATED THAT
IT WASN'T EASY. HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE FEBRUARY 14
MEETING OF CIS HEADS OF STATE IN MINSK AS AN EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT STEP IN THE PROCESS. A PACKAGE OF 18 SEPARATE
DOCUMENTS HAS BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THAT MEETING, HE SAID,
AND HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT MOST, IF NOT ALL, WOULD
BE ACCEPTED AT MINSK. "WE CANNOT DELAY FURTHER," HE
SAID, IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON "NORMAL FORMS OF FUTURE
EXISTENCE." ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE WITH SOME HUMOR OF THE
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RECENT GATHERING OF 5,000 MILITARY OFFICERS IN MOSCOW
HE ADDED THAT SOME "HOT HEADS AMONG US SAY THAT WE
SHOULD GIVE ULTIMATUMS TO THE PRESIDENTS. THEY CAN'T
UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESIDENTS ARE ELECTED BY THE
PEOPLE." (COMMENT: SHAPOSHNIKOV MADE THIS STATEMENT,
TRULY REMARKABLE FOR AN OFFICER OF THE FORMER RED ARMY,
WITH APPARENT SINCERITY. THERE WAS A CLEAR WARNING IN
HIS REMARKS THAT ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY ARE REACHING
THE END OF THEIR PATIENCE WITH THE POLITICAL
AUTHORITIES. END COMMENT.)

3. TURNING TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH UKRAINE ON THE BLACK
SEA FLEET, SHAPOSHNIKOV OBSERVED THAT RUSSIA WAS NOT
CLAIMING THE FLEET. ONLY UKRAINE WAS DOING THAT.
RATHER, RUSSIA MAINTAINED THAT THE FLEET FELL INTO THE
CATEGORY OF STRATEGIC ASSETS THAT SHOULD REMAIN UNDER
THE CONTROL OF THE COMMONWEALTH. IN THIS SPIRIT, HE
DISMISSED CRITICISM OF YELTSIN'S JANUARY 28 VISIT TO
THE BLACK SEA FLEET WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT ANY OF
THE OTHER PRESIDENTS OF CIS MEMBERS WOULD BE WELCOME ON
BOARD. IN THE END, HE SUGGESTED, UKRAINE WOULD HAVE TO
BE SATISFIED WITH 20 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ASSETS OF THE
FLEET. ON THE ISSUE OF OTHER CONVENTIONAL FORCES,
SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT ONLY MOLDOVA, AZERBAIJAN AND
UKRAINE WERE COMMITTED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL
ARMIES. UZBEKISTAN TENDED TOWARD THAT GROUP, HE ADDED.
SHAPOSHNIKOV OBSERVED THAT IT HAD BEEN EASIER WORKING
FOR ONE PRESIDENT THAN IT WAS FOR MANY.

4. TURNING TO STRATEGIC FORCES, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THE
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SITUATION WAS CLEARER. ALL TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS
WOULD BE REMOVED TO RUSSIA BY MID-SUMMER. AT PRESENT,
TACTICAL WARHEADS WERE PRESENT ONLY IN RUSSIA, BELARUS
AND UKRAINE. SECRETARY BAKER STRESSED OUR GREAT
INTEREST IN THE PROPOSALS ADVANCED BY PRESIDENT
YELTSIN. NOTING THAT WE LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS FEBRUARY 1 AT CAMP DAVID, THE SECRETARY GAVE SHAPOSHNIKOV A NON-PAPER ANALYZING PRESIDENT BUSH’S PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER SHARP CUTS IN STRATEGIC FORCES. HE NOTED THAT WE DID NOT BELIEVE OUR PROPOSALS WOULD RESULT IN AN IMBALANCE BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES, ALTHOUGH SOME OF OUR ASSUMPTIONS, SUCH AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF 500/700 SS-25’S AS OPPOSED TO THE 340 NOW IN THE FIELD, MIGHT PROVE WRONG, THE SECRETARY SAID, REQUIRING SOME RECALCULATIONS.

5. MOVING TO YELTSIN’S PROPOSALS, THE SECRETARY POSED SEVERAL QUESTIONS THAT HE SAID MIGHT BE DISCUSSED AT CAMP DAVID: 1) HOW WOULD THE RUSSIAN FORCES BE BROUGHT DOWN TO 2,000/2,100 WARHEADS? 2) WHAT DOES PRESIDENT YELTSIN MEAN WHEN HE SAYS RUSSIAN MISSILES WILL NO LONGER BE TARGETTED ON THE UNITED STATES? DOES THIS MEAN THAT THE WARHEADS WILL BE REMOVED? WILL THE MISSILES BE TARGETTED ON ANOTHER COUNTRY? OR WAS THIS SIMPLY A POLITICAL STATEMENT WITH NO IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS? IN REPLY, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT CHANGES SUCH AS THOSE DISCUSSED BY YELTSIN COULD NOT BE INTRODUCED FROM ONE DAY TO THE NEXT. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT THE KEY QUESTION WAS NOT HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THESE CHANGES BUT RATHER WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN RESPONSE. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THIS WAS A GOOD QUESTION. IN ORDER TO ANSWER IT, HE SAID, WE NEED ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS HE POSED REGARDING THE MEANING OF YELTSIN’S STATEMENT.

6. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT YELTSIN’S STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED A “SERIOUS ANNOUNCEMENT.” THERE ARE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION, SHAPOSHNIKOV ADDED, BUT RUSSIA WANTS CORRESPONDING STEPS BY THE UNITED STATES. HE SUGGESTED THAT REMOVAL OF SYSTEMS FROM ALERT STATUS AND RETARGETING AWAY FROM BIG CITIES MIGHT BE INITIAL STEPS, BUT HE REPEATED HIS POINT THAT THIS PROCESS COULD NOT BE COMPLETED “IN ONE DAY.” THE SECRETARY AGREED, ADDING THAT VERIFICATION COULD ALSO BE A PROBLEM. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES WOULD HAVE TO WORK ON THESE ISSUES. THE IMPORTANT POINT, HE SAID, IS THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERS IN BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE APPROACHED THE LEVEL OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AT WHICH SUCH MOVES WERE POSSIBLE.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ONE OF YELTSIN’S PROPOSALS WAS TO REPLACE MIRVED SLBM’S WITH SINGLE WARHEAD MISSILES. THIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE A VERY COSTLY PROCESS AND WOULD RESULT IN A VERY COST INEFFECTIVE BASING MODE. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID HE HAD LEARNED WITH INTEREST OF PRESIDENT BUSH’S PROPOSAL TO
REDUCE TOTAL SLBM WARHEADS BY 30 PERCENT. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THIS WERE DONE, THE UNITED STATES WOULD STILL HAVE "TOO MANY" SLBM WARHEADS. SECRETARY BAKER SAID HE BELIEVED SHAPOSHNIKOV HAD MISUNDERSTOOD THE U.S. SECRET

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PROPOSALS, AND FOR THIS REASON HE HAD GIVEN HIM OUR NON-PAPER. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN ACHIEVING AN ADVANTAGE OVER RUSSIA IN THIS AREA. HE AGREED THAT IT IS, AS SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID, A NEW ERA IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND WE CAN DO THINGS NEVER POSSIBLE BEFORE. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID HE BETTER UNDERSTOOD THE U.S. PROPOSALS. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PARITY, WITH THE U.S. EMPHASIZING SEA FORCES AND RUSSIA FORCES ON LAND. THE U.S. WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CUTS IN SLBMS, SHAPOSHNIKOV ADDED, IS A "VERY POSITIVE MOVE" AND ONE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. IN CONCLUSION, SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THE RUSSIAN SIDE WOULD WORK WITH THE U.S. NON-PAPER, WHICH WOULD FACILITATE A BETTER DISCUSSION AT CAMP DAVID. THERE ARE, HE SAID, "GREAT OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRESENT GENERATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS."

8. THE SECRETARY TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, NOTING THAT HE HAD PROPOSED EARLIER THAT DAY TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT THE TWO SIDES SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE "DO'S AND DON'TS" FOR SUCH TRANSFERS. REPORTS OF MAJOR RUSSIAN SALES TO IRAN, HE SAID, RAISE SERIOUS CONCERNS ON OUR SIDE AND MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE ASSISTANCE WE WANT TO PROVIDE TO RUSSIA AND THE OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES.

SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT RUSSIA HAD "NO BUYERS" IN IRAN AND ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS SELLING ARMS TO TURKEY.

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9. THE SECRETARY OBJECTED THAT TURKEY AND IRAN WERE HARDLY COMPARABLE IN TERMS OF THEIR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES, BUT HE SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA TODAY WAS SUCH THAT WE WOULD LIKE RUSSIA TO LET US KNOW WHEN OUR ARMS SALES CAUSE CONCERN IN MOSCOW. SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT

PRESIDENTS BUSH AND YELTSIN SHOULD DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT AT CAMP DAVID. HE ADDED THAT "WE NEED TO AGREE, NOT JUST TALK. IF YOU SELL TO VENEZUELA OR GUATEMALA, THIS IS NO PROBLEM FOR US. BUT WHEN YOU SELL TO OUR NEIGHBORS, THIS IS ANOTHER MATTER. OF COURSE, THIS DEPENDS UPON THE TYPE OF NEIGHBOR." TURNING TO IRAN,
SHAPOSHNIKOV SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT IRAN WAS LAYING CLAIM TO PARTS OF AZERBAYZAN.


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